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Abstract 
This thesis discusses the development of statistical theory 
in Britain in the period 1865 to 1925, and attempts to 
account for this development as an institutional and an 
intellectual phenomenon. Close connections are shown to 
have existed between statistical theory as a scientific 
specialty and eugenics and social Darwinism, in particular 
in the work of Francis Galton (1822 -1911) and Karl Pearson 
(1857- 1936). An analysis of eugenics as a social and 
political movement is presented, and it is argued that 
eugenics played a major role in facilitating the institutional 
growth of statistical theory as a field of study. Two 
scientific controversies involving Karl Pearson and his 
followers (with William Bateson and the early Mendelians, 
and with George Udny Yule) are examined, and it is suggested 
that these controversies might usefully be seen as generated 
and sustained by divergent social interests. The development 
of the theory of statistical inference in this period is discussed 
briefly, and the early pioneering work of W.S. Gosset 
('Student') and R.A. Fisher is surveyed. 
It is concluded that the generation and assessment of scientific 
innovations by statisticians in this period must be seen as 
fundamentally affected by social factors having their origins 
both within science and in the wider society. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Scope and Sources 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse a crucial 
period in the development of statistical theory in Britain, 
in an attempt to account for this development as an in- 
stitutional and intellectual phenomenon. The primary focus 
is upon interpretation and not upon narrative or description. 
Although ascertaining 'what actually happened' remains of 
the highest importance, it is more as a means to an end 
than as an end in itself. Matters of historical and 
sociological explanation are central. 
The first priority is, nonetheless, that of 
delineating the topic to be studied and indicating the 
available sources and materials for that study. The years 
1865 and 1925 are of symbolic importance rather than def- 
initive boundaries between historical periods. In 1865, 
Francis Galton published his first paper applying quanti- 
tative methods to the study of heredity. Before that date, 
and for a good while after it, it would be misleading to 
talk of the existence of a scientific specialty called 
statistical theory. There were of course a number of 
isolated pieces of work that can be pointed to as con- 
tributions to the theory of statistics. These did not, 
at/... 
at any rate in Britain, add up to anything approaching a 
coherent tradition of work.(1) By 1925, the date of 
publication of R.A. Fisher's Statistical Methods for 
Research Workers, many of the intellectual and some of the 
institutional foundations of modern statistical theory had 
been laid. The development in the intervening period of 
the 'British school' of statistical theory is thus an 
important episode in the history of modern statistics. 
I shall make no attempt to provide a rigorous 
definition of 'statistical theory'. By use of the term I 
wish simply to distinguish the object of this study from, 
on the one hand, the activity of gathering quantitative in- 
formation typically engaged in by official bodies and social 
scientists, and, on the other hand, the mathematical theory 
of probability. Of course, statistical theory (or 
mathematical statistics as some might prefer to call it) 
is not separated from these fields by an impermeable 
boundary. I t is, however, a distinct enterprise. The 
individuals dealt with here certainly collected numerical 
data, and were acquainted with, even if they did not work 
on, the mathematical theory of probability. They were, 
however, most distinctively involved with the construction 
of a theoretical framework for the analysis of quantitative 
data. They developed new concepts, such as correlation, 
regression /... 
(1) It could perhaps be argued that in the mathematical 
specialties of probability theory and the theory of 
errors there were coherent traditions. Aside from 
the issue of how much of this work can be counted as 
statistical theory, it should be noted that, as dis- 
cussed in section 2.1, these specialties were largely 
Continental rather than British in their composition. 
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regression and likelihood, that allowed data to be analysed 
in new ways. These concepts were formulated mathematically, 
but much more was involved than simply the application of 
existing mathematical theory to a new field. Shape was 
being given to a distinctive set of techniques of data 
analysis. These techniques, and not quantitative data nor 
probabilistic mathematics, form the primary subject matter 
of statistical theory. 
The major source for this study is of course the 
scientific publications of British statisticians of the 
period, the books and papers of men such as Francis Galton, 
Karl Pearson, R.A. Fisher, F.Y. Edgeworth, George Udny Yule 
and W.S. Gosset ('Student'). Here we find the explicit 
development, presentation and justification of their in- 
novations. As the aim of this study is not simply a 
description of these innovations, other sources of evidence 
were also drawn upon. Many of the men discussed here wrote 
widely on subjects other than statistical theory, and these 
writings have been used to gain information on their more 
general intellectual stances. A large body of archival 
material, chiefly letters between major participants in the 
development of statistical theory in Britain, was consulted. 
A list of these archival sources will be found at the end 
of this thesis (appendix A). This material helped fill in 
gaps in the written record, and provided crucial information 
about the attitudes of those, such as George Udny Yule, who 
did not publish widely on non -statistical topics. Several 
individuals /... 
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individuals also provided me with information, in interview 
or by letter, about this period. As most of the events 
discussed here took place well over 50 years ago, this in- 
formation did not consist of eye -witness accounts. None - 
theless, my informants suggested useful lines of inquiry and 
provided interesting insights into certain aspects of the 
personalities and developments discussed below. Finally, 
of course, there is a range of available secondary sources, 
from obituary notices written by contemporaries to the work 
of professional historians. These are discussed in the 
following section. 
1.2 The Historio ra.h of British Statistics 
The historian of British statistics has the good 
fortune to have two excellent general bibliographic sources. 
The volume of Kendall and Doig's Bibliography of Statistical 
Literature that deals with the period before 1940 
(Kendall and Doig, 1968) provides a remarkably comprehensive 
list of papers and books on statistical theory and method. 
The construction of the bibliography has evidently not been 
restricted by an anachronistic notion of statistical theory, 
and an extremely wide range of periodicals has been 
searched. Although small errors naturally creep in to a 
work of this nature,(2) its existence saves the historian 
of statistics many hours of work. H.O. Lancaster's 
Bibliography /... 
(2) For example, the paper by Black (1898), discussed in 
chapter five below, is mistitled. However, the very 
inclusion of this paper, unknown to historians, in- 
dicates the value of the bibliography. The most 
serious omission I have noticed is that of Galton(1877). 
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Bibliography of Statistical Bibliographies (1968), annually 
updated and extended in the Review of the International 
Statistical Institute, provides a very useful list of bio- 
graphies of statisticians (generally obituary notices). 
Aside from the useful biographical information these latter 
contain, in many cases they provide bibliographies of the 
works of the individuals concerned which are, for example, 
useful in pointing to non -statistical publications not 
listed by Kendall and Doig. 
The volume and range of the writings of the three 
most important figures of this period of British statistics, 
Galton, Pearson and Fisher, present unusually severe problems 
for the bibliographer. These problems were largely over- 
come for Galton by Karl Pearson (1914 -30) and Forrest's 
revised list (1974, 303 -17) must now be considered definitive. 
Morant's 648 -item bibliography of Karl Pearson's writings 
(Morant, 1939) greatly aids work on Pearson; some 
additional items are listed in Eisenhart (1974). Bennett's 
edition of the papers of Fisher (Bennett, ed., 1971 -4) con- 
tains a bibliography of all Fisher's papers, not simply 
those reproduced. 
There is a considerable quantity of historical 
writing on British statistics to be consulted. General 
histories of statistics are of fairly limited usefulness. 
The two best and most recent are Walker (1929) and 
Westergaard (1932). Westergaard's book deals well with 
such topics as official statistics in the nineteenth 
century /... 
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century, but the account ends in 1900 and thus the treat- 
ment of the developments discussed here is summary. 
Walker (1929) is still useful as a reference work. Her 
book does discuss the work of this period, although in a 
descriptive rather than analytical fashion. 
Much more important are the historical works 
written by members of the 'British school' themselves. 
Karl Pearson's massive study of Francis Galton (K. Pearson, 
1914 -30) has been criticised by Galton's latest biographer 
as resulting in the 'burial of the man beneath the monument' 
(Forrest, 1974, ix). While it is true that its bulk must 
certainly deter the general reader, Pearson's work remains 
a vital source of information for the historian: for 
example, many of the most important letters to and from 
Galton are reproduced therein. E.S. Pearson's biography 
of Karl Pearson (E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8) lacks the all - 
encompassing nature of its subject's biography of Galton, 
but it is still a major source of information on Karl 
Pearson. E.S. Pearson's other historical work, notably 
E.S. Pearson (1939; 1965; 1967; 1968), forms, together 
with his biography of Karl Pearson, an invaluable account 
of the development of statistical theory in Britain. 
Although this work is largely of a descriptive nature, it 
contains important explanatory insights. E.S. Pearson's 
biography of 'Student' (E.S. Pearson, 1939), which draws 
on the unpublished reports of 'Student' to his employers 
to reveal the importance of his situation as an industrial 
scientist /... 
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scientist in conditioning his statistical work, is perhaps 
the most important of these studies, and has been made use 
of here in chapter eight. 
Many other writings by statisticians and historians 
of science have also been drawn upon. The series of 'Studies 
in the History of Probability and Statistics', published in 
Biometrika, is the most important single set of papers. 
Several of these have been reprinted, together with other 
relevant material, in E.S. Pearson and M.G. Kendall (eds) 
(1970) and M.G. Kendall and R.L. Plackett (eds) (1977). 
The bulk of work on the history of statistics deals with 
the period prior to the nineteenth century, and thus is of 
little direct relevance here.(3) Some writers have, how- 
ever, dealt with the period under discussion here. Thus 
Weiling (1969) gives an overview of developments in this 
period, while Wei -Ching Chang (1973) focuses on one 
particular topic, the development of the chi square test. 
The work with which this thesis must most directly 
invite comparison is, however, that of five historians or 
sociologists of science who have dealt with the topics 
discussed here: Joseph Ben -David, Ruth Schwartz Cowan, 
Victor /.... 
(3) The most systematic work in this area is that of the 
Soviet historian Oscar Sheynin (1966; 1970; 1971a; 
1971b; 1972a; 1972b; 1973a; 1973b; 1974; 1976). 
Amongst other works worth particular attention are the 
studies of Gilli.spie (1972), Baker (1975) and Buck 
(1977), which focus on the 'social relations' of 
statistics rather than exclusively on its intellectual 
development, 
Victor Hilts, Lyndsay Farrall and Bernard Norton. 
Ben -David's brief treatment of the development of statistics 
(Ben- David, 1971, 147 -52) is interesting because it forms 
part of a work on the sociology of science which employs a 
different perspective to that of this thesis. Much of 
the material presented here can be taken as confirming 
Ben - David's discussion of the institutional development of 
statistics in Britain. My conclusions on the intellectual 
development of statistical theory, however, prove to be 
sharply at variance with the view of science put forward by 
Ben -David: see below, sections 1.3 and chapter nine. 
No such sharp disagreement exists between the 
conclusions reached here and those of the other four 
authors. The work of Cowan on Galton (Cowan, 1972a; see 
also Cowan, 1972b and Cowan, 1977), which emphasises the 
key role of Galton's eugenics in motivating his work on 
statistical theory, is fully confirmed in its central 
argument. Here I am attempting to build on Cowan's work 
in two ways. Firstly, the relationship between statistics 
and eugenics is examined, not only for the vital case of 
Galton, but also for later statisticians, in particular 
Karl Pearson. Secondly, while Cowan's focus is primarily 
on the question of motivation, the focus here will be more 
on the connections, if any, between factors such as eugenics 
and the content of statistical theory and statisticians' 
evaluations of it. 
Hilts (1973) places, by comparison with Cowan, 
more emphasis on the question of the content of Galton's 
innovations /... 
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innovations, and less on the question of motivation. 
Although he does not focus as clearly as Cowan does on the 
specific role of eugenics in affecting Galton's statistics, 
he puts forward an interesting argument about the relation- 
ship between Galton's theoretical innovations and the work 
of the preceding tradition of the theory of errors. Hilts's 
work is drawn on in chapter two, and section 2.4 attempts 
to formulate more precisely the comparison of Galton's 
work with that of the error theorists by looking at those 
error theorists, not discussed by Hilts, whose work can be 
seen as closest to that of Galton.(4) 
The focus of Farrall (1970) is on eugenics, not 
statistics, but in view of the intertwining of the two 
areas in the persons of Galton and Pearson, Farrall deals 
with several aspects of the development of statistics. 
He gives a very useful account of the 'biometric school' 
of British statisticians led by Karl Pearson. Chapter 
three of this thesis, which deals with British eugenics, 
draws heavily on Farrall's work, which is discussed in more 
detail there. 
The early work of Bernard Norton (1971) deals with 
the biometric school. As it is largely descriptive, it 
adds /... 
(4) Two other works by Hilts are of less relevance here. 
Hilts (1967) is a largely descriptive account of the 
development of British statistics, while his perceptive 
study of Farr (Hilts, 1970) falls somewhat outside the 
scope of this work. 
1 
r 
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adds only in historical detail to that of writers such as 
E.S. Pearson. Norton's later work, in particular Norton 
(1975a; 1975b; 1978), goes beyond this to develop an ex- 
planatory perspective on several of the developments dealt 
with here. The conclusions reached here are largely in 
agreement with those of Norton. On some particular issues, 
notably the controversy between the biometric school and 
the early British Mendelian geneticists, differences of 
opinion do, however, exist. These are briefly discussed 
in chapter six. 
Certain parts of this thesis move outside the 
history of statistics proper, and in these parts, chiefly 
chapters three and six, other bodies of writing are drawn 
upon. The discussion of eugenics makes reference not only 
to the work on eugenics by Farrall (1970) and, more recently, 
Searle (1976), but also to more general work in social 
history, in particular Annan (1955), Hobsbawm (1968) and 
Gareth Stedman Jones (1971). The biometrician /Mendelian 
controversy, discussed in chapter six, has become a focus 
of attention for historians of biology, and their work on 
it is listed in that chapter. Particular reference should, 
however, be made to the work of William Coleman (1970) on 
the biometric school's main opponent, William Bateson. 
Although Coleman's analysis of Bateson as a 'conservative 
thinker' lies within the tradition of the history of ideas 
rather than the sociology of knowledge perspective 
employed here, his work, if it survives detailed criticism 
from /... 
from historians of genetics, provides an insight into a 
form of thought radically different from that of the bio- 
metric statisticians who are the central focus of this 
study. Coleman's work does not deal explicitly with the 
controversy between Bateson and Pearson, but it will be 
argued that its central thesis can throw useful light on it. 
1.3 Is Scientific Knowled e a Social Phenomenon? 
Statistical theory in Britain was developed by a 
group of individuals whose intellectual interests and com- 
mitments were in many cases extremely wide. The central 
figures of this study, and several of the more minor figures, 
had strongly -held political and philosophical beliefs, and 
were involved in debating issues of considerable ideological 
importance. The question then raises itself: should their 
science be seen as separate from the broader context of 
their thinking and their social and political views, or 
should it be seen as intertwined with these? 
The rise of British statistics belongs to a 
period in the development of science described by Ravetz 
(1973) as 'having its terminal points in the French 
Revolution and in the atomic bomb'. This was a crucial 
era for the development of science: 
The institutions and attitudes of science and 
scientists at the present time are largely in- 
herited from that period, and the memory of 
that era is a point of reference for all analyses 
of the present except for those which see science 
simply as a factor of production. 
( Ravetz, 1973, 37) 
Prior /... 
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Prior to this period, science was a socially marginal 
activity, often delineated unclearly from fields such as 
philosophy and magic. After this period, large sectors 
of science have become, as Ravetz puts it, 'industrialised' 
through the massive intervention of the state and business. 
In the period in question, science became firmly established 
in the university systems of the advanced countries. 
Particular disciplines and specialties developed in- 
stitutional forms for the recruitment and training of pro- 
fessional scientists, for publishing research work and for 
maintaining control over its quality. While the financial 
support for science was by no means as generous as it was 
to become after 1945, this support was typically obtained 
from sources that placed a minimum of direct constraint on 
the work of scientists. The notion of pure science as 
conducted by an autonomous community of individual scholars 
should therefore apply to this period, if it is to apply to 
any. 
This period is thus a particularly crucial one 
for those who seek to understand the relationship between 
scientific knowledge and the wider society and culture in 
which the activity of science is pursued. Two viewpoints 
on this issue can usefully be contrasted. The first, 
widely held by historians and sociologists of science, is 
that science as an activity is indeed influenced by the 
society in which it takes place, the degree of social 
support, for example, determining the pace of scientific 
advance /... 
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advance. But, as Ben -David puts it, 'the basic concepts 
and the logical structure of science' are affected by the 
wider society in only an extremely limited way. 'Ideo- 
logical bias' can lead science into 'blind alleys', but 
true scientific development is determined in its in- 
tellectual structure by 'the conceptual state of science 
and by individual creativity -and these follow their own 
laws, accepting neither command nor bribe' (Ben - David, 
1971, 2, 11, 12).(5) 
Thus, in discussing the emergence of modern 
statistics, Ben -David isolates various social and in- 
stitutional factors affecting the development of the 
specialty in Britain and the United States. The rapid 
development of statistics in America is attributed by 
Ben -David to the responsiveness of American universities to 
practical needs. Britain's universities were not res- 
ponsive in this way, but there was a 'functional equivalent' 
in the 'semiformal and informal networks and circles com- 
prising the academic elite and outstanding researchers and 
intellectuals outside the academic field' (Ben -David, 1971, 
151). The fact that Britain had, by comparison with the 
United States, 'a far more developed scientific tradition 
at the time and a less abstract school of mathematics' (150) 
is taken by Ben -David to explain the fact that theoretical 
advance /... 
(5) The philosophical work of Imre Lakatos, who argues 
that 'external history' explains only those in- 
tellectual developments not accountable for in terms 
of a 'rationally reconstructed' internal history 
(Lakatos, 1974), can be seen as broadly parallel to 
this first position. 
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advance was much faster in Britain than across the Atlantic. 
The 'eugenics movement' is seen as giving rise to 'interest 
in biostatistics' (151). In Ben David's work the structure 
of social institutions, in particular universities, and 
the existence of social movements such as the eugenics 
movement, are thus taken as explaining the rate of advance 
of statistics. These factors could hinder or promote work 
in the field and perhaps condition the quality of work done. 
They are, however, not taken by Ben -David as explaining the 
content of the theoretical advances. In the light of his 
earlier general statements, it must be presumed that he 
considers this content to have been unaffected by them.(6) 
The alternative viewpoint rejects the claim that 
the esoteric knowledge -generating activity of scientists can 
be understood entirely in terms of 'its own laws', or general 
norms of rational thinking, or indeed in any terms which 
effectively bound it off a priori as an intellectual 
activity to be studied in isolation. If this view is 
correct, then neither the social organisation of science 
itself nor the wider society and culture can be excluded 
as possible determinants of scientific thought and activity. 
On this view, at least in its fully developed 
forms, it is not merely the generation of new ideas within 
science which is considered to be open to influence in 
this /... 
(6) Certainly there is no evidence that Ben -David 
believes that the eugenics movement led statistics 
into a 'blind alley'. 
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this way. The evaluation of new ideas by the scientific 
community and the process of the justification of in- 
novations are also believed to be essentially social. 
If the term 'social' is taken as referring both to the 
wider society and to the community of practitioners, then 
on this second view social factors are assumed to have 
potential influence on all scientific judgments, not merely 
'wrong' or 'biased' judgments.(7) The best known work 
which treats scientific activity as essentially communal 
and constitutively bound up with the social organisation 
of scientists is of course that of T.S. Kuhn (1970). Con- 
crete expositions of thoroughgoing links between scientific 
thought and evaluations and wider social and cultural 
factors have been offered by, for example, R.M. Young (1969) 
and P. Forman (1971). Barnes (1974) expounds this general 
position and explores some of its implications. 
An attempt will be made here to deal with the 
detailed content of statistical theory, and with the 
scientific judgments of statisticians within their specialty. 
It is hoped that the result will be the presentation of 
material of relevance to the assessment of the validity of 
these two contrasting views, in particular with regard to 
the /... 
(7) If this were a thesis on the philosophy of science 
it would be necessary to comment on the view that 
social factors affect the 'context of discovery' but 
not the 'context of justification'. This distinction 
is, however, not one that can easily be upheld in con- 
crete historical discussions such as the following. 
'Discovery' and 'justification' are inextricably 
intertwined. 
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the role of 'external' influences on science. 
An examination of the influence of social factors 
upon statistical theory does, however, pose problems which 
are in some ways different from those posed by similar work 
in the natural sciences. Nowadays the theories of the 
natural sciences are more readily accepted as 'inventions' 
than are mathematical theories, which are still frequently 
regarded as 'discoveries'. The propositions of logic and 
mathematics are sometimes held to have a status quite dif- 
ferent from those of the natural sciences. They are held 
to have the character of eternal truths, to be descriptions 
of objects in an immutable world of thought. This 
'Platonist' or 'realist' view has been advanced, for 
example, by G.H. Hardy: 
I believe that mathematical reality lies outside 
us, that our function is to discover or observe 
it, and that the theorems which we prove, and 
which we describe grandiloquently as our 
'creations', are simply our notes of our 
observations. 
317 is a prime, not because we think so, or 
because our minds are shaped in one way rather 
than another, but because it is so, because 
mathematical reality is built that way. 
(Hardy, 1967, 123 -4, 130. Quoted by Bloor, 1973, 176. 
Hardy's emphasis.) 
If the realist view of the propositions of 
mathematics and logic is adopted, then it is clear that to 
the extent that statistical theory is mathematical and 
logical in its nature, an a priori negative answer is 
provided to the question of whether social factors can 
affect /... 
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affect the content of statistical theory. For if the 
propositions of statistical theory are 'discoveries' and 
not 'inventions', the role of social explanation is 
limited and cannot include explanation of the content of 
theoretical developments. The history of statistics 
would then have to be written as we currently write the 
history of geographical exploration. In the latter, we 
might perhaps explain in terms of social factors the timing 
of Columbus's voyage, why he set off on the course he did, 
and why he was mistaken about what he found. Ore would not, 
however, explain in this way the content of what he found. 
America we would regard as being there whether or not he 
found it; its physical features we would treat as in- 
dependent of his activity. If we think of Galton as 'dis- 
covering' correlation, and of correlation being an eternally 
existing mathematical- logical object, then we cannot hope 
to be able to provide a sociological explanation for the 
content of Galton's work, whatever we might be able to say 
about his motivation, the timing of his work, and so on.(8) 
There /... 
(8) In fact, the parallel on a realist theory of 
statistics to Columbus would not be Galton, but 
Bravais, who might on this view be said to have 
'discovered' correlation, but not to have realised 
he had done so. Walker (1929, 96 -8) comments: 
... it is known that t Bravai sj set forth the 
mathematics of the normal correlation surface 
three decades before the idea of correlation 
had been conceived ... Bravais recognised the 
existence of a relationship, a 'correlation', 
between his principal variables, but gave it 
merely passing notice ... Lhe3 remained unaware 
of the stupendous idea in whose vicinity his 
mind was hovering ... he might, with one leap 
of creative imagination, have pounced squarely 
upon this conception ... 
For an alternative view of Bravais, see section 2.4. 
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There are, however, good reasons for doubting 
the realist view. As a theory of mathematics it has been 
convincingly challenged, for example by Wittgenstein (1967; 
see Bloor, 1973). Wittgenstein exposes the lack of any 
justification for supposing that real mathematical objects 
stand in correspondence to our mathematical concepts and 
procedures. Bloor emphasises the tendentious teleological 
character of accounts of mathematical innovation that 
'explain' thought processes in terms of their own products. 
Moreover, whatever plausibility realism possesses appertains 
only where there is broad agreement upon the validity of some 
piece of mathematics, or mathematical procedure. Such agree- 
ment does exist in the case of, say, the theory of cor- 
relation. But many areas of statistical theory exhibit not 
consensus but fundamental disagreement; for example, the 
theories of estimation and hypothesis testing. In dis- 
cussing these areas, we would not know which of the com- 
peting 'real worlds' of statistical theory to take as the 
basis of a realist account. In pondering areas such as 
these, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the 'real' 
status of concepts such as correlation arises simply from 
the consensus about them and their consequent taken -for- 
granted nature.(9) 
(9) Of course there are good reasons for the consensus 
about correlation, but the point is that this con- 
sensus is surely better seen as the result of the 
activities and discussions of statisticians, and of 
their experiences using the concept, and not as a 
consequence of the ontological status of the concept 
itself. 
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This thesis will eschew realism and will talk of 
statistical 'inventions' rather than statistical 'dis- 
coveries'. There are good reasons for doing so, such as 
avoiding the a priori closure of interesting lines of in- 
quiry, but fundamentally this can only be a presupposition. 
A realist history of statistics would probably emphasise 
the 'purely mathematical' aspects of statistical theories, 
the fact that much of statistical theory can be presented 
as simply the study of the properties of a set of functions 
of the real numbers such as the normal distribution, chi 
square distribution and Poisson distribution.(10) In 
accord with my anti -realist prejudices, I shall by com- 
parison place emphasis on statistical theory as the con- 
struction and study of techniques of reasoning. On this 
latter view, the correlation coefficient is taken, not 
simply as a parameter of a particular bivariate function, 
but as a means for analysing data in a particular way to 
allow particular conclusions to be drawn. In short, this 
thesis will treat statistical theory not as a set of truths 
but as a set of tools for thought. 
Treating statistical theory as a body of in- 
ventions makes it possible to ask two questions that do not 
arise for the realist. What are these inventions made out 
off... 
(10) It is probably this, together with the taken -for- 
granted status of the mathematics of real functions, 
which underpins the ease with which historians of 
statistics can slip into realism. 
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of? What are they made for? 
The history of statistics (as indeed the history 
of culture generally) provides a clear answer to the first 
question. New theories and techniques are produced by 
the extension, adaptation and modification of existing 
theories and techniques and by the 'borrowing' of ideas 
from other areas of culture. New ideas do not emerge from 
a vacuum, but are built from existing 'cultural resources' 
(Barnes, 1974, 45 -68). This, of course, is one reason for 
the 'continuity' of British statistical theory pointed to 
by E.S. Pearson (1967). Even striking innovations, such 
as (at least on the view taken here) Galton's notions of re- 
gression and correlation, were, as will be shown in chapter 
two, constructed by the metaphoric extension of biological 
ideas, and not developed from nothing.(11) 
(11 
The /... 
This general point, which is indeed obvious to 
historians of science, has interesting consequences 
for the sociology of knowledge that are sometimes 
overlooked in theoretical presentations of it. It 
becomes clear that there is no contradiction between 
asserting, on the one hand, the cultural continuity 
of a given intellectual field and, on the other, the 
role of social interests in shaping developments in 
the field. Both can be the result of the creative 
activity of human beings in shaping, from their exist- 
ing stock of knowledge and cultural achievements, new 
concepts adequate to the demands of new situations. 
While social interests may be a necessary cause of 
intellectual innovation, they can never be a suf- 
ficient cause. This implies, for example, that the 
attempt by Lukács (1971) to deduce from the interests 
of a given class the form of a unique appropriate 
'imputed class consciousness' is doomed to failure. 
The effects of pre- existing culture can never be 
ignored. The necessary corrective within the 
Marxist theory of knowledge to Lukács is Gramsci 
(1971), with his sensitivity to the role of pre- 
existing culture in the formation of class con- 
sciousness. 
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The question of 'what are these inventions made 
for ?' is rather more difficult. The dilemma is this: 
whenever techniques, procedures and concepts are developed 
and assessed, the context of assessment is potentially 
broader than that defined by their particular intended 
applications; simple -minded instrumentalism is unsatis- 
factory as a means of understanding scientific and mathe- 
matical innovation and judgment. On the other hand, the 
assessment and judgment of innovation apparently always 
takes place in a way that gives prominence to certain con- 
crete and specific aspects of the efficacy of innovations. 
Historians and philosophers of science have been unable to 
find actually operating within science a purely abstract, 
context -independent means of assessment that does not make 
reference to the particular achievements made possible by 
the innovations being assessed.(12) 
In what follows I shall enquire to what extent 
statistical techniques were actually constructed and 
evaluated with reference to the potential they were thought 
to possess for solving particular problems. I shall hypo- 
thesise that the judgments of the statisticians to be studied 
were in some as yet undetermined degree goal- oriented. 
A vocabulary is needed to give expression to this 
hypothesis /... 
(12) See Kuhn (1970); acceptance of this point is 
of course by no means confined to the work of 
Kuhn. 
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hypothesis. It is perhaps provided by Habermas's notion 
of 'knowledge- constitutive cognitive interests' (Habermas, 
1972). I use the term only tentatively, and certainly do 
not intend to imply the a priori validity or applicability 
of Habermas's overall theory. The notion of 'knowledge - 
constitutive cognitive interests' (or simply 'cognitive 
interests') will be used here to focus on the process by 
which particular potential scientific applications or uses 
of statistical theory may become important factors in 
statisticians' construction and judgment of theories. 
Crudely, the term will be used to identify (if they exist) 
those aspects of the potential applications of statistical 
theory that 'feed back' in an important way into theoretical 
development. To put it another way, the term will enable 
me to discuss the relationships between theory and practice 
in science by sorting out which aspects of the applications 
of scientific theory are, from the point of view of the 
development of that theory, incidental, and which play a 
constitutive role in theorising and the assessment of 
theories. 
A relatively familiar and straightforward example 
may help clarify this notion: the theory of errors, developed 
in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and widely 
used to this day in the analysis of the results of 
observation and experiment. How can one best analyse the 
construction and evaluation of innovations by error theorists? 
It does not seem plausible to see error theorists as seek- 
ing simply to develop formally valid mathematical syllogisms. 
Rather /... 
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Rather, they should surely be seen as judging knowledge 
claims within their specialty as contributions to a 
particular way of developing the potential of scientific 
prediction and control. It was generally acknowledged 
that experiment and observation could not yield exact, 
true values of the quantities being measured, but were 
always subject to a degree of error. One way of improving 
scientific prediction was to improve experimental and 
observational technique; another was to use the fact that 
measurements could usually be repeated in order to control 
and predict the magnitude of errors in measurement. The 
goal of error theory can be seen as the construction of 
mathematical techniques to improve scientific prediction 
in this latter fashion. Thus, techniques such as the 
method of least squares were designed and judged as ways of 
mastering error by providing a 'best' estimate of quantities 
subject to error. The 'probable error' of estimates 
measured the reliability of these estimates and permitted 
the prediction of the likely range of the true value of 
the quantity being measured. In short, error theory can 
be said to reflect knowledge- constitutive cognitive in- 
terests in improving prediction and control by the mastery 
of experimental and observational error. Innovations in 
error theory were judged not in abstract terms alone (for 
example, as formally correct or incorrect mathematical 
analysis) but according to their potential as resources in 
the attempt to master error. If an innovation had no 
such /... 
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such potential, it would presumably be judged either as 
outside the scope of error theory or simply as wrong.(13) 
Several points need to be made about the term 
'cognitive interests'. Its use does not imply a claim 
about individual motives, but only about the general 
character of evaluation within communities of scientists. 
In any social group there exists the possibility of a dis- 
junction between group norms and the motives of individual 
actors in obeying these norms. Error theorists, taken as 
a community of practitioners, can reasonably be seen as 
constructing and evaluating techniques in terms of their use- 
fulness in improving prediction by the mastery of error. 
But individual mathematicians may well not have had this as 
their goal. An individual could after all contribute to 
the mastery of error by a piece of mathematical theorising 
that was motivated simply by the desire to gain status by 
the display of mathematical competence. Nor is it suggested 
that scientists are necessarily conscious of the cognitive 
interests informing their work. In the case of error theory, 
this probably was the case: the very name of the specialism 
suggests it. In other cases, scientists may well be un- 
aware of, or take as natural and general, cognitive in- 
terests that the historian will be able to identify and will 
see as particular and specific. 
(13) I hasten to point out that this rather banal analysis 
is not put forward to throw light on error theory but 
merely to illustrate what I mean by 'cognitive 
interests'. Error theory itself is further dis- 
cussed in chapter two. 
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Finally, and emphatically, there is no sug- 
gestion that scientific specialties are necessarily 
utilitarian in the ordinary sense of this term, or that all 
science is 'applied science'. A knowledge- constitutive 
cognitive interest in prediction and control is quite dif- 
ferent from a particular interest in the solution to a 
specific practical problem. Even in the relatively 
'applied' field of error theory there is no indication that 
particular practical applications as such played a con- 
stitutive role in the assessment of innovations. Certainly 
the general interest in prediction and control was con- 
cretised round the specific problem of the mastery of error. 
This was, however, not a particular practical problem but 
a common feature abstracted from a wide range of instances 
of scientific experiment and observation. No single one 
of these instances took on any special theoretical role. 
It will therefore be suggested here that it may 
perhaps be useful to see innovations in statistical theory 
(and, in chapter six, in biology) as being constructed and 
assessed in terms of specific knowledge- constitutive cog- 
nitive interests. What might account for the existence 
of these specific interests? Possibly they are socially 
sustained and relate to specific social interests.(14) In 
(14) To avoid any possible confusion it is perhaps worth 
giving a rough but serviceable definition of a 'social 
interest'. I talk of a group as having a social in- 
terest in a particular outcome (the acceptance of 
particular ideas, the development of a particular 
technique, or whatever) if the wealth, status, power 
or security of the group would be increased, or other 
needs of the group satisfied, by that outcome. 
Complications of course arise if an attempt is made to 
distinguish between 'real' and 'perceived' interests, 
but that is not of primary importance here. 
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many cases these social interests will arise from within 
the social structure of science itself. Thus, the cognitive 
interests manifested in the development of error theory can 
presumably be related to the communal interests of schools 
of astronomers and physicists. On the other hand, there 
may be instances where particular cognitive interests are 
sustained by social interests arising from the wider 
society. 
The notion of 'cognitive interest' is thus put 
forward here as a tool for the analysis of the theoretical 
content of a particular science. By seeking to relate 
cognitive interests to both esoteric and wider social in- 
terests, it will be possible to provide a way of answering 
the question posed at the beginning of this section as to 
the relation of science and society. For if it can be 
shown that a particular wider social interest sustained a 
given cognitive interest and that the development of a 
scientific theory reflected that cognitive interest, then 
an effect of the wider society on the conceptual development 
of the theory can be said to have been exhibited. If such 
a connection does not exist, and social interests internal 
to a scientific specialty, such as in extending the range 
of problems solvable by its practitioners, adequately account 
for those cognitive interests that are present, it can be 
claimed that the relative autonomy of the scientific field 
in question has been demonstrated. Alternatively, both 
kinds of social interests may be operating, and may inter- 
act/.., 
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act to reinforce or crosscut each other, and an account 
that is neither simply 'internalist' nor simply 'externalist' 
will be produced. 
1.4 A Preliminary Remark on the Sociology of Knowledge 
The question of social interests and their relation- 
ship to knowledge takes us into the traditional sphere of 
the sociology of knowledge. A lengthy discussion of this 
would be quite out of place, but in order to prevent possible 
misunderstanding of the nature of some of the accounts put 
forward in subsequent chapters, one preliminary point needs 
to be made.(15) That is that no attempt is being made 
here to provide a causal explanation of the thought of 
particular individuals. Such an account might, in principle, 
be possible, but the lack of sufficiently strong psycho- 
logical and sociological theories and the sparseness of 
evidence certainly render it impracticable. Thus, we 
might try to explain an individual's thought as follows: 
Individual X holds belief B. X is a member of Group G. 
All members of G believe B. The criteria for membership 
of G are 'objective'; it is not a group self -selected on 
the basis of attachment to B. B is a belief 'appropriate' 
to G in its social situation. This format, it would appear, 
is that which many historians and sociologists of science 
think /... 
(15) Below, this point is made in terms of social ex- 
planations involving social groups such as classes. 
Identical considerations apply also to explanations 
in terms of more limited groups, such as the 
practitioners of a particular scientific discipline 
or specialty. 
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think of when discussing explanation in the sociology of 
knowledge. It is obviously unrealisable in practice. 
Groups are no.t homogeneous in their beliefs, and, if we 
weaken 'all members of G believe 8' to 'most members of 
G believe B', then the explanation of X's beliefs is 
greatly weakened. We often find that groups, or large 
sections thereof, hold beliefs that seem inappropriate to 
their situations. Members of subaltern groups frequently 
subscribe to those beliefs that are used to defend the 
system of domination under which they labour. Further, 
nearly all groups are to some extent 'self -selected'. In- 
dividuals may choose to give their allegiance to, or to 
seek membership of, groups quite different from those into 
which they were born. Ideologies deemed appropriate to 
one group are on occasion developed by individuals who by 
birth or occupation are in fact members of quite a dif- 
ferent group.(16) 
The difficulties of the sociology of knowledge 
so conceived need not, however, force us to abandon a 
sociological perspective. There is an alternative 
approach that eschews the attempt to explain in a strong 
sense the thought of particular individuals, but which in- 
stead relates thought to social structure in roughly the 
following manner. First of all, we have to identify 
social positions whose occupants may reasonably be held to 
have /... 
(16) See Child (1941; 1944) and Barnes (1977) for a 
discussion of these problems of 'imputation'. 
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have similar interests and experiences. We then argue 
that these interests and experiences constrain the set of 
beliefs 'appropriate' to occupants of these positions. 
'Appropriate' beliefs will be ones justifying a group's 
privileges, advocating an advance in its situation, 
furthering its coherence or the interests of its members 
and reflecting the salient features of the typical ex- 
periences of its members. It is not that the nature of 
an appropriate 'class consciousness' can be deduced a 
priori from the position of the group within the social 
structure, for the pre -existing states of belief and the 
ideologies of other groups obviously affect the beliefs 
appropriate to the group. Nor is there any reason why only 
one set of beliefs should be appropriate to a group; in- 
deed, conflicting beliefs may arise, reflecting, for example, 
different aspects of its experience, or tensions between 
the short -term and long -term interests of its members. 
These provisos aside, it should be possible to identify 
'tendencies' of thought that express the influence of the 
social situation of the group. These need not be manifest 
in the thought of all of the group's members, nor even in 
that of a majority of them. Nor need they be restricted 
in their manifestation to the members of the group: out- 
siders who identify with the group may well manifest them, 
often, indeed, in heightened form,(17) 
(17) The above approach to the sociology of knowledge 
follows, at least in its general thrust, that of 
Lukács (1971) and Goldmann (1964). 
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An analogy from the sociology of politics may 
clarify the status of this kind of explanation. To say 
that political party P expresses the interests of group 
G is not to imply that all members, or even most members, 
of G vote for P. I t is rather to assert that P's policies, 
if put into effect, would enhance the wealth, status, power, 
security and so on of G. Differential support for P 
between members and non -members of G might then be 
anticipated, but the point is that the core of the argument 
is structural and not individual. 
The virtue of this approach to the sociology of 
knowledge is that it does not attempt the practically 
impossible task of giving deterministic accounts of 
particular individuals, and that it takes into account the 
complexities of group affiliation. Obviously, it is a 
theoretical rather than an empirical approach, requiring a 
theoretical account of social structure and of the interests 
associated with the different locations in that structure. 
A case study such as this cannot claim in any sense to 
prove the correctness of such an approach. To attempt 
such a proof would take us of necessity into a study of the 
social relations of belief much wider than that undertaken 
here. My aim is more modest: to construct some tentative 
hypotheses about the relationship between belief and social 
structure in the period discussed, and then to argue that 
these hypotheses at least make sense of the historical 
materials presented here. 
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1.5 Outline of Subsequent Chapters. 
As the preceding two sections have indicated, I 
shall be attempting to examine in detail some particular 
developments, and to suggest some general explanatory 
hypotheses. In the following chapter, one particular in- 
dividual will be considered: Francis Galton. Galton is 
generally acknowledged as a founder of modern statistics 
(Cowan, 1968). But Galton was also the founder of the 
eugenics movement, and it will be argued in chapter two 
that it was his eugenic concerns which led him to his 
breakthrough in statistical theory. In chapter three, 
the focus will therefore broaden to consider the British 
eugenics movement, and an attempt will be made to relate 
the beliefs and fortunes of this movement to aspects of 
the changing British social structure. The general 
perspective developed in this chapter will be applied in 
chapter four to Karl Pearson, the crucial figure in the 
continuance of the line of work begun by Galton, and a man 
who laid many of the intellectual and institutional 
foundations of modern statistical theory. The relation- 
ship between Pearson's social position and his beliefs 
will be discussed, as will that between the political and 
philosophical aspects of his beliefs and his science. 
Chapter five will then examine the impact of Galton and 
Pearson, and their role in creating the nucleus in Britain 
of statistical theory as a scientific specialty. 
When /... 
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When beliefs go unchallenged, it is sometimes 
difficult to discern which aspects are primary and which 
secondary, which their holders are prepared to discard and 
which are central. Scientific controversy, the clash of 
differing theories, is therefore particularly important to 
the historian in throwing light on the nature of the systems 
of belief being studied. In chapters six and seven, two 
crucial controversies involving Karl Pearson and his 
followers will be examined. The first is the famous and 
bitter dispute between Pearson and the early Mendelian 
geneticists. Although this dispute takes us outside the 
boundaries of statistical theory, it allows a broader view 
of the scientific programme of Karl Pearson and his 
followers. Further, it provides an interesting testing 
ground for the framework of explanation developed in the 
foregoing chapters. The second controversy is much less 
well known. It was the first major dispute to divide the 
emerging community of mathematical statisticians, setting 
Pearson and those loyal to him against his former pupil 
George Udny Yule. Again, an attempt will be made to 
demonstrate the usefulness of the overall perspective of 
this thesis in understanding this rather esoteric dis- 
agreement. 
The last substantive chapter points forward from 
the zenith of the influence of Francis Galton and 
Karl Pearson. Neither Galton nor Pearson devoted much 
attention to the knotty problems of the general methodology 
of /... 
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of statistical inference. They were primarily concerned 
with developing substantive techniques and theories adequate 
for the development of their chosen field of research. In 
this chapter, Karl Pearson's somewhat informal views on 
statistical inference will be reconstructed. The work of 
Gosset and Fisher in transforming the Pearsonian approach 
to inference will then be presented, and it will be sug- 
gested that two new developments can be detected in their 
work. The first is the beginning of the systematic ap- 
plication of statistical methods in agriculture and industry. 
The second is the beginning of what we might term 'meta - 
statistics': the attempt to systematise statistical tech- 
niques developed in response to particular problems, and to 
forge a consistent theory of statistical inference. 
The conclusion will return to some of the issues 
raised in this introductory chapter concerning the in- 
fluence of social interests on science, and of the problems 
of applying the sociology of knowledge to science. The 




Francis Galton and Statistical Theory 
With his concepts of regression and correlation, 
Francis Galton achieved a major breakthrough in statistical 
theory. He did not simply add to a stockpile of available 
technical tools, but opened up a whole new area of ap- 
plication and theoretical development. His work rep- 
resents the natural starting point for a history of the 
development of modern statistical theory in Britain. 
However, in order to understand the radical nature of his 
innovations, it is necessary first to sketch in something 
of the background against which he must be placed. 
2.1 Statistics, Probability and Error 
There were three main traditions of work from 
which mathematical statistics in Britain might plausibly 
have sprung. The first of these was the work of the un- 
official and official gatherers of statistical information, 
in particular of the Statistical Societies. The second 
was work by mathematicians in the theory of probability, 
and in its actuarial applications. The third was the work 
of mathematical physicists and astronomers, most notably in 
the field of error theory, but also in the kinetic theory 
of gases. 
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In terms of numbers of researchers and volume of 
work produced, official statistics and empirical social 
research together form by far the most important of these 
three areas. Early Victorian Britain saw a 'statistical 
movement' which, although relatively short -lived, gave 
birth to a tradition of empirical social research and con- 
tributed much to the development of official statistical 
agencies.(1) This movement, and the Statistical Societies 
it gave rise to, were by no means committed to a 
sophisticated mathematical methodology. The term 'statistics' 
had, originally, no such connotation. The 1797 edition of 
the Encylopaedia Britannica defined the term as a 'word 
lately introduced to express a view or survey of any kingdom, 
county, or parish' (Cullen, 1975, 10 -11). It was only very 
gradually that 'statistics' came to refer exclusively to 
quantitative studies. 'The contents of the Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society would suggest that it was not until 
the present century that "statistics" came to mean solely 
numbers and the methods of analysing numbers' (Cullen, 1975, 
11). The early Victorian statistical movement should thus 
be seen not as the forerunner of the modern discipline of 
statistics /... 
(1) The main source here is Cullen (1975), but see also 
Abrams (1968), Elesh (1972), Cole (1972) and 
G.M. Young (1960, especially 32 -3). More generally, 
see Oberschall (ed.)(1972), Stephan (1948), 
Lazarsfeld (1961), Lecuyer and Oberschall (1968). 
Baines (1970) describes the general features of the 
nineteenth century British system of official 
statistics, while Royal Statistical Society (1934) 
describes the development of that Society. For 
medical statistics see Greenwood (1936; 1948), 
Hodgkinson (1968), Hilts (1970) and Eyler (1973; 1976). 
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statistics, but, Cullen argues, as a group of social 
reformers producing and utilising 'facts' to advance their 
programmes. 
The statisticians wanted to contribute more 
than voluntary and legislative action in the 
fields of public health and education: they 
were also free traders, supporters of the new 
poor law (if not framers and administrators of 
it), opposed to trade unions and working class 
radicals, suspicious of factory acts. 
(Cullen, 1975, 147) 
The squalor and unrest of early Victorian Britain was 
portrayed by the statistical movement as the consequence not 
of industrialisation nor of capitalism, but of urbanisation 
and its harmful effects on the physical and moral well -being 
of the working class. The remedy then lay in reforming that 
urban environment, chiefly through education and public 
health measures, rather than in more radical change. 
The most permanent institutional legacy of the 
statistical movement was the London Statistical Society, 
founded in 1834, which in 1887 became the Royal Statistical 
Society. This body reflected the concerns of the movement 
from which it sprang. 
Although there were a few mathematicians among 
the original members, there were many more 
economists, politicians, peers, government 
officials, and doctors of medicine: their 
object was politically useful information about 
society, not, say, the development of mathematical 
method. 
(Abrams, 1968, 14) 
In the first fifty years of its existence, only 11 out of 
the 511 papers read to the Society concerned statistical 
method (Abrams, 1968, 16). Towards the end of the 
nineteenth /... 
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nineteenth century a somewhat greater interest in method 
can be seen in its Journal, but this was largely imported 
from outside, as mathematical statisticians such as 
George Udny Yule began to use the techniques they had learned 
elsewhere to illuminate some of the traditional problem 
areas of the Statistical Society (see below, chapter seven). 
Even this development was extremely slow. In the 25 years 
between 1909 and 1934, only 15 out of 212 papers dealt with 
the 'collection and methods of statistics' (Royal Statistical 
Society, 1934, 205). In the period discussed in this 
thesis, the Royal Statistical Society, for all its importance 
and governmental influence, was largely irrelevant to the 
development of statistical theory. Its interests lay 
elsewhere.(2) 
The tradition of empirical social research that 
sprang from the statistical movement was also largely barren 
of methodological advances. As Stephen Cole argues, there 
was a lack of intellectual continuity, presumably resulting 
from the amateur and non -institutionalised nature of this 
field of study. 
It is very rare that any one of the researchers 
would pay enough attention to past work to either 
criticise it ... or to make advances on it. An 
intellectual history of British social research in 
the nineteenth century would not be very interest- 
ing reading. The end would be no different than 
the /... 
(2) Economic statistics was perhaps the area of 
activity of the Society and related bodies 
which was most highly developed. In the 
period discussed in this thesis, F.Y. Edgeworth 
and A.L. B'owley (see chapter five) were leading 
experts in this field. 
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the beginning and the middle no different than 
either end. 
(Cole, 1972, 108) 
It was not until well into the twentieth century that we 
find anything other than the most elementary use of 
statistical techniques. Systematic or random sample survey 
methods, for example, were not used in Britain until 1912 
(Stephan, 1948, 22; Bowley and Burnett-Hurst, 1915). 
Earlier surveys had either aimed at complete coverage, or 
had used specially selected subgroups of thepopulation.(3) 
Sophisticated designs or complex quantitative analyses were 
not to be found. At best, investigators sought adequate 
and representative coverage, and calculated those summary 
statistics they felt to be of substantive importance. 
After all, they were, in general, reformers concerned with 
influencing public policy and convincing lay audiences. 
A display of technical expertise beyond a basic minimum 
might well have been counter- productive, even had the 
researchers had the competence and motivation to engage in 
it. 
Medical statistics was developed to a somewhat 
greater /... 
(3) Thus Booth, in his famous survey of London, chose 
to examine families with school children, and to 
argue that the condition of the entire population 
would be the same 'or so far as there is any dif- 
ference better rather than worse' (quoted by Cole, 
1972, 81). 
E. Yeo (1976) has made the interesting suggestion 
that sampling was not used in early British studies 
of poverty because the complete door -to -door survey 
was valued in itself as a form of contact between 
'rich' and 'poor'. 
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greater level of sophistication than social statistics. 
The 1836 Registration Act established a national system for 
the recording of births, marriages and deaths, and a 
standardised system for the reporting of causes of death 
was introduced by William Farr. Death returns of large 
towns were published in the newspapers, and infant mortality 
rates and mortality rates for specific diseases were 
calculated. This data was put to considerable use, both 
administratively and for research into the causes of 
disease. But again the level of sophistication thought 
necessary or desirable in the analysis of this data was low. 
Mathematical precision might have helped, but 
few of our modern techniques existed and where 
they did were little used. Not even Farr was 
a good mathematician. People worked with figures 
using totals and bare averages. Producing the 
raw materials was sufficient to obtain results. 
(Hodgkinson, 1968, 185) 
Methodological debate there certainly was, but it concerned 
the inadequacies of the reporting system and gross errors, 
such as the comparative use of crude mortality rates without 
taking into consideration the age composition of populations 
(Eyler, 1976). The immediate problems faced by those pro- 
ducing and using vital statistics were not such as to 
suggest that the search for sophisticated analytic tools was 
the way forward. 
Turning to probability theory, we find an area 
of much less activity than that generated by the 'statistical 
movement'. If we leave aside the rather sporadic con- 
troversy, which was of a philosophical rather than mathe- 
matical/... 
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matical nature, about the definition of probability (this 
is returned to briefly in chapter eight), the theory of 
probability was something of a backwater in nineteenth 
century Britain.(4) The work of the Continental 
probability theorists, especially P.S. de Laplace (1814), 
overshadowed British contributions. Todhunter's com- 
pendium of the theory of probability, perhaps itself the 
most important British contribution to the field, ended with 
the work of Laplace (Todhunter, 1865). Little significant 
original research was done. Kendall and Doig's biblio- 
graphy (1968) reveals only sporadic and on the whole 
relatively trivial work on probability theory by British 
mathematicians. Of course, that is not to deny that 
acquaintance with the field was widespread. The theory of 
probability had become an established part of the mathe- 
matical curriculum. Textbooks of algebra, even at a 
relatively elementary level, contained rules for and ex- 
ercises in the manipulation of probabilities (see, for 
example, Todhunter, 1858). The student of mathematics 
would have been exposed from an early stage to such topics 
as the addition theorem for the probabilities of mutually 
exclusive events, and the multiplication theorem for the 
probabilities of independent events. Simple combinatorial 
algebra, together with these elementary theorems, would, 
however, have seen the student through most of the problems 
in /... 
(4) The three major recent works in the history of 
probability theory are David (1969), Maistrov (1974) 
and Hacking (1975). None of them, however, deals 
with the period discussed here. 
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in probability theory he was likely to meet, even at the 
relatively advanced level of the Cambridge Mathematical 
Tripos, as is revealed by the examination questions in 
Gantillon (ed.)(1852). In sum, probability theory was an 
established field of accepted knowledge, but not a prime 
area of ongoing research. Perhaps an explanation for this 
can be found in Boyer's suggestion (1968, 621) that British 
mathematical research after the Napoleonic Wars was focused 
in those areas where Continental achievement had been least. 
A British mathematician wishing to make his reputation 
might well have thought it advisable to avoid devoting a 
major research effort to a field which had been cultivated 
in so magisterial a fashion by an acknowledged giant such 
as Laplace. 
Actuarial work, where probability theory was 
linked to the data collected by vital statisticians in an 
enterprise of commercial importance, provided at least 
temporary employment for several important British mathe- 
maticians in the nineteenth century. Actuarial science 
,.. consists of the application of the laws of 
probability to insurance, and especially to life 
insurance. And we shall find that, first of all, 
there needed to be something for the law of 
probability to act upon, viz., a mortality table, 
and also a handmaiden, in the form of a developed 
law of compound interest and discount and of 
annuities certain. 
(Dawson, 1914, 95) 
As Dawson's review shows, the nineteenth century saw many 
advances in actuarial science. It would seem, however, 
that /... 
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that by this period the major technical instruments of 
actuarial work, such as the life table, had been developed. 
There was, of course, much theoretical and empirical work 
to be done to improve them, but this had become a fairly 
specialised line of work. Actuarial work was thus rather 
insulated from developments in statistical theory generally 
during this period.(5) 
Error theory was in a broadly similar condition 
to the theory of probability.(6) Like the theory of 
probability, error theory had been developed most fully by 
Continental workers, most importantly Gauss. It had become 
an important and established field, systematically presented 
in textbooks, of which the most widely used seem to have 
been Airy (1861) and Merriman (1901; first published in 
1884). Here was to be found the intellectual resources 
which statisticians like Galton and Pearson were first to 
turn to, such as the 'error curve' or 'law of frequency of 
errors' and the 'probable error'. Walker (1929, 50) explains 
these /... 
One leading British actuary, William Palin Elderton, 
played a subsidiary role in the development of the 
biometric school. See chapter five. 
For the history of error theory see Merriman's 
annotated bibliography (Merriman, 1877). More 
recent historical work, not, however, covering 
this period, includes Tilling (1973), Sheynin 
(1966; 1971a; 1972b; 1973a), Plackett (1972). 
Seal (1967) is the only recent work to cover the 
development of the theory of errors after Gauss 
at all extensively. 
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these chief theoretical concepts of the error theorists, and 
from her description we can see how these concepts related 
to the cognitive interests discussed in section 1.3: 
The term probable error originated among the 
German mathematical astronomers who wrote near 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
early use of the term is in certain memoirs 
dealing with astronomy, geodesy, or artillery 
fire, where the writer is attempting to make 
the best possible determination of the true 
position of a point from a series of observations 
all of which involve an element of error. A 
deviation from the true position of the point, or 
more commonly from the mean of the observations, 
of such a magnitude that, if the number of 
observations be indefinitely increased, one half 
of the errors may be expected to be numerically 
greater and one half numerically less than this 
value, is then termed the `probable error'. ;Then 
the frequencies of the various errors are plotted, 
the result is quite naturally spoken of as the 
'curve of facility of error', or 'curve of error', 
and the formula describing it as the 'law of 
facility of error', 'law of error', and 'error 
function'. 
It was generally assumed during the nineteenth century that 
what we now call the 'normal' or 'Gaussian' distribution was 
the law of error: it was, for example, sometimes referred 
to simply as the 'probability curve'. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, its accepted and 
established status, error theory was not an important area 
of theoretical work by British mathematicians. Only 14% 
of the 408 books and memoirs in the field surveyed by 
Merriman (1877) were published in Britain. The most con- 
sistent work was that of the Cambridge astronomer and 
mathematician, J.W.L. Glaisher (for whom see Forsyth, 1929). 
Even in his case the theory of errors was only a subsidiary 
interest /... 
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interest, and his major paper in the area (Glaisher, 1872), 
while a thorough and critical review of the literature, did 
not constitute a crucial methodological advance. 
Galton's work aside, there was little attempt in 
Britain to develop Quetelet's insight that the error 
theorists' 'probability curve' could be applied to social 
as well as physical phenomena. Indeed, Gillispie (1963) 
suggests that the impact of Quetelet's work was, paradoxically, 
most immediate in British physics (though see also the 
comments by Hesse, 1963). In any case, it seems established 
that James Clerk Maxwell read the review of Quetelet (1849) 
by Herschel (1850), and may have been encouraged by the 
example of Quetelet's work to use the theory of probability 
to construct models of physical phenomena: that is, to develop 
a statistical mechanics.(7) Statistical mechanics became 
an important area of study for British mathematical physicists 
in the later part of the nineteenth century. This initial 
episode apart, statistical mechanics and statistical theory 
proper seem, however, to have developed more or less in- 
dependently in the period discussed here.(8) Perhaps this 
was because statistical theorists were attempting to devise 
tools for drawing inferences from data, while the physicists 
were attempting to construct deductive models that would 
explain /... 
(7) See Brush (1967, 152) and Garber (1973, 19 -29). 
(8) One exception is the attempt by Burbury (1894; 
1895; 1899) to take up Galton's work on correlation 
and apply it in statistical mechanics. See appendix C. 
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explain the observed behaviour of gases. Whatever the 
explanation, British statisticians seem to have found few 
intellectual resources to exploit within statistical 
mechanics. 
The conclusion that has to be drawn from this 
brief survey of social statistics, probability theory, error 
theory and statistical mechanics is that none of these 
fields gave rise, in nineteenth century Britain, to any sub- 
stantial and significant contributions to or interest in the 
mathematical theory of statistics.(9) One consequence of 
this is that Francis Galton, although a scientist of con- 
siderable status and with wide -ranging contacts in the 
scientific community, seems for much of the period of his 
work in statistics to be ploughing a rather lonely furrow. 
Although he had many admirers, and obtained the temporary 
assistance of several mathematicians, it was not until quite 
late in his life that he found followers to develop his 
innovatory work. I t is to this innovatory work that we 
must now turn, 
2.2 Galton's Early Work in Statistical Theory 
Galton's/... 
(9) The question 'Why were these areas not productive of 
statistical theory ?' is somewhat misleading, in that 
workers in these areas did not see themselves as con- 
tributing to an entity labelled 'statistical theory', 
but were engaged in the pursuit of goals of a different 
and narrower nature. Quite aside from the general 
difficulties of trying to explain the reasons why 
something did not happen, a fuller study of the issues 
raised by this question would take us too far away 
from the main subject of this thesis. 
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Galton's main contributions to statistical theory 
were his pioneering of rank -ordering methods (the notion of 
the median, quartiles, etc.) and, more importantly, his in- 
vention of the concepts of regression and correlation. To 
describe these innovations in detail is unnecessary: there 
is a full account in Karl Pearson (1914 -30). Instead, I 
propose to examine the impetus behind Galton's statistical 
work, and the effect of that impetus on the content of his 
work 
That impetus was eugenics. This has been shown 
most clearly by Ruth Schwartz Cowan (1972a), who concludes 
(527 -8) : 
Galton created biostatistics while he was in 
pursuit of a solution to the problem of heredity. 
He dreamed of a truly eugenic society, a society 
based upon the laws of heredity: the laws of 
heredity would guide the breeding habits of men, 
and the evolutionary welfare of the race would 
become a moral criterion ... [Galton'sjeugenic 
dreams had provided him with the motivation and 
the mental perseverance that he needed to unlock 
the secrets of probability. 
I t is, however, clear also from Karl Pearson's biography 
(1914 -30, 3A, 434 -5): 
There was a unity underlying all Galton's varied 
work ... which only reveals itself when, after 
much inquiry and retrospection, we view it as a 
whole and with a spirit trained to his modes of 
thought ... From 1864 to 1911 Galton achieved in 
many fields, yet in 1864 he had realised his life - 
aim - to study racial mass -changes in man with the 
view of controlling the evolution of man, as man 
controls that of many living forms. 
Initially!... 
(10) The main biographical sources for Galton are 
K. Pearson (1914 -30) and Forrest (1974). For 
Galton's statistics see also Cowan (1972a) and 
Hilts (1973). 
- 47 - 
Initially, Galton simply used existing statistical 
concepts in eugenic theorising. His first paper on eugenics 
used only elementary quantitative arguments to bolster its 
conclusion that human mental characteristics were inherited 
and that 'the improvement of the breed of mankind is no 
insuperable difficulty' (Galton, 1865, 319 -20). His first 
major work on eugenics, Hereditary Genius (1869), went 
further than this by following Cuetelet in applying the 
'law of error' to human populations.(11) Galton argued, 
though could not prove, that the law applied to mental 
characteristics, as well as the physical ones discussed by 
Quetelet: 
This is what I am driving at - that analogy clearly 
shows there must be a fairly constant average 
mental capacity in the inhabitants of the British 
Isles, and that deviations from that average - 
upwards towards genius, and downwards towards 
stupidity - must follow the law that governs 
deviations from all true averages. 
(Galton, 1869, 32) 
Galton soon began to find that he needed tools 
different from those provided from the error theorists.(12) 
For the latter, variability ('error') was something at best 
to be eliminated, or at worst to be controlled and measured. 
The cognitive interests manifested in error theory thus 
militated /... 
(11) Galton learnt of the law of error from his friend 
William Spottiswoode, the geographer. See Galton 
(1908, 304), also Cowan (1972a, 512) and 
Spottiswoode (1861). 
(12) The argument of this paragraph is largely that 
of Hilts (1973). 
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militated against the treatment of variability as a 
phenomenon in its own right. For Galton, as a eugenist, 
human variability was the potential source of racial 
progress. Galton's eugenics thus led in his statistical 
work to an orientation towards variability as an in- 
(13) trinsical) y important p henomenon. In the light of 
this orientation, error theory concepts could be judged to 
be restrictive and misleading, even absurd (Galton, 1875a, 35). 
Galton's break with the error theory approach to 
variability is best seen in his paper 'Statistics by Inter - 
comparison' (1875a). In this paper he sought replacements 
for the error theory measures of central tendency (the 
mean) and of variability (the probable error). He did this 
by the use of relative rank rather than absolute value as 
the basis of his statistical analysis. He later justified 
this approach by explicit reference to the characteristics 
of social life (1889c, 474): 
Relative rank is, however, on the whole, a more 
important consideration than the absolute amount 
of performance by which that rank is obtained. 
It has an importance of its own, because the 
conditions of life are those of continual com- 
petition, in which the man who is relatively 
strong will always achieve success, while the 
relatively weak will fail. The absolute dif- 
ference between their powers matters little. 
Galton /... 
.11 11.16 
(13) It could be said that the work of both Galton and 
the error theorists manifested a cognitive interest 
in the prediction and control of variability, but 
this interest took different particular forms, the 
error theorists seeking to minimise the effects of 
'error', while Galton sought to preserve and make 
use of (biological) variability. 
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Galton would rank -order a set of individuals or objects by 
comparing them one against the other according to some 
quality. 
The object then found to occupy the middle 
position of the series must possess the 
quality in such a degree that the number of 
objects in the series that have more of it 
is equal to that of those that have less of 
it. In other words, it represents the mean 
value of the series in at least one of the 
many senses in which that term may be used. 
(1875a, 34; Galton's emphasis) 
This value Galton was later (1883, 52) to term the 'median 
value'.(14) To measure variability Galton used what were 
later called the quartiles: those objects such that one 
quarter and three quarters of the objects had smaller values 
of the quality in question. Half the inter -quartile 
distance was then a useful measure of the variability of the 
objects. Although Galton generally continued in his 
published work to use the terms 'mean' and 'probable error', 
in his actual calculations the median and inter -quartile 
distance are more frequent (see, for example, Galton 
1888b).(15) 
Galton's negative evaluation of error theory and 
his introduction of rank- ordering methods in statistics can 
therefore /... 
(14) Fechner (1874) independently developed the concept 
of the median value, der Centralwerth. (I owe 
the reference to Walker(1929, T-811-77- 
(15) Of course, for a normally distributed population the 
median and half the inter -quartile distance are equal 
to the mean and probable error respectively. Galton 
presumably continued to use the old terms so as to be 
understood by those trained in error theory. 
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therefore be traced to the operation in his case of cog- 
nitive interests different from those to be found in 
error theory.(16) They can also be taken as indicators of 
a new approach to the statistics of distributions. Even 
though his followers such as Pearson preferred, for reasons 
of mathematical tractability, to use the earlier formulae 
(mean instead of median, etc.), this shift of focus was 
to continue. Thus there was a gradual transition from 
use of the term 'probable error' to the term 'standard 
deviation' (which is free of the implication that a 
deviation is in any sense an error), and from the term 
'law of error' to the term 'normal distribution'.(17) 
Galton himself became aware of the divergence 
between his approach and that of the error theorists, and 
of the reasons for it. He wrote in his autobiography that 
some of his applications of the 'Gaussian Law' seemed 'to 
be comprehended with difficulty by mathematicians'. He 
went on to explain this in terms of what have here been 
called different 'cognitive interests': 
The primary objects of the Gaussian Law of Error 
were exactly opposed, in one sense, to those to 
which I applied them [sic. They were to get 
rid of, or to provide a just allowance for 
errors. But these errors or deviations were 





(16) Alternatively, we could talk of the same general 
cognitive interest differently 'particularised'. 
(17) For the history of these terms, see Walker (1929, 
185 and 188). 
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Galton's work represents, however, much more than a 
shift in general focus in statistical theory. The error 
theorists had worked predominantly with distributions of 
one variable or, at most, of mutually independent variables. 
Galton provided, in the concepts of regression and 
correlation, the key tools for the treatment of two 
dependent variables, and made the advance to the general 
treatment of any number of dependent variables a relatively 
easy technical problem. His work in this area arose 
directly from his eugenic concerns. 
In the last chapter of Hereditary Genius, Galton 
discussed the relationship between parent and offspring 
generations. He envisaged the development of a predictive, 
quantitative theory of descent. It might be possible, for 
example, to deduce the average contribution of each ancestor 
to the hereditary make -up of a child: 
Suppose, for the sake merely of a very simple 
numerical example, that a child acquired one - 
tenth of his nature from individual variation, 
and inherited the remaining nine- tenths from 
his parents. It follows, that his two parents 
would have handed down only nine -tenths of nine - 
tenths, or 81 /100 from his grandparents, 729/1000 
from his great -grandparents, and so on; the 
numerator of the fraction increasing in each 
successive step less rapidly than the denominator, 
until we arrive at a vanishing value of the 
fraction. 
(1869, 371) 
At first Galton felt that this theory could be 
developed /.., 
(18) There are exceptions to this generalisation. 
See section 2.4. 
(18) 
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developed from physiological considerations, in particular 
Charles Darwin's 'provisional hypothesis of pangenesis' 
(Darwin, 1868, 2, 357 -404, especially 374). pangenesis, 
however, proved to be a blind alley. Galton attempted 
to test the theory by transfusion experiments in rabbits. 
If the blood did indeed contain 'gemmules' which aggregated 
into the sperm or ova, as the theory of pangenesis appeared 
to suggest, then the offspring of a rabbit that had 
received a massive transfusion of the blood of another 
rabbit should show a tendency to resemble the latter rather 
than the former. Galton was unable to find any such 
effect, and concluded that the theory was untrue.(19) He 
put forward his own corrected version of pangenesis, 
without freely circulating gemmules (Galton, 1875b). This 
alternative theory had the additional feature of effectively 
denying the possibility of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, a possibility which had been affirmed in 
Darwin's original theory of pangenesis and which Calton had 
apparently never liked.(20) While Galton's new theory made 
possible what is arguably the first clear statement of what 
is now called the genotype /phenotype distinction (Galton, 
1875b/... 
(19) K. Pearson (1914 -30, 2, 156 -66); Cowan (1977, 
173 -9). Darwin responded to Galton's experiments 
by claiming that it was not an essential part of 
the theory of pangenesis that the 'gemmules' in 
fact circulated in the blood and that they could 
travel through the body in other ways. 
(20) For Galton's attitude to the theory of the in- 
heritance of acquired characteristics, see 
Cowan (1968; 1977). 
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1875b, 94), it did not lead to the development of a 
mathematical law connecting parent and offspring generations. 
To find this, Galton had to turn to direct experiment. 
Ideally, Galton would have preferred to use 
human data; however, these were as yet unavailable, and 
he turned to a more convenient alternative. He began work 
on sweetpea seeds, though 
It was anthropological evidence that I desired, 
caring only for the seeds as means of throwing 
light on heredity in man. 
(Galton, 1885a, 507; quoted by Cowan, 1972a, 517) 
His scheme was to grow sweetpeas from seeds of a measured 
size, and then to measure the seeds produced by these plants. 
The second generation of seeds could then be considered the 
offspring of the first. Galton would thus have the data 
for a direct numerical examination of the relationship 
between two generations connected by heredity. He began 
the experiment by taking several thousand sweetpea seeds 
and weighing them individually, thus obtaining the mean 
and probable error of the distribution of weight. He then 
made up several sets of seeds. Each set consisted of 
seven packets, each packet containing ten seeds of exactly 
the same weight. The weights were chosen so that one 
packet contained very small seeds (with weights given by 
the population mean minus three times the probable error), 
the next slightly larger (weight equal to the population 
mean minus twice the probable error) and so on up to a 
packet with giant seeds (weight equal to the population 
mean plus three times the probable error). Nine of these 
sets /... 
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sets were made up, and Galton sent them to friends to grow. 
Two sets failed, but he obtained the produce of the other 
seven sets. 
He presented the results of the experiment in a 
lecture delivered at the Royal Institution on 9 February 
1877 (Galton, 1877; the data on which the statements in 
this lecture were based were never fully published).(21) 
Galton said that an exceedingly simple law connected parent 
and offspring seeds. Let the mean of the parent generation 
be M and its probable error be Q. Then the parent seeds 
fall into the seven categories M - 3Q, M - 2Q, M - Q, M, 
M + Q, M + 2Q, M + 3Q. The offspring of each category of 
parent had weights distributed according to the law of 
frequency of error, and the probable error of each group 
of offspring was the same: the offspring of the smallest 
seeds were no less variable than the offspring of the 
largest seeds. But the mean weight of each class of off- 
spring was less extreme than that of their parents. As 
Galton put it, 'reversion' had taken place. Further, this 
reversion was linear. That is, the seven parent categories 
gave rise to seven offspring classes with means M - 3bQ, 
M - 2bQ, M - bQ, M, M + bQ, M + 2bQ, M + 3bQ, where b is a 
positive constant less than one.(22) 
A/... 
mlo IMO 
(21) Galton (1885c, 258 -60) discussed the relationship between 
the diameters of parent and offspring seeds and gave a 
table of figures for this. The original records of 
the sweetpea experiment have not been found in the 
Galton papers. 
(22) Galton used 'r' not 'b'. I have changed his notation to 
make it clear that, to use Galton's later terminology, 
the constant is a coefficient of regression, not of 
correlation. 
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A hypothetical example may make this clearer. 
Suppose the parent generation to have mean 100 units and 
probable error 20 units. Then we have seven sets of 
seeds of weights 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160 units. 
The mean weight of the offspring of the parent seeds 
weighing 40 units is not 40 units but 70 units; the off- 
spring of the parents weighing 60 units have mean weight 80 
units; of those weighing 80 units, 90; of those weighing 
100, 100; of those weighing 120, 110; of those weighing 
140, 120; of those weighing 160, 130. In this case 
b = ?; the offspring seeds differ from the mean by only 
half as much as their parents. 
On the face of it, this is an odd result. Does 
it not mean that the offspring generation will be clustered 
round the mean much more closely than the parent generation? 
Galton was, of course, well aware that the curve represent- 
ing the distribution of a particular character in a species 
ordinarily remains virtually identical from one generation 
to another (Galton, 1869, 27). He argued that linear 
reversion to the mean was in fact part of the process by 
which the stability of the distribution was maintained from 
generation to generation. The 'compression' of the dis- 
tribution due to reversion would be balanced by the 
'expansion' due to fraternal variability (that is, to the 
variability within groups of brothers and sisters). Galton 
suggested that this process could be seen as having, in 
theory, two parts. We start with a parent generation with 
probable /... 
- 56 - 
probable error cl. Reversion we imagine as 'compressing' 
this distribution to one with a probable error of bcl (b is 
less than one). We now imagine each parent as tending to 
breed true to the (reverted) parental type, but the offspring 
of each parentage having a probable error f, The 'error' 
of the offspring generation (c2) will thus be the resultant 
of the two independent 'errors' bcl and f: 
c22 = b2 c12 + f2 
Parent and offspring generations can then have equal 
variability (c1 = c2) provided f2 = (1 - b2) c12 : this is 
a quantitative statement of the balancing of fraternal 
variability and the reduction in variability due to reversion. 
Unlike sweetpea seeds, human offspring have more 
than one parent. Galton found a neat device for handling 
this problem: the mid -parent. The mid- parent was a 
fictitious amalgam of the characteristics of father and 
mother. Thus the mid -parental height was the mean of the 
paternal and maternal heights, with female height adjusted 
to allow for the greater mean and probable error of male 
height. Offspring could now be considered as descended 
by uniparental inheritance from this mid -parent. The 
population of mid -parents has, because of its construction, 
a smaller variability than either paternal or maternal 
populations. To see why this is so, let paternal height 
be x, let maternal height (adjusted to make it comparable 
with paternal height) be y, and let the probable error of 
the paternal generation (which is equal to the probable 
error /... 
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error of the adjusted maternal generation) be c. The 
formula for mid -parental height is simply 4 (x + y). 
So the square of the probable error of the mid -parental 
population is given by ç ( c2 + c2), if we can assume 
paternal and maternal height to be independent (that is, no 
assortative mating). This gives a probable error for the 
mid- parental population of 3.1, not c. As we shall see, 
this difference was to be of some importance in the develop- 
ment of Galton's later work. 
In retrospect, this paper (Galton, 1877) can be 
seen as the first stage of Galton's revolution in statistical 
theory: his first development of the concept that was later 
to be called linear regression. However, Galton did not 
at the time see himself as doing anything other than con- 
tributing to knowledge about heredity, as is indicated by 
his use of the ordinary biological term 'reversion'. 
Further, it may appear from the account so far given that 
the 'law of reversion' was reached purely empirically; 
that Galton simply looked at the data and deduced the law. 
This is most unlikely. Galton had a definite prior notion 
of the kind of law he was looking for: a simple, predictive, 
mathematical statement of the relationship between parent 
and offspring generations. There is indeed reason to 
believe that his data did not unequivocably 'suggest' the 
law of reversion. Some later comments by Galton indicate 
this. Thus he wrote (1885c, 259): 
I possessed less evidence than I desired to 
prove /... 
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prove the bettering of the produce of very 
small seeds. 
His data was not even sufficiently good to enable him to 
give a numerical value for the coefficient of reversion: 
The exact ratio of regression remained a 
little doubtful, owing to variable influences; 
therefore I did not attempt to define it. 
(1885a, 507) 
It would therefore seem that Galton was seeking to show 
order in his data, rather than the data spontaneously 
manifesting order,(23) 
2.3 The Bivariate Normal Surface and Correlation 
By the end of the 1870's Galton had thus broken 
with the error theory approach to statistics, even though 
he still used the rather incongruous error theory terminology. 
He had also made the first decisive step, with his law of 
reversion, in developing a statistical theory of two 
dependent variables. The 1880's saw him consolidate this 
early work, develop the theory of the bivariate normal 
distribution, and move from the concept of reversion to 
that of correlation. 
In the early 1880's Galton began to seek anthro- 
pometric data of direct relevance to problems of human heredity. 
This /... 
(23) K. Pearson (1914 -30, 3A, 4) has reconstructed from 
Galton's seed diameter data a diagram which shows 
the relatively poor approximation of this data to 
the simple ' la.w of reversion'. 
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This data could, he felt, be of other than purely scientific 
use. As the notion that human characteristics were pre- 
dominantly hereditary became more and more established, it 
was 'highly desirable to give more attention than has been 
customary hitherto to investigate and define the capacities 
of each individual' (1882, 333). With this information, 
Galton felt that a better fit of individuals and their 
social roles could be achieved. Galton called for the 
establishment of 'anthropometric laboratories' in which 
individuals and whole families could have a wide range of 
physical and mental traits examined and measured. 
In 1884 Galton set up just such a laboratory at 
the International Health Exhibition held in South Kensington. 
By 1885 over 9,000 people had paid the small fee and been 
measured for keenness of sight, colour sense, 'judgment of 
eye', hearing, highest audible note, breathing power, 
strength of pull and squeeze, swiftness of blow, span of 
arms, height standing and sitting, and weight (Galton, 
1885b). The offer of public prizes for the best -kept 
'family records' brought in another body of important 
anthropometric data (Forrest, 1974, 179 -80). 
With this data Galton was able, in effect, to 
repeat the sweetpea study on human beings. He revealed 
his first results in his Presidential Address to the 
Anthropological Section of the British Association (1885a). 
(Further details were published in his (1885c) and (1886)). 
On /... 
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On the basis of the family records already obtained he 
claimed: 
An analysis of the records fully confirms 
and goes far beyond the conclusions I obtained 
from the seeds. 
(1885a, 507). 
The particular human trait he chose to investigate was 
stature. It was easy to measure, relatively constant 
during adult life, its distribution closely followed the 
law of frequency of error, and assortative mating accord- 
ing to stature was, Galton argued, negligible. Galton 
had to hand the stature measurements of 928 adult children 
and of their 205 parentages. For each parentage he 
calculated the height of the mid -parent by multiplying the 
mother's height by 1.08 and taking the mean of that and 
the father's height. He was then able to investigate the 
relationship of offspring height to mid -parental height. 
Galton found that this human data showed clearly 
the pattern more ambiguously manifested by the sweetpea. 
data. A relationship of linear reversion (or 'regression' 
as he now called it)(24) existed between offspring and mid- 
parental heights. A mid -parental deviation of one unit 
implied an expected offspring deviation of 2/3 of a unit 
(b = 2/3), and the probable error of the offspring of each 
class of mid -parent was constant. 
Galton /... 
(24) Cowan (1972a, 520) argues that Galton changed his 
terminology because he now realised the greater 
generality of the relationship he had found. 
- 61 - 
Galton did not stop at this confirmation of his 
earlier result. On examining the joint frequency dis- 
tribution of offspring and mid -parental heights, he noticed 
some strange patterns: 
I found it hard at first to catch the full 
significance of the entries in the table, 
which had curious relations that were very 
interesting to investigate. They came out 
distinctly when I 'smoothed' the entries by 
writing at each intersection of a horizontal 
column with a vertical one, the sum of the 
entries of the four adjacent squares, and 
using these to work upon. I then noticed... 
that lines drawn through entries of the same 
value formed a series of concentric and 
similar ellipses 
(1885c, 254 -5) 
Galton guessed that these patterns might be the clue to a 
deeper understanding of regression. They might, for example, 
help him understand why, when he reversed the direction of 
his analysis and examined the distribution of mid- parental 
heights for a given offspring height, he found a relation- 
ship of regression, but with a coefficient of 1/3 and not 
2/3 (1885a, 509). 
Galton decided to try to construct, from what he 
knew of regression, an equation for the joint frequency 
surface which had displayed these elliptical patterns. 
Doubting his own mathematical powers, he sought the 
assistance of the Cambridge mathematician, J.D. Hamilton 
Dickson. In formulating the problem for Hamilton Dickson, 
Galton in fact more or less solved it. Hamilton Dickson 
was able to write down directly the equation Galton needed 
(Galton, 1886, 63 -6). 
Galton's/... 
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Galton's statement of the problem can be presented 
in modern terminology and notation as follows. Let y 
represent mid -parental height, and x offspring height, where 
both y and x are measured from the means of their respective 
generations. Suppose that y is normally distributed with 
standard deviation L7 . Let the probability density of 
y be g(y). Then 
1 (' 2 
g(y) dy = e xp 2 d y . 
N 1-rr P- t 1, s 
Consider now the offspring of those mid -parents with a 
particular height y. These offspring have mean height 
Ì312Y' 
where`312 is Galton's (1877) coefficient of reversion, 
b. Further, this array of offspring has a standard 
deviation independent of y; again this is a result 
originally formulated in 1877. Call this standard 
deviation 
or 
given y, is thus 
The conditional probability density of x, 
2 3 f (x ` y) dx = 1 exp { 
(x - ,ï y) dx, 
0 ZY t.z 
To obtain h(x,y), the joint distribution of x and y, all 
Hamilton Dickson had to do was to multiply the conditional 
probability density of x, given y, by the probability 
density of y. 
h (x, y) dx dy = f (x 
f 
y) dx g (y) dy 
1 x z 2-rr P- Z. r- 
2 
eXY d y 
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1 2 2 ir(x -/3y) ' 2-n- v' v- e xp z z- dx dy. 'z . 
The contours of equal frequency are given by 
(x - ß12y)2 + 2 - 
2 2 = Constant I. 2 7. 
and are, as Galton had found empirically, ellipses. 
The joint probability density can then be factored 
differently, so that it represents the conditional probability 
density of y, given x, multiplied by the probability density 
of x. An expression for the ratio of P21 (the regression 
of mid -parents on offspring) to ̀ j12 (the regression of off- 
spring on mid -parents) can then be found: 
i s 
/3,L 7.1 
Now al, the standard deviation of the mid- parental 
generation, is, as shown above, /j. So fit //ßf1 = -2-, and 
if /3/ = 1, then /3 = 
21 
empirically.(25) 
precisely as Galton had found 
Galton had thus, with the assistance of Hamilton 
Dickson, constructed an expression for what would now be 
called the bivariate normal distribution. The modern 
reader /... 
OS mi. MR 
(25) In the notation used by Hamilton Dickson, A1= tan 0, 
tan s , kv= = a, k d = c, k a,,Z = b, where k = 
0.6745, the 'conversion factor' from standard 
deviations to probable errors on the assumption of a 
normal distribution. In the numerical example 
(Galton, 1886, 63 -4), tan 0 = 3i a = 1.22 inches, 
b = 1.50 inches. 
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reader may not immediately recognise it as such; that is 
because the formula is now usually written in terms of r, 
the coefficient of correlation of x and y. To modern 
eyes, the step from 'regression' to 'correlation' seems an 
obvious one. But Galton had no immediate motivation to 
extend his analysis. His eugenic researches had thrown 
up specific puzzles, which he had, in his eyes, adequately 
solved. It was to take a further impetus to make him move 
from 'regression' to 'correlation'. 
The stimulus that led to his work on correlation 
was a system of personal identification, proposed by the 
French anthropometrician and criminologist Alphonse 
Bertillon, which consisted in compiling measurements of 
selected parts of the body. Galton's interest in the topic 
of personal identification (another product of which was of 
course the finger -print system) was in part the result of 
his general concern with heredity and family likeness: 
... one of the inducements to making these 
inquiries into personal identification has 
been to discover independent features suitable 
for hereditary investigation ... it is not 
improbable, and worth taking pains to inquire 
whether each person may not carry visibly about 
his body undeniable evidence of his parentage 
and near kinships. 
(Galton, 1888a, 202) 
r)ertillon's system was clearly of importance, but one aspect 
of it worried Galton. Its effectiveness would be reduced 
to the extent that the component measurements of the system 
were not independent: 
The /... 
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The bodily measurements are so dependent 
on one another that we cannot afford to 
neglect small distinctions. Thus long 
feet and long middle- fingers usually go 
together ... No attempt has yet been made 
to estimate the degree of their inter- 
dependence. I am therefore having the 
above measurements (with slight necessary 
variation) recorded at my anthropometric 
laboratory for the purpose of doing so. 
(Galton, 1888a, 175) 
Galton would indeed have been familiar with the 
well -known biological principle of the interdependence (or 
correlation) of organs. Thus Darwin had written in The 
Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: 
All the parts of the organisation are to a 
certain extent connected or correlated to- 
gether; but the connection may be so slight 
that it hardly exists, as with compound 
animals or buds on the same tree. 
(1868, 2, 319) 
In his copy Galton underlined the words 'are to a certain 
extent' and 'so slight'. (25) With the mass of data from 
the Anthropometric Laboratory (as well as Bertillon's own 
measurements), Galton was in a position to investigate the 
exact extent of the correlation of various parts of the 
human body. The results of the investigation (which 
examined such measurements as stature and cubit) were for 
him a happy surprise. As he told the Anthropological 
Institute on 22 January 1889: 
... it became evident almost from the first 
that /... 
(25) Galton's copy is in the library of the Galton 
Laboratory. Ruth Cowan notes the underlining 
(1972a, 526). 
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that I had unconsciously explored the 
very same ground before. No sooner had 
I begun to tabulate the data than I saw 
that they ran in just the same form as 
those that referred to family likeness 
in stature, which were submitted to you 
two years ago. A very little reflection 
made it clear that family likeness was 
nothing more than a particular case of 
the wide subject of correlation, and that 
the whole of the reasoning already bestowed 
upon the special case of family likeness 
was equally applicable to correlation in 
its most general aspect. 
(Galton, 1889a, 403 -404) 
The previous month he had presented the results 
of his work to the Royal Society: 
'Co- relation or correlation of structure' 
is a phrase much used in biology, and not 
least in that branch of it which refers to 
heredity, and the idea is even more frequently 
present than the phrase; but I am not aware 
of any present attempt to define it clearly, 
to trace its mode of action in detail, or to 
show how to measure its degree. 
(Galton, 1888b, 135) 
Galton had found that height regressed on cubit, and cubit 
on height, in the same way as offspring height regressed on 
mid -parental height. If height and, say, left cubit are 
both measured from their respective population means, then 
the mean cubit of individuals with height x would be 
/321 
x, where /321 is a constant. Similarly individuals 
with cubits y would have mean height/8 12 Y. So far so 
good, But 
/3 12 
is not in general equal to /3 21, so neither 
/312 norfl21 can serve as a measure 
of the dependence or 
correlation of height and cubit. The measure must, 
intuitively, have a property of recipricocity: the 
correlation /,.o 
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correlation of height and cubit must be the same as the 
correlation of cubit and height, As Galton already knew, 
the lack of recipricocity of coefficients of regression 
was due to the different probable errors of the two 
variables involved (ß21//'l2 
- 
2Z 
/G2) . Thus the next 
step was easy, but only once Galton had been motivated to 
make it. 
These relations C of regression] are not numerically 
reciprocal, but the exactness of the co- relation 
becomes established when we have transmuted the 
inches or other measurement of the cubit and of 
the stature into units dependent on their 
respective scales of variability. We thus 
cause a long cubit and an equally long stature, 
as compared to the general run of cubits and 
statures, to be designated by an identical 
scale -value. The particular unit that I shall 
employ is the value of the probable error of any 
single measure in its own group. 
(Galton, 1888b, 136) 
After each variable had been reduced to standard 
units by division by its own probable error, Galton found 
that some simple relationships held. Either variable 
regressed linearly on the other, and the coefficients of 
regression were equal. This latter result followed of 
necessity from his procedure, but Galton confirmed it 
empirically. Galton called the mutual value of the 
coefficients of regression r. The value of r would always 
be less than one, he claimed.(26) Finally, Galton con- 
cluded that 'r measures the closeness of the co- relation' 
(1$)88b, 145). 
Much /... 
(26) Galton did not consider in this paper the possibility 
of negative values of r. 
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Much work, of course, remained to be done on the 
theory of correlation: for example, the invention by 
Pearson (1896) of an efficient non -graphical method of 
calculating the coefficient of correlation. The 
essential breakthrough, however, had been made. Even 
though direct eugenic concerns were not present in 
Galton's work on correlation, the motive to do that work 
came from an interest in personal identification partly 
inspired by eugenics, and the intellectual tools used by 
Galton - the theory of reversion /regression and of the 
bivariate normal distribution - had themselves been created 
directly out of Galton's eugenic researches. Galton's 
eugenics thus accounts at least in part for his invention 
of correlation. 
2.4 Galton and the Error Theorists 
The Preceding two sections have shown the detailed 
interconnections of Galton's statistics and his eugenics: 
the way that at all stages his eugenics informed and guided 
his statistical theorising. The closeness of this con- 
nection is sufficient to suggest that it is reasonable to 
see Galton's eugenics not merely as providing the motive 
for his statistical work, but also as conditioning the 
content of it. Yet a study of his work alone is not 
sufficient to establish this latter point, for the 
objection could always be raised that others working at 
the time might well have developed the same theories, even 
though /... 
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though they had no eugenic concerns. It is thus necessary 
to enquire a little more deeply: to compare Galton's work 
with that which most closely approached it, and to seek 
the crucial differentiating cognitive interests. 
The other work that came closest to Galton's was 
done within the error theory tradition. While most error 
theory dealt with errors in the measurement of one quantity, 
on occasion two or more simultaneously occurring errors 
were considered: for example, in the measurement of the 
position of a point on a plane or in space. Take the 
case of a point in a plane, whose position is measured with 
respect to two axes at right angles to each other. Let 
the errors in measuring one co- ordinate be denoted by x, 
and in measuring the other co- ordinate by y. Assume that 
both x and y follow the 'law of error', with probable errors 
given by 0.6745 tr. and 0.6745 al respectively. Then the 
probability densities of x and y are given by 
2 
f (x) dx - l exp x dx 
7r- (7; 2 Cr". 
and f (y) dy - 1 exp - y2 dy 
2rr 62, 2 i7; 
If it can be assumed that the errors in the two directions 
are independent, then the joint distribution of x and y will 
be given by 
l (x, ) d . = (xJ d x 5(y) rr ° `! y = ex -iL i}y ,1 ti,ztlj ` y °' 
This /... 
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This much was well understood by all error theorists and 
there is no approach here to the notion of correlation. 
Several writers in the error theory tradition, however, 
went beyond this: for our present purposes the most 
important of these were Bravais and Schols.(27) 
Auguste Bravais (1811 -63) worked as a naval 
officer, astronomer and physicist.(28) In his paper 
(Bravais, 1846) he considered the situation where the 
position of a point is not determined by direct measurement 
of its co- ordinates, but where estimates of its co- ordinates 
are derived from other, more basic, observations. These 
basic observations (m, n, p, ...) are mutually independent; 
the resultant estimates of the co- ordinates of the point (x,y) 
are, however, not independent as the same basic observation 
may be employed in the estimation of both x and y. 
La coexistence des mames variables m,n,p,... 
dans les équations simultanées en x et y, 
améne une corrélation telle, que les modules 
h yr cessent de représenter la possibilité 
des valeurs simultanées de (x,y) sous le vrai 
point de vue de la question. 
(Bravais, 1846, 263) 
The /... 
(27) Robert Adrain appears to have been the first mathe- 
matician to consider the simultaneous occurrence of 
two errors (Walker, 1928, 467 -8). Gauss (K. Pearson, 
19204; Seal, 1967) and Giovanni Plana (. Walker, 1928, 
470 -6) dealt with simultaneous errors; neither, 
however, approachedthe problem of dependent variables 
as clearly as Bravais and Schols. Bravai s' s work seems 
to have become known to British statisticians through 
the references to it in Czuber (1891); Seal (1967) 
drew attention to the work of Schols. 
(28) For biographical details see calker (1928) and the 
Index Biographique des Membres et Correspondants de 
l'Acad &mie des Sciences. 
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The 'modules d'erreur' of x and y, h and h , are, in 
x y 
modern notation, 1/(2w-12) and 1/(2vr 22): Bravais was noting 




2rra- v- exp Z[xs + vz] dx dy 
1 2 °+ trz 
does not give the joint distribution of x and y, because of 
the 'corrélation' between these two variables. 
Bravais showed that - assuming the equations 
relating x and y to the basic observations to be linear, 
and the basic observations to be mutually independent and 
to follow the 'law of error' - the joint distribution of 
x and y was 
'r- e xp fj - Lax 
2 
+ 2exy + by2, dx dy, 
where K, a, b and e were constants to be evaluated. 'Le 
probleme se trouve ainsi ramené á déterminer, a posteriori, 
la valeur des quatre coefficients K, a., b, e' (Bravais, 
1846, 268 -9). 
Bravais had thus reached an equation formally 
very similar to that of Galton and Hamilton Dickson. The 
modern statistician, acquainted with Galton's work on the 
bivariate normal surface, would expect Bravais to continue 
by evaluating his constants in terms of the coefficient of 
correlation of x and y or of the coefficients of regression. 
Bravais in fact did nothing of the sort. Passing through 
an intermediate stage of the analysis where he evaluated 
the /... 
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the separate 'modules d'erreur' of x and y in terms of K, 
a, b and e (Bravais, 1846, 269 -70), Bravais went on to 
construct expressions for K, a, b and e in terms of the 
parameters of the linear transformation by which x and y 
were derived from the direct observations and the 'modules 
d'erreurs' of these observations (Bravais, 1846, 270 -2) . 
He made no attempt to investigate or measure the dependence 
of x and y in his further analysis, the most interesting 
aspects of which were his discussion of the elliptical 
contours of equal frequency, and his extension of the 
result to three variables, x, y and z. 
Charles Schols (1849 -97) worked as a civil 
engineer and taught at the Breda military academy before 
being appointed Professor of Geometry at the Polytechnic of 
Delft.(29) Unlike Bravais, who worked with a model of 
independent basic observations, Schols was prepared to 
consider dependent basic variables. He criticised previous 
writers who had assumed the independence of errors in 
different directions in treating problems of artillery fire: 
Dans les principaux ouvrages qui traitent 
de la probabilité du tir, les formules ... 
sont établies á l'aide du théoréme de la 
probabilité composée d'événements indépendants 
les uns des autres en multipliant les 
probabilités des déviations dans les deux 
directions. Dans cette déduction on n'a 
pas fait attention á ce que ces deux 
déviations ne sont pas indépendantes l'une 
de l'autre. 
(1886, 174) 
(29) Biographical details for Schols are taken from 
Poggendorf's Biographisch- Literarisches Handwörterbuch. 
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Schols worked with a model he claimed (1886, 176) to be 
more general than that of Bravais: he assumed only that 
the errors of the co- ordinates of a point in space were 
the resultant of a number of small errors. 
Schols followed a process of analogical reason- 
ing, treating the distribution of error by analogy with 
the inertia of a rigid body, and showing that probable 
errors corresponded to moments of inertia. He concluded 
that the distribution of error would have principal axes 
similar to those of the ellipsoid of inertia, and showed 
that with respect to these principal axes, the law of 
error could be written as (in modern terminology): 
!_ xd dz. f lx,y,Z) áxy x =l2rr)32. 
or v- x l, v; # i + 3 a 
a a) 
In other words (Schols, 1886, 149): 
La résultante d'un grand nombre d'erreurs suit 
la méme loi que la résultante de ses trois 
projections sur les axes principaux, considérées 
comme indépendantes les unes des autres. 
Schols's conclusion was that although the assumption of the 
independence of errors in different directions was not 
necessarily correct, one could act as if it were correct, 
provided one worked with the correct system of axes: 
Lorsqu'on veut appliquer le théorème de la 
probabilité d'événements indépendants, on ne 
peut le faire qu'après avoir démontré que les 
écarts peuvent gtre considérés comme indépendants, 
bien qu'ils ne le soient pas en réalité, 
demonstration que nous avons donnée 
(Schols, 1886, 175; Schols's emphasis) 
From /... 
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From the point of view of a realist theory of 
statistics (see section 1.3), the behaviour of Bravais and 
Schols seems very strange. Why did they not 'discover' 
correlation or regression? Bravais explicitly and Schols 
implicitly(30) had reached an expression formally identical 
to that derived by Galton; being better mathematicians than 
he, they were even able to deal with the three variable, and 
not merely the two variable, case. While Bravais might be 
'excused' on the grounds that, as Pearson (1920b, 192) 
points out, he simply assumed that basic observations must 
be uncorrelated, this does not, as Seal (1967, 219) notes, 
apply to Schols. 
When, however, a non -realist perspective is 
adopted and the cognitive interests structuring error theory 
are considered, this puzzle disappears. Both Bravais and 
Schols were, despite the somewhat abstract nature of their 
papers, dealing with practical problems of error theory. 
In Bravais's case, the particular problem appears to have 
been theodolite work (Pearson, 1920b, 190); in that of 
Schols, artillery fire. Ln both cases, cognitive 
interests in the control and measurement of error are 
apparent: Bravais and Schols were attempting to provide 
two -dimensional and three -dimensional analogues of the 
successful one -dimensional technology of the law of error 
and /... 
(30) Had he 'bothered' to write his equation with respect 
to any set of axes other than the principal axes, 
that is. 
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and the probable error. As stated above, most error 
theorists felt quite justified in treating the problem by 
assuming the independence of errors in different directions. 
As it is part of good experimental or observational 
technique to ensure that different measurements are in- 
dependent of each other, this was a perfectly reasonable 
assumption to make. Bravais's procedure on having reached 
his two- dimensional law of error makes perfect sense in this 
perspective. The 'correlation' of x and y was the result 
simply of the fact that x and y were constructs from the 
basic observations. Bravais was not concerned to examine 
their dependence from the point of view, say, of the in- 
fluence of one on the other, for this would have made little 
sense. Instead he worked back to what he knew about, the 
basic observations and their probable errors, in order to 
be able to express the probable errors of x and y and their 
law of error in terms of empirically known quantities. 
For Schols, too, the problem of the dependence 
of variables was a 'residual' one to be analysed away. 
Working in a marginal area to which error theory applied 
only by extension, he felt unable to make the confident 
assumption of the independence of the basic variables. 
An astronomer or surveyor whose basic measurements were 
correlated could be told to improve his technique so as 
produce independent variables, but an artillery captain 
might well not be able or willing to do so. Schols's 
solution was to show that even if the problem might be 
substantively /... 
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substantively intractable, a neat mathematical device, the 
use of principal axes, solved it theoretically by 'dissolving' 
the dependence of the variables. Having shown this, he was 
content. Writing out his equation for axes other than the 
principal axes was irrelevant, as was any further in- 
vestigation of the dependence of x, y and z. 
In the language of Kuhn (1970), it could be said 
that Bravais and Schols were extending the basic paradigm 
of error theory to solve the problem of dealing with 
dependent variables, a problem which was marginal rather 
than central to the theory. They provided solutions that 
were practically adequate but involved no new concepts. 
Galton, on the other hand, was working in a completely dif- 
ferent framework. As a eugenist, he was naturally con- 
cerned with the effect of the characteristics of one 
generation on that of the next. The statistical dependence 
of two variables (of, say, offspring height and mid -parental 
height) was thus central to his research. Statistical 
dependence was no marginal problem to Galton: it was the 
very basis of the possibility of a eugenic programme, for 
eugenics would be impossible if parental and offspring 
characteristics were independent. Galton's eugenics thus 
gave rise to a cognitive interest, absent in error theory, 
in the understanding and measurement of statistical 
dependence as a phenomenon in its own right. His con- 
ceptual innovations, the statistical notions of regression 
and correlation, reflect this interest. 
Galton's/... 
What differentiated 
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Galton's theoretical work from that of the error theorists 
was thus a cognitive interest arising from his eugenic 
concerns. In this sense we can conclude that eugenics 
entered into his development of statistical theory by 
providing a new problem, as well as by providing in the 
concept of reversion /regression - taken over into 
statistics from his eugenically- informed biology - the 
resources necessary for its solution. 
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Chapter Three 
Eugenics in Britain 
Eugenics forms the backdrop to many of the develop- 
ments in statistical theory discussed in this thesis, and 
the case of Francis Galton indicates that the connection 
between eugenics and statistics was intimate. In order to 
achieve a rounded view of the development of statistical 
theory in this period, it is therefore necessary to set it 
in context by discussing the evolution and social nature of 
the .3ritish eugenics movement. The sociological analysis 
of eugenics developed in this chapter will be used below, 
especially in chapters four, six and seven, in an attempt 
to analyse particular intellectual developments in terms of 
the sociology of knowledge. 
A few introductory words are in order. 'Eugenics' 
referred, primarily, to schemes for 'racial improvement' by 
deliberate legislative or other attempts to alter the 
social distribution of fertility. The two strategies con- 
sidered were that of increasing the fertility of the 'fit', 
which was known as positive eugenics, and decreasing the 
fertility of the 'unfit', or negative eugenics. Closely 
bound up with eugenics as a social programme was an account 
of human biology that claimed that certain crucial human 
characteristics (such as mental ability) were largely 
inherited /... 
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inherited and relatively little affected by environment. 
I shall normally refer to this account by its usual modern 
name of 'hereditarianism'. The development of the 
hereditarian account of human beings and the study of the 
social distribution of fertility, its consequences and the 
factors affecting it, formed the 'scientific' aspect of 
eugenic s. 
(1) 
Unlike its counterpart in the United States,(2) the 
eugenics movement in Britain has only very recently begun 
to receive the attention of historians. With the exception 
of some work by members of the Eugenics Society (Blacker, 
1952; Schenk and Parkes, 1968), the only important secondary 
source was for several years Farrall (1970). Farrall's 
comprehensive and detailed study firmly established the 
essential points of the history of eugenics in Britain, 
and it is extensively drawn on here. Since the completion 
in 1975 of the original draft of this chapter (which 
appeared /... 
(1) To introduce a systematic distinction between a 
'scientific' side of eugenics and eugenics as a social 
programme would, however, be anachronistic and mislead- 
ing. Both are linked in Galton's original definition: 
We greatly want a brief word to express the science 
of improving stock, which is by no means confined 
to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially 
in the case of man, takes cognisance of all influences 
that tend in however remote a degree to give to the 
more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance 
of prevailing speedily over the less suitable than they 
otherwise would have had. The word eugenics would 
sufficiently express the idea .., 
(Galton, 1883, 25) 
(2) For eugenics in the United States see Haller (1963), 
Ludmerer (1972), Pickens (1968) and Allen (1975b; 1976). 
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appeared as MacKenzie, 1976) two further works have become 
available. Waterman (1975) discusses the Eugenics Society 
in the decade before the Second World War, and thus his 
concerns are rather different from those of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, his views on the causes of the last phase of 
the decline of the eugenics movement are not contradictory 
to those advanced here. Learle (1976) discusses the 
period 1900 to 1914. His description of eugenics before 
the First tforld War is fully congruent with that advanced 
here, although it is arguable that he does not develop his 
analysis to its full potential extent (MacKenzie, 1978b). 
3.1 Eugenics and British Culture 
As pointed out in section 1.3, social interests 
always operate within a framework of pre- existing culture. 
British eugenists did not develop their ideas in an in- 
tellectual vacuum. They drew on already present beliefs 
about heredity and society, adopting some of these unaltered, 
transforming others to suit their interests, and adding new 
elements. While the result was undoubtedly a new set of 
ideas, it is worth briefly examining some of the cultural 
resources on which they drew. 
In his biography, Galton (1908, 288) described 
early nineteenth century beliefs about heredity as 'lax 
and contradictory'. To the extent that this was so, it 
can /... 
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can be attributed to the large variety of social purposes 
that such beliefs served. The animal breeder used heredity 
as a guide in developing stock; the physician used it as 
an explanation of disease; the moralist used it to sanction 
deviance; the middle class male used it as an argument for 
female passivity (Rosenberg, 1974). Before eugenics, there 
was no single dominant social use to which heredity was put, 
there was no generalised controversy about heredity, and 
thus there was little pressure to consistency in the deploy- 
ment of ideas. 'Clarification' came only as a result of 
the eugenists' systematic and controversial use of the 
ideas of heredity; pre- eugenic notions formed a rich, 
varied and plastic body of knowledge capable of easy 
deployment in various directions. 
Hereditarian beliefs were employed in arguments 
about social reform before eugenics, but the use made of 
them was frequently opposite to that typical of the eugenics 
movement. Heredity was invoked as a sanction reinforcing 
the case for particular environmental reforms. Bad con- 
ditions, drunkenness and drug abuse were held to have a 
detrimental effect on the children of the present generation, 
through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. 
Environmental reforms:- such as sanitary improvements or a 
curb on the drink trade - would, it was claimed, improve 
not simply this generation but the next.(3) As Rosenberg 
(1974/... 
(3) It should, however, be noted that many of those 
campaigning for compulsory custodial treatment of 
alcoholics did not accept this optimistic view, and 
saw retreats as a means of isolating alcoholics. 
See R.H. MacLeod (1967e).. 
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(1974, 221 -2) points out, Richard Dugdale's famous study 
of the Jukes family was not a call for eugenics, as it was 
later to be interpreted, but for environmental reform. 
Sufficiently vigorous action in education and the improve- 
ment of conditions, extended over two or three generations, 
could, it was hoped, stamp out the social evils manifested 
by the Jukes family, 
It is not possible to attribute the change in 
the social uses of beliefs about heredity that took place 
in the later nineteenth century simply to internal changes 
within science. Certainly, most British biologists after 
1890 did follow August Weismann in his rejection of the 
view that acquired characteristics could be inherited. 
And eugenists did use this as a basis for arguing that 
only eugenic reform could have a permanent effect on the 
race. However, it is clear that Weismannism did not cause 
eugenics. Galton had independently rejected the in- 
heritance of acquired characters before Weismann's work 
appeared, possibly because of his eugenic views (Cowan, 
1968 and 1977, 156 -7). The reception of ,ieismann's views 
in Britain was, in fact, strongly conditioned by their 
perceived political significance.(4) There had been no 
major change in the available scientific evidence on the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics. Nor did 
acceptance /... 
(4) See, for example, Ball (1890). Burnham (1972)argues 
that this political response to Weismann was a 
peculiarly Anglo- American phenomenon. 
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acceptance of Weismannism compel or even indicate advocacy 
of eugenics.(5) 
Another component in the intellectual background 
of eugenic thought was political economy and the image of 
society it developed (Abrams, 1968). For all its rejection 
of Enlightenment optimism, of the environmentalism of the 
utilitarians, and of the revolutionary- bourgeois notion 
that 'all men are born equal', eugenics retained certain 
key elements of classical bourgeois thought. The eugenic 
view of society was individualistic and atomistic. The 
fitness of a society was the sum of the fitnesses of the 
various individuals comprising it. Although the eugenists 
stressed race, their view of race was not a holistic one. 
A race was not an unalterable essence, but a historical 
population, the sum of its parts. 
There was a particularly close affinity between 
eugenics and the biological variant of bourgeois political 
economy, social Darwinism. The eugenic identification of 
social failure with biological unfitness, the notion of 
progress coining through the elimination of the 'unfit', and 
the biological view of society, are all drawn from social 
Darwinism. Indeed, Halliday (1971) has attempted to 
treat the two movements as more or less equivalent. In 
this /... 
(5) Alfred Russel Wallace, for example, accepted that 
acquired characteristics were not inherited, but 
rejected eugenics as a political programme. 
See Wallace (1890). 
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this, however, he is wrong. Earlier social Darwinism 
(especially Spencer's) held that the elimination of the 
unfit could be achieved by political inaction. If the 
state would stop interfering in the working of natural 
laws, all would be well (Spencer, 1873, 343 -6). Eugenics, 
in contrast, did not trust to laissez- faire. 'What Nature 
does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly', wrote Galton (1909, 
42), 'man may do providently, quickly, and kindly'. 
Thus, eugenists drew on resources present in the 
culture of Victorian Britain. They combined these in 
their own characteristic manner and developed from them 
patterns of thought of a novel kind: both general, such as 
the nature /nurture distinction, and more specialised, such 
as the statistical view of heredity and evolution. Je 
must now consider who developed and propagated this new 
and characteristic body of thought. 
3.2 The Social Come si tion of the Eu enics Movement 
British eugenics can, for our purposes, be said 
to have begun in the 1860's with the publication of the 
first article on the subject by Galton (1865). During 
the 1880's eugenics became a definite topic of public 
discussion in books and articles. Between 1900 and 1914 
it achieved institutional expression, notably with the 
establishment of a Eugenics Laboratory in the University of 
London and in 1907 with the foundation of the Eugenics 
Education /... 
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Education Society (E.E.S.). By 1913 -14 the E.E.S. had 
over 1,000 members (Farrall, 1970, 211 -2). 
The most straightforward answer to the question, 
'Who were the eugenists ?', is provided by examining the 
membership of the E.E.S. in the key years 1908 -14. With some 
exceptions (notably Karl Pearson), nearly all known 
British eugenists were members of the Society. Its 
membership has been examined by Farrall, who concludes 
(1970, 225 -8): 
The leadership of the Eugenics Education 
Society was dominated by well- educated 
members of the middle -class professions 
of medicine, university teaching and 
science ... Membership was not only drawn 
almost exclusively from the middle classes 
but also heavily from the intellectual, 
creative and welfare professions. Of 
those whose profession has been discovered 
only three military officers and one 
businessman would be excluded definitely 
from this category. 
To the extent that the hypothesis of membership drawn 
virtually exclusively from the professional middle class 
is true, it should be possible to identify every member 
of the E.E.S. by use of the various biographical dictionaries 
of the professions (such as the Medical Directory), in 
addition to sources such as the Dictionary of National 
Biography and Who's Who. As a check that this coula in 
fact be done, and that the rather high proportion of in- 
dividuals not positively identified by Farrall did not 
contradict his conclusion, I examined one group of members: 
the forty -one elected members of the Council for 1914 (vice - 
presidents/.., 
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presidents and honorary members were omitted). Forty of 
these were identified (see appendix B for details), and 
their occupations were as follows: 














This confirms Farrall's analysis. It seems safe 
to conclude that while eugenics may possibly have enjoyed 
support amongst other social groups, the bulk of its 
activists were of the professional middle class. 
and /... 
Business 
(6) Several of the doctors held university or medical 
school teaching posts. 
(7) One, Cockburn, a doctor by training. 
(8) One, Havelock Ellis, also an author; the other, 
Mond, also a businessman. 
(9) One official of the National Association for the 
Welfare of the Feeble -Minded, one farmer (and 
amateur agricultural scientist), one retired army 
engineer, and five wives or widows (of a naval 
lieutenant, an admiral, a civil servant and 
businessman, a merchant and geographer, and a 
surgeon) for whom no occupational data could be 
found. 
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and the hereditary aristocracy (as distinct from ennobled 
commoners) were not prominent in support of eugenics, in or 
out of the E.E.S. Nor were the working class. It 
would also seem clear that the eugenists were not recruited 
equally from all sections of the professional middle class. 
The universities, science and medicine were heavily 
represented; law and the church more sparsely. Finally, 
it is of interest to note that a large proportion of the 
members of the E.E.S. were women; this was not, however, 
fully reflected in the composition of its Council,(10) 
Such evidence on social composition is, however, 
inevitably ambiguous. One possible conclusion from it is 
that drawn by Farrall, who identifies eugenics as a form of 
the 'middle class radicalism' described by Parkin (1968). 
Members of the 'welfare and creative' professions tend to 
join reforming bodies forreasons which reflect, not their 
social interests, but the psychological satisfaction to be 
found in moral reform. Thus 
... the members of the eugenics movement 
found emotional satisfaction in expressing 
their personal beliefs in action rather 
than seeking specific material improvement 
in their status within society. 
(Farrall, 1970, 293) 
On this view, there is no reason to expect any intimate con- 
nection between the composition of the eugenics movement 
and!... 
/WO ale 
(10) The complex relations of eugenics and feminism will 
be discussed by Helen Rugen in her forthcoming 
University of Edinburgh Ph.D. thesis. 
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and the views it put forward, other than the fact that these 
were of a general moral- reforming nature. Another con- 
clusion, however, is also possible: that eugenics was an 
ideology of the professional middle class, and that it did 
reflect the search of members of this group for 'material 
improvement in their status within society'. On this 
view, eugenics would be not simply a movement of pro- 
fessionals, but also a movement for professionals. My 
reading of the propaganda and schemes of the eugenists 
susupports this latter view.(11) pp Before discussing this, 
it is however necessary to turn briefly to some relevant 
features of the social position of the professional middle 
class. 
3.3 The Professional and the Social Structure 
On a Marxist view of industrial capitalist 
societies, the basic capital /labour polarity gives rise to 
two fundamental classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
This dichotomy must, however, be refined in order to examine 
the actual social structure of Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain with a view to discussing the eugenics movement. 
Firstly, it is necessary to note the clear distinction drawn 
by contemporaries between what were sometimes referred to 
as /... 
IM 
(11) See also Searle (1976, 45 -66), who comments that 
'the professional middle classes and the in- 
telligentsia' were 'the heroes of the play' in 
eugenic propaganda (59). 
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as the 'respectable working class' and the 'residuum' or 
lumpen- proletariat. This distinction will be returned to 
in section 3.5. Secondly, attention must be given to the 
significant number of occupational positions that can be 
classed neither as 'bourgeois' nor as 'proletarian'. 
Professional jobs fall into this category. Some pro- 
fessionals such as doctors and lawyers were self -employed, 
and can perhaps be seen as, in the traditional sense, petty 
bourgeois. An increasing number of professionals were, 
however, employees of the state or private concerns. 
Like the proletariat, they were forced to sell their labour 
power, even though the terms on which they did so were much 
more favourable. 
The group of self -employed and salaried pro- 
fessionals form what is usually referred to as the 'pro- 
fessional middle class'.(12) Certain general features of 
the /... 
(12) There would be little point in embarking here on a 
discussion as to whether or not professionals and 
other white- collar workers form a class in the 
Marxist, or any other, sense. That issue - together 
with the consequent problems of what class it is, if 
they form a class, or to which class they are attached, 
if they do not - is the subject of much debate. See 
for example Poulantzas (1975), Carchedi (1975a; 1975b; 
1976), B. and J. Ehrenreich (1976) and Johnson (1977). 
For the limited purposes of the present discussion it 
is sufficient to draw on this literature simply for 
the insights it provides into the social situation of 
the professional. The following analysis does not 
assume the validity of any particular (Marxist or non - 
Marxist) class theory, although it might eventually 
profit from reformulation in terms of an adequate 
theory of the professional middle class, should such 
a theory be developed. 
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the social situation of professionals can be identified, 
at least tentatively. Firstly, they occupy a position 
intermediate between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. 
They are differentiated from the bourgeoisie (and the 
aristocracy) in that they do not own or control substantial 
quantities of capital (or land). They are differentiated 
from the proletariat in that their work is held to be 
mental labour, superior to manual labour. Secondly, 
recruitment to this group is generally not automatic, but 
is achieved through the education system. As J. and J. 
Ehrenreich (1976, 29) point out, the son ofawealthy 
businessman is virtually ensured the possibility of a 
similar position; the same holds for the son of a manual 
labourer. 'Class reproduction' for professionals is, 
however, more precarious. 3eing the child of a professional 
is an advantage, but does not guarantee similar status. 
3. and J. Ehrenreich suggest that 'class reproduction' 
comes to dominate the 'interior life' of the class: 
... all of the ordinary experiences of life - 
growing up, giving birth, childraising - are 
freighted with an external significance unknown 
in other classes. 
(1976, 29) 
While this may be exaggerated (the degree of this anxiety 
must undoubtedly be historically variable), it is worth 
noting that 'class reproduction' takes on a specifically 
problematic form in the professional middle class. 
Thirdly, the absolute and relative number of professional 
jobs, and their social importance, tend to increase with 
the /... 
- 91 - 
the development of capitalist economies. This process 
is, however, not uniform. Thus Hobsbawrn (1968, 267) 
suggests that, in some respects, it was relatively slower 
in Britain than in Germany or France. Further, it is at 
least arguable that these jobs and the fortunes of their 
incumbents are not tied to the continuance of a specifically 
capitalist economic order, and that the responsibilities 
and rewards associated with them might in at least certain 
cases be no less, or even greater, in a socialist state. 
What strategies does the professional middle class 
typically employ in pursuit of its interests? Historically, 
the most significant has of course been 'professionalisation' 
itself. The rationale of professionalisation is to 
legitimate the activity of an occupational group by reference 
to its accredited possession of a body of knowledge, to 
impose controls on access to this knowledge and to member- 
ship of the occupational group, and to free the group as 
much as possible from pressure from outsiders or 'laymen'. 
The strategy of professionalisation thus reflects the 
crucial role of accredited knowledge in differentiating 
the professional middle class from the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat. Professional autonomy and control over access 
to membership of the profession are also important in 
alleviating the difficulties of 'class reproduction'. The 
high rate of self -recruitment to be found in the medical 
profession, for example, is evidence of the degree to which 
this strategy can bear fruit. When we turn to more 
general /... 
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When we turn to more general political strategies, we find, 
however, a certain indeterminateness. The professional 
middle class is a relatively privileged group within 
capitalist society, and yet many professional jobs are not 
bound intrinsically to a capitalist order. A professional's 
conservatism and a professional's socialism are both 
possible. What does seem likely, however, is that both 
the conservatism and the socialism will be expressed in 
terms of an ideology of the 'expert' and of 'meritocracy'. 
Harold Perkin writes of the British professional middle 
class: 
Their ideal society was a functional one based 
on expertise and selection by merit. For them 
trained and qualified expertise rather than 
property, capital or labour, should be the 
chief determinant and justification of status 
and power in society. 
(1972, 258) 
Charting the growth of the professional middle 
class in Britain is difficult. Problems in the occupational 
classifications in the census, and the general difficulty 
of deciding when a particular occupation became in the full 
sense a 'profession', make even rough estimates of numbers 
difficult.(13) The formal growth of professionalisation 
(13) Mitchell and Deane (1962, 60) give a table of figures 
for the period 1841 -1921 suggesting that the percentage 
of occupied males who were in tprofessional occupations 
and their subordinate services' rose from about 2% in 
1841 to 3% in 1921, while the corresponding figures 
for females were 3% in 1841 and 8% in 1921. These 
bald figures are however misleading. For example, 
'professional entertainers and sportsmen' are in- 
cluded, but veterinary surgeons excluded. Even more 
seriously, the rapid change in the position of 
particular occupations in this period means that the 
social content of particular occupational labels com- 
pletely altered in many cases. 
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is easier to chart.(14) Perkin comments (1972, 254 -5): 
With urbanisation and the rise of living 
standards, doctors, lawyers, writers, and 
even the clergy (including dissenting 
ministers) found an enlarged demand for 
their services, which reduced their 
dependence on the few rich and increased 
that on the many comfortable clients of 
their own social standing. The transition 
enabled them to acquire a greater measure of 
self- respect, and to demand corresponding 
respect from society ... At the same time 
new professions proliferated, and organised 
themselves to demand the same kind of status 
and independence as the old. 
The emergence of some of the newer scientifically -based 
professions was undoubtedly slower in Britain than, say, 
in Germany, and overall growth in the number of professionals 
was perhaps less important than consolidation and the drawing 
of boundaries. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to talk 
(at least by the latter part of the nineteenth century) of 
the emergence of an established professional middle class. 
Of course, there were important lines of division: between 
self- employed professionals and the newer group of pro- 
fessional employees; between the older professions sucheas 
law and the church, and the new more marginal ones; between 
male professionals and women seeking, or having succeeded 
in achieving, entry to the professions. Despite this, it 
would appear that the professional middle class did have 
some common sense of identity and social position (Perkin, 
1972, 254 -61). In the next two sections, we shall see 
how /... 
SO NO 
(14) The classic study of this, the senior author of 
which was a prominent member of the Eugenics Society, 
is Carr -Saunders and Wilson (1933). 
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how in the case of some professionals this consciousness 
related to eugenics. First, let us turn to the founder of 
the eugenics movement, Francis Galton. 
3.4 Francis Galton and the Origins of Eugenics 
By birth, marriage and inclination Galton belonged 
to an early élite of the emerging Victorian professional 
middle class. N.G. Annan (1955) has called the group to 
which Galton belonged 'the intellectual aristocracy'. The 
origins of this group lay in the bourgeoisie. The families 
from which it came were distinguished from the bulk of the 
bourgeoisie by religion (they were Quakers, Unitarians or 
members of the Clapham Sect) and by their philanthropic 
and anti -slavery concerns. The children of marriages 
within this group tended to abandon direct business involve- 
ment for the world of scholarship, education and the pro- 
fessions. They rapidly rose to dominant positions in the 
universities, public schools, science and literature. Some 
entered the state bureaucracy, to become 'mandarins' of the 
increasingly professional civil service. Although ties of 
kinship and common interest bound this group to other 
sections of the élite of Victorian Britain, Annan (1955, 
248) emphasises that it maintained a separate identity. 
At least until the end of the nineteenth century, it 
remained tightly -knit, held together by continuing inter- 
marriage and by a common commitment to educational and 
administrative reform, to the abolition of religious tests 
and /... 
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and to the introduction of selection by competitive examination 
in the civil service. This programme expressed the 'in- 
tellectual aristocracy's° commitment to modernisation, and 
laid the basis, in its success, for a growth in the size 
and influence of the professional middle class as a result 
of the expansion of education and rational bureaucracy. 
Francis Galton could well be taken as an archetype 
of this group. He was born into one of the families of 
the °intellectual aristocracy' (the Wedgwood /Darwin /Galton 
family) and married into another (the Butlers). He in- 
herited from his Quaker ancestors sufficient money never to 
have to practise a profession for gain (he was trained in 
medicine and mathematics), and the two families to which he 
belonged brought him connections in science, medicine, 
education and the church. Direct observation of kinship 
links within this professional élite may have been the 
source of his initial hereditarian convictions. He wrote 
in his autobiography (Calton, 1908, 288): 
I had been immensely impressed by many obvious 
cases of heredity among the Cambridge men who 
were at the University about my own time. 
He did not, however, give any general interpretation to this 
to begin with. The spur to such an interpretation was the 
publication by his cousin, Charles Darwin, of The Origin of 
Species (Darwin, 1859). Almost fifty years later, Galton 
wrote (1908, 287): 
The publication in 1859 of the Origin of Species 
by Charles Darwin made a marked epoch in my own 
mental /... 
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mental development, as it did in that of 
human thought generally. Its effect was 
to demolish a multitude of dogmatic barriers 
by a single stroke, and to arouse a spirit 
of rebellion against all ancient authorities 
whose positive and unauthenticated statements 
were contradicted by modern science. 
As important as any detailed impact that Darwin's work had 
on Galton was the general effect on him of the controversy 
following its publication. Galton was present at the 
British Association meeting at Oxford in 1860 when Huxley 
and Wilberforce debated Darwin's theories (Forrest, 1974, 
84). Galton clearly felt the need to choose sides between 
scientific naturalism and its theological opponents. Given 
his background, there could be little doubt which side he 
would choose. He became a leading member of the group of 
scientific intellectuals which included Huxley, Spencer and 
Tyndall. He vigorously opposed the dogmas of revealed 
religion, and sought to replace the Christian faith by a 
system of belief based on natural science. The near 
monopoly of the church in comfortable professional positions 
must, Galton felt, be ended, and an adequately- supported 
profession of science established. The scientists' role 
should not be a mere technical one: they should form 'a 
sort of scientific priesthood throughout the kingdom, whose 
high duties would have reference to the health and well- 
being of the nation in its broadest sense'(Galton, 1874, 260415) 
(15) For Galton's anti -clericalism and its context, see 
F.M. Turner (1974b). Turner (1974a) is a sensitive 
study of the relations of science and religion in this 
period. 
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In the 1860's, Galton began to interpret his 
experience of kinship links in the professional élite in 
a naturalistic and evolutionary framework, and to derive 
from this a faith and a social practice for the scientific 
priesthood. The method of his initial studies in 
heredity was a simple generalisation of his early 
observations of his contemporaries. He sought to trace 
kinship links amongst those acknowledged to be of exceptional 
mental ability (amongst his examples were his own and his 
wife's families). By this means he showed that achieve- 
ment ran in families: the closeness of kinship links 
amongst the eminent was far greater than wouldbe expected 
if eminence was distributed at random in the population. 
This Galton interpreted as proof of the inheritance of 
mental ability, and he went on to argue for a eugenic pro- 
gramme which would ensure the careful and early marriage and 
high fertility of the most able (Galton, 1865; Galton, 1869). 
Galton saw in eugenics the basis for a new scientific and 
evolutionary religion, in which an individual would be seen 
only as a manifestation of immortal germ plasm (1869, 
especially 376). 
The practice of eugenics also necessitated social 
changes. The dominance of society by plutocracy and 
hereditary nobility must, Galton felt, be ended. Extremes 
of inherited wealth and titles of nobility had a bad 
effect on the race, causing the degeneration and sterility 
of originally healthy stock. 
The /... 
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The best form of civilisation in respect to 
the improvement of the race, would be one in 
which society was not costly; where incomes 
were chiefly derived from professional sources, 
and not much through inheritance; where every 
lad had a chance of showing his abilities, and, 
if highly gifted, was enabled to achieve a 
first -class education and entrance into pro- 
fessional life, by the liberal help of the 
exhibitions and scholarships which he had gained 
in his early youth; where marriage was held in 
high honour as in ancient Jewish times; where 
the pride of race was encouraged (of course I 
do not refer to the nonsensical sentiment of 
the present day, that goes under that name); 
where the weak could find a welcome and a 
refuge in celibate monasteries or sisterhoods, 
and lastly, where the better sort of emigrants 
and refugees from other lands were invited and 
welcomed, and their descendants naturalised. 
(Galton, 1869, 362) 
At the end of his life, Galton wrote a novel, 
Kantsaywhere, in which he described his eugenic utopia.(16) 
This reads, in many respects, as a direct description of 
the practice and ideals of the 'intellectual aristocracy'. 
The island of Kantsaywhere is dominated by a benevolent 
oligarchy, the Eugenic College, who administer it along the 
lines suggested by Galton's early articles. The College 
examines eugenic fitness, encourages the early marriage of 
the 'fit', and deports or segregates the 'unfit'. The 
population have fully accepted the rule of the College, and 
'everyone is classed by everybody else according to their 
estimate or knowledge of his person and faculties'. The 
College is trusted and looked up to: 
The Trustees of the College are the sole 
proprietors /... 
(16) This was never published. The surviving fragments 
are reproduced in Karl Pearson (1914 -30, 3A, 411 -25). 
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proprietors of almost all the territory of 
Kantsaywhere, and they exercise a corresponding 
influence over the whole population. Their 
moral ascendancy is paramount. The families 
of the College and those of the Town are con- 
nected by numerous inter -marriages and common 
interests, so that the relation between them 
is more like that between the Fellows of a 
College and the undergraduates, than between 
the Gown and Town of an English University. 
In short, Kantsaywhere may be looked upon as 
an active little community, containing a 
highly -respected and wealthy guild. 
(quoted by K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 414) 
Competitive examinations determine status, the intellectually 
gifted intermarry, and the dominance of society by the 
extremely wealthy and titled has been replaced by the 
dominance of the intellectual élite. In short, the 
relaxed social control of the university, passing and 
'plucking', has been extended over the whole of society. 
Galton's eugenics had thus a double aspect. He 
came from an intellectual elite closely bound by kinship 
ties. In this social group achievement was inherited 
(though we might now want to interpret this socially rather 
than biologically). Successful fathers had successful 
sons; these sons generally married within the social group 
and themselves had successful offspring.(17) So Galton 
was interpreting generally and naturalistically a salient 
facet of his social experience. At the same time, an 
intrinsic part of his eugenic programme was the advancement 
of the interests of the professional middle class. The 
middle /... 
MO UM OS 
(17) Mothers and daughters, it is worth noting, scarcely 
figured in Galton's eugenic thought except as the 
transmitters of hereditary ability. 
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middle class 'expert', rather than the priest, aristocrat 
or plutocrat, should exercise power in an efficient, 
modernised, eugenic society. Science, rather than 
Christian religion, should be the dominant cultural form. 
Thus Galton's eugenics both expressed the social experience 
and reflected the social interests of the rising pro - 
fessional elite to which he belonged. (18) 
3.5 Eugenics as an Ideology of the Professional 
Middle Class 
Although, as we have seen, the eugenics movement 
was made up almost exclusively of members of the professional 
middle class, few were of such high status as Galton.(19) 
Nor /... 
(18) Buss (1976) interprets the origins of Galton's eugenics 
differently. He argues that it arose from the con- 
tradictions between the liberal individualist emphasis 
on the existence of equality of opportunity and the facts 
of the hierarchical division of labour: a hereditarian 
interpretation of mental ability being necessary to 
explain why, given equal opportunities, such grossly 
unequal outcomes could result. 
It seems to me that while this view is useful in under- 
standing eugenics in general, there is little evidence 
that Galton felt the particular contradiction Buss out- 
lines. Further, Buss account of 'democratic-liberal - 
capitalistic- individualism' seems idealised, as when 
he claims (1976, 56): 
We see in Kantsaywhere an ideological doctrine of 
eugenics that was a distortion of reality vis-a - 
vis British nineteenth century liberal individualism... 
In Kantsaywhere the political system would seem to 
be totalitarian ... 
(19) Indeed given the closeness of the functional and kinship 
relations of the 'intellectual aristocracy' to the 
British bourgeoisie and aristocracy, we might almost 
want to describe it as a professional, modernising 
fraction of the British ruling class. This fraction 
might then be seen as separate from, but exercising 
hegemony over, the bulk of the professional middle class. 
Certainly the 'intellectual aristocracy' provided the 
culture heroes of the British professional middle class 
from Darwin to Keynes. 
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Nor did later eugenic methodology reflect the social origins 
of eugenics in as direct a way as did Galton's kinship 
studies. Nevertheless, it is possible to see several 
connections between eugenics and the professional middle 
class. These connections seem to me to indicate that 
British eugenics can best be_seen as an ideology of the 
professional middle class.(20) 
At times the Eugenics Education Society acted as 
a straightforward advocate of the financial interest of the 
middle class: 
... the incidence of the income tax is claiming 
attention, and a letter has been sent by the 
President to all Members of Parliament pointing 
out that any system of taxation which takes no 
account of the necessary expenditure involved in 
bringing up a family may, in a sense, be said to 
penalise marriage and parenthood, and that taxation 
which retards marriage and discourages parenthood 
on the part of worthy citizens has a harmful in- 
fluence in tending to lower the proportion of men 
and women of good stock or blood in the com- 
position of the generations of the future. There 
is no question that the income tax at present 
falls most heavily on parents belonging to the 
middle and professional classes, to whom this 
description can be appropriately applied. 
It is suggested that the way to remedy this evil 
is to extend the principle of allowing rebates 
for each child ..® 
(E. E. S. , 1914, 7) 
When /... 
0.11 
(20) This analysis is intended to apply only to Britain. 
Garland Allen (1975b, 39) argues that eugenics in 
the United States was 'founded, financed or in other 
ways supported' by at least a section of the ruling 
class. American eugenics differed in content from 
British eugenics, in that race, rather than class, 
appears to have been the dominant theme (Rosenberg, 
1974, 227). Allen (1975b, 41) suggests that it was 
the racial aspect of American eugenics that made it 
attractive to the American ruling class. 
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When the First World War broke out, the Council of the 
E.E.S. discussed what practical eugenic action could be 
taken in the war situation. As a result of this dis- 
cussion, the E.E.S., in conjunction with the heads of the 
leading professional bodies and institutions, helped form 
a 'Professional Classes War Relief Council' and set up a 
maternity home for the wives of professional men serving 
in the armed forces- (E.E.S., 1915, 4 -5). 
The significance of eugenics was, however, much 
wider than this. Eugenics was used both to legitimate the 
social position of the professional middle class and to 
argue for its improvement. As noted in section 3.3, the 
professional middle class owes its social position neither 
to wealth nor to ascribed status, but to the specialised 
mental abilities and knowledge of its members. The 
hereditarian theory of mental ability, as developed by the 
eugenists, implied that only a limited section of the 
population had the potential to achieve the skills and 
knowledge required for professional middle class roles. 
The professional middle class had, according to the 
eugenists, achieved their position, not by accident of 
circumstances, but as the result of generations of selection 
for mental ability. The next generation of professionals 
would of necessity have to be recruited largely from the 
existing professional middle class. Thus, a rigidly 
stratified educational system was justified, with only the 
narrowest of ladders to allow the unusually gifted child, 
the!... 
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the 'sport', to rise from the lower classes. Eugenics 
offered the professional middle class an educational 
philosophy which enabled them to justify the effective 
monopoly of professional education by the existing pro- 
fessional class. The eugenist could consistently advocate 
an expanded educational system - 1870 -1914 was a period of 
considerable educational expansion - while laying down a 
structure for this expansion which maintained existing 
privileges.(21) 
One interesting facet of the discussion of mental 
ability by British eugenists is that 'business acumen' or 
'entrepreneurial skills' played no part in it. We find no 
English Men of Business paralleling Galton's English Men of 
Science, although a hereditarian account of business skills 
could have been constructed with equal plausibility. ;While 
the majority of British eugenists did not attack the business 
community, they did not seek to legitimate it in a similar 
way to their legitimation of the professional middle class. 
There was also little attempt to legitimate the hereditary 
nobility. Indeed, a not uncommon target for attacks by 
eugenists was the House of Lords. Following Galton's 
views on the detrimental effect on the race of the peerage, 
schemes such as for the replacement of the House of Lords 
by /... 
NO 610 
(21) See K. Pearson (1902b) for an example of this type of 
argument. B. Simon (1971) shows the deep and 
persistent role of crypto -eugenic arguments in 
British educational thought and policy making. 
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by an upper house of families of genuine eugenic worth 
were discussed. Arnold White, for example, pictured the 
aristocracy and plutocracy as degenerate and prey to 
hereditary ills as the result of inbreeding and marriage 
for wealth rather than for health and mental ability 
(White, 1900. 
Most eugenists stopped short of an explicit 
attack on the existing power structure of British society. 
A significant section, however, attacked the existing ruling 
groups as unable to administer a modern society efficiently 
and scientifically, and condemned capitalist society as 
dysgenic (i.e. anti -eugenic) in its operation. A eugenic 
policy, they argued, was impossible while laissez -faire 
capitalism demanded large supplies of unskilled labour and 
a permanent pool of unemployed. Among socialists who at 
least temporarily supported eugenics were Karl Pearson, 
Jane Hume Clapperton and several leaders of the Fabian 
Society, including Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw and 
H.G. Wells.(22) 
Socialist support for a movement I have analysed 
as representing the interests of the professional middle 
class seems paradoxical. However, the main point of 
reference /... 
MO PO 60 
(22) Pearson is discussed in chapter four; for Clapperton, 
see her (1885) and Farrall (1970, 32 -4); for 4ebb, 
his (1907); for Wells, Hyde (1956); for Shaw, whose 
'extremism' on the subject of marriage and monogamy 
terrified most eugenists, see the preface to Shaw 
(1972). 
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reference for Fabian socialists, and near -Fabians such as 
Pearson, was not the working class but the professional 
middle class. As Eric Hobsbawm (1968) has shown, the 
social composition of the Fabian Society was 'over- 
whelmingly non -proletarian', with journalists, writers, 
university and school teachers, doctors, clergy and public 
officials the most common occupations of its members. 
There were wide political differences between the Fabians 
and the majority of working class socialists: 
The Fabians, alone among socialist groups, 
opposed the formation of an independent party 
of labour, supported imperialism, refused to 
oppose the Boer War, took no interest in the 
traditional international and anti -war pre- 
occupations of the left, and their leaders 
took practically no part in the trade union 
revivals of 1889 or 1911. 
(Hobsbawm, 1968, 253) 
But the chief concern of the Fabians was not with the working 
class as the agency of social change. Fabian ideology 
(especially as expressed by the Webbs) pivoted round the 
salaried middle class: 
They are the trained, impartial and scientific 
administrators and expert advisers who have 
created an alternative court of appeal to profit. 
(Hobsbawm, 1968, 258) 
The Fabians saw in the ethos of professionalism 'a working 
alternative to a system in which men worked in proportion 
only to their financial incentive' (Hobsbawm, 1968, 258). 
The professional middle class would realise that a socialist 
society 'really suited them just as well if not better than 
the capitalist' (Hobsbawm, 1968, 259). 
Why /... 
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Why should a professional middle class ideology 
take a socialist form? As noted in section 3.3, and as 
the Fabians themselves argued, there are no necessary 
reasons why the interests of the professional middle class 
should be tied to a capitalist economic order. The 
rising 'meritocracy' could see their skills as necessary 
to any industrial society, not merely a capitalist one. 
There were indeed particular reasons why professionals 
(especially in the new, rising professions) should be 
hostile to laissez -faire capitalism. Laissez -faire 
restricted the scope for their talents and their job 
opportunities (for example in the lack of state support for 
science). It could be blamed for the relatively slow 
growth of, for example, new professions such as that of the 
industrial scientist. As Hobsbawm points out, a lot of 
the Fabians' socialism is merely hostility to laissez- faire, 
not to capitalism. 
Hobsbawm (1968, 266) concludes that the history 
of the Fabians 
... must be written not in terms of the 
socialist revival of the 1880's, but in terms 
of the middle -class reactions to the breakdown 
of mid -Victorian certainties, the rise of new 
strata, new structures, new policies, within 
British capitalism: as an adaptation of the 
British middle classes to the era of imperialism. 
On this view, Fabian socialism and eugenics can be seen not 
as political opposites but as different (though overlapping) 
variants of the same adaptation. Eugenics was the kind 
of /.., 
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of social reform that the Fabians liked: scientistic and 
involving planning, state action, legislation and (no 
doubt) an expansion of bureaucracy. If Fabian eugenists 
differed from their more conservative brethren, it was 
perhaps only in that they took a more fundamental and 
long -term attitude to the interests of the professional 
middle class. 
Fabian socialist support for eugenics thus 
strengthens, rather than weakens, the evidence for the 
hypothesis that eugenics expressed the social interests of 
the professional middle class. The professional men and 
women in the eugenics movement were 'seeking a material 
improvement in their status'. This can be seen in their 
identification of the professional middle class as the 'fit' 
par excellence. It can also be seen in the use of the 
hereditarian theory of mental ability to claim that the 
divide between professional, mental labour and manual labour 
was not merely a social division, but the reflection of a 
distinction between different kinds of people. These 
relationships do not, however, exhaust possible connections 
between eugenics and the professional middle class. Two 
further connections can be suggested, although unlike the 
'class interest' aspect of eugenics they are not explicit 
in eugenic propaganda, and the identification of them must 
therefore be tentative. 
The first possible link concerns the plausibility 
of accounting for social and economic status in terms of 
individual 
/,.p 
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individual cognitive ability. Bowles and Gintis (1976) 
point out that this has been a largely untested and un- 
examined assumption of both hereditarians and most of 
their environmentalist opponents. (23) pp Certainly, the 
existence of a strong causal connection was quite unself- 
consciously assumed by British eugenists. In part, this 
no doubt reflected an interest in legitimating the hier- 
arachical division of labour. It may be, however, that 
the very social situation of the professional middle class, 
as distinct from the bourgeoisie or proletariat, helped to 
make this assumption natural. Because social position is 
achieved in the professional middle class primarily through 
the formal educational system, individual cognitive ability 
might well appear to professionals to play a much larger 
part in determining life chances than it would to members 
of other classes. (24) 
Secondly, eugenics was particularly relevant to 
the problems of `class reproduction' faced by the pro- 
fessional middle class of late Victorian Britain and 
documented by Banks (1965). A persistent theme of eugenic 
propaganda /... 
(23) Their own study throws doubt on the validity of this 
assumption for contemporary America. They use a 
normalised regression model to evaluate the separate 
causal contributions of I.Q., years of schooling, 
socio- economic status of parent, etc., and find that 
of I.Q. surprisingly small. 
(24) One might, for example, speculate that members of the 
bourgeoisie or aristocracy would place greater weight 
on non -cognitive personality traits, such as 'ambition' 
or 'sense of duty'. 
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propaganda was that these problems (the cost of education, 
for example) were causing deliberate restriction of family 
size amongst the 'fit'. Again, the eugenic proposals for 
alleviating this problem (alteration of the incidence of the 
income tax, etc,) can be seen as fairly straightforward 
manifestations of class interest. However, it is possible 
that there was also an element of self -reassurance present. 
Rosenberg (1974, 235) argues that the 'irreducible core of 
the hereditarian commitment' was 
... the desire for assurance that one's children 
would somehow be endowed with the virtues required 
to make their lives successful - and thus to allay 
the guilt, the anxious striving, the ambivalence of 
their parents. 
Eugenics, it could thus be argued, offered the professional 
middle class psychological comfort in the face of anxiety 
about 'class reproduction',(25) 
3.6 Eugenics, the Residuum and Social Imperialism 
Eugenics was not only a matter of raising the 
fertility (and status) of the professional middle class: 
it /... 
(25) I have not attempted to develop any social -psychological 
interpretations of the individuals studied in this 
thesis; I lack the competence to do so. However, a 
reading of the letters of British statisticians of this 
period would certainly suggest that difficulties in 
parent -child relations, centring around 'class re- 
production', were undoubtedly present in many cases. 
I mention this simply in order to point out that, if 
the methods of 'psychohistory' are in the future 
employed on the subjects of this study, any psycho- 
analytic interpretations that are produced should 
possibly be seen not as opposed to class explanations, 
but as complementary to them. 
- 110 - 
it also involved lowering the fertility of those at the 
bottom of the social scale. While this aspect of it was 
little emphasised in Galton's early, utopian, positive 
eugenics, it came more and more to the fore in the period 
from 1880 onwards. Within Galton's own work negative 
eugenics became more prominent, though he always treated 
the subject with a certain caution, even distaste, and 
avoided 'unmentionable' topics such as sterilisation and 
contraception. More generally, the 'unfit' rather than 
the 'fit' were the central focus of eugenic propaganda. 
What, we must ask, were the views on class structure held 
by the eugenists, and who were the unfit who were to be 
dissuaded from breeding? 
The eugenists accepted a rough equation of social 
standing and genetic worth. Indeed, this was generally an 
axiom of their thought, and seldom a proposition they felt 
any need to defend. At least for those social groups con- 
ventionally regarded as being below the professional middle 
class, class position was taken as a sure indicator of 
average mental ability. The view of social structure the 
eugenists held was summarised by Galton in his 1901 Huxley 
Lecture (Galton, 1909, 1 -34). Galton took the social 
categories of Booth's survey of London and mapped them 
onto his assumed distribution of inherited 'civic worth'. 
In figure one, I have presented his results in graphical 
form. 'R,S,T,U,V' and 'r,s,t,u,v' are the subdivisions 
of 'civic worth'. 
below /... 
The lowest group, classes t,u,v and 
below,'are undesirables' (1909, 11). It is against them 
(and particularly against the 'criminals, semi -criminals 
and loafers' of v and below) that negative eugenics should 
be practised; for example, habitual criminals should be 
'segregated under merciful surveillance and peremptorily 
denied opportunities for producing offspring' (Galton, 
1909, 20). Galton (and the other eugenists) did not wish 
to depress the birth rate of all groups below the middle 
class. It would scarcely have been in the interests of 
the middle class to do so: eugenists were agreed that 
manual workers were socially necessary. What they wanted 
was to improve the discipline, physique and intelligence of 
the working class by eradicating the 'lowest' elements of 
it. The eugenists attempted to draw a line between 
socially useful and socially dangerous elements of the 
lower orders. While the exact placing of this line was 
vague, and varied from one writer to another, all were agreed 
that this distinction was necessary. 
The lowest social group ('t,u,v and below') were 
a prominent - indeed the prominent - social problem in the 
eyes of middle class late Victorians and Edwardians. The 
attitudes of the middle class to this group have been 
elucidated by Gareth Stedman Jones (1971). Jones argues 
that in the latter part of the nineteenth century there 
was a shift in middle class fears about social stability. 
Attention was no longer focused on the heartlands of the 
industrial revolution (such as Manchester), but became 
centred on London. 
middle /... 
Since the decline of Chartism, most 
Figure One 











large employers etc. 
For explanation, see text. 
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middle class observers felt that the respectable working 
class of the North of England were no longer a threat or 
a social problem. The problem rather lay with a smaller 
and more specific group in the slums of the big cities. 
The most characteristic image of the working 
class was that of increasingly prosperous and 
cohesive communities bound together by the 
chapel, the friendly society, and the co -op. 
Pitted against the dominant climate of moral 
and material improvement however was a minority 
of the still unregenerate poor: those who had 
turned their backs on progress, or had been 
rejected by it. This group was variously 
referred to as 'the dangerous class', the 
casual poor or most characteristically, as 
'the residuum'. 
(Jones, 1971, 10-11) 
In other words, the perceived problem of social control was 
no longer the working class as a whole, but only a !residual' 
section of it. The largest concentration of the 'residuum' 
was in London. The Quarterly Review summed up middle class 
attitudes as early as 1855: 
... the most remarkable feature of London life 
is a class decidedly lower in the social scale 
than the labourer, and numerically very large, 
though the population returns do not number 
them among the inhabitants of the kingdom, who 
derive their living from the streets ... for the 
most part their utmost efforts do little more 
than maintain them in a state of chronic 
starvation .,, very many have besides their 
acknowledged calling, another in the background 
in direct violation of the eighth commandment; 
and thus by gradations imperceptibly darkening 
as we advance, we arrive at the classes who are 
at open war with society, and professedly live 
by the produce of depredation or the wages of 
infamy. 
(quoted by Jones, 1971, 12) 
The worst situation was in the East End. 
From /.., 
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From the end of the 1860's to the First World 
War, the East End was a by -word for chronic 
and hopeless poverty, and endemic economic 
malaise. 
(Jones, 1971, 99) 
There was thus a definite 'social problem' in London. The 
residuum were not, it is true, radical or revolutionary. 
They were, however, politically volatile, and, pressed by 
extreme hardship, they were liable to riot. 
Social control was not the only problem. Middle 
class observers felt that the poor were not only dangerous 
but also physically and mentally degenerate. The urban 
slum dweller was characteristically compared with the 
healthy and strong agricultural labourer. It was widely 
believed that urban conditions caused the degeneration of 
immigrants from the country, whether by the direct effect 
of environment or by the selection of the worst types. 
Francis Galton was an early proponent of the theory of 
urban degeneracy: 
It is perfectly distressing to me to witness 
the draggled, drudged, mean look of the mass 
of individuals, especially of the women, that 
one meets in the streets of London and other 
purely English towns. The conditions of their 
life seem too hard for their constitutions, and 
to be crushing them into degeneracy. 
(Galton, 1869, 340) 
Increasingly the problem of urban degeneration was seen in 
the context of imperialism. A degenerating population was 
serious enough under any circumstances, but it could be 
fatal to a British Empire faced with increasing foreign 
Bcofiomic/ .. . 
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economic competition, colonial war and the ultimate threat 
of inter- imperialist war. The early reverses suffered by 
British troops in the Boer War (1899 -1902) gave concrete 
form to these misgivings. It was put about, and widely 
believed, that up to 60% of working class volunteers for 
the army had had to be rejected because they failed to 
meet the army's minimum standards of physical fitness 
(Gilbert, 1966, 84 -91). 
The problem, then, was seen to be a section of 
the working class that lacked moral fibre (i.e. was outside 
social control) and was physically unfit. The growth of 
large cities had broken the older forms of social control 
based on direct personal contact between rich and poor. 
The most important early attempt at a solution was the 
Charity Organisation Society, set up in 1869, which sought 
to reimpose social control through organised, selective 
charity and trained social workers (Jones, 1971, 241 -61). 
With the deepening urban crisis of the 1880's and the 
serious rioting of 1886 -7, there was a conscious search for 
new responses to the problem. Crucial to these was the 
distinction between the respectable working class and the 
residuum: the residuum must be isolated from the working 
class as a whole (even at the price of concessions to the 
bulk of workers) and neutralised or eliminated. Fabians, 
Tories and Liberal Imperialists could find common ground 
in agreement that a solution to the problem of the urban 
residuum was a prerequisite of imperial survival. The 
basis /... 
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basis was thus laid for social imperialism. This linking 
of imperialism and social reform loomed large in British 
politics between the 1880's and 1914, and, as Farrall (1970) 
points out, provided a favourable context for eugenic schemes.26) 
The eugenists had a biological explanation of the 
residuum . The suspension of natural selection through 
the operation of charity, medical science and sanitary reform 
had led, they claimed, to the flourishing, in the hearts of 
the great cities, of a group of people tainted by hereditary 
defect. Members of this group were unemployed because they 
lacked the health, ability and strength of will to work. 
Hereditary weakness turned them towards crime and alcohol. 
Their constitutions inclined them to wasting diseases such 
as tuberculosis. The residuum was outbreeding skilled 
workers and the professional middle class. The eugenists 
warned that although natural selection was largely 
suspended within British society, competition between dif- 
ferent nations went on. Britain was engaged in a struggle 
for survival that was normally commercial but might at any 
time become military. National fitness for this struggle 
was necessary. Under the conditions of modern civilisation, 
a replacement for natural selection had to be found in con- 
scious eugenic selection. A pliable and fit working class 
could be bred by isolating the residuum in institutions 
where /... 
WI ON 
(26) See also Semmel (1960) and Searle (1971; 1976). 
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where parenthood would be made impossible.(27) 
Negative eugenics was thus not an abstract moral 
reform programme, but a specific response to a specific 
problem. The eugenists proposed the most thorough solution 
to the problem of the residuum, short of immediate 
elimination. Social control was to be imposed by the 
detention in institutions of the habitual criminal, the 
alcoholic, the 'hereditary' pauper, and so on. Prevention 
of parenthood in these institutions would mean the eventual 
disappearance of the residuum as a group. This solution 
would leave untouched the position and privileges of the 
higher social classes, while drawing in full on the skills 
of the middle class scientific expert. While it might 
seem a rather extreme proposal, it differed only in 
thoroughness and scientific rationale from similar proposals 
put forward at the time, such as Charles Booth's plan for 
labour camps for the residuum (Jones, 1971, 305 -8). 
3.7 The Rise and Decline of Eugenics 
The rise and decline of the eugenics movement in 
Britain seems to be largely accounted for by variations in 
the credibility of the programme for negative eugenics. 
Four major turning points can be identified: the urban 
crisis/... 
IMO ONO 
(27) This argument was made, for example, by White (1901) 
and by Karl Pearson (1909c; 1909d; 1909e). 
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crisis of the 1880's, the Boer War (1899- 1902), the First 
World War, and the world slump and the emergence of German 
facism (1929 -34). 
Before 1880, it is impossible to talk of eugenics 
as a movement: it was more a utopian speculation. The 
urban crisis of the 1880's, and the related emergence of 
social imperialism, provided the context for serious con- 
sideration of negative eugenics (White, 1895; first pub- 
lished in 1886). The real opportunity for the eugenists 
came with the Boer War and the boost it gave to social 
imperialism. This prompted Karl Pearson and Arnold 'White 
to write their most famous social imperialist and eugenic 
tracts (Pearson, 1901a; White, 1901). As White (1901, 
xiii) wrote: 
In South Africa we have a lesson. Shall we 
profit by it sufficiently to reconsider our ways? 
Pearson wrote to Galton urging him to open a direct campaign 
for eugenics, sensing that the time was ripe for 'a word in 
season' on eugenics (Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 242 -3). Although 
almost in his eighties, Galton responded by campaigning for 
and funding eugenics. The years from 1901 to 1914 were of 
gradual, if unspectacular, success for the eugenics movement, 
which by the time of the outbreak of war seemed on the 
threshold of at least some legislative impact. Prominent 
political figures had shown interest in eugenics, as was 
witnessed by the presence of names such as A.J. Balfour and 
Winston Churchill on the list of vice -presidents of the 
International /.., 
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International Eugenics Congress, held in London in 1912. 
A small but growing group of M.P.'s responded to eugenic 
ideas, and the Eugenics Education Society was able to 
claim the formulation and passing of the Mental Deficiency 
Act of 1913 as in part the result of its work (E.E.S., 
1914, 5 -6). 
After 1918, all this impetus had gone.(28) There 
was no disastrous immediate decline of British eugenics. 
The cadre of the movement remained intact. But eugenics 
seemed to lack political credibility. The E.E.S. (re- 
named simply the Eugenics Society) evolved gradually into 
a learned society rather than a campaigning political group. 
The broad spectrum of political support in the professional 
middle Increasingly, eugenics as a full - 
scale political programme became identified with the extreme 
right -wing. What went wrong for the eugenists? 
One answer might be that the conditions for the 
credibility of the social programme of negative eugenics no 
longer existed after 1918. Before the War, the problem of 
social control was seen as centred on a relatively small 
and well- defined subgroup of the working class. After 1918, 
things were different. Red Clydeside and the industrial 
battles of the 1920's suggested that there was a pressing 
danger /... 
(28) Searle (1977) points out that the eugenics movement 
did enjoy something of a revival during the slump 
of 1929 onwards. 
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danger to established society from the working class as a 
whole, Unemployment was no longer localised (indeed 
London, the core of unemployment before 1914, was relatively 
prosperous during the 1920's and 1930's by comparison with 
the industrial North). A political strategy for the 
British ruling class clearly had to involve a reckoning 
with the working class as a whole. Such a strategy did 
evolve, empirically rather than theoretically, in the 
1920's. Although it involved intransigence at certain 
key moments (notably the General Strike of 1926), the key 
to the strategy was an accommodation with the political 
and industrial leadership of the working class in the 
Labour Party and trade unions. This left no place for 
eugenics; to make the point starkly, sterilisation of the 
unemployed (as advocated by MacBride (Werskey, 1969)) 
was out of place in such a strategy. It was impossible 
both to reach a compromise with the official leadership of 
the working class and to threaten that class (or a sig- 
nificant subsection of it) with negative eugenics. 
Most eugenists gradually came to terms with this 
reality and diluted their proposals accordingly. Some, 
like R.A. Fisher, ceased to propagandise for eugenics, 
while continuing privately to hold eugenic beliefs.(29) 
A few maintained the old attitudes intact, and looked to 
the /... 
MO IMO 
(29) 'Interviews with students and colleagues of Fisher 
have convinced me of this point. 
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the application of eugenic measures in the context of the 
destruction of the labour movement rather than that of 
accommodation with it. Thus, George Pitt -Rivers, 
formerly Secretary of the International Federation of 
Eugenic Societies, joined the British Union of Fascists 
(Werskey, 1972b, 232) and was interned during the Second 
World War. The Nazi victory in Germany and the subsequent 
Nazi eugenic measures strengthened the association of 
eugenics and the extreme right. After some initial 
hesitation, the Eugenics Society condemned Nazi eugenics. 
But British eugenists found it difficult to make it clear 
that what they preached was different from what the Nazis 
practised. By the late 1930's eugenics in the old, strong, 
sense was identified with fascism. In the absence of gains 
for fascism within British society, eugenics was bound to 
decline. 
3.8 Opponents of Eugenics 
Even at the peak of its influence in the 
Edwardian period, eugenics was not unopposed. Within the 
professional middle class itself, eugenics had its critics. 
Clerics, particularly Catholic clerics, were notable among 
them.(30) These professionals of the old order had their 
own strategy for dealing with problems of poverty, unemploy- 
ment/... 
(30) On the relations of eugenics and religion see Inge 
(1909; 1921) and Peile (1909). 
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ment, social control and the family. Despite efforts by 
the E.E.S. not to offend the church, eugenics appeared as 
an intruder into the traditional sphere of religious 
authority and as a competing secular and scientistic 
ideology.(31) A great deal of the reluctance of the 
eugenists to advocate the use of contraceptives and 
sterilisation as techniques of negative eugenics can be 
attributed to fear of religious condemnation. 
Amongst other opponents of eugenics were those 
socialists who, unlike the Fabians, took the working class 
as their prime reference group. Stella Browne, a 
socialist and feminist, attacked the E.E.S. for 'class bias 
and sex bias', and argued that women themselves should have 
control over their own fertility (Rowbotham, 1973, 152). 
Other socialists concentrated on defending the working class 
against the charge of genetic inferiority. In a series of 
articles in The New Age, M.D. Eder (1908) took the eugenists 
to task for their view that the 'upper middle class' 
represented 'the brains of the nation'. Eder reminded 
Karl Pearson that Gauss, whose work provided the base of 
much of the mathematics Pearson deployed in support of 
eugenics, was 'the son of a bricklayer'. De Vries's 
mutation theory was seen by Eder as a biological justi- 
fication of revolutionary socialism, which refuted the 
gradualism /... 
(31) This attitude comes over clearly, if idiosyncratically, 
in G.K. Chesterton (1922), in which eugenics is con- 
demned from a Christian, anti -scientistic and anti - 
industrial point of view. 
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gradualism of evolutionary socialists such as Pearson. 
After the First World War, the socialist attack on eugenics 
began to find a small number of supporters within science. 
The radical scientists of the 1930's, such as Lancelot 
Hogben, saw the eugenics movement as a paradigm case of 
the anti- working class use of science, and the defeat of 
eugenic ideology became one of their major preoccupations 
(Werskey, 1972a). 
Aside from these two major sources of opposition 
to eugenics, particular individuals and small groups were 
hostile to eugenics for less general reasons. The 
eugenists presented their major opponent as a social reformer 
who ascribed all to environment and nothing to heredity. 
Such a parody creature scarcely existed.(32) Nonetheless, 
some groups felt their schemes for particular reforms 
threatened by eugenic ideology. Karl Pearson, for example, 
earned the wrath of temperance workers for his denial that 
environmental reform (temperance measures) would have a 
beneficial effect on the next generation (Farrall, 1970, 
250 -82). Similarly, Pearson's view that the major factor 
in the incidence of tuberculosis was an inherited tubercular 
'diathesis' led to controversy with public health workers 
and other medical men seeking environmental control of the 
disease. 
Oa WM /OP 
(32) The nearest approach is perhaps L.T. Hobhouse, who 
attacked eugenics from the point of view of an 
activist, reforming liberalism, arguing that progress 
was ethical and social, rather than racial. But 
even he accepted particular eugenic measures such as 
'control of the feeble -minded'. See Hobhouse (1911). 
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Chapter Four 
Karl Pearson 
In a dialectical conception the individual ceases 
to be an atom which exists in isolation and 
opposition to other men and to the physical world, 
and the 'collective consciousness' ceases to be a 
static entity which stands above and outside 
particular individuals. The collective con- 
sciousness exists only in and through individual 
consciousness, but it is not simply made up of the 
sum of these. In fact, the term 'collective con- 
sciousness' is not a very satisfactory one, and I 
myself prefer that of 'group consciousness', accom- 
panied in each case, as far as that is possible, by 
the description of the group in question: family, 
professional, national, class. This group con- 
sciousness is the tendency common to the feelings, 
aspirations and ideas of the members of a particular 
social class; a tendency which is developed as a 
result of a particular social and economic situation, 
and which then gives rise to a set of activities 
performed by the real or potential community con- 
stituted by this social class. The awareness of 
this tendency varies from one person to another, 
and reaches its height only in certain exceptional 
individuals or, as far as the majority of the group 
is concerned, in certain privileged situations: 
war in the case of national group consciousness, 
revolution for class consciousness, etc. It 
follows from this that exceptional individuals can 
give a better and more accurate expression to the 
collective consciousness than the other members of 
the group .oa 
(Goldmann,1964, 18) 
The aim of this chapter is to suggest the outlines 
of a sociological account of the thought of Karl Pearson. 
In many ways, Pearson is the key figure in the developments 
discussed here: he continued the line of work begun by 
Galton, notably in its statistical aspects; he made many 
important /... 
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important contributions of his own to statistical theory; 
and he played the central role in the early institutional 
development of mathematical statistics in Britain, The 
account developed in this chapter will be used in chapters 
six and seven in an attempt to explain the two major con- 
troversies in the pre -1914 history of British statistics and 
statistical biology. 
4.1 Some Problems of Historiography 
Although a fully comprehensive biography of 
Karl Pearson has yet to appear, some extremely valuable work 
on him is available. Several biographical accounts have 
been written, of which the longest and most comprehensive 
is that by his son, E.S. Pearson (1936 -38), although those 
by George Udny Yule (1936) and Churchill Eisenhart (1974) 
are also useful; Eisenhart's article includes a review of 
the major secondary sources on Karl Pearson's work. Any 
study of Pearson is much aided by Morant's almost compre- 
hensive 648 item bibliography of Pearson's writings 
(Morant, 1939).(1) Pearson as a social thinker has been 
discussed perceptively by Bernard Semmel (1958; 1960, 35 -52) 
and by Lyndsay Farrall (1970). Finally, the recently com- 
pleted work of Bernard Norton (1978) is closest to the 
approach taken here, and several of Norton's insights are 
drawn /... 
we me MO 
(1) Three additional items are listed by Eisenhart 
(1974, 467). 
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drawn on below. 
From these accounts, the main features of 
Karl Pearson's life and work emerge clearly and are not 
disputed by any of the above authors.(2) He was born in 
1857. On his father's side his ancestors were Yorkshire 
farmers and Quakers, while his mother's family included 
master -mariners from Hull. Despite relatively humble 
origins, his barrister father, William Pearson, rose to 
become a moderately successful London lawyer (although at 
the cost of 15 hour -long working days) (3) Karl Pearson's 
secondary education was received mainly at University 
College School, thus beginning an association with University 
College, London which was to last throughout his life. (In 
anticipation of what follows, it should be noted that 
University College during the nineteenth century had a 
decided radical and free -thinking tone compared with Oxford 
and Cambridge and its London 'sister', King's College.) 
In 1875 the young Pearson won an open -entrance mathematical 
scholarship to King's College, Cambridge. In 1879 he sat 
the Mathematical Tripos examination, emerging as Third 
Wrangler, and subsequently he received a College Fellowship. 
While holding it, he trained for the legal profession (he 
was!... 
41110 
(2) What follows is drawn chiefly from E.S. Pearson (1936 -8). 
(3) Karl Pearson described him as 
.., an iron man with boundless working powers, who 
never asked a favour in his life, and never really 
got on because he forgot to respect any man's 
prejudices, and never knew when he was beaten. 
(Pearson to Galton, 16 October 1907. K. Pearson, 
1914 -30, 3A, 328.) 
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was called to the Bar in 1881), but also pursued more general 
historical and philosophical studies, spending a considerable 
amount of time in Germany. He did not abandon his interest 
in mathematics, and in 1884, he was appointed Professor of 
Applied Mathematics and Mechanics at University College, 
London he had already published four papers in traditional 
areas of applied mathematics). He remained in this position 
until 1911, when he was appointed to the newly created 
Galton Professorship of Eugenics in the University of London. 
He held this post until his retirement 22 years later, and 
he continued to work at University College almost up to his 
death in 1936. 
Pearson's published work was extraordinarily wide 
ranging. In the period 1879 to 1892, aside from his pub- 
lications in applied mathematics, he wrote on such subjects 
as German history, art and folklore, philosophy, politics 
and social problems. His work in these areas formed the 
basis for his two major books of this period: The Ethic of 
Freethought (1888) and his famous Grammar of Science (1892a). 
From 1892 onwards, his attention increasingly shifted to 
statistics and its application to biology. In 1894 he 
began to teach the advanced theory of statistics and there 
appeared the first of a long series of 'Mathematical Con- 
tributions to the Theory of Evolution'. The collection of 
essays, The Chances of Death and other Studies in Evolution 
(1897), clearly shows this transition. Pearson soon 
started publishing fundamental work in the theory of 
statistics /... 
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statistics: in 1896 he introduced the product -moment 
formula for the coefficient of correlation and developed 
much of the theory of multiple correlation and regression; 
in 1898 he published a general theory of the probable errors 
and correlation of errors of frequency constants; in 1900 
he introduced the tetrachoric coefficient of correlation 
and the chi square test. In 1900 he was instrumental in 
the foundation of Biometrika, the first journal to be 
largely devoted to the publication of statistical theory. 
He founded a Biometric Laboratory at University College, 
where much research and teaching of statistical theory was 
done, and also took over the running of the Eugenics 
Laboratory established by Galton (after 1911 directing them 
jointly as the Department of Applied Statistics). The 
publications of these two laboratories, together with the 
papers written by Pearson and his pupils for Biometrika, 
form a massive body of theoretical and applied work in 
statistics, of a nature and a bulk previously unprecedented. 
This work ranged from abstract studies of the theory of 
correlation to the controversial Studies in National 
Deterioration and Questions of the Day and the Fray. 
Temporarily interrupted by the 1914 -18 War (when most of the 
resources of the Department of Applied Statistics were 
devoted to work for the war effort), this mammoth output 
continued only slightly reduced after 1918 (indeed in 1926 
a new journal Annals of Eugenics was set up by Pearson to 
remove some of the load from Biometrika). While the 
volume /... 
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volume of Pearson's socio- political polemic was reduced, 
the monumental three volume Life, Letters and Labours of 
Francis Galton (1914 -30) easily filled its place. At the 
same time, the Department of Applied Statistics continued 
as the foremost centre for advanced teaching in statistical 
theory. 
To the historian of mathematical statistics, 
Karl Pearson presents something of a problem. How does 
one deal with a man whose interests and publications ranged 
from German history to the theory of evolution, from the 
matriarchy theory to statistical inference? The problem 
is that Pearson saw no watertight components within his 
thought: his statistical theory was explicitly published 
as a contribution to the study of evolution; Darwinian 
evolution was the theoretical basis for his political, 
social and ethical views. His eugenics and his statistics 
he saw as mutually reinforcing: at the end of his life he 
fought bitterly against the division of his Department of 
Applied Statistics into a Department of Statistics and a 
Department of Eugenics. We now see him as a great 
statistician and a somewhat less important philosopher; a 
contemporary such as Hobson (1905) could see him as a leading 
scientific apologist for imperialism. Of course, it is 
possible to separate out artificially one aspect of his 
thought and to treat that in isolation; but to their 
credit few, if any, of the above authors seek to do that. 
The various aspects of Pearson's work were far from in- 
dependent/... 
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dependent of each other, and to study any particular aspect 
in isolation from the others would be to give a one -sided 
view, and to miss the integrated nature of Pearson's thought. 
To give an adequate account of Pearson's work, it 
is thus necessary to study as an interconnected whole his 
politics, his philosophy, his eugenics, his biology and his 
mathematical statistics. Studies that elucidate con- 
nections between different areas of Pearson's work are there- 
fore of obvious importance: Norton (1978), which traces the 
influence of Pearson's philosophy and his social Darwinism 
on his statistics, is the best example of this approach. 
Nevertheless, this kind of study - showing how Pearson's 
ideas on one topic can be related to his prior ideas on 
another - must, useful as it is, leave some questions un- 
answered. The first of these concerns the start of the 
'chain' of interconnected ideas: the process of showing the 
intellectual antecedents of each phase of Pearson's work 
cannot be endless, yet how i s i t to end? The second con- 
cerns the nature of the links in the chain, of the inter- 
connections. I t seems difficult to imagine that a person's 
ideas at time t2 are logically determined by those he or she 
had at time t1: people frequently discard or modify their 
previous beliefs. But if the connections are not those of 
logical necessity, what are they? 
One possible solution, at least to the first of 




ideas in his social background and early experience. But 
this would seem an unpromising research programme. There 
were many children from families of upwardly -mobile pro- 
fessionals who developed views quite dissimilar to 
Pearson's, and therefore in what sense can it be said that 
Pearson's background was the cause of his beliefs? If we 
had complete knowledge of his background and early ex- 
periences, then it might be possible to isolate those 
factors which made Pearson develop one set of views, while 
others from a broadly similar background developed dif- 
ferent views. However, this approach is no more hopeful: 
in part because it calls for data we do not possess, in 
part because it presupposes a view of the efficacy of 
socialisation which does not take into account the fact 
that individuals frequently change their ideas and 
affiliations as they move through life. A deterministic 
account of an individual's thought thus runs into insuperable 
theoretical and practical difficulties. But is it not 
possible to produce a sociology of knowledge account of an 
individual's thought, which does not involve the attempt to 
see that particular individual as socially determined? 
4.2 The Sociolo of Knowledge and Individual Actors 
The approach I will take is, broadly, that sug- 
gested by Lucien Goldmann,and outlined in the quotation at 
the head of this chapter. This approach, in my opinion, 
provides /... 
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provides one possible solution to a major problem of the 
sociology of knowledge. In the sociology of knowledge, at 
least as classically conceived, explanation is structural 
in its nature. Particular ideas, or sets of ideas, are 
related systematically to social- structural categories. 
This is done, broadly speaking, in two ways. Ideas are 
seen as reflecting the social interests of actors in a 
particular social -structural category (for example, the 
interests of the bourgeoisie) or as embodying the social 
experience of such actors (for example, the class experience 
of the proletariat). The analysis of eugenics in chapter 
three is an example of this kind of imputation. However, 
as Goldmann points out, it is the individual, not the 
structural category, who is the bearer of concrete ideas. 
If the sociology of knowledge is not to be a purely 
theoretical endeavour we must therefore study individuals 
or groups of individuals, and in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, these groups are likely to be quite small. The 
problem thus arises of how the structural explanations of 
the sociology of knowledge relate to the study of concrete 
individuals. 
A crude form of the sociology of knowledge dis- 
solves this problem by the implicit assumption that all 
actors belonging to a particular structural category(4) will 
think /... 
(4) In what follows 'class' will be taken as typical of a 
structural category, but it is not implied by this that 
'class' is the only category to which imputations can 
be made. 
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think in the manner held to be appropriate to that category. 
This, indeed, is the version of the sociology of knowledge 
frequently put forward by those seeking easy refutations of 
the sociality of thought. It is manifestly false. A 
somewhat less crude view of the sociology of knowledge 
weakens this assumption by making it a statistical one: 
we must expect a majority of actors to think in the 
appropriate fashion. This is a view well adapted to the 
situation of those who perform attitude surveys, but in 
historical work we are seldom in a position to test hypotheses 
in this form. In any case, it is hard to see why any 
particular proportion of individuals should be crucial. 
Why 50 %, and not 60 %, or 20 %? The empiricist formulation 
of this kind of approach will tend to leave it unable to 
explain, except in an extremely ad hoc fashion, the sudden 
changes in consciousness often observed, in particular 
amongst subordinate classes, in crisis situations. 
It is possible, however, to solve this problem in 
a way that avoids these pitfalls without abandoning 
empirical reference. The solution hinges around seeing 
social -structural explanations as accounts of tendencies. 
That is, in essence, the solution proposed by Goldmann 
(1964), and before him by Lukács (1971; first published in 
1923). The interests and experience of a particular class 
give rise to specific tendencies in the thought of that 
class. These tendencies are not psychological biases or 
dispositions: they are tendencies associated with sets of 
roles /... 
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roles, not necessarily with particular individuals. No 
denial is implied of the individual's freedom to construct 
idiosyncratic idea systems for himself or herself. Nor 
are these tendencies necessarily manifest. We can say, 
correctly, that 'glass has a tendency to break', even if no 
window pane is ever broken: we cannot prove this proposition 
true or false by a statistical survey of windows. 
Similarly with classes. Tendencies in the thought of a 
class will not normally be unopposed. Past traditions, 
the thought of other cultures and other classes may be 
sufficiently strong to swamp any tendency to thought of a 
particular kind. In subaltern classes, exposed as they 
are to a wide variety of institutions of ideological 
domination, these countervailing tendencies can be expected 
to be particularly strong. 
So this form of imputation involves no necessary 
predictions at the individual level, either of a universal, 
or of a statistical nature. However, it is not without 
empirical reference. It is true that a study done of a 
class at one particular time (for example, an attitude 
survey) is unlikely to tell us much about the truth or 
falsity of such structural imputations of tendencies. 
However, longitudinal and historical studies can be of use. 
As Goldmann suggests, in situations of crisis, when counter- 
vailing tendencies weaken, we should expect to see a 
heightening of the expression of imputed tendencies. Other 
things being equal, as the social coherence of a class in- 
creases, as it is more strongly differentiated from other 
classes /... 
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classes, as it finds itself in conflict with other classes, 
these tendencies should grow stronger. 
Similarly, we should expect these tendencies to 
be strongly manifested in the thought of some individuals, 
and not in that of others. Those in whose thought imputed 
tendencies are particularly strongly manifested are 
Goldmann's 'exceptional individuals'. Goldmann, however, 
gives no rule for predicting in advance who these individuals 
will be: they are identified only ex post facto on the 
basis of their thought. But this leaves unclear the sense 
in which these individuals are to be thought of as exceptional. 
For Goldmann, it is in practice not the individuals but their 
ideas which he analyses as exceptional: because their ideas 
express the interests and experience of a class in its 
purest form, they possess an exceptional coherence and 
aesthetic merit. This formulation, however, is hardly 
satisfactory from the point of view of the sociology of 
knowledge, despite its possible merits as a theory of 
aesthetics, because it gives no account of the origins of 
this purity of expression and coherence. 
There is, however, another way to develop Goldmann's 
notion. All societies of any complexity are structured in 
more than one way and at more than one level. Thus we can 
identify within any given society an overall structure, such 
as a class structure, and a fine structure, consisting of all 
sorts of more particular gender, occupational, kinship or 
generational /... 
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generational structures, and of specific institutions such 
as state apparatuses, educational institutions, political 
parties or trade unions.(5) If our theory seeks to relate 
ideas to the overall class structure, then we must expect 
the fine structure of the society, insofar as it does not 
run parallel to the overall structure, to generate particular 
interests and experiences and thus to cross -cut and 
'suppress' this relation. The fine structure produces 
'noise' from the point of view of our overall pattern of 
explanation. So perhaps we can expect 'exceptional in- 
dividuals' to be found in structural locations and historical 
situations where the 'distorting' effects of the fine 
structure are least. It is clearly impossible without much 
study to specify these locations and situations. One 
tentative suggestion is that individuals in marginal roles, 
or those who have moved from one class to another, could be 
particularly sensitive to the overall rather than the fine 
structure.(6) But this clearly needs much refinement 
before it can become a usable theory; and in any case 
structural accounts do not depend for their validity on this 
type of conjecture. 
Even /... 
(5) Of course, what is seen as the overall structure is 
dependent on the theoretical perspective employed. 
One might, for example, see gender structuring as 
primary, and class structuring as a form of fine 
structure overlaying this. 
(6) Compare the role of marginal individuals in scientific 
and technological innovation as discussed, for example, 
by Edge and Mulkay (1975) . 
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Even if exceptional individuals can, at the 
present, only be identified ex post facto, that does not 
imply that analyses of them need be uninformative. It 
is clear that the study of these individuals cannot, 
because of the way they are selected, provide an independent 
check on the validity of our theory. But, if our theory 
is correct, we should at least expect it to provide a 
coherent and convincing account of the thought of these in- 
dividuals. Further, we should expect that if the ideas of 
these individuals be available to other members of their 
class at a time when, in the sense suggested above, their 
class consciousness is (on our theory) high, then these 
ideas should be well received. Given necessary conditions - 
such as the physical dissemination of their ideas - the 
thought of these exceptional individuals should in some 
sense be successful. 
To proceed with this approach, we first need a 
theory of social structure which is applicable to the 
historical situation in which we are interested. Ideally, 
this theory should be precise, well -developed and with a 
record of successful application in fields other than the 
sociology of knowledge. From this theory, together with an 
understanding of the historical situation, the next stage 
is to produce an account of the interests and social ex- 
perience of the class (or other social- structural category) 
in question. This might include an account of its economic 
interests, its relationships of competition or co- operation 
with /... 
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with other classes, salient work or other experiences of 
its members, and so on. Then the field of knowledge in 
which we are interested should be examined, with a view to 
determining key features of the pre -existing system of 
knowledge, and the relationship of that knowledge to 
social practice and to the interests of other social 
classes. Knowledge is never constructed ex nihilo, and 
thus the pre -existing state of knowledge is always an 
important factor in determining how those who construct 
new knowledge in fact do so. From our theoretical account 
of the interests and experience of the social class in 
which we are interested, together with our account of the 
situation in which it finds itself, in particular as regards 
pre- existing systems of knowledge, it should then be possible 
to posit tendencies in the thought of this class and in the 
society generally. This account of the tendencies of 
thought can then be put to use in ways suggested schematically 
above. The account will stand or fall on the basis of its 
success in explaining past developments of thought or in 
predicting future developments.(7) 
this/... 
Chapter three can be taken as an attempt to begin 
MIS =I 
(7) Perhaps the most interesting case, and certainly the 
most important one, is where the theory in question 
is used as a guide to political practice. Thus 
Marxists posit a 'tendency' in the thought of the 
working class, and part of Marxist political practice 
is to attempt to enhance that posited tendency in 
ways suggested by Marxist theory. The success of 
this forms a 'criterion of practice'. This is 
perhaps the closest we can get in the sociology of 
knowledge to experiment in the natural sciences. 
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this type of analysis for the British professional middle 
class.(8) A particular social -structural category - the 
professional middle class - was identified, and, by examin- 
ation of its structural and historical situation, certain 
tendencies in its thought were predicted. These included 
tendencies such as that to the emphasis on accredited 
knowledge and expertise as the proper basis for social 
status. Eugenics was described as a system of belief which 
exemplified these tendencies; Fabianism was taken as another 
example. The aim of this present chapter is to go beyond 
this general analysis, and to investigate the extent to 
which a Goldmann -style 'exceptional individual' analysis 
can be applied to Karl Pearson as a member of this class. 
4.3 Pearson's Politics 
Karl Pearson thought of himself, and was thought 
of by his contemporaries, as a socialist. This fact has 
in the past been uncomfortable to those who wish to fit 
Pearson into neat categories. Thus, in his investigation 
of the connections between hereditarianism and conservatism, 
on the one hand, and environmentalism and liberalism or 
radicalism, on the other, Pastore (1949, 29 -41) sees Pearson 
as/... 
(8) In real historical research, the analysis can never 
be as mechanical as the schematic outline given in 
this section might suggest. As Goldmann argues, it 
is necessary to move dialectically between the society 
and the body of beliefs in question: each illuminates 
the other. 
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as a socialist environmentalist before 1900, but a con- 
servative hereditarian after 1900. As against this, it 
will be argued below that there was a continuity in 
Pearson's views throughout his life; that he became a 
hereditarian well before 1900; and that his politics can 
indeed be described, within the Victorian understanding of 
the term, as socialist. There was no contradiction between 
his variant of socialism and his hereditarianism: in fact, 
the relationship between these two aspects of his beliefs 
is very important in helping us understand his thought. 
As Bernard Norton has noted, Pearson was a 'non - 
joiner'. Although the most important eugenist after Galton, 
he did not join the Eugenics Education Society; although 
the most prominent British statistician, he did not join 
the Royal Statistical Society. He did join the Royal 
Society of London (if the offer was made one could hardly 
refuse), but subsequently spent a considerable time on the 
brink of resignation. He was a seeker after perfection: 
the flaws inevitable in any real -world institution irritated 
him and led him to loathe committees and societies. 
Another society he did not join was the Fabian Society; 
this was despite the fact that he was, in a sense to be 
elucidated below, the most consistent Fabian. Among 
Pearson's personal acquaintances were leading Fabians such 
as Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw; Pearson wrote a 
generally favourable review of the first edition of Fabian 
Essays (Shaw (ed.), 1889; Pearson, 1890); in the 
introduction /... 
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introduction to the second edition of his Ethic of Free - 
thought, Pearson complimented the Fabians on their 'ex- 
cellent educational work' in bringing socialism to the 
forefront of public debate (1901d, vii). On the other 
hand, Pearson had no time for the more radical alternative 
to the Fabians, the Social Democratic Federation (Pearson, 
1888, 7). 
The elements of Pearson's political position were 
in fact worked out before the Fabian Society was founded in 
1884. In 1879, on one of his early trips to Germany, 
Pearson met Raphael Wertheimer, a Jewish law student and 
socialist (Norton, 1978). Wertheimer appears in the 
fictionalised letters of Pearson's first book, The New 
Werther (1880). Pearson was at this time particularly 
open to new and radical ideas. His career at Cambridge 
had been marked by battles with authority over compulsory 
divinity lectures and chapel. Despite his academic success 
and the friends Cambridge had brought him, he left somewhat 
disillusioned and in search for the creed he had failed to 
find at Cambridge: 
'Tis coin or custom draws men to this spot, 
Or, since it was their father's lot, 
Or, to gain social stamp, but not to learn; 
While teachers only teach to earn. 
(Pearson, 1881a, 191) 
Wertheimer introduced the young Pearson to the ideas of the 
'Socialists of the Chair' and of the emerging reformist 
wing of German social- democracy.(9) The 'Socialists of the 
Chair /... 
- 
(9) This confirms Bernard Semmel's speculation (1958, 113) 
that Pearson came into contact with the ideas of the 
'Socialists of the Chair' while in Germany. For some 
of the ideas of the Katheder -Sozialisten see Schumpeter 
(1954, 800 -20). 
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Chair', as portrayed by the fictionalised Wertheimer in The 
New Werther, did not seek revolution, but rather a slow and 
progressive state take -over of large enterprises, factories 
and the land. They appreciated that while change was necessary, 
all real change must be gradual (Pearson, 1880, 34). This 
essentially Fabian doctrine Pearson picked up and made his 
own, and he integrated it with a perspective on British 
social structure and the situation of British society. 
The earliest clear expression of Pearson's emerg- 
ing political position is in an article he wrote for the 
Cambridge Review entitled 'Anarchy' (Pearson, 1881b). 
Pearson's subject was revolution. He examined the state 
of the European socialist movement, seeing it as essentially 
split between the followers of 'democratic socialism' on the 
one hand, and 'revolutionary anarchy' on the other. Marx, 
he saw as supporting the former wing in theory, but the 
latter in practice: 
... Marx as theorist is one of the most powerful, 
logical, and sharpest of thinkers, though as 
practical politician it is hard not to condemn 
him severely. 
(Pearson, 1881b, 269) 
Pearson claimed that, up to the end of the 1870's, the 
'democratic socialists' had been dominant, and he cited as 
an example the defeat of Bakunin by Marx within the Com- 
munist International. However, he felt the pendulum had 
then swung towards the 'revolutionary anarchists'. The 
attempts by Hödel and Nobiling to assassinate the Kaiser 
and /... 
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and the passing of the Anti -Socialist Law had thrown the 
German socialists 'entirely into the hands of the 
anarchical party' (1881b, 269). The socialist movement 
had returned to a revolutionary perspective: 
In the early part of this year, the largest 
meeting of Internationalists ever held 
assembled in London; the German Socialists 
were represented by Marx, Liebknecht, Bebel, 
etc., and the Russian Nihilists were also 
represented. A complete reunion must have 
taken place between the two parties ... We 
may then look upon the German Socialists and 
the Russian Nihilists for the future as the 
secret party of anarchy ... 
(Pearson, 1881b, 269; Pearson's emphasis) 
There was, Pearson claimed, a 'party of anarchy' at work even 
within Britain, which, although at present probably small, 
was potentially very dangerous. 
The revolutionary anarchists would 'probably have 
little if any influence on the better class of working man'. 
But the urban °residuum', not the 'better class of working 
man', constituted the danger: 
... in the dumb, helpless masses of our great 
towns, the Proletariat pure and simple, they 
[the anarchists foster that process of fermentation 
which is but too surely progressing. 
(Pearson, 1881b, 269) 
Pearson pointed not just to the poverty and degradation of 
the urban masses, but also to their insurrectionary potential: 
The chance visitor to London, who sees the constant 
flow of busy faces in the Strand, the marshalled 
lines of chariots in the Row, the wealth and 
prosperity scattered around, would scarcely believe 
in the anarchical element existing in strength in 
such a town. But let him cross Blackfriars Bridge 
on a Saturday night, let him penetrate into the 
Borough /... 
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Borough, let him make a Pilgrimage on Sunday to 
the back of Soho, and his opinions as to the 
stability of society may be somewhat shaken. 
There he will see the stunted forms, the pallid 
faces, deeply lined with what the Westender in 
ironic simplicity calls vice, the scarcely clothed, 
the scarcely sexed figures of the Proletariat ... 
Those emaciated beings, weak and feeble as they 
look, have power to break the half -inch of glass 
which separates them from the weapons they require, 
have power in their millions to throw down the 
few feet of bricks which guard the arsenals. 
Those three millions could sweep a few thousand 
police and soldiers before them as the wind blows 
a handful of chaff ... Again, let me repeat, the 
Proletarier Csic3 have nought to lose but their 
chains, a world to gain. Anarchy can bring them 
no harm, they can but benefit from it ... Anarchy, 
and what then? Night, blackest night, and but 
faint chance of a dawn. The revolution which is 
imminent is not a second French Revolution, the 
triumph of the Bourgeoisie over an aristocracy of 
birth, but the victory of the Proletariat over an 
aristocracy of wealth, over that very Bourgeoisie 
itself. In the struggle mighty empires will fall 
and ancient thrones be shaken. It looms as a 
gaunt spectre over the closing years of the 
nineteenth century ,.. 
(1881b, 269-70; Pearson' s emphasis) 
There was only one way, Pearson felt, that this calamity 
could be avoided: 'the revolution must be carried through 
from above'. But to rely on the bourgeoisie to do this 
was impossible, as they would not part with their wealth 
without a struggle. Further, simply removing wealth as a 
factor stratifying society was not sufficient: it had to 
be replaced by another factor. 
Anarchy can only be prevented by maintaining 
some kind of society with its forms and grades, 
but if we do not graduate society on the scale 
of wealth, on what shall we graduate it? 
(1881b, 270) 
Different stages of society had been stratified, Pearson 
said!.,. 
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said, first according to strength, then according to a com- 
bination of strength and 'nobility of feeling', then by 
'nobility of birth', and finally by wealth. 
What can take the place of this? Possibly, 
education and culture may. So that while 
power material shall be divided as equally 
as may be between the various classes, power 
intellectual shall form a scale on which the 
necessary graduation of society may take place. 
Power intellectual shall determine whether the 
life -calling of a man is to scavenge the streets 
or to guide the nation. 
(1881b, 270) 
The article, however, ended on a gloomy note despite this 
suggestion. Pearson doubted whether the 'ruling 
Bourgeoisie' would accept such a standard of 'power in- 
tellectual'. Christian religion, which used to form 'a 
real bond between class and class', had ceased to be 
effective, and there was no indication of a new religion 
emerging to 'draw mankind together'. 
We seem as it were drifting helplessly onward 
to the brink of a terrible and unexplored abyss ... 
(Pearson, 1881b, 270) 
In this article, together with the passages on 
socialism in The New Werther, the outline of Pearson's 
political viewpoint is already present. His image of 
society was of a fundamental divide between the 'ruling 
Bourgeoisie' on top, and of the 'proletariat pure and simple' 
at the bottom. Above the 'proletariat pure and simple' was 
'the better class of working man'. Although Pearson was 
not specific at this point about what lay between the latter 
class and the bourgeoisie, it is clearly in that intermediate 
area /... 
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area that he placed himself. British society, as then 
organised, he judged to be in a state of dangerous in- 
stability. He felt that change was inevitable. He was, 
however, very concerned that social change should not be 
abrupt, revolutionary and anarchic, but gradual and guided 
from above. Class conflict should be avoided: indeed the 
socialist should preach class harmony rather than class con- 
flict. The state should be strengthened, and citizens 
should be taught that their primary loyalty lay to the state, 
not to their own personal or class interests. Land and 
capital should be nationalised, but in a slow and pro- 
gressive fashion. Stratification by wealth should be re- 
placed by stratification by mental ability. This position 
was in his later writings to be amplified and extended: by 
the proposal of a specific means - the conversion of free- 
hold in property to 100 year leasehold - for the slow take- 
over of property,by the development of detailed blueprints 
for an education system to ensure that the able were 
properly trained for power,(10) and so on. Nevertheless, 
it remained essentially unchanged except for its articulation 
in an increasingly hereditarian framework. 
In a paper, 'Socialism in Theory and Practice', 
delivered in 1884 to a working class audience (Pearson, 1888, 
346 -69) , the contours of Pearson's view of society emerge 
clearly. There was a governing class in Britain, Pearson 
told /... 
op sw 
(10) See K. Pearson (1888, 367 -8; 1902b) for these schemes. 
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told his audience, which was composed of the 'owners of 
land and owners of capital'. This class 'naturally 
governs in its own interests'. Two classes were ex- 
cluded from power by this governing class: 
The educative class (the class which labours 
with its head) and the productive class (the 
class which labours with its hands) have little 
or no real influence in the House of Commons. 
(Pearson, 1888, 348) 
He called for the transition from a social system based on 
wealth to one based on labour. But this immediately raised 
the point of the relationship of mental and manual labour. 
I have met with certain working -men, who believed 
nothing but labour of the hand could have any 
value; that all but labourers with the hand were 
idlers. 
(1888, 353) 
Both head work and hand work, Pearson asserted, are forms of 
labour: 
The man who puts cargo into a ship is no more 
or less a labourer than the captain who directs 
her course across the ocean; nor is either of 
them more of a labourer than the mathematician 
or astronomer whose calculations and observations 
enable the captain to know which direction he 
shall take when he is many hundred miles from 
land. The shoemaker or the postman are no 
more labourers than the clerk who sits in a 
merchant's office or the judge who sits on the 
bench. The schoolmaster, the writer, and the 
actor are all true labourers. 
(1888, 353) 
Because all kinds of labour are necessary parts of an in- 
tegrated division of labour, it must be an 'axiom' of 
socialism that 'all forms of labour are equally honourable'. 
Nevertheless, there was little doubt in Pearson's mind 
that /.., 
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that head work was, in the long run, more important than 
hand work. 
There is labour of the hand, which provides 
necessaries for all society; there is labour 
of the head, which produces all we term progress, 
and enables any individual society to maintain 
its place in the battle of life - the labour 
which educates and organises. 
(1888, 355; Pearson's emphasis) 
Thus, Pearson's socialism - while it unquestionably was in 
the categories of the time validly describable as socialism - 
in no way implied a shift of identification to the working 
class. It was to the class of 'head workers' that he owed 
allegiance. Certainly Pearson was no egalitarian, nor 
did he interpret socialism as having any egalitarian con- 
sequences. 
So far as I understand the views of the more 
active socialists of to -day, they fully recognise 
that the better posts, the more lucrative and 
comfortable berths, must always go to the more 
efficient and more productive workers, and that 
it is for the welfare of society that it should 
be so. 
(Pearson, 1897, 1, 112) 
The only major instance of practical political 
activity by Pearson is interesting in this light. This 
was his campaign for the absorption of the separate 
university colleges in London in a._single university con- 
trolled by its professoriat. This involved Pearson in 
the establishment of an 'Association for Promoting a Pro- 
fessorial University for London'. It brought him into 
conflict with the authorities of University College, who 
sought a federal solution in which, no doubt, they rather 
than /... 
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than the teaching staff would have control. It even found 
him opposed to Thomas Henry Huxley, who was seeking a com- 
promise solution. While this was undoubtedly political 
activity of a radical nature (there was talk of sacking 
dissident staff), it was activity clearly aimed at the 
furtherance of the interests of this particular group of 
'head workers'.(11) 
Pearson's political position was essentially 
Fabian.(12) Like Fabianism, it can be analysedas an 
ideology appropriate to the interests of a rising pro- 
fessional middle class. It was a strategy for containing 
the working class threat by a process of gradual reform, 
while slowly edging the bourgeoisie out of positions of 
power, and replacing a society based on wealth by one 
based on knowledge and mental skills. In its full develop- 
ment, Pearson's position can in a certain sense be seen as 
more consistent than the Fabianism of the Fabian Society. 
The crucial issue on which Pearson differed from the 
majority of Fabians was that of political democracy and the 
extension of the franchise. The Fabians saw universal 
suffrage as the path to socialism. Pearson did not. 
Reviewing the first edition of Fabian Essays (Shaw (ed.), 
1889), Pearson wrote (1890, 198): 
On /... 
(11) For an account of this campaign see K. Pearson (1906, 
285 -8). Pearson's writings on the issue are collected 
in Pearson (1892b). 
(12) See Hobsbawm (1968) and chapter three above. 
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On the one hand, 'socialism postulates democracy', 
on the other 'democracy holds socialism in its 
womb'. These are the oft -repeated doctrines of 
our Fabians. Personally dreading an uneducated 
democracy as much as a prejudiced aristocracy, 
and thinking that of the two the former is the 
slightly less stable form of government, we 
cannot but deprecate this identification of 
socialist and social-democrat. 
Uneducated people would be incapable of choosing leaders 
whose view of socialism was suitably gradualist; rather, 
they would vote for a demagogue who would offer immediate 
benefits at the expense of long -term social stability. 
Democracy might then be the 'worst foe' of socialism. By 
comparison with this, Pearson preferred even the 'autocratic 
socialism' of Bismarck, dealing out reforms with one hand 
while repressing the social democrats with the other. 
Pearson's ideal was, as he expressed it elsewhere, 'the 
cautious direction of social progress by the selected few' 
(Pearson, 1888, 322). 
What are we to make of this divergence? Aside 
from this point, Pearson's views on socialist strategy co- 
incided almost exactly with the Fabians'.(13) It was not 
the case that Pearson had a more jaundiced view of the 
working /... 
(13) He did disagree with proposals of a guild -socialist 
rather than state -socialist nature (of which there 
were some in Fabian Essays), arguing that autonomous 
worker -controlled enterprises were doomed to failure. 
Many Fabians would, however, have agreed with him. 
Thus, Beatrice Webb was delighted to find that in 
Stalin's Soviet Union 'there i s no d -d nonsense about 
Guild Socialism;' (quoted in S. and B. Webb, 1975, 
xxxvii). 
Pearson's other disagrements with the Fabian Essays 
centred on what he felt to be a failure to deal 
adequately with the population question and with 
feminism (see below). 
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working class than did most Fabians. In 1889 the Fabian 
journal Today did not merely approve Booth's plan to force 
the chronic poor into labour colonies, but enthused about 
it as a harbinger of the collectivist change Fabians 
desired (G.S. Jones, 1971, 314). Rather, the difference 
between the Fabian Society and Pearson should perhaps be 
seen as lying in the difference between expediency and con- 
sistency. The Fabians were seeking political influence, 
first through the Liberal and later the Labour Party: an 
extension of the franchise, they calculated, could only 
increase the pressure to social reform, and thus strengthen 
their position. The 'fine structure' of British politics 
dictated that they support the extension of political 
democracy. Critics of the Fabians indeed sensed that 
their commitment to democracy was less than total. 'At 
heart[their]principal leaders are bureaucrats not democrats', 
one wrote (quoted by Hobsbawm, 1968, 264). Pearson, on 
the other hand, was uninterested in calculations of 
particular political advantage. Like many Fabians, he 
feared and distrusted the working class, especially the 
urban slum dwellers: any measure that might place potential 
power in their hands he resisted. In this sense, he was 
more consistent than they were: he in his thinking was 
affected only by the 'overall' structure of classes; they 
by /... 
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by the fine structure of institutions.(14) 
4.4 Pear son's Darwinism 
As a scientific (and scientistic) intellectual 
in late Victorian Britain, it is not surprising that 
Karl Pearson should have been an ardent Darwinian. To be 
a Darwinian was to ally oneself with progress against 
reaction, with the secular against the religious, and with 
the rising scientifically -based professions against the 
still powerful Established Church. Despite the availability 
of a whole range of intermediate positions between Darwinian 
naturalism and scriptural anti- Darwinism,(15) the potency 
of Darwinism as a cultural symbol remained almost undiminished. 
Pearson embraced that symbol ardently. Interestingly 
enough, however, he did not do so until the mid- 1880's 
(after his first writings on politics, philosophy and 
history), and the manner in which he finally came to 
Darwinism is of some significance. 
Pearson /... 
WS 
(14) It is not that Pearson was more consistent in any 
absolute logical sense. Logically, it is perfectly 
consistent both to fear the working class and believe 
them inferior, and to argue that the franchise should 
be fully extended to them: one's aim might for 
example be to defuse working class protest. Perhaps 
it could be said that Pearson and the Fabians were 
following different logics: his reflecting the 
overall social structure, theirs a particular 
aspect of the structure of political institutions. 
(15) See, for example, F.M. Turner (1974a). 
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Pearson did not come to Darwinism as a biologist 
(he showed almost no interest in biology as such until 
after 1890) nor even, primarily, as a freethinker seeking 
a weapon against revealed religion. To him, Darwinism 
was first and foremost a theory of history.(16) His early 
thought about history and historical change was cast in 
quite a different idiom, that of German idealism and 
historicism. Thus, he compared 'Manchester' political 
economy unfavourably with the German historical school, and 
indicated his acceptance of Fichte's 'socialist' theory of 
the state (1881c, 124; Pearson's emphasis): 
... Fichte, arriving at the conception that 
every species has its purpose, argues that if, 
in the development of mankind, the purpose of 
the species man is ever to be realised, so must 
all individual forces be united and directed to 
this one purpose. Necessarily therefore an 
organisation must exist which compels individuals 
to put all their force into this one direction. 
That organisation is the State. 
Pearson's attitude to the state was clearly incompatible with 
the dominant individualistic and laissez -faire social 
Darwinism epitomised by Spencer. Pearson thus found it 
necessary to transform social Darwinism before he could 
become a Darwinian, before he could write that 'the philosophy 
of history is only possible since Darwin' (1888, 430). 
The way in which he did this was simple: he argued 
that the chief locus of the struggle for existence was no 
longer /... 
(16) Bernard Norton's suggestions on this point I have found 
particularly useful: for some of these, see Norton(1978). 
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longer the individual but the group. The traditional social- 
Darwinist objection to socialism, that by suspending in- 
dividual competition it would suspend natural selection and 
cause the race to deteriorate, was invalid. The spur to 
efficiency was not individual competition, but inter -group 
struggle: survival went to the fittest group, not the 
fittest individual. In inter -group struggle, the social 
organisation of the group counted for as much, or indeed 
more, than the individual fitnesses of the individuals com- 
prising the group. The internal competition that resulted 
from laissez -faire capitalism weakened a nation in inter- 
national struggle. A class- divided nation, with an unfit 
and disaffected proletariat, could hardly hope to compete 
successfully with a well -organised and united state.(17) 
Pearson was by no means the only individual who, 
in the 1880's, was seeking to modify the individualistic 
thrust of previous social Darwinism. 
could write in Fabian Essays: 
By 1889 Sidney Webb 
Weknow now that in natural selection at the 
stage of development where the existence of 
civilised mankind is at stake, the units 
selected from are not individuals, but societies. 
(Shaw (ed.), 1889, 89) 
D.G. Ritchie (1889) also put forward similar arguments to 
Pearson about the relationship of Darwinism and socialism. 
I t /... 
(17) The fullest statement of the above views is the 
essay 'Socialism and Natural Selection', first 
published in 1894 (1897, 1, 103 -139), but they 
can be seen in embryo in The Ethic of Freethou ht 
(1888). 
- 155 - 
I t was, of course, natural that those who formed the 
'socialist revival' of the 1880's should seek to show that 
Darwinism need not be individualist and laissez -faire in its 
social implications. But another factor, wider than the 
British socialist revival, also may have been at work: the 
growing consciousness of imperialism. 1880 is conventionally 
taken as the beginning of the 'Age of Imperialism' 
(Gollwitzer, 1969). Although there clearly was a con- 
sciousness of imperialism before 1880, the early 1880's saw, 
for example, the foundation of explicitly pro -imperialist 
movements such as the Primrose League (1883), the Imperial 
Federation League (1884) and the protectionist National Fair 
Trade League (1881) (Gollwitzer, 1889, 105; Browne, 1974, 
56). There was an increasing awareness of the economic 
importance to British capitalism of overseas investment and 
colonies, and also of the fact that, following the establish- 
ment of the German Reich in 1871 and the rapid industrial 
growth of post -Civil War America, British supremacy was no 
longer automatic. Although it was only after 1900 that 
this consciousness reached its height, from the late 1880's 
awareness of the reality of inter -imperialist competition 
was a growing factor in British politics. 
The connections between imperialism and the 
'external' social Darwinism of the 1880's and after are in- 
timate. The 'internal' social Darwinism of Spencer could 
be, and was, used to legitimate a laissez- faire, com- 
petitive, capitalist order. 'External' social Darwinism 
took /... 
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took its model of group struggle from the economic and 
military competition of the advanced nations and the 
ruthless suppression of 'inferior' peoples: at the same 
time it was used to legitimate imperialism. (18) 
These two explanations of the transition in 
social Darwinism in the 1880's - the re -birth of socialism, 
and the growing consciousness of imperialism - should not 
be taken as competing. As Semmel (1960) has pointed out, 
there was in this period a strong connection between 
imperialism and movements for social reform. Social reform 
was necessary to secure national efficiency in the inter - 
imperialist struggle: social reform could be financed from 
the profits of imperialism. While non -socialists, such 
as Joseph Chamberlain, played on this connection, to the 
Fabians it was particularly vital. 'National efficiency' 
in the inter -imperialist struggle was the key slogan, the 
short -cut to power for the scientific - expert and specialised 
administrator (Searle, 1971). In practice, this Fabian 
policy was less than totally successful, in that their 
support for the Liberal Imperialists such as Roseberry 
against Campbell -Bannerman and Lloyd- George turned out to 
be inexpedient (Hobsbawm, 1968, 253). Nevertheless, their 
diagnosis /... 
(18) Hofstadter notes a similar transition in social 
Darwinism in the United States (1968, 202), although 
it seems to take place rather later in the United 
States, perhaps because of the somewhat later develop- 
ment of expansionist tendencies in that country. 
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diagnosis that inter -imperialist competition was a spur to 
technocratic and collectivist reform was surely right, even 
if it took the First World War to prove it (Marwick, 1967, 
162 -202 and 244 -276). Thus, it is important not to let 
the present anti -imperialist connotations of socialism 
cloud our analysis. Imperialism and socialism of the 
Fabian variety were, in the period 1880 -1914, parallel 
rather than conflicting developments. 
Pearson developed perhaps the most thoroughgoing 
scientific rationalisation of social -imperialism, this 
fusing of imperialism and social reform. Semmel (1960) 
takes him as his first example of a social -imperialist 
thinker, and, as noted above, the anti -imperialist Liberal 
Hobson saw him as a leading scientific defender of imperialism. 
From early on, Pearson was decidedly pro -imperialist. In 
his talk, 'Socialism in Theory and Practice', he told his 
audience: 
Some of you may be indifferent to the great 
empire of England, to this superiority of 
Englishmen, but let me assure you that, small 
as in some cases is the comfort of the English 
working classes, it is on the average large com- 
pared with that of an inferior race - compared 
say with the abject condition of the Egyptian 
peasant. 
(1888, 354) 
Certainly, the tone of his imperialism became harsher as 
time went on. His most important social -imperialist tract, 
National Life from the Standpoint of Science, contained such 
sentiments as: 
The path of progress is strewn with the wreck of 
nations /... 
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nations; traces are everywhere to be seen of 
the hetacombs of inferior races, and of victims 
who found not the narrow way to the greater 
perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in 
very truth, the stepping- stones on which mankind 
has risen to the higher intellectual and deeper 
emotional life of today. 
(1901a, 62) 
But this should not be interpreted, as it is by Pastore, 
as abandonment of his early socialism. Previously to this, 
he had linked equally imperialist sentiments to socialism: 
No thoughtful socialist, so far as I am aware, 
would object to cultivate Uganda at the expense 
of its present occupiers if Lancashire were 
starving. Only he would have this done directly 
and consciously, and not by way of missionaries 
and exploiting companies. 
(1897, 1, 111; Pearson's emphasis) 
Was social -imperialism, like Fabianism, an ideology 
of the rising professionals? Can we see Pearson's social 
Darwinism - which clearly reflected his social -imperialism - 
as the expression of his social interests as a professional 
in an imperialist nation? We can, but with one reservation. 
There is a clear sense in which social- imperialism can be 
seen as in the interests of the professional middle class. 
Imperialism as such broadened the opportunities available 
to members of this group: 
The practical tasks which imperialist policy 
gave to explorers, geographers, doctors, engineers, 
technicians, and numerous other specialists with 
scientific or technical university qualifications, 
certainly did a great deal to win over these groups 
to the imperialist movement. 
(Gollwitzer, 1969, 86) 
The specifically 'social' side of social -imperialism - 
collectivist, technocratic reform - was also in the in- 
terests of this group, providing them with increased authority 
and /... 
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and job prospects. However, we cannot analysesocial- 
imperialism as an ideology of the professional middle class 
alone. The interests of the bourgeoisie and, according to 
Lenin (1973, 107 -113), those of the 'aristocracy of labour' 
also were served by social -imperialist policies. Social - 
imperialism cannot, then, be regarded as imputable to a 
single class in a manner similar to Fabianism. Neverthe- 
less, the point remains that, in developing his social 
Darwinism in the way he did, Pearson was formulating an 
ideology expressive of the interests of his class in its 
historical situation. 
A further aspect of Pearson's Darwinism needs 
discussing, although it does not represent a transformation 
of preceding thought in the sense his 'external' social 
Darwinism does. This aspect is his attitude to evolutionary 
change. As noted above, Pearson was very concerned that 
the pressure of the working class against capitalism should 
lead only to gradual, controlled change. Indeed, he saw 
this as a key part of his role as an intellectual: 
There are mighty forces at work likely to 
revolutionise social ideas and shake social 
stability. It is the duty of those, who have 
the leisure to investigate, to show how by 
gradual and continuous changes we can restrain 
these forces within safe channels, so that 
society shall emerge strong and efficient from 
the difficulties of our nineteenth -century 
Renascence and Reformation. 
(1888, 7) 
In the Ethic of Freethought, from the introduction to which 
the above quotation is taken, one of his chief aims was to 
demonstrate /... 
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demonstrate the futility of attempting revolutionary 
rather than gradual change. The most striking piece of 
historical work in this volume was a description of the 
Anabaptist 'Kingdom of God in Munster' (1888, 263 -314). 
He described in detail the organisational failings and 
eventual terrible fate of the millenial communists. In 
'Socialism in Theory and Practice' he made his meaning 
clear to his working class audience. The examples of the 
Kingdom of God in Münster and the more recent Paris Com- 
mune demonstrated a law of history, that 
no great change ever occurs with a leap; 
no great social reconstruction, which will 
permanently benefit any class of the community, 
is ever brought about by a revolution. It is 
the result of a gradual growth, a progressive 
change, what we term an evolution. This is as 
much a law of history as of nature. 
(1888, 363; Pearson's emphasis) 
As the last sentence indicates, Pearson sought to legitimate 
his gradualist socialism by an appeal to nature as well as 
history. 'Human progress, like Nature, never leaps; this 
is the most certain of all laws deduced from the study of 
human development' (1888, 122). Thus, in the 1880's 
Pearson formed a strong political commitment to a gradualist, 
non -saltatory view of evolution (see chapter six for some 
consequences of this). 
This emphasis on gradualism was far from unique 
to Pearson. The very name of the Fabian Society was, of 
course, chosen to convey an insistence on gradualism. 
That 
is, however, of particular interest in Pearson's 
thought is 
the /... 
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the way in which gradualism is explicitly linked to a 
view of the role of 'head workers' in social change. 
Arguing for 'the enthusiasm of the study' as against ' the 
enthusiasm of the market -place', he wrote: 
Human society cannot be changed in a year, 
scarcely in a hundred years; its organism 
is as complex as that of the most differentiated 
type of physical life; you can ruin that organism 
as you can destroy life, but remould it you cannot 
without the patient labour of generations, even of 
centuries. That labour itself must be directed by 
knowledge, knowledge of the laws which have dictated 
the rise and decay of human societies, and of those 
physical influences which manifest themselves in 
humanity as temperament, impulse and passion. 
(1888, 121) 
Here it is the abstraction 'knowledge' that must be in com- 
mand of social change. But in convincing his working 
class audience of the futility of revolution, it is the 
bearers of this knowledge who must command: 
... the labourers with the hand will never be 
permanently successful in a revolution, unless 
they have the labourers with the head with them; 
they will want organisation, they will want 
discipline, and this must fail unless education 
stands by them. 
(1888, 363) 
Of course, the Fabians would have agreed that it was the role 
of head- workers to organise and discipline the manual workers: 
thus the young Ramsay Macdonald called for socialism as a 
'revolution directed from the study' (quoted, Hobsbawm, 
1968, 258). Nevertheless, it is in Pearson's thought that 
we find the connections between gradualism and a leading 
role for head- workers especially clearly spelt out. 
4.5/... 
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4.5 Pearson's Feminism 
Pearson's Ethic of Freethought was regarded by 
his contemporaries as a daring book. The South African 
feminist Olive Schreiner wrote to Havelock Ellis: 
You don't realise what a very brave thing a man 
in Pearson's position has done in printing that 
book at all. Anything approaching to that has 
never been published in England before by a pro- 
fessor in a college or university. 
(27 January 1888. Quoted in Cronwright -Schreiner 
(ed.), 1924, 129.) 
This was, however, not primarily because of the passages 
on socialism, rather because of those on the woman's 
question. The 'movement for the complete emancipation of 
women', together with the socialist movement, formed, in 
Pearson's opinion, the two most important movements of the 
time. Just as Pearson was, in the categories of his 
period, a socialist, he was also a feminist. At the same 
time, he had reservations about the women's movement that 
paralleled exactly those he had about the labour movement. 
As he wrote in an article of 1894: 
It is almost idle to say what we wish women's 
future to be; the scientific attitude consists 
in endeavouring merely to trace the changes that 
are taking place, in sympathising with the dif- 
ficulti'es and struggles of our fellow human beings 
under them, and finally, in trying so to direct, for 
we cannot possibly check, the revolutionary forces at 
work that they shall tend to the greater rather than 
the less stability of the body social. 
(1897, 1, 243; Pearson's emphasis) 
It was most important, he felt, that the women's movement 
should stop thinking and talking in terms of 'rights of 
women /... 
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women' but should instead consider how women's role 
should best be reformulated to increase social efficiency 
and stability: 
Not until the historical researches of Bachofen, 
Girard Teulon, and McLennan, with the anthro- 
pological studies of Tylor and Ploss, have been 
supplemented by careful investigation of the 
sanitary and social effects of past stages of 
sex -development, not until we have ample 
statistics of the medico -social results of the 
various regular and morbid forms of sex- relation- 
ship, will it be possible to lay the foundations 
of a real science of sexualogy. Without such a 
science we cannot safely determine whither the 
emancipation of women is leading us, or what is 
the true answer which must be given to the 
woman's question ... We have first to settle what 
is the physical capacity of woman, what would be 
the effect of her emancipation on her function of 
race -reproduction, before we can talk about her 
'rights', which are, after all, only a vague 
description of what may be the fittest position 
for her, the sphere of her maximum usefulness in 
the developed society of the future. 
(1888, 371) 
Pearson's feminism was real enough. He advocated 
the economic independence of women from men. He was 
prepared to take seriously, if not to endorse unequivocally, 
proposals for 'free unions' to replace conventional marriage 
(1888, 442 -3). He argued that women had a 'duty to labour', 
and did not exclude from this professional work. Pearson 
accepted that change in gender roles was unavoidable and 
sought, as the above quotations indicate, to make sure that 
the women's movement was directed into channels that would 
not ultimately threaten the stability of his social world. 
Indeed, he saw how advantage could be taken of women joining 
the workforce. The Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories 
depended very heavily on women researchers, who coula of 
course /.., 
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course be paid less than their male counterparts.(19) 
Although the employment of women in science was at this 
time still a rarity, Pearson was quick to see the gains that 
could flow from it: 
The enormous number of women of the middle 
classes doing nothing, or busy over trivialities, 
is terrible to think of, when one sees in one 
branch of work only - scientific research - how 
much might be done by organised workers of every 
grade of capacity. 
(1901d, 420 fn.) 
Pearson was an early proponent of schemes for the 'endowment 
of Motherhood' (1888, 444). These schemes were of course 
adopted by the Fabians, and it may be that Pearson was the 
first person to convince Sidney Webb of their desirability 
(Webb to Pearson, 29 May 1887; Pearson Papers, CI D3). 
Indeed, in the light of the overall similarities of 
Pearson's position on feminism and his position on socialism, 
it would seem not inaccurate to refer to his feminism as a 
'Fabian feminism'. 
Pearson's feminism affected his academic work in 
several ways. Much of his early historical work was devoted 
to developing the theory that pre -Christian Germany was a 
matriarchal society (1888, 395 -426; 1897, 2, 1 -245). It 
is possible that some of his work attacking traditional 
craniometry, and in particular the common assumption that 
brain size was an indicator of intellectual capacity, was 
motivated /... 
ea OW 
(19) See the financial records of these laboratories in 
the Pearson Papers, 244 -5. 
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motivated by a desire to undermine the sexist use of 
craniometric arguments (Fee, n.d.). It is clear that 
Pearson's introduction of the coefficient of variation 
(standard deviation divided by mean) as a measure of varia- 
bility resulted from his wish to deny the validity of the 
commonly asserted proposition that men are more variable 
than women. For most physical characteristics, such as 
height, when variability is measured by the standard 
deviation, men are more variable than women. When, however, 
the greater mean values of these characteristics for men are 
taken into account, through the use of the coefficient of 
variation, this is no longer true (Pearson, 1897, 1, 256- 
377). Nevertheless, by far the most important effect of 
Pearson's contact with feminism on his academic work was 
indirect. Feminism led him to serious consideration of 
heredity. 
4.6 Pearson's Eugenics 
Pearson's early writings (up to 1885) show no 
evidence of his having thought in any detail about heredity. 
At times, he inclined to a position that could be seen as 
hereditarian: for example, his remarks on the hierarchy of 
(20) 
'power intellectual' in Pearson (1881b). At other 
times /... 
(20) But even here he writes that 'power intellectual 
cannot be collected and bequeathed' (1881b, 270). 
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times, he appears environmentalist, as in his emphasis on the 
beneficial effects of education for the working class. 
However, in 1885 he became a founder member of the 'Men's 
and Women's Club', a small circle of radical intellectuals 
devoted to 'the free and unreserved discussion of all 
matters in any way connected with the mutual position and 
relation of men and women' (quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1936- 
38, part 1, 210). It was in papers to this club that his 
early position on heredity was developed: a paper of 1885 
on 'The Woman's Question', and one of 1886 on 'Socialism 
and Sex' (1888, 370 -394 and 427 -46). 
The woman's question, Pearson noted, 'opens up 
great racial problems' (1888, 393). Among these were the 
problems that flowed from what he called 'the law of in- 
herited characters° (1888, 390): that is, the tendency to 
the inheritance of mental and physical characteristics. 
'The progress of the great mass of the people', he noted, 
'is so dishearteningly slow'. The 'middle classes' have 
developed greatly in intellectual powers, 'but place a 
modern working man beside a mediaeval craftsman, and morally 
or intellectually should we be able to mark an absolute 
progress ?' (1888, 390). It was suspected, he said, that 
the more highly educated men and women were having fewer 
children than the less educated. Must the state, or 'a 
strong public opinion', not intervene? 
Shall those who are diseased, shall those who 
are nighest to the brute, have the right to 
reproduce their like? Shall the reckless, the 
idle /... 
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idle, be they poor or wealthy, those who 
follow mere instinct without reason, be 
the parents of future generations? Shall 
the consumptive father not be socially 
branded when he hands down misery to his 
offspring, and inefficient citizens to the 
state? It is difficult to conceive any 
greater race crime. Out of the law of in- 
herited characters spring problems which strike 
deeply into the very roots of our present 
social habits. 
(1888, 391) 
Considerations such as these were central to Pearson in the 
reforms he wished to see in the social organisation of 
reproduction. He did indeed wish to see women freed from 
the absolute control of their husbands, but they should not 
thereby achieve full control over their reproduction. Part 
of the 'socialistic solution' of the sex problem was 
... state interference if necessary in the 
matter of child -bearing, in order to preserve 
intersexual independence on the one hand, and 
the limit of efficient population on the other. 
(1888, 445) 
So, by the mid- 1880's, Pearson was seriously enter- 
taining the idea of the necessity of state interference 'in 
the family of the anti -social propagators of unnecessary 
human beings' (1888, 433). His eugenics emerged from his 
social and political thought, before he started academic 
work on heredity. It is therefore important to understand 
his eugenics as a social and political programme that was 
only later articulated scientifically. Pearson's Fabianism, 
his social Darwinism and his feminism fed into his eugenics, 
and he used eugenics as a 'scientific' mode of expressing 
his ideas in these fields. The transition in his 
political thought - to the extent that there is one - 
represented /... 
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represented the condensing of his ideas in these different 
fields into a single system best describable as eugenics. 
No radical break was involved. His adoption of eugenics 
did not, for example, entail his abandonment of socialism. 
Quite the opposite: he argued that a eugenic policy could 
not be successful under capitalism, chiefly because 
capitalist employers, desiring large supplies of cheap, un- 
skilled labour, had an interest in maintaining the rate of 
reproduction of the 'unfit' at home and permitting large 
scale immigration of the 'unfit' from abroad (1888, 334 -40). 
Socialism was thus a precondition for successful eugenics: 
The pious wish of Darwin that the superior and 
not the inferior members of the group should be 
the parents of the future, is far more likely to 
be realised in a socialistic than in an individualistic 
state. 
(Pearson, 1897, 1, 138) 
Practical eugenics, Pearson wrote, is concerned 
with two fundamental problems: 
(i) The production of a sufficient supply of 
leaders of ability and energy for the 
community, and 
(ii) The provision of intelligent and healthy 
men and women for the great army of workers. 
(1909e, 22) 
In previous generations this had been achieved by natural 
selection. However, during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, profound social changes had taken place, which had 
both reduced the impact of natural selection and brought into 
play countervailing forces. 
Where the battle is to the capable and the 
thrifty, where the dull and idle have no chance 
to propagate their kind, there the nation will 
progress, even if the land be sterile, the 
environment /... 
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environment unfriendly and educational facilities 
small. Give educational facilities to all, limit 
the hours of labour to eight -a -day - providing 
leisure to watch two football matches a week - 
give a minimum wage with free medical advice, 
and yet you will find that the unemployables, 
the degenerates and the physical and mental 
weaklings increase rather than decrease. 
(1909d, 20 -21) 
The 'full purifying force of natural selection' had been 
suspended (Pearson, 1909c, 12) by humanitarian social and 
economic measures. The abolition of child labour, had, for 
the 'better class' of workers, turned a child from an 
economic asset to a straightforward expense (Pearson, 1909e, 
7-9). Within the 'cultured classes', 
the child has never been an economic asset; 
it is a luxury which we know we must pay for, 
and expect to pay for, until after college and 
professional training, and, in the case of 
unmarried daughters, often long after our own 
lives are concluded. 
(Pearson, 1909e, 21) 
While the 'better class' of workers and the 'cultured classes' 
had, in response to these pressures, restricted their 
fertility, the 'unemployables and degenerates', who could 
turn to public and private charity to support their offspring, 
had not done so. The resulting patterns of differential 
fertility, as revealed by Pearsoriscollaborator Heron (1906), 
were, Pearson argued, disastrous. 
Pearson did not, however, desire a return to 
laissez- faire, nor think one practical. 
Do I therefore call for less human sympathy, 
for more limited charity, and for sterner 
treatment of the weak? Not for a moment; 
we cannot go backwards a single step in the 
evolution of human feelings, 
(1909c, 25) 
The /... 
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The struggle of national group against national group 
necessitated the growth of intra -group solidarity and of 
the ethical feelings associated with it So the clock could 
not, as more right wing eugenists might suggest, be simly 
set back. The emotions associated with group solidarity 
must instead be channelled into rational forms, and 
artificial selection must replace natural selection. 
... I demand that all sympathy and charity 
shall be organised and guided into paths 
where they will promote racial efficiency, 
and not lead us straight towards national 
shipwreck. 
(1909c, 25) 
The nation that first succeeded in doing this would be 
'destined to be the predominant state of the future' (1911, 
27). 
Pearson as a eugenist was thus no opponent of 
social reform as such. His argument was rather that reform 
should be 'scientific', and eugenics was to be the science 
that was to deterine its scientificity. Two social 
premises, which can be traced from his political thought of 
the 1880's, were built into his eugenics. The first was 
the notion of a wide divide between 'working' and 'cultured' 
classes, with the latter the result of long selection for 
the mental abilities of the leader, co- ordinator and in- 
itiator. The second was of a working class divided into 
a 'better class' of skilled, hardworking and socially necessary 
workers, and a sub- proletariat of 'unemployables and 
degenerates', who, if not carefully controlled, would 
'pollute /... 
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This last point is explicit in 
Pearson (1909c, 39) where he talks of 'that infernal lake 
which sends its unregarded rivulets to befoul more fertile 
social tracts'. Furthermore, Pearson's eugenics, like his 
feminism, can be described as 'Fabian'. He supported 
schemes for social reform such as national insurance and 
child allowances, which, he felt, would, if properly 
administered with regard for eugenic principles, increase 
the birth -rate of the 'better class' of workers relative to 
that of the sub -proletariat (1909e). He saw eugenics as 
a cohesive ideology, a secular religion which would enable 
the working class 'to see beyond the horizon of class - 
interest, [would] enable them to look upon the nation as an 
ever -changing organisation susceptible of advance or decay, 
as it obeys or disobeys stern natural laws' (1910b, 30 -31). 
The 'Fabianism' of his eugenics emerges, however, most 
clearly in his conception of the nature of eugenics and of 
the best strategy for eugenists. Referring to Bernard Shaw's 
eugenic 'extremism', Pearson wrote: 
We may remind the Editor of 'Fabian Essays' 
that the doctrines of Eugenics will best be 
served, like those of socialism, by a slow 
process of impenetration. 
(1914 -30, 3A, 261) 
While not eschewing support for particular eugenic measures 
such as the Mental Deficiency Bill (1912b, 28), Pearson's 
immediate goal was the establishment and institutionalisation 
of an academic science of eugenics, with 
..o its endowments, its special laboratory, 
its technical library and its proper share 
in the cúrriculum of academic studies. 
(1909c, 3) 
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This academic discipline was then to be the basis of a 
campaign of persuasion directed at professionals, rather 
than the population at large, or politicians: 
To produce a nation healthy alike in mind and 
body must become a fixed idea - one of almost 
religious intensity, as Francis Galton has 
expressed it - in the minds of the intellectual 
oligarchy, which after all sways the masses and 
their political leaders. 
(1909c, 25) 
Pearson was suspicious of the Eugenics Education Society, 
fearing the influence within it of amateurs and cranks. 
This was probably unjustified, given the high representation 
of the 'intellectual oligarchy' in the Society, but Pearson 
was concerned to the point of obsession with keeping the 
eugenics movement under the control of properly trained 
experts (see, for example, Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 407). 
If this control by experts was to be maintained, 
the facilities for training them, and the number of positions 
of power and influence open to them, must be greatly in- 
creased. Pearson was particularly interested in the scope 
for transforming the newly established profession of public 
health officer, by introducing training in both mathematics 
and medicine. He hoped in this way to develop a potential 
cadre of expert eugenists (Pearson, 1912b, 3 -11). His own 
Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories were of course uniquely 
suited establishments for such training. For Pearson, as 
for the Fabians generally, one of the attractions of 
scientistic social reform, whether 'socialist' or 'eugenist' 
in nature, was surely the growth of the occupational 
opportunities /... 
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opportunities for,and the status of, suitably trained 
experts and the teachers of these experts. 
The controversies over tuberculosis and alcoholism 
throw interesting light on the differences in attitude 
between Pearson and the majority of eugenists. The latter 
controversy, especially, brought Pearson into direct con- 
flict with leading members of the Eugenics Education Society. 
In these controversies, men who were often generally 
sympathetic to eugenics, but wished to preserve special 
status for a particular area of environmental reform 
(environmental health measures against tuberculosis, the 
temperance movement, etc.) came into conflict with the con- 
sistent hereditarianism of Pearson and his followers. In 
the case of tuberculosis, Pearson called for the restriction 
of the fertility of the tuberculous, claiming that this 
would, by eliminating inherited constitutional susceptibility 
to the disease, eliminate it, while public health measures 
would be inadequate. Pearson felt that cynical motives 
accounted for the beliefs of his opposition: 
..Q quite recently and solemnly assembled in 
conclave, the wise men of medicine agreed that 
the constitution was an important factor in 
tuberculosis, but that it was not desirable to 
lay stress on it at the present time, for it 
would check the flow of public money into the 
fight against the tubercle bacillus. But 
what if the tubercle bacillus is actually com- 
mitting suicide, or what if immunity be surviving 
without the aid of the expenditure of thousands 
of pounds of public money? Well, to say that, 
means that you will cut off the present or 
prospective occupation of a certain number of 
gentlemen who are fighting in one special manner 
the tubercle bacillus, and therefore, even if 
true, it must not be rashly said in public. 
(1911,12; Pearson's emphasis) 
Without /... 
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Without necessarily accepting Pearson's account, it can be 
seen how particular occupational commitments could crosscut 
a general position. Pearson's occupational commitments 
were of a different nature to those of most eugenists. 
His aim was the development of an academic science of 
eugenics, and thus he could afford this kind of consistency 
in the face of pragmatic counter -arguments. 
A similar pattern was manifest in the controversy 
over alcoholism. In many ways, the eugenics and temperance 
campaigns were similar. Both sought social 'purification', 
and both attempted to improve the physical fitness of the 
working class, and to increase its amenability to social 
control, by the removal of a source of 'pollution'. Pear son 
and his co- workers suggested, however, that the causal chain 
in much temperance thought and propaganda should be reversed. 
Parental alcoholism was, they felt, merely the symptom of 
a general hereditary degeneracy and not, as temperance 
reformers suggested, the direct cause of feeble- mindedness 
and degeneracy in offspring. In this, Pearson was merely 
being a consistent hereditarian, but he infuriated fellow 
eugenists who were supporters of the temperance movement. 
They saw a main plank of anti -alcohol propaganda ('it damages 
the children') being eroded.(21) In this instance, 
Pearson /... 
(21) This controversy is discussed in detail in Farrall 
(1970, 250 -82). Note, once again, that Pearson's 
opponents are not being accused of logical incon- 
sistency. Thus, it was perfectly logical to hold 
to a generalised hereditarianism but to argue that 
particular environmental 'race poisons' such as 
alcohol might have a direct chemical effect on the 
germ plasm. See, for example, Herbert (1910, 115). 
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Pearson was extending, into a new area, an idea already 
familiar in eugenic thinking, in a fashion unconstrained by 
pre- existing commitments in that area. His opponents, with 
their prior involvement in temperance reform, rejected this 
direct extension of eugenics, and instead sought ways of 
reconciling the rhetorical needs of temperance agitation 
and of eugenics. 
4.7 Pearson's Philosophy 
In the years up to 1892, Pearson developed a 
characteristic system of moral philosophy and of epistemology. 
The latter, as Norton (1978) has shown, had an influence on 
his eugenics and his Darwinism: he wished to develop these 
along 'proper' scientific lines, 'proper' lines for him 
were positivist lines. In this he inevitably failed. It 
is easy to show that his actual scientific practice fell short 
of his own positivist criteria (see chapter seven). His 
philosophy was thus not a determinant of his science in any 
absolute sense. Nonetheless, his attempt to develop his 
science in such a way that it could be accounted good, 
positivist science did have an effect on its style and con- 
tent, even if his practice escaped the bounds he sought to 
place on it. Similarly, while his moral philosophy perhaps 
did not have any independent influence on his science, it 
did form an important and revealing part of his system of 
thought. 
Pearson's/... 
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Pearson's moral philosophy can be summed up in two 
maxims: 
... morality is what is social, and immorality 
what is anti -social... 
The ignorant cannot be moral. 
(1888, 117, 122) 
Pearson rejected all systems of absolute morality, such as 
Christianity, and he had no time for the ethical theories 
of those he saw as attempting to reintroduce such systems, 
such as Kant and the neo- Hegelians (1888, 117,325). He 
put forward, instead, not an ethical relativism, as might 
at first be assumed from the statement 'morality is what is 
social', but an ethical naturalism. The basis of morality 
was the need for social coherence in the inter -group struggle 
for existence. Morality was not, however, simply the 
following of group norms. The truly moral actor had to take 
into account, not only the existing state of society, but 
also the direction of its evolution: 
One thing only is fixed, the direction and 
rate of change of human society at a particular 
epoch. It may be difficult to measure, but it 
is none the less real and definite. The moral 
or good action is that which tends in the direction 
of growth of a particular society in a particular 
land at a particular time. 
(1888, 428) 
This is why 'the ignorant cannot be moral'. Only the in- 
dividual who has knowledge of science and history, and who 
is therefore acquainted with the scientific laws of social 
evolution, can know which course of action is moral. 
Pearson's moral philosophy, while in itself a not 
particularly /... 
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particularly unusual form of Victorian evolutionary 
naturalism, is interestingly related to other facets of his 
thought. As a radical and freethinker, he sought a 
foundation for morality different from the received 
morality of Christianity. As an intellectual and a pro- 
fessional, a view of morality that placed such a high 
premium on scientific knowledge had clear attraction for 
him. As a middle class socialist and a male feminist, he 
sought a weapon to use against the demands of more extreme 
socialists and feminists. Against revolutionaries in either 
field, he argued that to talk of the 'rights' of labour or 
of women was nonsense. Talk of 'rights' led too easily to 
revolutionary upheaval, he felt: it was 'the enthusiasm of 
the market place'. Consideration, instead, of the laws of 
social development, of the necessarily gradual nature of 
evolutionary change, led to moderation and the avoidance of 
revolutionary agitation, to 'the enthusiasm of the study' 
(1888, 115 -34, 370 -2). 
If scientific knowledge was to play the role of 
the determinant of the nature of moral action, Pearson 
clearly needed to demarcate the boundary between properly 
scientific knowledge and mere belief. After all, many late 
Victorians claimed that science showed the futility and 
perniciousness of both socialism and the emancipation of 
women; some claimed that there were areas of knowledge 
over which science had no sway, and in which revealed 
religion had therefore to be relied upon; others claimed 
that /.,. 
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that new 'sciences' such as psychical research proved the 
existence of a spirit world. If Pearson was to maintain 
the social and political positions he held, if he was to be 
able to use 'science' as a tool in argument, and if he was 
to be able convincingly to legitimate 'scientific expertise', 
he needed a demarcation criterion that could be deployed 
against arguments such as the above. It was arguably for 
this reason that he was led to develop a philosophy of 
science. 
This philosophy of science was presented in the 
Grammar of Science (1892a). It was founded on a positivist 
and phenomenalist epistemology. All knowledge, Pearson 
argued, was based on sense- impressions; it was impossible 
meaningfully to discuss unknown and unknowable 'things -in- 
themselves' that metaphysicians saw as lying behind sense - 
impressions. The task of science was simply to describe 
as economically as possible the 'routine of perceptions'. 
Concepts that were firmly based on experience, and those 
that contributed to economy of description, were allowable: 
others were to be banished. The sphere of science as thus 
delimited was co-extensive with the sphere of all valid 
knowledge. Certainly, there were types of phenomena that 
had yet to be satisfactorily described by science, but 
there were no phenomena to which the scientific method was 
not applicable. What was not science was simply not 
knowledge. Pearson's was an idealist position. For him, 
the referent of scientific law'a.s the routine of human 
perception /.., 
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perception, not the unknowable physical universe: 'matter' 
was as redundant and unscientific a concept as 'spirit'. 
On the other hand, his philosophy did not carry the anti- 
scientific, or at any rate anti -scientistic, connotations 
frequently associated with idealism. Indeed, it is in- 
teresting that a genuinely 'spiritualistic' idealist such 
as St. George Mivart should perceive Pearson's position as 
de facto materialist (Mivart, 1895). 
Pearson's philosophy integrated well with the 
other elements of his position. It was an apt underpinning 
for a man seeking progressive reforms, and wishing moral 
sanction for these, while wanting to avoid an appeal to the 
morality of the market -place. Morality was based on 
evolutionary law. Thus its progressive nature was 
guaranteed, and only those who had knowledge of science and 
of social development could claim the label 'moral'. Pearson's 
positivism was a useful element in his struggle against anti - 
scientistic reaction and those he saw as its allied within 
science. His epistemology, as developed in his philosophy 
of science, w4s a superb polemical weapon for revealing the 
'superstition' and 'metaphysics' in the thought of his 
opponents. 
Pearson was not the only thinker to deploy 
philosophy in this way. The philosophy of Mach, with its 
phenomenalism and ethical relativism, was taken up by 
scientific and political radicals (such as Lenin's 'ultra - 
left /... 
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left' opponent Bogdanov) as a weapon against 'establishment' 
science and as a possible scientific justification for 
radicalism through an operationalised Marxism and an ethical 
relativism (on this see Feuer, 1971).(22) While Mach's 
followers took their radicalism further than Pearson and 
his followers (the Machian, Friedrich Adler, chose to 
assassinate a Prime Minister), the general connotations of 
the two philosophical systems were similar. It is perhaps 
in this context that one should see the reason for the 
success of Pearson's philosophy of science in attracting 
young, radical scientists of the period up to 1914. 
(23) 
4.8 Pearson's Science 
Up to 1892, Pearson's directly scientific work lay 
within a very orthodox tradition of applied mathematics. 
From that year on, it underwent a complete transformation. 
The purpose of this section is to present an explanation of 
this shift, and to attempt to show the relevance to an under- 
standing of this shift of knowledge of Pearson's wider 
beliefs and aims. By the early 1890' s, Pearson had 
developed the distinctive political and philosophical 
position analysed above, with its interlinked elements of 
Fabian socialism, reformist feminism, emerging hereditarianism, 
social /... 
(22) For the relations between Pearson and Mach, see Thiele 
(1969). 
(23) For one testimonial to its success, see J.B.S. Haldane 
(1957, 430). 
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social Darwinism, ethical naturalism, and a positivist and 
phenomenalist epistemology. The conjuncture of this 
ideological position, the high level and particular character 
of his mathematical training and competence, and at least 
one important 'accident', resulted, it will be argued, in 
a move into work in statistical theory of a particular 
kind.(24) 
Four phases in Pearson' s involvement with his new 
line of work can be identified. The first was the period 
up to the beginning of 1891. The most important piece of 
evidence from this period is a paper, read by Pearson to 
the Men's and Women's Club, on Galton's Natural Inheritance 
(Galton, 1889b; Pearson, 1889).(25) It was indeed natural 
that Pearson, given his interest in heredity and his mathe- 
matical knowledge, should turn to Galton's work. Nor is 
it surprising that, given his pre- existing beliefs about 
heredity and his speculations about eugenics, he should 
find what he read exciting and important. He wrote: 
The general conclusion one must be forced to 
by accepting Galton's theories is the imperative 
importance of humans doing for themselves what 
they do for cattle, if they wish to raise the 
mediocrity of their race. 
(Pearson, 1889, 34) 
He/... 
(24) At least one other individual, Arthur Black, shared a 
broadly similar conjuncture of factors, except that 
the circumstances of his life were much less happy 
than that of Karl Pearson. Black will be discussed 
in chapter five. 
(25) I am grateful to Professor E.S. Pearson for allowing 
me to see this paper. 
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He was, however, not immediately attracted to Galton's 
quantitative approach: 
Personally I ought to say that there is, in 
my own opinion, considerable danger in applying 
the methods of exact science to problems in 
descriptive science, whether they be problems of 
heredity or of political economy; the grace and 
logical accuracy of the mathematical processes 
are apt to so fascinate the descriptive scientist 
that he seeks for sociological hypotheses which 
fit his mathematical reasoning and this without 
first ascertaining whether the basis of his 
hypotheses is as broad as that human life to 
which the theory is to be applied. I write 
therefore as a very partial sympathiser with 
Galton's methods. 
(Pearson, 1889, 2) 
Pearson's initial attraction to Galton's work thus appears 
to have been the result of its substantive, rather than 
methodological, importance. It was as an 'amateur' student 
of heredity and eugenics that Pearson first came into con- 
tact with Galton's statistical theory. 
No immediate consequences followed from this first 
contact. At this stage in his career Pearson's energies 
were chiefly devoted to the preparation of The Grammar of 
Science, and to the Gresham Lectures on Geometry in which 
many of the ideas of the Grammar were first presented 
(E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 1, 212 -6). The work on the 
Grammar involved some consideration of the concept of 
probability, and Pearson used Bayes's theorem to justify 
inductive inference (1892a, 166 -79). This hardly broke 
new ground, but there were some indications in the Grammar 
of the developing direction of Pearson's thought. One of 
the four 'claims of science' discussed by Pearson was that 
science /... 
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science 'can on occasion adduce facts having far more 
direct bearing on social problems that any theory of the 
state propounded by the philosophers from the days of Plato 
to those of Hegel' (1892a, 31; Pearson's emphasis). The 
example Pearson gave of this was Weismann's theory of the 
non -inheritance of acquired characteristics: 
Now this conclusion of Weismann's - if it be 
valid, and all we can say at present is that 
the arguments in favour of it are remarkably 
strong - radically affects our judgment on the 
moral conduct of the individual, and on the 
duties of the state and society towards their 
degenerate members. No degenerate and feeble 
stock will ever be converted into healthy and 
sound stock by the accumulated effects of 
education, good laws, and sanitary surroundings. 
(1892a, 32) 
In the Grammar, we also find Pearson's positivist criteria 
of valid knowledge turned against much biological thinking, 
in particular that of the opponents of Darwinism. The task 
of the biologist was simply to describe, as economically as 
possible, the phenomena, and not to attempt to explain them: 
... the failure to grasp [this distinction] has 
been made the ground for what is really a meta- 
physical attack on the Darwinian theory of 
evolution. As I interpret that theory it is 
truly scientific, for the very reason that it 
does not attempt to explain anything. It 
takes the facts of life as we perceive them, 
and attempts to describe them in a brief formula 
involving such conceptions as 'variation', 'in- 
heritance', 'natural selection', and 'sexual 
selection' ... Perhaps some of the modern critics 
of Darwin will be less ready to consider adaptations 
as 'not explicable' by natural selection, but due to 
the 'precise chemical nature of protoplasmic 
metabolism', or to 'an internal fate, expressible 
in terms of dominant chemical constitution', if 
they once grasp that physics and chemistry in their 
turn render nothing 'explicable', but merely, like 
natural selection itself, are shorthand descriptions 
of changes in our sense -impressions. 
(1892a, 421 -2) 
The /... 
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The second phase of Pearson's change of direction 
in his mathematical work, foreshadowed as it was in the 
Grammar, did not come until after its publication. At the 
beginning of 1891, W.F.R. Weldon became Professor of Zoology 
at University College, London. Weldon, who will be dis- 
cussed in chapter five, had independently developed an in- 
terest in Galton's work, though from a professional 
biologist's rather than political thinker's point of view. 
He had already published work using Galton's statistical 
methods (Weldon, 1890), and had tried unsuccessfully to 
interest mathematicians at Cambridge in this area (Pearson, 
1906, 283). Pearson and he almost immediately began an 
intense intellectual collaboration and personal friendship. 
It was this contact with Weldon that led to Pearson's first 
original work in statistical theory. Pearson's interest 
in the field was developing rapidly. He chose to deliver 
some of his Gresham Lectures on the 'Geometry of Statistics'. 
These began in orthodox enough fashion, with an account of 
the historical development of statistics, then of graphical 
methods of data presentation and of the laws of probability 
(E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 1, 214 -6). But already the 
terminology Pearson used was altered to take account of the 
move away from the traditional area of error theory to other 
applications: 
... in November 1892 variation is measured by 
the mean error; by November 1893 the standard 
deviation has been introduced and the curve of 
error becomes the normal curve. 
(E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 1, 216; E.S. Pearson's 
emphasis) 
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In October 1893 Pearson sent to the Royal Society his first 
paper on statistical theory. Its title indicates the con- 
text in which it was written: 'Contributions to the Mathe- 
matical Theory of Evolution' (Pearson, 1894). It dealt 
with the dissection of frequency curves into normal com- 
ponents, and the applications were drawn from data supplied 
by Weldon. A second paper followed a year later, and dis- 
cussed the fitting of skew frequency curves to observational 
data (Pearson, 1895). In this paper the famous Pearson 
system of frequency curves, all derived from one fundamental 
differential equation, was first presented. 
Unquestionably, the 'accident' of Pearson's being 
brought into contact with Weldon was important in this phase 
of the transition in Pearson's work. The stimulus of con- 
versations with Weldon and of the problems thrown up by 
Weldon's data were undeniably important in the production 
of these two initial papers. It does not, however, seem 
justifiable to attribute to this accident the extreme 
determining role suggested by J.B.S. Haldane (1957, 431), 
who concludes that if Pearson had met, instead of Weldon, 
an economist or engineer interested in the variation of 
manufactured goods, he would have started work in industrial 
quality control rather than biometric statistics. Weldon 
acted as the 'trigger' for intellectual developments the 
roots of which it is possible, as we have seen, to trace 
back in Pearson's thought well before the contact with his 
fellow /... 
fellow professor.(26) 
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It is not very useful to speculate 
on what might have happened if Weldon had not been appointed 
to University College: suffice it to say that the contact 
between Pearson and Weldon was only one contributory factor 
in the transition here examined. 
Pearson's first two statistical papers might con- 
ceivably be interpreted as the work of a man who saw in 
biology a sphere for the application of his mathematical 
skills, but which had no intrinsic interest for him. His 
next statistical paper (Pearson, 1896) and the two volumes 
of essays, The Chances of Death (1897), demonstrate the 
falsity of this view. They can be taken as indicators of 
a third phase in this transition. Pearson himself wrote 
of this phase: 
Now, if you are going to take Darwinism as your 
theory of life and apply it to human problems, 
you must not only believe it to be true, but you 
must set to, and demonstrate that it actually 
applies. That task I endeavoured to undertake 
after the late Lord Salisbury's famous attack on 
Darwinism at the Oxford meeting of the British 
Association in 1894. It was not a light task, 
but it gave for many years the raison d'étre of 
my statistical work. 
(1912b, 11; Pearson's emphasis) 
Salisbury (1894) had suggested that the process of natural 
selection could not be demonstrated, but was merely an 
implausible hypothesis. He called for a return to the 
principle of creative design. While too much weight should 
not be placed on this incident alone, as again the development 
of /... 
(26) See also Norton (1978). 
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of Pearson's thought lay in this direction anyway, it should 
be noted that Salisbury was the epitome of what Pearson 
opposed in the upper classes of British society. The 
religiously motivated attack on Darwinism from the High 
Tory peer led to an immediate riposte from Pearson, first 
published in the Fortnightly Review of 1894 and reprinted 
in the Chances of Death (1897, 1, 140 -172). Pearson 
attacked Salisbury as a representative of 'reaction' and 
the 'new bigotry' and claimed that 'the theory of evolution 
is likely to become a branch of the theory of chance', and 
that when this happens views like Salisbury's would obtain 
'very poor comfort' as a 'quantitative measure of the rate 
of natural selection' was found (1897, 1, 172, 167). 
Pearson's work of the 1890's on the quantification 
of the theory of evolution can thus be seen as an attempt 
to defend Darwinism against its opponents, with a view to 
its application to 'human problems'. Pearson's political 
position can be seen as operative here in two ways: firstly, 
in the potency for him of Darwinism as a cultural symbol 
representing the struggle of the scientific intellectual 
against 'reaction'; secondly, in the crucial importance to 
him of developing an intellectually 'hard° and applicable 
social Darwinism. It would be mistaken to see biometry 
(the name he gave to this new area of study) as simply the 
application of statistical techniques to biology. The 
fact that Pearson took up this study, and the way he 
developed it, were both conditioned by the political role 
of /... 
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of his evolutionary theory. Further, his positivism was 
also of importance in conditioning the form in which he 
developed evolutionary biology. He sought a theory of 
evolution and heredity that could be presented as simply a 
summary of the 'facts' of the biological world: a 
statistical approach was therefore clearly suitable 
(Norton, 1978).(27) 
Pearson's third 'Mathematical Contribution to 
the Theory of Evolution' (Pearson, 1896) best illustrates 
the nature of Pearsonian biometry. This was a very 
ambitious and important paper, in which Pearson put forward 
the now standard product -moment expression for the co- 
efficient of correlation and developed a large part of the 
theory of multiple correlation and regression. These 
developments in statistical theory arose from the attempt 
in the paper to produce a quantitative theory of evolution 
on the basis of formal definitions of various concepts of 
the theory. The paper should not, however, be seen as a 
general, disinterested biological monograph. In a real 
sense it was about human beings in society. The definitions 
are /... 
(27) This should not be taken as implying either that his 
biometric theories in fact fulfilled strict positivist 
criteria, or that his philosophical views were the only 
reason he chose to develop a statistical evolutionary 
theory. On the latter point, it should be noted that 
Darwinism was already an implicitly statistical theory 
(although not expressed quantitatively); that Pearson's 
competences lay, not in biology, but in mathematics of 
a particular application- oriented type (notably con- 
tinuum mechanics); and that Pearson had before him a 
potent exemplar in Galton's work on statistical biology. 
- 189 - 
are general: but it is clear that man was the paradigm 
organism to which they were intended to apply. To gain 
the type of data necessary for the application of these 
definitions to an animal population in the wild would be 
a daunting task for biologists even nowadays. Further, in 
writing this paper Pearson had a political purpose. He 
wished to refute the theory that, should natural selection 
be suspended and random mating take place, a species would 
revert to an original 'species type'. This theory, 
originally put forward by Weismann, and referred to by 
Pearson as the doctrine of ' panmixia', had been given wide 
circulation by Benjamin Kidd in his popular Social Evolution 
(1895; first published in 1894). Kidd wrote: 
... if all the individuals of every generation 
in any species were allowed to equally propagate 
their kind, the average of each generation would 
continually tend to fall below the average of the 
generation which preceded it, and a process of 
slow but steady deterioration would ensue. 
(1895, 37; emphasis deleted) 
This law, Kidd concluded, proved the impossibility of the 
long -term success of a socialist society: with the struggle 
for survival suspended, degeneration would automatically 
follow. Pearson immediately attacked this anti -socialist 
doctrine in a paper in the Fortnightly Review of July 1894 
(reprinted in Pearson, 1897, 1, 103 -39) and backed up his 
point of view with a detailed quantitative analysis in the 
1896 paper (Pearson, 1896, 298 -318). His aim was to show 
that the efficacy of selection was greater and more permanent 
than the doctrine of 'panmixia' allowed. To do this, he 
had /... 
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had to modify Galton's interpretation of regression. 
Galton had assumed that regression took place to a fixed 
racial mean, and in this form the theory of regression 
indeed suggested that the suspension of natural selection 
could lead to the consequences suggested by Kidd. Pearson 
saw that to avoid these consequences it was necessary to 
assume 'that successive selections must connote some pro- 
gression of the focus of regression' (1896, 307). On the 
assumption that 'the focus of regression is the mean of the 
population from which parents have been selected' (1896, 
308), it was possible to show that 
... with the correlation coefficients of in- 
heritance anything like their value in man, 
five generations of selection of the type 
required in both parents would suffice to 
establish a breed. 
(1896, 317; emphasis deleted) 
The subsequent suspension of selection would not then be 
followed by any automatic deterioration. 
Thus, we see how Pearson's quantitative analysis 
could have a political import. It was possible to use it 
to argue for the efficacy of a 'socialist' policy, in which, 
for the sake of group solidarity in inter -imperialist 
struggle, intra -group competition - and the resulting natural 
selection - was suspended and replaced by conscious eugenic 
selection. No deterioration would ensue: indeed careful 
eugenic selection would permanently improve the quality of 
the race. From the point of view of Darwinism and eugenics, 
socialism was superior to an individualism 
.., which /... 
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.., which to -day seems directly to encourage the 
unlimited breeding of the physically and mentally 
most degenerate classes in the community, and 
refuses to impose any test as to physique or in- 
tellect on the pauper aliens it allows to enter 
the social group. 
(1897, 1, 137 -8) 
Further, it is clear from Pearson (1896) that, in his bio- 
metric work, Pearson was by no means simply developing 
technical tools to aid others' theories. He was prepared, 
for reasons which lie in his attitudes to politics and 
Darwinism, to modify essential substantive components of 
Galton's theories, such as the evolutionary interpretation 
of regression. Finally, it is possible to understand, 
reading Pearson's reply to Kidd, the polemical force of the 
quantitative apparatus Pearson was able to deploy. To take 
just one example: 
While at the sources of knowledge vague descriptive 
reasoning is being succeeded by a more just quantit- 
ative theory of evolution, the innumerable conduit 
pipes represented by popular writers and the press 
are still providing the public with a fluid so con- 
taminated with the germs of muddle -headedness that 
it is little wonder if whole classes of the community 
are poisoned. I venture accordingly to make the 
following definite statement:- That until the 
quantitative importance and numerical relationship 
of the various factors, vaguely grouped together 
as the theory of evolution, are accurately ascertained, 
no valid argument can be based on the theory of 
evolution with regard to the growth of civilised 
human societies. We must remain agnostic as to 
these problems until the theory of evolution has 
been readjusted on its new basis. 
(1897, 1, 105) 
For Pearson, the 'readjustment' to the 'new basis' of the 
theory of evolution, was a project of great importance. 
The theory of evolution 
... is not merely a passive intellectual view of 
nature; it applies to man in his communities as 
it /... 
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it applies to all forms of life. It teaches 
us the art of living, of building up stable 
and dominant nations, and it is as important 
for statesmen and philanthropists in council 
as for the scientist in his laboratory or the 
naturalist in the field. 
(Pearson, 1900a, 468) 
It was Pearson's chosen task to purge this theory of meta- 
physics and to place it on a sure, incontestable, quantitative 
and positivist framework. In doing this, he was working 
on an enterprise that expressed all the major elements of 
his political and philosophical position. 
By this third phase, Pearson's transition to work 
in biometric statistics was essentially complete. The 
fourth phase, from the end of the 1890's onwards, was one 
of consolidation and of the building of a research team. 
The problems dealt with by Pearson began to include a wide 
range of puzzles thrown up as a by- product of the main thrust 
of biometric research. A good example of this was his 
development of the chi square test. The work on curve 
fitting of the early 1890's led to a need for some measure 
of the goodness -of -fit of a theoretical curve to observed 
data. Weldon's attempts to develop (through dice tossing) 
empirical stochastic models for frequency distributions led 
to a similar need. E.S. Pearson (1965, 330 -337) documents 
the early efforts by Weldon and Pearson to solve these 
problems. W.F. Sheppard, who will be discussed in the 
following chapter, attempted to solve the problem, but was 
defeated by his failure to cope with the correlation between 
the divergences in different cells of a frequency distribution 
(see /... 
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(see Lancaster, 1969, 12). Pearson - who was able to draw 
on his knowledge of multivariate correlation, a knowledge 
gained in his studies of heredity and evolution - finally 
developed a solution to the problem (Pearson, 1900c). We 
can see here a problem arising in a derivative fashion from 
biometric statistical work, and being solved in a way not 
directly conditioned by this work, except in that concepts 
directly developed in this work provided a resource for its 
solution. Nevertheless, even in this phase the general 
nature of Pearson's programme of scientific research 
remained conditioned by the overall social and political 
aims of its founder.(27) Indeed the specific part played 
by eugenics, rather than social Darwinism generally, was, 
as will be shown in chapter seven, to increase. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The relationship between the starting -point of 
the analysis of this chapter - the structural situation of 
the professional middle class - and its end - the details 
of Pearson's science - involves a long chain of mediations. 
The two crucial mediations are first, the claimed role of 
Pearson as an 'exceptional individual' expressing a pro- 
fessional middle class ideology in particularly clear and 
consistent form; and second, Pearson's social, political 
and philosophical beliefs as conditioning his science. 
This /... 
(27) See chapters six and seven. 
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This second point has, I hope, been demonstrated. The 
first point, is, however, inevitably more tentative, as it 
involves a move far beyond the kind of documentary evidence 
that can be used to justify the second. It is, therefore, 
perhaps apt to conclude this chapter with a review of the 
'exceptional individual' argument as applied to Pearson. (28) 
Pearson's overall intellectual position was 
unique. Particular aspects of it - Fabianism, social 
Darwinism, reformist feminism, eugenics, ethical naturalism, 
positivism - were of course shared in varying degrees by 
late Victorian professionals, But with the possible ex- 
ception of a handful of Pearson's followers, the overall 
'mix' of elements is not, to my knowledge, to be found 
exactly replicated in any other individual. The crucial 
point made here - which distinguishes the approach to the 
sociology of knowledge associated with Lukács and Goldmann 
from any empiricist, statistical approach - is that this 
uniqueness in no way invalidates the analysis of Pearson's 
system of belief as one appropriate to the professional 
middle class of late Victorian Britain. This analysis 
is, of course, theoretical in its nature. It cannot be 
demonstrated that Pearson consciously and deliberately set 
out /... 
(28) The sociological claim relating particular sets of 
ideas to particular social interests (in this case 
those of the professional middle class) could, of 
course, stand independently of the 'exceptional in- 
dividual' hypothesis. The validity of the latter 
supports the former, but the invalidity of the 
latter does not necessarily imply the invalidity of 
the former. 
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out to create a professional middle class ideology. Al- 
though some of his early writings clearly show him in 
search of an appropriate belief system, the role of class 
interests in shaping this can only be presumed, and it is 
certainly not to be expected that he would necessarily be 
conscious of them. If the analysis of Pearson's beliefs 
and of the structural position and interests of the pro- 
fessional middle class presented here is accepted, then we 
have an instance of the 'match' of ideas and social position. 
Explaining why this 'match' came about exactly when it did, 
and why the particular individual Karl Pearson should have 
manifested it, is, however, beyond the present capacity of 
the sociology of knowledge. In the last analysis, it is 
not necessarily a sociological problem. 
This does not mean, however, that all we can do 
is to point to this one instance of a 'match'. It is 
possible to look at the relationship between the historical 
fate of a system of belief and that of the class to which 
it is imputed. Ideologies are of course context -bound, and 
there is no reason to expect a permanent attachment of 
particular ideas to particular classes in changing cultural 
and historical circumstances. Nevertheless, at least some 
regularities can surely be expected. Take Fabianism, for 
example. The growth of the professional middle class (and 
of state bureaucracy and social intervention) that has taken 
place since 1914 has meant that Fabianism has changed from 
a minority belief to a dominant ideology. It is no longer 
radical /... 
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radical to talk of experts, scientific administration and 
politics, or selection on merit, nor to demand an expansion 
in the role of the state. Similarly with eugenics. While 
negative eugenics as a programme of social control proved 
context -bound, many of the qugenists' psychological ideas 
became widely accepted. The relatively recent reaction 
against them within sectors of the professional middle 
class, itself an interesting problem for the sociology of 
knowledge, should not blind us to the ideological success 
of the hereditarian theory of mental ability. A reaction 
has also set in against scientific positivism of the 
Pearsonian kind, but the ideas set out in the Grammar of 
Science, even if they would be rejected by professional 
philosophers, would not be wholly unacceptable to many con- 
temporary scientists. 
29) The employment of women as 
researchers and in other professional and 'para- professional' 
positions has become commonplace. The particular form of 
Pearson's reaction against individualistic social Darwinism 
is outdated, but the notions of collectivism, and of the 
development of internal cohesion against external threat, 
have enjoyed considerable twentieth century success. 
It would, therefore, not be correct to dismiss 
Pearson's ideas as simply those of an idiosyncratic 
individual /... 
(29) Not, that is, in their technical detail - Pearson's 
phenomenalism was, even its time, alien to the 
experience of working scientists, who had difficulty 
in treating atoms, genes, etc., as anything other 
than real entities - but in terms of the general 
image of science presented. 
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individual. It is too easy to focus on aspects that were 
discarded and now seem outlandish, and to forget those that 
became the common -place beliefs of the professional middle 
class of at least the recent past, if not the present. 
On the whole, the ideas embraced by Pearson were ideas 
growing, rather than declining, in their historical 
importance. This growth can surely be attributed to the 
growth of the professional middle class and its social role: 
Fabianism, the 'IQ cult', positivism, and so on, grew as 
professionaladministrators, teachers and psychologists, 
social and natural scientists became more important. On 
the other hand, Pearson as an individual, while at least 
moderately famous as a general intellectual in the Edwardian 
period, never enjoyed the cult status amongst the professional 
middle class that, say, Herbert Spencer enjoyed amongst the 
American - and to a lesser extent, British - bourgeoisie and 
petty bourgeoisie. In full accord with his own views on 
the social responsibility of the scientific intellectual, 
Pearson eschewed opportunism. He never made the compromises 
that would have been necessary to become leader of a social 
movement such as Fabianism or eugenics.(30) That does not 
mean, however, that the ideas he put forward should be seen 
as unsuccessful ideas. 
The analysis of Pearson presented here does differ 
(30) It is interesting to compare the relations between 
Pearson's thought and that of the majority of Fabians 
and eugenists, with the relations between Pascal's 
thought and that of the 'moderate' Jansenists, as 
described by Goldmann (1964). 
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in its nature from that by Goldmann (1964) of Pascal and 
Racine, in which Goldmann's sociology of knowledge is best 
developed. Goldmann's argument rests, ultimately, on a 
claimed structural homology between Jansenism, as expressed 
by Pascal and Racine, and the social situation of the class, 
the noblesse de robe, to which Jansenism is imputed. The 
analysis of Pearson does not depend on structural parallels, 
but rather on imputations of class interests. Further, 
Goldmann makes much of the aesthetic coherence of the ideas 
of his principal subjects. The coherence found in Pearson's 
work is not of this nature: it refers instead to what I 
claim to be the relative freedom of Pearson's thought from 
the 'noise' generated by particularistic interests. These 
two major reservations aside, it is to be hoped that this 
chapter has shown that the type of analysis pioneered by 
Goldmann can be of use in understanding aspects of the 
relationship between individual thinkers and their class 
positions. A sociological approach need not be restricted 
to relatively large -scale movements such as eugenics, but 
can also be used to analyse the work of unique individuals 
such as Karl Pearson. 
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Chapter Five 
The Emergence of Statistical Theory as a 
Scientific Specialty 
Up to this point, discussion of statistical theory 
has been focused almost exclusively on only two men, 
Francis Galton and Karl Pearson. Certainly, they were 
central to the development of British statistics, but, in 
order to give a rounded picture of the context in which 
they worked, it is necessary to consider other, less 
prominent, individuals, and also institutional developments. 
It has been convincingly argued (notably by Ben -David and 
Collins, 1966) that good and productive ideas alone are not 
sufficient for the foundation of a new scientific specialty. 
Several things must happen before we can talk of the 
emergence of a new specialty: a network of scientists in- 
terested in the new field must develop; means of communication 
between them, both formal and informal, must be established; 
a mechanism must be devised for recruitment to, and training 
in, the field, and this mechanism must be given some stable 
form; sufficient financial and other resources must be 
obtained to permit the foregoing. 
A considerable literature has developed over the 
last few years which employs this perspective in the dis- 
cussion/... 
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cession of the growth of scientific specialties,(1) and 
useful provisional summaries of it are given by Edge and 
Mulkay (1975) and in the introduction to Lemaine et al (eds) 
(1976). Perhaps the most useful way to conceptualise the 
problem is to see the development of a new discipline as 
analogous to the development of a new political party. 
Seen in this light, some of the points raised in this 
literature become strikingly familiar. Compare, for example, 
Griffith and Mullins (1972) with Lenin (1947): both works 
emphasise the crucial role of tightly -knit and coherent 
groups, even if small, in promoting revolutionary change. 
Consider the above list of necessary conditions 
for the development and institutionalisation of a new 
discipline. Do they not apply also to the development of 
a new political party? It too must be based on a network 
of committed individuals, who must develop means of com- 
munication with each other. It too needs to recruit, and 
to develop the ideological and other competences of those 
it recruits. Notoriously, it too requires material 
resources. However, the analogy of the political party 
suggests /... 
(1) For example, Ben -David (1960), Ben -David and Collins 
(1965), Hagstrom (1965, 159 -253), C.S. Fisher (1967), 
T.N. Clark (1972; 1973), Cole (1972), Oberschall 
(1972), Mulkay (1972; 1974; 1975; 1976a; 1976b), 
Mulkay and Edge (1973), Edge and Mulkay (1975; 1976), 
Mulkay, Gilbert and Woolgar (1975), Mullins (1972; 
1973a; 1973b; 1975), Griffith and Mullins (1972), 
Law (1973), Law and Barnes (1976), Whitley (1974; 
1975), Stehr (1975), Krohn and Schifer(1976), 
Dolby (1976), Worboys (1976), Van der Daele and 
Weingart (1976), Chubin (1976), Johnston and Robbins 
(1977). 
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suggests that it may well be misguided to search for a 
single set of factors governing the development of 
scientific specialties. Political environments differ. 
Factors which promote the successful growth of a party in 
one environment (for example, a highly centralised internal 
structure) may hinder its growth in another, Funds may be 
most readily available from one source (business concerns, 
say) in one situation, and from another (mass subscriptions) 
in another. Similarly with scientific disciplines. 
Access to graduate students, say, may be necessary for growth 
under the normal conditions of the scientific enterprise in 
industrialised societies, but it can hardly be a universal 
factor, The creation of a new journal may sometimes be 
necessary, sometimes not, 
So the perspective taken here will not be an 
attempt to list a set of factors that are present or absent 
in the development of British statistics. Rather, Galton 
and Pearson will be considered as the nucleus of a 
scientific 'party', attempting to build networks, to 
establish adequate means of communication, recruit and train 
others and to gain resources to do so, An attempt will be 
made to understand the situation in which they operated, 
and how particular institutional structures and ideological 
contexts helped and hindered them in their enterprise. 
Further, lest this framework be thought too voluntaristic, 
attention will be paid to the 'side bets' (Becker, 1960) 
involved in the process. 
original /.,. 
Interests extraneous to the 
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original enterprise, became involved in it, and transformed 
its nature, independently of the conscious intention of 
those who initiated it. The process of the formation of 
'side bets' is, of course, familiar to students of politics. 
In attempting to promote change, reformers frequently 
develop a stake in the very institutions they have set out 
to alter or destroy. Nothing as complete as this happens 
in the case of British statistics, but it is clear that the 
enterprise that developed largely as a result of the efforts 
of Galton and Pearson was not shaped by their initial in- 
tentions alone, 
5.1 Galton and the Mathematicians 
In 1892 Francis Galton wrote to the former Senior 
Wrangler, W.F. Sheppard: 
What is greatly wanted is a clean elegant résumé- 
of all the theoretical work concerned in the social 
and biographical problems to which the exponential 
law has been applied. I believe the time is ripe 
for any competent mathematician to do this with 
much credit to himself. I am not competent and 
know it... I have often considered what seems 
wanted and been very desirous of discovering someone 
who was disposed to throw himself into so useful 
and such high -class work. He might practically 
found a science, the material for which is now 
too chaotic. 
(Quoted in K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3B, 486 -7; 
Galton's emphasis) 
Galton had tried long and hard to generate consistent interest 
by a 'competent mathematician' in the mathematical and 
statistical aspects of the problems on which he was working. 
Up to 1892, he had sought to develop active collaboration 
with /.., 
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with at least seven such men: H.W. Watson, Donald MacAlister, 
J.D. Hamilton Dickson, John Venn, S.H. Burbury, W.F. Sheppard, 
and Francis Ysidro Edgeworth. While none of these col- 
laborations was sterile, none produced the fruitful 
results of Galton's contact with Karl Pearson. I t is, 
therefore, worth contrasting these former with the latter, 
and also to discuss one further mathematician, Arthur Black, 
who, although he never met or corresponded with Galton, 
might have contributed more than any of the others apart 
from Pearson, had his career not been terminated by his 
suicide in 1893. 
Galton's relationships with the first six are 
discussed in appendix C. All six were Cambridge graduates, 
and all were highly placed in the Tripos examination in 
mathematics. Only Hamilton Dickson pursued a career ex- 
clusively in university teaching and research in mathematics. 
The others spent at least part of their lives in the 
established professions: Watson and Venn, the church; 
MacAlister, medicine; Burbury and Sheppard, the law. One 
might indeed suspect that men like this, academically trained 
but marginal to any established career structure in mathe- 
matics, might be ideally suited to the role of innovator in 
an applied mathematical field. This may have been the case, 
but, with the partial exception of Sheppard, they all seem 
to have lacked commitment to Galton's particular project. 
The pattern in each case is similar. Each became interested 
in a particular problem or aspect of Galton's work, in- 
vestigated/... 
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vestigated it mathematically, and having done so dropped it 
and returned to his own pursuits. In modern parlance, their 
role was almost that of the 'consultant', except that it was 
the chance to display their mathematical competences on an 
interesting problem - and perhaps the flattering contact 
with a highly prestigious man like Galton - that motivated 
them, rather than financial reward. 
Galton's contact with ra.F. Sheppard, although it 
was productive of a much larger body of work than his con- 
tact with the other five, was not qualitatively dissimilar. 
Sheppard's initial interest in Galton's work may have been 
sparked by its eugenic applications, but his prime motive 
seems to have been simply that, in first Galton's and then 
Pearson's work, he found an excellent area for the application 
of his particular skills. Where Galton and Pearson had 
provided the key concepts, he followed with detailed in- 
vestigation and tabulation. He was particularly competent 
in what would now be called numerical analysis. He drew 
up the first modern tables of the normal curve using the 
standard deviation as the argument (Sheppard, 1903). He 
proved a moderately important theorem in bivariate normal 
correlation, which is now sometimes known as Sheppard's 
theorem on median dichotomy (Sheppard, 1898b). In chapter 
eight his work on the calculation of probable errors will 
be discussed. In general, though, it can be said that it 
is not unfair to the man, with his great concern for 
precision and numerical accuracy, that his name should have 
gone /... 
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gone down in the history of statistics primarily as the in- 
ventor of a correction formula: Sheppard's formula for the 
correction of moments estimated from grouped data, first 
presented in Sheppard (1897b). 
Unlike these six mathematicians, Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth (1845 -1926) began work on statistical theory in- 
dependently of Galton.(2) Apparently self- taught in mathe- 
matics, he was educated in modern languages at Trinity 
College, Dublin and in classics at Oxford, and seems to 
have then spent some years practising law. In 1880 he 
became Lecturer in Logic, and in 1888 Professor of Political 
Economy, at King's College, London. In 1891 he was 
appointed Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford. 
Utilitarianism formed the basis of his early work, 
notably Edgeworth (1877; 1881). His utilitarianism was, 
however, not at all radical in its thrust. Thus Edgeworth 
claimed that when 
.., we calculate the utility of pre -utilitarian 
institutions, we are impressed with a view of 
Nature, not, as in the picture left by Mill, all 
bad, but a first approximation to the best. de 
are biassed to a more conservative caution in 
reform. And we may have here not only a direction, 
but a motive, to our end. For, as Nature is 
judged more good, so more potent than the great 
utilitarian has allowed are the motives to morality 
which /... 
(2) For biographical studies of Edgeworth see Keynes 
(1926), Bowley (1934) and Kendall (1968); the only 
comprehensive bibliography of Edgeworth's extensive 
writings is H.G. Johnson (n.d.). A.L. Rowley (1972; 
first published in 1928) is a valuable guide to 
Edgeworth's frequently obscure work in mathematical 
statistics. His work on inference is discussed in 
Pratt (1976) . 
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which religion finds in the attributes of God, 
(1881, 82) 
Edgeworth appears to have first made use of Galton's work 
in order to justify the removal of any egalitarian 
implications from the utilitarian goal of maximising 
happiness. Edgeworth argued that individuals differed in 
their capacity for happiness and that to maximise total 
happiness more of the 'means of happiness' should be given 
to those most able to enjoy them.(3) He then had to 
answer the objection that the capacity for happiness might 
be the result of education. Edgeworth argued that this 
would be incompatible with 'what is known about heredity' 
(1881, 59). Citing Quetelet and Galton, he argued that 
the distribution of capacity for happiness was normal, and 
that the offspring of parents with a given capacity for 
happiness would have capacities for happiness distributed 
normally round those of their parents (1881, 69 -70). To 
maximise happiness in the next generation, those with a low 
capacityfor happiness should not have children, concluded 
Edgeworth, and he commented favourably on Galton's notion 
of a refuge for the 'weak' in celibate monasteries (1881, 
71 -2). 
Edgeworth did not take this idea any further: 
ama IN* 
(3) Lest anyone be so foolishastoimagine that the pro- 
letariat had a large capacity to be happy, Edgeworth 
hastened to point out that 'the higher pleasures are 
on the whole most pleasurable ... those who are most 
apt to enjoy those pleasures tend to be most capable 
of happiness' (1881, 58). 
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it must be suspected that he was interested in eugenics 
only in so far as hereditarian ideas helped him in the 
production of a conservative utilitarianism. He worked 
on statistical theory from the 1880's onwards, but it was 
not along the lines of Galton's research programme. 
Edgeworth's general aim was the construction of a 'mathe- 
matical psychics' with two main subdivisions: the study of 
utility, which led him into his well -known work in mathe- 
matical economics; and the study of belief, which led him 
into research in statistical theory, in particular in those 
parts closely connected to the foundations of the subject, 
as in Edgeworth (1883a; 1883b; 1884; 1885; 1887). His 
work in this latter area was obscurely presented and had 
little impact at the time. Even those parts that might 
have been of use to other British statisticians, such as 
his work on the °Edgeworth expansion' generalising the 
normal distribution or on the 'method of transformation', 
were not taken up.(4) Only one statistician seems to have 
taken Edgeworth's work seriously enough to study it in 
detail: Arthur Lyon Bowley, for whom see section 5.4. 
In the 1880's Edgeworth was the only person in 
Britain, with the exception of Galton, doing anything 
approaching serious and sustained general work in statistical 
theory /... 
(4) Welch (1958) points out that Edgeworth (1883b) provided 
a Bayesian solution to the problem, later made famous 
by Gosset, of making inferences about means from small 
samples. For Edgeworth this was, however, a com- 
pletely theoretical problem, devoid of the practical 
context that was to give Gosset's work its force. 
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theory.(5) Accordingly, Galton appears to have tried on 
more than one occasion to recruit Edgeworth to work on the 
statistics of heredity.(6) In the early 1890's Edgeworth 
finally turned to a problem suggested by Galton's work, 
that of generalising the bivariate normal distribution con- 
structed by Galton and Hamilton Dickson to an indefinite 
number of variables. Edgeworth's papers on correlation 
(1892a; 1892b; 1893a; 1893b; 1893c; 1893d) show clearly 
that he solved the problem in essence, even though they are 
marred by occasional errors, misprints and obscurities.(7) 
Edgeworth, however, did no further statistical work along 
Galton's lines. Instead, in the words of Karl Pearson, he 
'ploughed always right across the line of the biometricians'] 
furrows' (quoted by Kendall, 1968, 262); Edgeworth thus 
stood aside from the main line of development of statistical 
theory in Britain. 
The men so far considered all lived in more or 
less /... 
(5) From Kendall and Doig (1968) I produced a list of papers 
published in Britain in the 1880's in the fields of 
statistical theory, error theory and actuarial theory 
(papers on narrow areas of probability theory, such as 
solutions to problems posed in Whitworth's Educational 
Times, were excluded). Edgeworth and Galton together 
accounted for a majority of these papers (40 out of 78). 
(6) See the Edgeworth -Galton correspondence in the Galton 
Papers (189 and 237). 
(7) This work has been the subject of some disagreement. 
Pearson (1920b) doubted whether Edgeworth should really 
be said to have solved the problem; Seal (1967) dis- 
agrees, arguing that Edgeworth showed in principle how 
to obtain the result. Once Edgeworth's determinantal 
notation is understood (it follows Salmon, 1859), what 
he was doing becomes clear; and Edgeworth (1893d), which 
was apparently overlooked by both Pearson and Seal, states 
explicitly how to construct an expression 
for the multi- 
variate normal distribution. 
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less favourable circumstances and became fairly well known 
in their respective fields. Not so the next figure to be 
discussed, who published nothing in his lifetime and has so 
far escaped the attention of historians.(8) Arthur Black 
(1851 -93) was the son of David Black, solicitor and coroner 
in Brighton. David Black and his family are described by 
Garnett (1953, 4 -6). Arthur was the eldest of eight 
children, of whom the sixth, Constance, later Constance 
Garnett, was to become famous for her translations of the 
novels of Tolstoy and Ddstoyevsky. Little about Black's 
early life can be discovered from the available material. 
He took a B.Sc. degree of the University of London by 
private study, graduating in 1877. He must have attended 
some classes, for a letter from Weldon to Galton describes 
him as having been a 'favourite pupil' of W.K. Clifford, the 
famous Professor of Applied Mathematics at University College 
(4 June 1894; Galton Papers, University College, London, 
340/C). Subsequently he earned a rather precarious living 
as/... 
(8) I am indebted to Messrs David and Richard Garnett for 
providing me with information about Arthur Black, and 
for locating the surviving manuscript notebooks. 
Mr David Garnett has kindly allowed Black's notebooks 
to be placed in the Library of University College, 
London. Mrs Jacqueline Golden of University College, 
London kindly provided me with copies of letters from 
the Galton archive which refer to Black (293/A, 245/18A, 
340/C). Professor Egon Pearson provided me with two 
further letters from the Karl Pearson architrel also 
at University College,London, and with the assistance 
of Miss Peek, Keeper of the Archives at Cambridge 
University, succeeded in discovering information on 
the abortive efforts to publish Black's Algebra. 
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as an army coach and tutor in Brighton, while pursuing his 
mathematical and philosophical interests. His marriage 
was fraught and unhappy, and he finally died by his own hand 
in very sad circumstances (The Times, 20 and 21 January 1893). 
After his death his sister Constance and brother 
Robert, a doctor in Brighton, sought to publish some of his 
work. He left behind him a large, and apparently fairly 
complete, manuscript on the Algebra of Animal Evolution. 
This was sent to Karl Pearson, who was personally known to 
Constance; they moved in similar circles of radical in- 
tellectuals. Pearson started to read it, but realised 
immediately that it discussed topics very similar to those 
he was working on, and decided not to read it himself but 
to send it to Francis Galton for his advice. Galton was 
clearly impressed by it, and recommended its publication, 
although he admitted he found some of the mathematics rather 
difficult to follow. Cambridge University Press agreed to 
publish it, with Weldon acting as an editor. Problems seem 
to have arisen, however, in finding a mathematician to act 
as co- editor and finally all concerned agreed that part of 
the mathematical work should be extracted and published. 
M.J.M. Hill, Professor of Mathematics at University College, 
London, took responsibility for this. It would appear that 
Pearson continued to wish not to read the manuscript, so as 
to avoid being placed in a potentially difficult position. 
The resulting paper (Black, 1898) is the only published part 
of Black's work, and the reference to it in Kendall and Doig 
(1968)/... 
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(1968) appears to be the only reference to Black in the 
statistical literature. 
Unfortunately, it has proved impossible to locate 
the manuscript of the Algebra of Animal Evolution. It was 
returned to Constance Garnett; a footnote in Black's paper 
describes it as being in her possession and available to be 
read by those interested. It was, however, not included 
in a set of some two dozen manuscript notebooks of Arthur 
Black in the possession of her son and grandson, Messrs 
David and Richard Garnett. However, the surviving note- 
books, together with the material extracted from the Algebra 
by Hill, give some indication of the scope and nature of 
Arthur Black's work. Like Pearson and Weldon, Black was a 
convinced Darwinian. He took the side of scientific 
naturalism against its theological opponents. The main 
focus of his work seems to have been an attempt to use his 
considerable mathematical skills to develop a quantitative 
theory of evolution. One incomplete notebook, probably part 
of a draft of the introduction to his larger manuscript, is 
entitled: 
An Algebra of Evolution, being an essay on the 
quantitative mathematical treatment of rate of 
change of specific types, as affected by severity 
of competition, extent of deviation from the average, 
longevity, fecundity, tendency to deteriorate, and 
pure chance. 
Another notebook entitled The Theory of Deviation from an 
Average begins: 
The subject of the following essay is the theory 
of the measurement and statistical treatment of 
individual variations, such as are exhibited by 
all /... 
- 212 - 
all individuals of all species of animals and 
plants from one another and from the average 
of their species. In particular the aim is to 
put the theory of variation of specific characters 
in course of time by natural selection upon a 
mathematical footing: the advantages of which 
will be to exhibit such parts of the theory as 
admit of proof in a demonstrative form, and to 
estimate quantitatively those tendencies to 
change which evolutionists describe. The treat- 
ment will be merely theoretical, that is the methods 
of dealing with such problems will be investigated, 
but the actual application of the results to 
special cases will not be entered upon. The data 
are probably not yet accumulated for that task. 
The theory itself dictates what kinds of data are 
needed. 
It is impossible on the available evidence to give 
any assessment of how successful Black was in his overall 
task. The work extracted by Hill from the Algebra of Animal 
Evolution was an evaluation of the multiple integral 
J 
V exp ( -U) dx1 dx2...dxn, 
'where U and V are homogeneous quadratic functions of the n 
variables xl, ..., xn and a constant x0, and all the in- 
tegrations are from -00to +00, it being further supposed that 
U is essentially positive' (Black, 1898, 219). This is a 
very competent solution of a problem of some difficulty, but 
tells us little of the more statistical side of Black's work. 
On this the notebooks are more revealing. 
Buried amongst a large bulk of unorganised material, 
nearly all of it rough working, are a couple of quite striking 
fragments. The first occurs during a discussion of problems 
to do with the probabilities of survival and reproduction. 
In investigating such problems Black naturally turned to 
the multinomial distribution and its properties. The most 
interesting /.., 
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interesting aspect of this investigation is his discussion 
of an event which occurs n times where n is very large, and 
has r possible outcomes, with probabilities cl, ..., cr. 
Let z be the probability that outcome one will occur u1 
times, outcome two will occur u2 times, and so on, with 
L46-1-...-+,4,..= n., Then z can be written, according to the 
formula for the multinomial distribution, as 






Now suppose that n can be expressed as the sum of r integers 
Ul, ..., Ur, where U1 = ncl and so on. Let vl 
= ul U1, 
and so on. I f n is large, and v) ,. v,, small compared to 
4riT, Black showed that z can be approximated by k exp ('%.61)., 
where k is a constant and w = v'a. .- s.vT /u. This of course 
is what would now be called the X% approximation to the 
multinomial distribution. Although Abbe and other authors 
had discussed the x distribution previously, it had not 
been from this standpoint (Pearson, 1931; Sheynin, 1966; 
Sheynin,1971a; Kendall, 1971). Only Bienaymé appears to 
have approached the problem from the angle of the multinomial 
distribution, and his analysis, although perhaps more 
rigorous than Black °s, did not lead to the final simple 
expression (Lancaster, 1966). Of course, as Black did not 
interpret the Ui as expected frequencies and the ui as 
observed frequencies, nor attempt to integrate his pro- 
bability density z within a suitable contour, we cannot 
credit him with anticipating Pearson's invention of the X 
goodness -of -fit test (Pearson, 1900c). 
The /... 
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The second interesting fragment constitutes an 
apparently independent derivation of what is now called 
the Poisson distribution, though it perhaps should not 
strictly be attributed to Poisson (David, 1969; Sheynin, 
1971b). This comes in a notebook entitled Problems relat- 
ing to the Mathematical Treatment of Statistics: Periodicity 
and Deviation. Black obtained the distribution to give 
the probability of an incident occurring 0, 1, ... times in 
a given interval of time, when the average of its occurrence 
in a small unit interval has some small value, say Y. He 
showed that 
... the rule is write certainty in the form e e Y, 
and expand elr in powers of Y by the exponential 
theorem. The successive terms are the probabilities 
of 0, 1, ... incidents. 
The surviving notebooks do not give any evidence that Black 
attempted to test the applicability of this distribution to 
empirical data. 
If we include Karl Pearson, nine mathematicians 
who came into contact with Galton's work have now been con - 
sidered.(9) They responded in various ways, from giving 
Galton assistance on a specific problem to, in the case of 
Black and Pearson, deciding to devote the major part of 
their intellectual energies to statistical work along 
Galton's lines. The pattern of response does not seem 
explicable /... 
110 
(9) Black never came into personal contact with Galton, 
and Pearson apparently did not until after he began 
work on biometric statistics. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that for both Galton's work formed a crucial 
exemplar. 
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explicable simply in terms of their occupational positions 
or institutional affiliations. A more important factor 
seems to have been the general attractiveness, or otherwise, 
of Galton's research programme. Pearson and Black appear 
to have been attracted by its political and cultural 
dimensions;(10) the others, although in several cases not 
unsympathetic to Galton's aims, regarded Galton's work 
primarily as a source of interesting problems of a mathe- 
matical nature. 
Given the fact that the only person aside from 
Galton who might be seen as a likely candidate to establish 
a school of statistical theory, F.Y. Edgeworth, did not in 
fact do so, this pattern becomes extremely interesting. 
It would suggest that the connections between statistical 
theory and eugenics found in the case of Galton affected not 
only his work but also the response to it, and thus played 
an important part in the early development of statistical 
theory as a specialty. There is little point in speculat- 
ing what would have happened if Pearson had not been 
attracted to Galton's programme, or if Black had not killed 
himself. What can, however, be suggested is, first of all, 
that Galton's perception, quoted at the start of this 
section, that statistical theory was 'ripe' for systematic 
development /... 
1011 
(10) The evidence on Black's views is somewhat scanty. 
The notebooks suggest a man whose general intellectual 
position was similar to Pearson's, for example in his 
attitude to science; his sister Constance was a member 
of the Executive Committee of the Fabian Society, and 
Mr David Garnett suggests that Black himself was 
probably politically radical. 
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development by the early 1890's was correct; secondly, 
that examination of Galton's efforts at 'recruitment' in- 
dicates that what was needed was someone with a broad com- 
mitment to, and not merely a technical interest in, the 
field. 
5.2 The Biometric School 
In the previous section, what might be called 
the 'first phase' of the development in Britain of statistical 
theory as a specialty was discussed. That phase can be 
seen as ending around 1892, when Karl Pearson and W.F.R.Weldon 
began the collaboration that was to grow into the biometric 
school. A second phase of development, which continued 
until the 1920's, had started. 
For the first phase of development, an analysis 
of individual cases was apt. Statistical theory in Britain 
did not have an institutional location. Such work as took 
place was done either by isolated individuals or by pairs 
of individuals in temporary collaboration. With the 
emergence of the biometric school, the focus of the analysis 
must shift. The institutionalisation of statistical theory 
had begun, and it is necessary first of all to understand 
the emerging institutional structure. 
Happily, there is a considerable amount of 
secondary material to draw from here. Karl Pearson himself 
(1906 /... 
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(1906; 1914 -30, 3A), E.S. Pearson (1936 -8) and, more 
recently, Lyndsay Farrall (1970, 54 -202 and 318 -25) have 
all discussed in some detail the development of the 
biometric school. It is unnecessary to repeat their 
descriptions. Instead, this section will focus on three 
particular aspects of the biometric school. 
The first point emerges clearly from consideration 
of the development of statistical theory in Britain from 
almost any point of view: that is, the crucial role of the 
biometric school in this process. Its centrality can be 
seen from the fact that in the 1890's, the decade of its 
establishment, the members of this school were already pro- 
ducing around half the papers in statistical theory pub- 
lished in Britain.(11) From 1894, when Pearson began teach- 
ing his first advanced course in statistical theory, until 
the 1920's, when Fisher established an alternative centre 
at Rothamsted Experimental Station, the biometric school was 
the only institution in Britain providing an advanced train- 
ing in statistical theory. Its importance is indicated by 
Ben- David's comment (1971, 151 fn.): 
Those who actually taught Eat University College 
include 5 of the 15 persons named as the most 
important contributors to the development of 
present -day statistical method in the International 
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. 
Biometrika/... 
(11) A list of these papers, produced from Kendall and 
Doig (1968) in the same way as that referred to in 
the previous section, contained 122 items. Of 
these Galton, Pearson and their associates were 
responsible for 64; the next most important source 
was Edgeworth, who produced 13. 
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Biometrika (the 'house journal' of the biometric school) 
was for a long period the major publication outlet for work 
in statistical theory in Britain: it remains one of the 
world's foremost journals in this field. 
It is clear, therefore, that in discussing the 
biometric school we are dealing with a social institution 
of prime importance in the development of statistical theory. 
A second important aspect of the school is, however, that 
in terms of financial and organisational backing statistical 
theory was essentially a subsidiary part of its activity. 
Two partly separate developments came together in the bio- 
metric school: a move from within the community of bio- 
logical scientists to quantify biology, and the tradition 
of eugenically- orientated statistical work begun by 
Galton.(12) The first development was crucial to the 
formation of the school; the second to its continuing 
existence and growth. 
The move from within biology to quantify its 
subject matter can be traced to a crisis within the 
dominant tradition of professional evolutionary biology in 
Britain, the school of evolutionary morphology centred 
round F.M. Balfour at Cambridge. The aim of this school 
was to establish phylogenetic relations (evolutionary trees) 
between classes of organism by comparative study of their 
forms, relying in particular on the hypothesis that 'ontogeny 
recapitulates /... 
-(12) That these two aspects were intertwined is argued in 
chapter six. 
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recapitulates phylogeny'. In 1886 one young member of the 
school, William Bateson, wrote: 
Of late the attempt to arrange genealogical trees 
involving hypothetical groups has come to be the 
subject of some ridicule, perhaps deserved. 
(Quoted by Provine, 1971, 37) 
There seems to have been, at least amongst the younger 
practitioners of descriptive evolutionary morphology, a 
general openness to new, and hopefully more rigorous, methods 
of investigation.(13) 
Galton's statistical studies, although focused on 
human heredity rather than general problems of evolutionary 
biology, offered a possible exemplar of just such a new 
method. W.F.R. Weldon (1860 -1906) saw in Galton's work a 
way of reconstructing evolutionary biology on a sounder 
basis than that offered by the morphological approach in 
which he had been trained. Weldon, who in December 1890 
became Professor of Zoology at University College, London, 
demonstrated in a series of four papers (1890; 1892; 1893; 
1895) the applicability of Galton's methods to populations 
of crabs and shrimps. The first paper showed that measure- 
ments made on several local races of shrimp followed the 
normal distribution. This paper was sent to Galton to 
referee, and brought Weldon and Galton into personal contact, 
Galton aiding Weldon in revising the statistical analysis 
(Pearson!... 
(13) In terms of the overall development of biology, the 
most significant new approach was Roux's work in what 
he called Entwicklungsmechanik, the first parts of 
which were published in 1888 (Allen, 1975a, 21 -8). 
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(Pearson, 1906, 282 -3). The following two papers applied 
Galton's correlation techniques, using a non -graphical 
method of determining the coefficient of correlation devised 
by Weldon himself, Weldon (1895) attempted the ambitious 
task of demonstrating natural selection at work in a popu- 
lation of crabs,(14) 
As outlined in chapter four, Weldon and Pearson 
began an active collaboration in the early 1890's, As 
Professors of Zoology and Applied Mathematics in University 
College, they were able to build up a small group of 
students and co- workers who were either independently sup- 
ported or in posts associated with the two professorships. 
Thus, Pearson's first course on advanced statistics had an 
audience of two: George Udny Yule, Pearson's demonstrator, 
and Alice Lee, a lecturer in Bedford College. Weldon 
recruited several postgraduates, first at University College 
and then, from 1899, at Oxford; notable among these were 
Ernest Warren, Arthur Darbishire and Edgar Schuster. - This 
group contributed to biometry and, in the case of the last 
named, eugenics.(15) 
The work of Weldon and his postgraduates demonstrates 
the early importance of the move within the biological com- 
munity to a statistical methodology. This move, however, 
largely petered out: the fact that it did not survive 
We ldon' s /... 
(14) See Norton (1973) for a discussion of this paper and 
of the reaction to it. 
(15) See, for example, Warren (1902), Darbishire (1902 -4), 
Schuster (n.d,). 
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Weldon's early death indicates its lack of implantation. 
Several possible causes can be adduced. It was work that 
required a relatively unusual combination of training; 
professional biologists were suspicious of the new method- 
ology; the biometrician /Mendelian controversy may have led 
some biologists to identify biometric methods with hostility 
to Mendelism.(16) Whatever the causes, biometry as a 
specialty within professional biology must be judged a 
failure.(17) 
With the waning of biometry as a biological 
specialty, the overt connection between statistics and 
eugenics became of increasing importance in the development 
of the biometric school. From the early 1900's onwards, 
began the transformation of his still relatively 
haphazard and informal group into an established research 
institute. In this process, some resources were available 
to him simply through his university professorship and the 
general reputation of his work.(18) Other funds, however, 
came specifically for eugenics. In February 1905, Francis 
Galton gave the University of London £1500 to establish a 
Eugenics Record Office, and from then until his death he 
gave /... 
we 011 
(16) These last two factors are discussed in chapter six. 
(17) See Farrall (1970, 186 -9). 
(18) Thus, from 1903 onwards he received through the University 
College authorities a grant of £500 per annum from the 
Worshipful Company of Drapers (Farrall, 1970, 129 -31). 
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gave £500 per year for eugenics research (Farrall, 1970, 
131). At the end of 1906, Galton asked Pearson to take over 
the direction of the Eugenics Record Office, which became 
known as the Galton Laboratory of National Eugenics (Farrall, 
1970, 111). The Eugenics Laboratory, together with a 
'Biometric Laboratory' established from Pearson's other 
resources and oriented more towards statistical theory as 
such, became the beginnings of a solid institutional base 
for the biometric school. 
This base was further extended when Galton died 
in 1911. In his will he left the residue of his estate to 
the University of London for the establishment of a 'Galton 
Professorship of Eugenics' with 'a laboratory or office and 
library attached thereto', and recommended that the post be 
offered to Karl Pearson (K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 437 -8). 
A public appeal was launched for funds for a building for 
the Eugenics Laboratory, and supported in a Times leader in 
October 1911: 
The state of morals and of intelligence disclosed 
by the recent strikes, the state of health of the 
rising industrial population as disclosed by the 
medical inspections of schools are alike in showing 
the need for the study and the application of Eugenics, 
and in affording support to the appeal which we bring 
before our readers. 
(Quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 2, 190) 
The appeal seems finally to have brought in some £2300.(19) 
Most of the money was provided by friends and relatives of 
Galton /.., 
014 
(19) Calculated from the official subscription list in the 
Pearson Papers (247). 
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Galton and members of the Eugenics Education Society: there 
were no very large donations from businessmen.(20) A much 
larger sum of money was provided (though it was apparently 
not initially earmarked for eugenics) by a donation to 
University College from a businessman, Sir Herbert H.3artlett.(21] 
The money from Galton, Bartlett and the sub- 
scribers to the appeal fund made possible the provision of 
a building intended to house the Biometric and Eugenic 
Laboratories, which were now jointly called the Department 
of Applied Statistics, and enabled Pearson to give up his 
onerous teaching duties as Professor of Applied Mathematics 
and become Galton Professor of Eugenics. Thus, the first 
university department in Britain committed to advanced teach- 
ing and research in statistical theory was established, with 
the funds for its establishment coming largely from the con- 
nections between statistics and eugenics. Pearson had, at 
least in part, succeeded in securing the institutional base 
of biometric statistics. 
It should be emphasised that the use by Pearson 
of the 'eugenic connection' to obtain support for statistical 
research /... 
(20) The Hon. Rupert Guinness and Lord Northcliffe both 
contributed, but only relatively small sums (£100 
and £25) . 
(21) Pearson Papers (239). The money was passed to 
University College through the leading 'Liberal 
Imperialist', Lord Roseberry. Roseberry seems to 
have been sympathetic to eugenics, having previously 
promised £100 to the appeal fund (Pearson Papers, 238), 
and may have been responsible for 'steering' the money 
towards the Eugenics Laboratory. 
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research was not a cynical or opportunist strategy, but 
reflected both his personal beliefs on the relationship of 
eugenics and statistics and their actual coupling in the 
practice of the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories. 
Pearson believed that eugenics had to have a statistical form 
to be properly scientific and a sound basis for social action 
(see chapter four and section 6.5): he was, for example, 
reluctant to become Professor of Eugenics unless allowed to 
carry on the direction of the Biometric Laboratory, with its 
programme of teaching and research in statistical theory 
(K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 436). At the same time,as will 
be shown in detail in chapter seven, the needs of eugenics 
figured large in his work in statistical theory. In his 
last report to the Worshipful Company of Drapers, who had 
provided regular funds for the Biometric Laboratory, Pearson 
warned of the need to keep statistical theory 'in touch with 
practical needs' (E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 2, 230) and 
there is no doubt that in his mind eugenics - as 'the main, 
if not the sole, safeguard for future national progress' 
(K. Pearson, 1909d, 39) - was the source of the most central 
of these practical needs. In reality, there seems to have 
been little clear demarcation between the Biometric and 
Eugenic Laboratories, which shared personnel, methods and 
problems. The Laboratories are best seen as a unified 
research institute pursuing, at least in the period up to 
1914, a multi- faceted but still integrated research 
programme. 
The third aspect of the biometric school to be 
discussed is its internal social organisation. 
It would 
appear /... 
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appear that it was a coherent social group under the clear 
leadership of Pearson. Much of its work was collaborative. 
To the extent that the nature of this work tended to involve 
large numbers of measurements, and a very large amount of 
detailed arithmetical calculation, this was inevitable. 
Despite the division of labour involved, Pearson seems to 
have kept a close eye on the progress of work. He would 
frequently assist subordinates in the preparation of their 
work for publication. Ethel Elderton wrote that he 'always 
had time to sit down and discuss an individual problem. We 
did not go to his room, but he came round at least once a 
day to see everyone' (quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 
2, 182). W.S. Gosset wrote: 
... I gained a lot from his 'rounds': I remember 
in particular his supplying the missing link in 
the probable error of the mean paper - a paper for 
which he disclaimed any responsibility ... at 5 o'clock 
he would always come round with a cup of tea ... and 
expect us to carry on till about half past six. 
(E.S Pearson, 1936 -8, part 2, 182 -3) 
This social situation led naturally to a high degree of in- 
tellectual coherence, which was reinforced by the fact that 
the group possessed its own organs for publication (Biometrika, 
and the various series of Biometric and Eugenic Laboratory 
publications) over which Pearson appears to have exercised 
fairly direct control. Indeed, Yule claims that Biometrika 
was 'surely the most personally edited journal that was ever 
published' (Yule, 1936, 100). 
Within the group strong personal ties were formed, 
and a considerable esprit de corps seems to have existed. 
Yule /... 
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Yule writes that, 'in the old days', Pearson and he 'spent 
several holidays together' (1936, 101). When Weldon moved 
to Oxford, the biometricians would meet in a country cottage 
for a working weekend (Pearson, 1906, 309 -10). Yule in- 
forms us that there was much social intercourse between 
Pearson and his students, and that '... the influence of 
[Pearson' sj striking and dominating personality went far 
beyond the class -room walls' (1936, 100), 
There seems to have been a strong sense of the 
correctness of the scientific approach of the biometric 
school, and conversely of the weakness of much of the work 
done outside it. In Karl Pearson's lectures, writes 
Egon Pearson, 'we were told of the sins of many people' 
(1936 -8, part 2, 207). Pearson was a fierce controversialist, 
and on occasion personally cold and hostile to those with 
whom he disagreed. This attitude does not seem to have 
sprung from psychological disposition: Yule, who had 
personally felt Pearson's anger, conceded that Pearson was 
in non -intellectual matters unfailingly courteous and 
friendly (Yule, 1936, 101). Perhaps it makes more sense 
to see Pearson's attitude as the response of the man at the 
centre of a small group of researchers, pursuing what he felt 
to be work of the greatest scientific, social and moral 
importance in a world he interpreted as prejudiced, in- 
different and hostile. In any case, the consequence was 
a further tightening of the group boundary. Those members, 
or former members, of the biometric group who espoused what 
Pearson /... 
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Pearson considered to be error were cut off from the group. 
As the letters between Yule and Greenwood in the period 
immediately before 1914 indicate, those 'expelled' had a 
definite sense of a bounded group from which they had been 
excluded (Yule Papers, box 1; Yule- Greenwood Letters). 
5.3 The Members of the Biometric School 
A large number of people worked, at least for a 
short period, in the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories at 
University College. From 1911 onwards the Laboratories had 
a joint staff of between six and twelve (Farrall, 1970, 320- 
1). In addition to paid staff, postgraduate students and 
other individuals with their own sources of finance came to 
the Laboratories to study and do research. Over 40 in- 
dividuals are known to have worked with Pearson in the period 
1900 to 1914.(22) 
why /... 
On the available evidence, it is impossible to tell 
- - Y 
(22) The following list, which does not claim to be ex- 
haustive, was compiled from the employees of the 
Laboratories as listed by Farrall (1970, 320 -1), 
together with those who collaborated with Pearson in 
his published work: Ethel Elderton, W.P. Elderton, 
P.F. Everitt, David Heron, W.S. Gosset, J.A. Harris, 
C.B. Goring, John Blakeman, W.R. MacDonnell, Raymond 
Pearl, Leon Isserlis, E.C. Snow, H.E. Soper and Major 
Greenwood, all of whom did work requiring considerable 
knowledge of statistical theory; and A. Fry, A.O. 
Powys, M. Lewenz, F.E. Cave- Browne -Cave, S. Jacob, 
M. Radford, A. Barrington, G. Uchida, A. Wright, E. Pope, 
Julia Bell, E.Y. Thomson, H.G. Jones, E.H. Nettleship, 
C.H. Usher, W. Gilby, R. Crewdson Bennington, E. Lea -Smith, 
M. Crawford, H. Rishbieth, Edith M.M. de G. Lamotte, 
H.J. Laski, G. McMullan, K.V. Ryley, M.H. Williams, 
B. Cave, G. Jaederholm and A. Davin, all of whom con- 
tributed to other aspects of the work of the Laboratories. 
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why these individuals came to work with Pearson. Some, 
such as the future social -democratic political theorist, 
H.J. Laski, appear to have come because of their enthusiasm 
for eugenics. 
(23) 
Others had no interest in eugenics, but 
came to learn specific skills that would be useful to them 
in other contexts. W.S. Gosset, to be discussed in chapter 
eight, is a case in point. In most cases, however, the 
motives of the individuals concerned are quite unknown. 
More information is available on the subsequent 
careers of those who passed through the Laboratories. Two 
main career paths seem to have been followed by those who, 
in their time at the Laboratories, became sufficiently skilled 
in statistics to engage in independent publication. A 
minority became full -time eugenic or biometric researchers, 
or took up teaching and research in statistical theory. 
Some of these, notably Ethel Elderton, obtained permanent 
employment at University College. The rest found employment 
elsewhere. Raymond Pearl and J.A. Harris returned to 
academic careers in biometry in the United States, while 
Greenwood and Soper went on to statistical careers in Britain. 
The majority of those trained by Pearson, however, found 
employment outside academic research and teaching or in non - 
statistical academic work. Heron became chief statistician 
to the London Guarantee and Accident Co. Ltd. (E.S Pearson, 
1970a). Edgar Schuster eventually became Assistant 
Secretary to the Medical Research Committee, forerunner of 
(23) Martin (1953, 14 -16); K. Pearson (1914 -30, 3B, 606 -9); 
H.J. Laski (1912). 
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the Medical Research Council (Paton and Phillips, 1973). 
Leon Isserlis became statistician to the Chamber of Shipping 
(Irwin, 1966). E.C. Snow became Director of the United 
Tanners Federation (G.R. White, 1960) . '".S. Gosset 
returned to the Guinness Brewery in Dublin. W.P. Elderton 
never left employment as an actuary (Menzler, 1962). 
John Blakeman became head of the Mathematics Department of 
Leicester College of Technology and subsequently Principal 
of Northampton College of Technology (Who was Who, 1914 -30) . 
Employment opportunities did then exist for 
Pearson's highly trained students. These opportunities 
were, however, not such as to permit the easy diffusion of 
the particular type of eugenically- oriented statistical 
theory pursued at University College. Finding employment 
nearly always meant turning to other kinds of work. Thus, 
Pearson complained in a letter to Galton in 1909: 
You must remember that at present the training in 
statistics does not lead to paid positions. It 
is beginning to, but the posts available are few ... 
In the last four or five years I have had at least 
two or three really strong men pass through my hands, 
but I could not frankly say: 'Stick to statistics 
and throw up medicine or biology because there is 
some day a prize to be had'. I feel sure, however, 
with a future, such men will naturally turn to 
Eugenics work. Only this last winter one of my 
American students said: 'I wish I could go in for 
Eugenics, but my bread and butter lies in doing 
botanical work. I know that definite posts are 
there available'. And that was precisely the 
case with Raymond Pearl, who has now got the control 
of an Agricultural State Breeding Station - he was 
far keener on man than on pigs and poultry, but the 
public yet has not realised that it needs breeding 
also ... At present the biometrician is the man 
who by calling is medical, botanical or zoological, 
and he dare not devote all his enthusiasm and energy 
to our work. The powers that be are against him in 
this country. 
(K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 381) 
Let /.., 
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Let us consider one case in detail, that of 
Major Greenwood (1880- 1949). One individual cannot, of 
course, be claimed necessarily to be typical, but in 
Greenwood's case there happens to be more information avail- 
able than on almost any of the other students of Karl Pearson 
(apart, that is, from Yule and Gosset who are considered in 
chapters seven and eight). In addition, Greenwood was one 
of the most important of Pearson's pupils from the point of 
view of the future development of statistics in Britain. 
A typewritten autobiographical note in the Pearl 
Papers (filed with Greenwood to Pearl, 4 April 1926) gives 
us some insight into Greenwood's background and the reasons 
why he started work with Pearson. His father and grand- 
father shared a medical practice in the East End of London. 
On the whole my childhood was pretty typical of 
a London lower middle class ménage. It had a 
good deal of the ugly snobbishness that H.G. Wells 
has gibbetted, but there was a real love of books 
and a real knowledge of books. 
Greenwood's father was determined that he should follow the 
family tradition and become a doctor, but he lacked 
enthusiasm for this. Nevertheless, at age 18 he entered 
the London Hospital, 'the great hospital of East London'. 
'I continued to loaf, until Pearson's Grammar of Science did 
for me what it had done for other lads and I found my in- 
tellectual interest..' That was in 1901, a year after the 
publication of the second edition of the Grammar containing 
a summary of the results of the first decade of biometric 
work. Greenwood confessed that for 'Karl Pearson, 
I 
developed /... 
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developed an almost school -girl passion' (Hogben, 1950, 140). 
In the intervals in his medical curriculum Greenwood worked 
on a biometric study, contrasting healthy and diseased organs, 
which was published in Biometrika (Greenwood, 1904). The 
conclusion of the paper (1904, 73) was that, on the theory 
of natural selection, 
,.. death before senility as far as it is selective 
is the destruction of the less fit, i.e. of those 
not approaching within certain limits the type 
suitable to the environment. Thus it comes about 
that we shall expect on the Darwinian theory to 
find the individuals who die of disease in adult 
life to be more variable and less highly correlated 
in their organs than the 'healthy'. This is 
precisely what we do find... 
In 1904 he graduated in medicine. His autobiographical 
note continues: 
My father allowed me to go to Pearson for a year, 
provided that at the same time I was assistant in 
his practice (which was a very easy one). That 
year, 1904 -5, was a year of furious work. Pearson' s 
assistant Blakeman came to board at my father's house 
(my mother died at the end of November 1904). He was 
about my age and a Cambridge Wrangler. His effortless 
superiority in mathematics and the difficulty of 
following Pearson's lectures stimulated my vanity and 
I have never worked so furiously as I did in that 
year. Of course I did not become a mathematician; 
I am not one now, I have not the temperament, but I 
laid a foundation upon which I have built not al- 
together inefficiently. At the end of the year, 
I had another piece of luck. Hill [Leonard Hill, 
the physiologist] asked me to be his demonstrator 
and the British Medical Association gave me a 
research scholarship. So at the age of 25 I 
entered the profession of scientific research. 
Thus, it would appear that Greenwood was won to 
statistics by his attraction to the general aspects of 
Pearson's programme. He adopted many of Pearson's con- 
troversial views, for example on the importance of hereditary 
factors /... 
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factors in the incidence of tuberculosis: 
... in the present state of knowledge, it is 
difficult to believe that the parental correlation 
of between 0.46 and 0.68 for pulmonary tuberculosis 
is not a measure of inherited predisposition rather 
than of parental infection. 
(Greenwood, 1909, 267) 
In a paper published in the Eugenics Review (Greenwood, 1912, 
289 -90) he supported the eugenists' argument on the existence 
of a hereditary type 'physiologically inferior to the 
normal' comprising 'the tuberculous, the criminal, the 
mentally ill- balanced', and so on. 
In 1910 Greenwood was appointed statistician at 
the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine and, as he wrote 
in his autobiographical sketch, 'became a statistician for 
good'. Later he became the first Senior Statistical Officer 
in the Ministry of Health and, in 1927, first Professor of 
Epidemiology and Medical Statistics at the London School of 
Hygiene (Hogben, 1950, 142). Greenwood played a major part 
in the development of medical statistics. Hogben con- 
cludes (1950, 141): 
That statistical methods are now beginning to 
enlist the respect of the medical profession, is 
due in no small measure to Greenwood's pioneer 
work on large -scale trials to assess the efficacy 
of prophylactic and therapeutic measures. 
It is interesting to note that Greenwood's com- 
mitment to eugenics did not long survive his entry into the 
new role of statistician working in epidemiology and pre- 
ventive medicine. It seems likely that in an occupational 
setting concerned with environmental measures to prevent the 
spread of disease, he found the pessimism of the eugenists, 
for /... 
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for example about the campaign against tuberculosis, un- 
supportable. His letters to his close friend Yule reveal 
his growing doubts. Thus, he wrote to Yule on 30 June 1913 
about the biometricians' neglect of the environment: 
All this chatter about nutrition having no relation 
to, not the Anlage of intelligence - that is some- 
thing we know nothing about - but the manifestation 
of the Anlage as shown in the shaping of the child 
at school either in work or in the impression he 
produces on the teacher is manifest balderdash. 
Give a dog a protein -free diet and he will become 
a corpse after a certain number of days, give him 
protein but not enough to keep him in nitrogenous 
equilibrium and he will equally become a corpse in 
a rather greater number of days. Now we know that 
many of the kids are not in nitrogenous equilibrium 
(Rowntree etc. ad nauseam). All this is not just 
medical dogma but hard solid experimental fact. 
Really if this is all we statisticians can do to- 
wards the solution of social problems ... 
(Yule Papers, box 1) 
By 1914, he was prepared to join with Yule in publicly attack- 
ing some of Karl Pearson's published work in eugenics 
(Greenwood and Yule, 1914). 
The sequence in the case of Greenwood appears to 
have been as follows: recruitment into the biometric 
school, based at least in part on the general attractiveness 
of Pearson's programme; the learning of skills and the use 
of these both in applied work in a broadly eugenic framework 
and in theoretical work in statistics (for an example of 
the latter, see Greenwood, 1913); departure from the 
immediate context of the biometric school in order to obtain 
employment; growing doubts, perhaps stimulated by the new 
occupational setting, about the validity of eugenics; 
application of the skills learnt for different purposes. 
This /... 
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This sequence was, of course, not universal. Individuals 
could join the school for purely instrumental reasons, and 
not adopt eugenic beliefs. Others, like Greenwood, had 
to leave to find a job, but may, unlike him, have retained 
eugenic beliefs: a case in point seems to have been 
David Heron (see Heron, 1919). This is as we might expect. 
Any institution can expect to attract to itself individuals 
with a variety of motives, many divergent from the initial 
goals of the institution. The institution will not 'stamp' 
those who pass through it with a set of attitudes for all 
time. Some will retain attitudes learnt in the institution 
while others will not, and the explanation of these dif- 
ferences will have to be sought, in part, in the con- 
tingencies of their future careers. 
5.4 Statistics outside the Biometric School 
On almost any indicator one cares to choose (for 
example, quantity of publications, number of researchers, 
importance of results obtained, or role played in recruit- 
ment and training), the biometric school dominated statistical 
theory in Britain in the period from the early 1890's to 1914. 
Nevertheless, there were individual statistical theorists 
who were not members of the biometric school, and these also 
have to be considered. 
Perhaps the single most important point about them 
is that they were indeed individuals. There was no other 
coherent /... 
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coherent group of workers to rival the biometric school. 
Edgeworth, the most distinguished statistician of the older 
generation not trained in or associated with the biometric 
school, remained an effective isolate. His sole statistical 
follower, Arthur Lyon Bowley (1869 -1957), lectured on 
statistics at the London School of Economics, and in 1915 
was appointed Professor of Statistics there (A.H. 3owley, 
1972, 81). Important though Bowley's work in social 
statistics and econometrics was, he did not develop a 
school of statistical theory.(24) Within psychology, a 
number of workers turned to 'psychometrics', notably 
Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt and Godfrey Thomson. Again, 
their work, while important within psychology, was not 
productive of much innovation within statistical theory: 
from the statistical point of view it can indeed be seen as 
largely derivative of that of Galton and Pearson. A number 
of other individuals became interested in statistical theory 
from a wide variety of viewpoints, such as John Brownlee 
(medical statistics and perhaps eugenics) and John Maynard 
Keynes (probability in relation to philosophy and logic). 
Among those who were not members of the biometric 
school but who developed an interest in statistical theory 
in the period 1900 to 1914, one individual of course stands 
out: R.A. Fisher. Fisher was to dominate British statistics 
from /... 
(24) For Bowley, see A.H. Bowley (1972) and Allen and 
George (1957). 
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from the late 1920's to the 1950's to almost the same 
extent as Karl Pearson dominated the statistics of the 
previous 30 years. Fisher's work in biology and statistical 
theory will be discussed below, in chapters six and eight. 
In the context of this chapter, only one question will be 
asked about him. Why did he become a statistician? 
Fisher was educated at Stanmore Park School and 
Harrow, and in the Autumn of 1909 went on a scholarship to 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge.(25) Within two 
years he had developed a strong interest in statistics, which 
he maintained despite not finding a permanent post in the 
field of statistics until 1919. 
Statistical theory as such was not taught at 
Cambridge until 1912, when Yule was appointed to a lecture- 
ship in statistics. By that time, Fisher's interest in 
statistics /... 
(25) Details of Fisher's early life are based on 
Mahalanobis (1938), which was itself based on infor- 
mation given to Mahalanobis by Fisher (F. Yates, 
personal communication). Subsequent biographical 
notices (such as Yates and Mather, 1963) rely on the 
Mahalanobis account for the pre -1920 period. It 
should be noted, however, that the Cosset- Fisher- 
Pearson correspondence published by E.S. Pearson 
(1968) has shown this account to contain certain 
inaccuracies, and it should therefore be read in 
conjunction with this correspondence and that pub- 
lished by McMullen (ed.)(n.d.). 
Fisher's papers are in the care of the Genetics 
Department, University of Adelaide, and I was unable 
to obtain access to them. The records of the Cambridge 
University Eugenics Society, which I found in the 
Library of the Eugenics Society in London, make possible 
some supplementation of the published record. In addition, 
several colleagues and students of Fisher kindly allowed 
me to interview them: F. Yates, D. Finney, W. Federer, 
G. Wilkinson and D. Hayman. Fisher's daughter, 
Mrs Ruth Box, who is working on a biography of Fisher, 
had the kindness to reply to several written questions. 
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statistics was already developed, and in any case he seems 
to have attended only one of Yule's lectures. A more 
possible source of Fisher's interest was his undergraduate 
tutor, the astronomer F.J.M. Stratton (1881 -1960). Stratton 
was well versed in the theory of errors, and he lectured in 
the subject.(26) This was, of course, notuusual for an 
astronomer. Stratton, however, was at least temporarily 
attracted to the idea of applying error theory outside 
astronomy. He teamed up with the agriculturalist T.B. Wood 
to write a paper (Wood and Stratton, 1910) advocating the 
use of error theory techniques in agricultural research: 
The astronomer, being a mathematician, has devised 
a method of estimating the accuracy of his averages, 
which he invariably applies with great advantage. 
The agriculturalist cannot do better than follow his 
example. By doing so he will often be prevented 
from publishing experimental results which can only 
be misleading to those who read and act on them. 
The method consists in finding the 'probable error' 
of a result by the device known as 'least squares'. 
(Wood and Stratton, 1910, 425) 
Stratton published one other non -astronomical scientific 
paper (Stratton and Compton, 1910). This concerned right - 
handedness and left -handedness in barley (barley leaves are 
frequently folded so that one margin overlaps the other) and 
in man. Stratton helped Compton analyse the barley data, 
and together they fitted to the human data a simple Mendelian 
model modified by a certain percentage of 'accidental' 
change /... 
(26) Brunt (1917) was largely based on Stratton's lectures. 
I owe this reference to Edwards (1974, 14) . For Stratton's 
own use of the theory of errors, see, for example, 
Stratton (1909). For details of Stratton's career, 
see Chadwick (1961). 
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change (by which genetically left- handed individuals in 
fact become right -handed, etc.). 
Stratton may have played an important role, then, 
in generating Fisher's interest in statistics, and in teach- 
ing him the established body of error theory techniques. 
After graduating in 1912, Fisher spent a further year on a 
physics scholarship, studying error theory with Stratton 
and statistical mechanics with James Jeans. It is, however, 
far from certain that this kind of exposure to statistics 
would have generated in Fisher a desire to begin serious 
work in statistical theory. In the purely academic con- 
text, there was little incentive to do research in statistical 
theory, as is evidenced by Stratton's own return to purely 
astronomical work. A non -academic stimulus may well have 
been necessary, 
Just such a stimulus was provided by Fisher's in- 
volvement in the Cambridge University Eugenics Society.(27) 
The records of this society contain three unpublished papers 
by Fisher (1911; 1912a; 1912b).(28) Fisher and a fellow 
undergraduate, C.S. Stock, appear to have been the main force 
behind the Society, which was founded in the Spring of 1911. 
Although /... 
OW 1111 
(27) Fisher's role in this Society is not mentioned by any 
of his biographers. Although Mahalanobis states that 
'the object of the statistical theory of evolution is 
to supply a sound basis for eugenics, the science of 
man' (1938, 244), later writers on Fisher have tended 
to play down his eugenic concerns. 
(28) Fisher (1911) has now been published by Norton and 
Pearson (1976). 
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Although it attracted such influential patrons as Lord 
Rayleigh and the Bishop of Ely, and a wide ranging academic 
membership (including J.M. Keynes), the senior members of 
the Society seem to have played little active part in it, 
'[Wep see so little of them, hear so little from them', 
complained Fisher (1912b). The most regular activity of 
the Society was the series of discussion meetings held by 
its undergraduate group. These meetings began in Fisher's 
rooms in October 1911, when Stock gave a general intro- 
duction to 'The Eugenic Field'. At the second meeting on 
10 November 1911, Fisher introduced the group to the 
scientific basis of eugenics, with a paper entitled 'Heredity, 
comparing the Methods of Biometry and Mendelism' (Fisher, 
1911). This paper shows that Fisher had already immersed 
himself in the academic literature relevant to eugenics. 
He had clearly read widely in the two major competing 
approaches to heredity, and had thought deeply and in an 
original fashion about the difficult topic of multifactorial 
Mendelian models. 
The Society itself was shortlived. Its activities 
seem to have ceased by the outbreak of the First World War 
(it was revived after the War, but finally ceased to exist 
in 1923, according to a pencilled note in the file of 
records). However, the effect on Fisher of his involvement 
with eugenics was much more long - lasting. Around this time, 
he read 'carefully and very critically' Pearson's series of 
'Mathematical Contributions to the Theory of Evolution' 
(Mahalanobis /... 
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(Mahalanobis, 1938, 240), and he began original work in 
statistical theory. It seems unlikely that Fisher would 
have done this if it had not been for the stimulus of 
eugenics. During the period 1913 to 1919, when he moved 
around restlessly from job to job, the Eugenics Society (of 
which he quickly became a leading member at the national 
level) seems to have played an important role in encourag- 
ing him in his work. In a paper in the Eugenics Review, 
he concluded a simplified outline of his now famous work on 
'The Correlation of Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian 
Inheritance' by acknowledging his 
... deep sense of gratitude to the Eugenics 
Education Society, who have most generously 
assisted me throughout; and in particular to 
Major Leonard Darwin whose continual kindness 
and encouragement has enabled me to carry through 
the work. 
(Fisher, 1918b, 220) 
Fisher dedicated his Genetical Theory of Natural Selection 
(1930) to Leonard Darwin (who was the youngest son of 
Charles Darwin and President of the Eugenics Society for many 
years), 'in gratitude for the encouragement, given to the 
author, during the last fifteen years, by discussing many 
of the problems dealt with in this book'.(29) 
(29) Given the untechnical nature of Leonard Darwin's pub- 
lications (for example, L. Darwin, 1926) it would seem 
likely that his help was in the nature of general support 
rather than detailed advice. I have not been able to 
find any extant correspondence between Leonard Darwin 
and Fisher. Some of Leonard Darwin's correspondence 
is at Down House; by courtesy of Roy MacLeod I was 
able to see another set of letters of Leonard Darwin's 
that was being catalogued at Sussex University and is 
now in Cambridge University Library. 
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It is possible, then, to conclude that Fisher's 
commitment to eugenics may have played a major role in 
motivating and sustaining his early interest in statistical 
theory and statistical biology. It seems to have been 
largely in the context of the Cambridge University Eugenics 
Society that his early studies of these areas were made, and 
the Eugenics Education Society appears to have been an 
important reference group for his work, encouraging him in 
it and providing him with an important vehicle for the pub- 
lication and discussion of his ideas. Thus, consideration 
of the case of Fisher supports the case that the connection 
between statistics and eugenics was important to the develop- 
ment of the specialty of statistical theory in Britain. 
5.5 From Eugenics to Statistics 
In this chapter I have analysed the scientific 
'party' founded by Galton and Pearson. Previous chapters 
have shown that eugenics and social Darwinism played a 
major role in the motivation of these two men to found this 
'party'. Its subsequent fate also was closely tied to 
these motivating concerns. The general attractiveness of 
eugenics played at least a partial role in attracting several 
key individuals to work in statistics, most notably R.A. 
Fisher. The establishment of the Department of Applied 
Statistics at University College would have been impossible 
without money which was given by Galton and others for 
eugenic research. The connection between statistics and 
eugenics /... 
- 242 - 
eugenics thus in large part accounts for the partial in- 
stitutionalisation of statistical theory as a scientific 
specialty that took place in Britain prior to 1914. 
To leave the story there would, however, be mis- 
leading. Techniques were being developed by Galton, 
Pearson and their followers that were of much wider 
potential application than merely to eugenics. The skills 
of the staff of the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories 
could be turned to other fields. During the First World 
War, the resources of the Laboratories were largely devoted 
to work on employment statistics and ballistics: a develop- 
ment Pearson the patriot welcomed, but Pearson the eugenist 
found frustrating (see E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 2, 241 -5). 
Although the Department of Applied Statistics had grown out 
of work on eugenics and evolution, the connection was not 
unbreakable. 
The War was the turning point. Egon Pearson writes: 
... in the early summer of 1914 the auspices for 
the future of biometry and eugenics were good... 
A spacious new building was nearing completion... 
funds for its equipment were in the bank ... 
Courses of public lectures were well attended; 
though sometimes hidden behind a screen of con- 
troversy and of journalistic popularisation of 
the concept of eugenics, a growing body of opinion 
was learning to appreciate the value of statistical 
method. 
(1936-8, part 2, 195) 
During the War, inflation ate away the Department's funds, 
its research programme was interrupted, and Pearson found 
it difficult to retain trained staff as new openings for 
statisticians /... 
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statisticians opened up in government service. Just as 
seriously, by the end of the War the enthusiasm for eugenics 
which characterised the years before 1914 had largely 
passed. Possible causes of this are discussed in chapter 
three; the consequences for Pearson's group were that the 
unified research programme pursued prior to 1914 began to 
fragment. As eugenics became less important, the various 
parts of the Pearsonian programme - statistical theory, 
anthropometry, craniometry, and so on - began to develop 
more independently. For example, when Karl Pearson's son 
Egon Pearson was appointed to a job in the Department in 
1921, his line of work came to diverge more and more from 
the statistical theory which Karl Pearson had developed in 
integral connection with eugenics and Darwinism. 
Karl Pearson fought against the tide. Despite, 
for example, discouragingly poor audiences at public 
lectures on eugenics, Pearson established in 1925 a new 
journal, Annals of Eugenics, devoted 'wholly to the scientific 
treatment of racial problems in man' (E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, 
part 2, 217). The journal survives to the present, though 
under the title Annals of Human Genetics. On Pearson's 
retirement in 1933 there came, however, the hardest blow. 
The authorities of University College decided to divide 
his Department of Applied Statistics into two, establishing 
separate chairs of Statistics (to which Egon Pearson was 
appointed) and Eugenics (to which R.A. Fisher was appointed). 
A legacy from W.F.R. Weldon's widow made possible the 
establishment /... 
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establishment of a chair of Biometry (to which J.B.S. Haldane 
was appointed). Despite this increase in the number of 
senior posts, Pearson felt that the division of his Depart- 
ment constituted a fragmentation which negated his life's 
work, and he bitterly opposed it (E.S Pearson, 1936 -8, 
part 2, 231 -2). 
So the unification of statistics, eugenics and 
biometry in Pearson's programme did not survive. Eugenics 
in the academic context became human genetics, largely 
(though perhaps not entirely) lacking the political thrust 
of Pearson's eugenics. New factors came to be of importance 
in the development of statistical theory (some of these are 
discussed in chapter eight). Yet the statistical techniques 
of the biometric school were, in many cases, integrated, 
albeit in a changed interpretation, into the new statistical 
theory. The Department created by Pearson survived, 
although it was divided. Pearson's students carved out 
careers for themselves in these changed circumstances. 
Perhaps the best way to conceptualise this process is, as 
suggested at the beginning of this chapter, in terms of the 
formation of side bets. The aim of Pearson and, before him, 
Galton, had been to create a scientific specialty and a 
research institute in which statistical research into 
heredity and evolution would be pursued, with the ultimate 
aim of the application of the knowledge gained in a eugenic 
programme. In pursuing this aim, they had recruited others 
to this programme, funded and established a new University 
department /... 
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department, and so on. But in doing so, interests, in- 
dividuals and bodies extraneous to the initial aim became 
involved. The most systematic and advanced training then 
available in mathematical statistics was offered. It 
attracted those who had no interest in eugenics as such, 
and took on a momentum of its own. To give the research 
institute a stable setting, it was established within 
University College: this committed the College authorities 
to it, but gave them power over it. These, and other 
similar side bets, meant that the institutional develop- 
ment started by Pearson and Galton was no longer tied to 
their initial purposes alone. As eugenics waned, the side 
bets became more prominent until they came to dominate the 
initial purposes. 
- 246 - 
Chapter Six 
Biometrician versus Mendelian 
The best -known of the controversies involving 
Karl Pearson and his co- workers is that with the early 
Mendelian geneticists led by William Bateson. It was 
marked by the shattering of personal friendships, by 
heated public debate, by suggestions of fraud and by long- 
standing divisions within the British scientificcommunity. 
Pearson suggested that the early death of his co- worker 
Weldon could be attributed in part to the strain of the 
controversy (1906, 311). Few scientific controversies 
rival the biometrician /Mendelian dispute in terms of con- 
temporary public prominence, or in terms of the later 
attention of historians. The controversy has been the 
subject of recent studies by Froggatt and Nevin (1971a; 
1971b), Provine (1971), Cock (1973), Norton (1973; 1975a; 
1975b), de Marrais (1974) and Farrall (1975). The course 
of the controversy has, therefore, been thoroughly docu- 
mented, and various suggestions for explanations of it put 
forward. The methodological issues raised by these are 
discussed in MacKenzie and Barnes (1975) . In this chapter, 
I shall not discuss the detailed course of the controversy 
(for which see the above studies and MacKenzie and Barnes, 
1975, 165 -73). I shall attempt instead to provide an 
explanatory /... 
- 247 - 
explanatory account of the controversy, using the pers- 
pective on Karl Pearson developed above, together with 
additional material on William Bateson. (1) The chapter 
will conclude with a brief discussion of the work of 
R.A. Fisher, who, together with J.B.S. Haldane and 
Sewall Wright, is regarded as having resolved the con- 
troversy, and, in doing so, as having created modern popu- 
lation genetics (Provine, 1971, especially 130 -78). 
6.1 Green Peas, Yellow Peas and Greenish -Yellow Peas 
In 1900, Mendel's work on heredity was 'rediscovered' 
by three Continental biologists, Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns 
and Erich von Tschermak.(2) The Cambridge biologist 
William Bateson (1861 -1926) seized eagerly on the new 
approach. He became the leading British Mendelian, and 
played a crucial role in developing the new 'paradigm' and 
extending it into different fields.(3) He coined the term 
'genetics', and the new discipline it refers to owed a 
great deal to his work. Much of the terminology of 
Mendelian genetics is his (for example, 'homozygote' and 
'heterozygote /... 
(1) This account is based on that of MacKenzie and Barnes 
(1975), but has, I hope, been strengthened. 
(2) I place the word 'rediscovered' in inverted commas 
because of the extremely interesting suggestion by 
R.C. Olby (1975) that the 'rediscoverers' read into 
Mendel's work what was not in fact there: a theory 
of genetic determinants in the modern sense. 
(3) For Bateson's life and work see B. Bateson (ed.) 
(1928) and W. Coleman (1970). 
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'heterozygote'), and many early examples of the successful 
use of Mendelian explanations are to be found in his work 
and that of his group of co- workers, of whom R.C. Punnett 
(1875 -1967) was the most prominent, Karl Pearson and 
W.F.R. Weldon, on the other hand, responded to Mendelism 
negatively. Pearson described Mendelism as a largely 
unproven theory as late as 1930 (1914 -30, 3A, 288), long 
after its virtually total acceptance by professional bio- 
logists. He continued to support a different approach to 
the study of heredity, based on his own early work and 
that of Francis Galton before him. 
Bateson and the Mendelians operated with a theo- 
retical model of the process of heredity, at the basis of 
which were discrete, elementary genetic factors. These 
latter we have come to call 'genes', but that term is some- 
what misleading because we tend to think of the gene as a 
physical thing, while at the beginning of the period dis- 
cussed here the Mendelian factor was a purely theoretical 
entity. William Bateson, for example, never fully accepted 
the notion of the Mendelian factor as a material particle 
and disliked the chromosome theory on which this imputation 
was based (Coleman, 1970). Mendelian factors were held to 
pass unchanged from parent to offspring: pairs of factors 
underwent segregation and random distribution, but no 
blending of factors took place. Using elementary 
probability theory, together with assumptions about, for 
example, the dominance of one factor over another in the 
visible/ 
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visible manifestation of the factors in the offspring, theo- 
retical accounts of processes of heredity could be produced. 
These accounts were applied to the inheritance of characteristics 
such as, classically, the green and yellow colourations, and 
smooth and wrinkled forms, of pea seeds. 
The biometricians, on the other hand, did not use 
a developed, explicitly theoretical model of heredity.(4) If 
we were to seek a single exemplar as characteristic of their 
approach, it would be the treatment of quantitative, easily 
measured characteristics such as height. Galton's 'typical 
laws of heredity' (1877) were descriptions of statistical 
regularities in the relationship between parental and off- 
spring characteristics. Pearson (1896, 259) formalised 
this approach with his operational definition of heredity as 
the correlation between parental and offspring characteristics. 
The concept of heredity predominant in the work of the bio- 
metric school was thus, to use the modern terminology, that 
of phenotypic resemblance. 
These two different approaches to heredity can be 
seen as 'incommensurable' (Feyerabend, 1962; Kuhn, 1970). 
For the Mendelians, the prime task was the development of a 
model of the process of heredity. 
model /... 
NO 
Particular uses of the 
(4) Weldon did attempt to develop a model, wider in scope 
than the Mendelian model, that would account for phenomena 
such as segregation and dominance as well as for blending 
inheritance. This was never published in his lifetime, 
but is summarised in Pearson (1908): the development of 
Weldon's ideas can be traced in his letters to Galton 
from 1900 to 1906 (Galton Papers, 340 G -J). 
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model certainly had to be checked against the empirical data 
produced by breeding experiments, but a failure in any given 
case would not lead to the discarding of the basic model. 
Rather, an attempt would typically be made to elaborate the 
model further, for example by the development of concepts 
such as partial dominance, so as to explain successfully 
the puzzling phenomena. More difficult puzzles, such as 
the problems in providing a simple Mendelian explanation of 
the inheritance of characteristics such as human height, 
were simply set aside for later consideration. For the 
biometricians, on the other hand, the task was primarily 
one of the description of phenotypic resemblance. ' Mendelism 
is only a truth so long as it is an effective description', 
wrote Pearson (1914 -30, 3A, 288). The simplicity of early 
Mendelism was a point against it, not for it. 4hat appears 
to be Pearson's earliest discussion of Mendelism(5) con- 
sidered Mendelism as a description of phenotypic resemblances, 
and concluded that it was unlikely to fit all the cases of 
inheritance of characteristics such as eye -colour and coat - 
colour, much less more complex characteristics.") 
So the biometricians and Mendelians differed in 
their /... 
(5) An undated manuscript entitled 'Mendel's Law', a copy 
of which was kindly sent to me by Dr Maxine Merrington 
of University College, London. 
(6) If Olby's view of Mendel's papers is justified, then 
Pearson, in considering Mendelism a theory of pheno- 
typic resemblances and not of genetic determinants, 
was reading them correctly, and the early Mendelians 
reading them incorrectly' 
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their concepts of heredity (phenotypic resemblance versus 
a process of passage from parent to offspring of theoretically 
posited factors). Their criteria of scientific evaluation 
differed correspondingly. Phenomena for which successful 
Mendelian explanations could not be found were, for the 
Mendelians, puzzles to be resolved; for the biometricians, 
they were arguments againstivfendelism. This incommensur- 
ability extended to accounts of particular phenomena. 
Mendel's experiments were predicated on the unproblematic 
classification of peas into different classes (yellow/green; 
smooth /wrinkled). He deliberately used only characteristics 
which he felt to 'permit of a sharp and certain separation' 
(1865, 45). But the biometricians doubted that this sharp 
differentiation was possible, even for the characteristics 
that Mendel had chosen. Weldon (1902) argued that pea seeds 
did not fall naturally into Mendel's classes, but shaded 
gradually from yellow to green through intermediate tones, 
and from smooth to wrinkled by various degrees. He presented 
photographs of pea seeds to prove his point.(7) In reply 
Bateson argued that Weldon had used a 'mongrel' pea, rather 
than the 'pure' variety needed to demonstrate Mendelian 
phenomena (1902, 188 -9). 
'purity /... 
But the very notion of the 
NO OM OM 
(7) The colour plate illustrating Weldon's article caused 
much concern because, through technical difficulties 
in colour reproduction, it at first showed half the 
pea seeds green, and half yellow, instead of the con- 
tinuous gradation of colour that Pearson and Weldon 
felt undermined Mendel's approach. Pearson to 
Galton, 28 January 1902 (Galton Papers, 293E). 
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'purity' of a variety was in itself a theoretical Mendelian 
concept, not a simple empirical description (Bateson, 1902, 
129). Further, Bateson argued that, even if pure -bred peas 
were used, anomalous results could be produced by such con- 
tingencies as accidental crossing, 'sporting' and environ- 
mental factors. 
The dispute between the biometricians and the 
Mendelians could not, to use Kuhn's phrase, 'be unequivocally 
settled by logic and experiment alone' (1970, 94). There 
was nothing illogical in arguing, as Pearson did, that the 
best approach to heredity was that which best described the 
regularities of phenotypic resemblance, nor in placing a 
priori confidence in a theoretical model and being unabashed 
at its inability initially to explain anything other than a 
small range of observed phenomena, as the Mendelians did. 
Nor could experimental studies of heredity have resolved 
the issue, even if the two sides had been able to agree on 
the interpretation of a given result. An undisputable 
demonstration of an F2 generation exhibiting a predicted 
Mendelian ratio would not have converted Pearson and Weldon 
to Mendelism: they could simply have pointed to the vast 
range of phenomena not adequately described by Mendelism. 
Nor, a fortiori, would the failure of Mendelism in a particular 
case have caused the Mendelians to jettison their basic 
model. In historical actuality, attempts at 'crucial ex- 
periments' did not in any case reach any definite con- 
clusions, but largely degenerated into disputes about the 
competence /... 
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competence and honesty of the experimenters (Provine, 1971, 
73-80 and 87-8). 
The incommensurability of the two positions did 
lead to difficulties of understanding and communication.(8) 
This is particularly the case with the different inter- 
pretations of Galton's 'law of ancestral heredity'. As 
Froggatt and Nevin (1971a; 1971b) emphasise, disputes over 
the validity of this 'law' were prominent in the controversy. 
Galton had primarily intended the law, first pointed to in 
his 1865 paper on 'Hereditary Talent and Character' (1865, 
326), to summarise the degree of influence of ancestors of 
each degree on the height, say, of an individual: 
... the influence, pure and simple, of the mid- 
parent may be taken as ?, of the mid -grandparent 
4f of the mid -great -grandparent , and so on. 
(1885c, 261) 
Pearson certainly interpreted the law as one of phenotypic 
resemblance, and attempted to recast it in terms of the 
theory of multiple regression: as a linear equation giving 
the predicted height of an individual (in terms of the 
deviation from the mean height of that individual's generation) 
as a function of the heights of that individual's ancestors 
(in terms of the deviation of their heights from the means 
of their generations) (Pearson, 1898; Pearson, 1903a). 
At/... 
AM 
(8) 'Mr Bateson and I do not use the same language', 
wrote Karl Pearson (1902a, 331). 
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At first sight, Mendelism contradicted this 
whole approach. Once the genetic characteristics of the 
parents were known, knowledge of distant ancestry was 
redundant in predicting offspring characteristics. Thus 
Weldon could write (1902, 252): 
The fundamental mistake which vitiates all work 
based upon Mendel's method is the neglect of 
ancestry .., not only the parents themselves, 
but their race, that is their ancestry, must be 
taken into account before the result of pairing 
them can be predicted. 
Bateson, in replying, appeared to agree that a fundamental 
divergence existed between Mendelism and the 'ancestrian' 
approach (1902, 114): 
.., the Mendelian principle of heredity asserts a 
proposition absolutely at variance with all the 
laws of ancestral heredity, however formulated. 
The two sides were, however, talking about different things. 
The Mendelians had in mind, not phenotypic resemblance, but 
genetic structure. It was true that on a Mendelian view, 
distant ancestry was irrelevant, in the sense that what 
mattered was the composition of the zygote: all individuals 
with the same zygote were genetically identical, irrespective 
of where the particular factors had come from. When, how- 
ever, it came to predicting on a statistical and phenotypic 
basis the characteristics of offspring, then even on a 
Mendelian view the characteristics of an individual's 
ancestry were relevant, as these helped predict the (unknown) 
parental genetic make -up. As Pearson (1904a; 1909a; 1909b) 
was able to demonstrate, a multi -factorial Mendelian model 
in fact led, at the phenotypic level, to a multiple re- 
gression!... 
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gression equation similar to the law of ancestral heredity. 
This last development illustrates that difficulties 
of understanding and communication, while they did exist, 
were surmountable. In spite of their incommensurability - 
or, perhaps, because of it, because of the fact that the 
two approaches were on different ontological levels - there 
was no absolute formal barrier to a synthesis of the two 
approaches. Sporadic attempts at reconciliation were in- 
deed made from early on (for example, Yule, 1902). Thus, 
the analysis of the dispute cannot stop at the demonstration 
of the incommensurability. We must go on to ask what 
factors generated and maintained the controversy, and treat 
the observed incommensurability, in so far as it was per- 
sistent, as part of the controversy we are trying to under- 
stand. 
6.2 Professional Competences 
Bateson appears to have felt that the biometricians 
did not possess (or, in the case of Weldon, were not using) 
the competences of trained biologists. Thus, he lamented 
the fact that Galton and Pearson were not trained in the 
profession of the naturalist' (1902, xii). The connection 
between theoretical Mendelian factors and the observed 
properties of organisms was not such that anyone could 
immediately 'see' what was going on. A naive approach, 
which failed to take account of the complexities of the 
relationship /... 
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relationship between theory and the results of particular 
experiments, could mislead, as Bateson felt had happened 
in the case of Weldon. Even classification of peas into 
categories - green or yellow, smooth or wrinkled - could 
not be done mechanically, as Bateson felt the biometricians 
did it, but was a difficult task requiring experience (see 
Bateson to Yule, 28 November 1922; Yule Papers, box 22). 
The statistical approach of the biometricians was quite in- 
adequate, Bateson told the 1904 meeting of the British 
Association, in dealing with subtleties of, for example, the 
creation of new stocks in practical breeding: 
Operating among such phenomena the gross statistical 
method is a misleading instrument; and, applied 
to these intricate discriminations, the imposing 
Ccmelation Table into which the biometrical 
Proaustes fits his arrays of unanalysed data is 
still no substitute for the common sieve of a 
trained judgment. For nothing but minute 
analysis of the facts by an observer thoroughly 
conversant with the particular plant or animal, 
its habits and properties, checked by the test 
of crucial experiment, can disentangle the truth. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 240) 
Conversely the biometricians, particularly Pearson, 
felt themselves to be practising a more rigorous form of 
biology, which employed exact definitions and mathematical 
argument. Bateson and the 'old school' of biologists 
operated with 'confused and undefined notions', the bio- 
metricians with 'clear and quantitatively definite ideas' 
(Pearson, 1902a, 321). The lack of mathematical training 
of the majority of biologists was blamed by Pearson for 
what he saw as their indifferent or hostile response to 
biometry. In the theory of evolution, and some other 
fields /... 
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fields of biology, 'without mathematics, further progress 
has become impossible'. 
.., mathematical knowledge will soon be as much 
a part of the biologist's equipment as to -day of 
the physicist's. 
(Pearson, 1902a, 344) 
Thus, the participants themselves viewed the con- 
troversy as, at least in part, a clash of traditional bio- 
logical and mathematical competences. How far is it 
possible to build this insight into an acceptable account 
of the controversy? One possible approach would be to 
start with the training individuals receive and their early 
disciplinary experiences, and to regard these as having a 
conditioning effect on their future scientific work. This 
approach is, in effect, that employed by de Marrais (1974) . 
He argues that the mathematical perspective of Galton and 
the biometricians, in particular their continual use of the 
normal curve, constrained their perception. It was impossible 
logically to move from continuous variation to determine a 
finite number of underlying factors. 
... by its very nature the Frequency Law prohibits 
the discovery of the real (i.e., finite number of) 
causal agencies determining a trait's distribution 
pattern or 'type'. 
(de Marrais, 1974, 154) 
By comparison, Bateson, who was a notoriously weak mathe- 
matician, was not constrained in this way. 
The nonmathematical basis of William Bateson's 
(and all the early Mendelians') thought rep- 
resented not so much a cause of his Mendelism 
as an absence of the mainstay holding together 
the bundle of inhibitory relations that held back 
the biometricians. 
(de Marrais, 1974, 169) 
However /... 
- 258 - 
However, the model of the operation of training 
difference and early experiences implied in arguments such 
as this seems implausible. To use Wrong's phrase, it 
would seem to involve an 'oversocialised conception of man' 
(Wrong, 1976). Without supporting theory or evidence, it 
is difficult to imagine why individuals should be trapped 
in this manner by their disciplinary socialisation. After 
all, there are plenty of instances of individuals breaking 
with the approach of their training: thus both Weldon and 
Bateson broke, in different ways, from the morphological 
and embryological approach to biology of their Cambridge 
training (Pearson, 1906; Coleman, 1970). Training is 
obviously of importance, but an individual is not necessarily 
programmed for life by his or her training. 
The internal social structure of science is, as 
Hagstrom (1965) argues, competitive. Prestige and reward 
follow from the recognition, by his or her fellows, of the 
scientist's work as correct and interesting. In this 
'market', the scientist's resources are his or her ability 
to perform successful scientific work, his or her com- 
petences. No -one is all- competent. Individuals' com- 
petences are competences to use particular techniques, to 
work within the framework of particular theories, to handle 
particular materials. Thus, we can expect there to arise 
a tendency to evaluate new theoretical developments, new 
techniques, and so on, in terms of their effects on the 
value of scientists' existing competences. Other things 
being /... 
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being equal, we would expect scientists to be favourably 
inclined to developments which enhance the value of their 
competences, and hostile to those which devalue them. 
Training, on this view, provides individuals with com- 
petences, and these competences can affect a scientist's 
evaluations because of their role as resources in a com- 
petitive market for scientific knowledge.(9) 
On this view, it is certainly possible to under- 
stand the hostility shown by traditional biologists to bio- 
metry. If the biometric approach came to dominate biology, 
as Pearson clearly and publicly hoped, then traditional bio- 
logical skills would be devalued. E. Ray Lankester wrote 
(1896, 366): 
You can not (it seems to me) reduce natural 
history, as Prof. Weldon proposes, to an un- 
imaginative statistical form, without either 
ignoring or abandoning its most interesting 
problems, and at the same time refusing to 
employ the universal method by which mankind 
has gained new knowledge of the phenomena of 
nature - that, namely, of imaginative hypothesis 
and consequent experiment. 
One of Bateson's favourite bits of advice to young biologists 
was to 'treasure your exceptions' (B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 
324). But there was little room in the biometric approach 
for the skilled attention of the biologist to the individual 
case. Biometry would substitute the skills of the mathe- 
matician for those of the biologist, and Bateson (along with 
many /... 
(9) MacKenzie and Barnes (1975, 176 -8). This view of the 
relationship of socialisation and future behaviour is 
largely taken from Becker (1960; 1964). 
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many of his colleagues) was no mathematician. Bateson 
publicly admitted that 'his [Pearson's] treatment is in 
algebraical form and beyond me' (1902, 110 fn.).(10) 
Conversely, this view helps us to understand the 
widespread acceptance of Mendelism by the new generation of 
professional biologists following the rapid development, by 
T.H. Morgan and others, of the Mendelian chromosome theory 
in the period 1910 -15 (G.E. Allen, 1975a, 56 -65). This 
new generation had, according to Allen (1975a, 33 -9), been 
trained in an experimental and mechanistic approach to 
biology (the Entwicklungsmechanik of Roux played a crucial 
role in this). Initially these biologists (including 
Morgan himself) were sceptical of the Mendelian approach, 
which they found too speculative (Allen, 1975a, 53). The 
establishment of the Mendelian chromosome theory, by the 
use of the fast -breeding Drosophila melanogaster and the 
development of techniques such as chromosome mapping, changed 
their attitude completely. The techniques of Morgan's 'fly 
room' brought the study of heredity into the sphere of ex- 
perimental biology. Mendelism then became the key to extend- 
ing the scope of experimental biology: it was a theory which 
enhanced the value of the competences of experimental bio- 
logists, by showing that the use of these competences could 
throw new light on traditional biological areas (Allen, 1968, 
138/... 
(10) Bateson's position should not be overdrawn. He was 
quite prepared to use elementary statistical techniques 
in his own work. What he objected to was the sub- 
ordination of the biological to the mathematical that 
he perceived in biometry. 
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138). 
This approach to training, then, seems helpful 
in understanding certain aspects of the controversy: the 
antagonism of Bateson and traditional biologists to the 
biometric approach to the study of heredity and biology 
generally; and the widespread and almost total acceptance 
of Mendelism by professional biologists in the period 1910- 
20. However, certain features remain puzzling. One of 
these, discussed by Coleman (1970), is Bateson's hostility 
to the very chromosome theory that was responsible for the 
widespread acceptance of Mendelism.(11) Another, more 
central to the controversy, is Pearson's rejection of the 
Mendelian approach. For this, surely, cannot be explained 
in terms of competences. Although Pearson doubted the 
truth of Mendelism, he was able to operate mathematically 
within the Mendelian framework with ease, showing a grasp 
of the consequences of Mendelian heredity in a randomly 
breeding population far superior to that of any of the 
British Mendelians.(12) Mendelism was already a mathe- 
matical theory, even if the mathematics involved were simple 
and crude; a perfect opportunity was opened up for a 
mathematician to display his competence and the relevance 
of mathematics for biology by further developing these 
mathematical /... 
(11) It should be noted, however, that Bateson, who was in 
many ways not an experimental biologist in the new 
sense, would not have had shared the experimentalists' 
reasons for finding the chromosome theory attractive. 
112) See Pearson (1904a; 1909a; 1909b). 
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mathematical aspects. Thus a 'professional competence' 
explanation is at best one -sided: it does not appear that 
it can be used to explain the hostility of the biometricians, 
as a group of scientists with mathematical competences, to 
Mendelism. 
6.3 Heredity and Evolution 
Disagreement between Pearson and ;Weldon, on the 
one hand, and Bateson, on the other, was not limited to the 
question of the validity of Mendelism as a theory of evolution. 
Even before 1900, the two sides were already in dispute. 
This dispute had various manifestations: Weldon's (1894) 
review of Bateson (1894); the controversy on the origin of 
the cultivated Cineraria; the attacks by Bateson on 4Wreldon's 
work on crabs and Pearson's work on 'homotyposis'. A com- 
mon thread ran through all these particular disagreements 
(for which see, for example, Provine, 1971 and Norton, 1973). 
That thread was the question of the nature of evolutionary 
change. The majority of writers on the controversy agree 
that these early disagreements are crucial to an understand- 
ing of the later disagreement over Mendelism (see, especially, 
Provine, 1971). 
The biometricians (Pearson, Weldon and their co- 
workers, but not Francis Galton) believed that evolution 
was a process of gradual change, taking place by the 
selection of continuous variations. If height conferred 
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a selective advantage, then the mean height of a population 
would rise gradually from one generation to the next, because 
each successive generation would be formed by proportionately 
more offspring of tall parents than of short parents. In 
this, the biometricians were following Darwin (1859). The 
orthodox view had never gone unchallenged, even within the 
community of evolutionists: both T.H. Huxley and Francis 
Galton had doubted that evolution worked in this way, and 
had suggested a greater role for discontinuous variations 
('sports' or 'saltations'), which differed markedly from the 
parental generation (Provine, 1971, 10 -24). Thus, Galton 
had felt that evolution might not proceed smoothly, but 
might 'jerk' from one position of 'stability' to another 
(1869, especially 367 -70 and 375 -6). Those opposed to 
Darwinism also took up the issue of discontinuous variations, 
although, unlike Huxley and Galton, they tended to suggest 
that a 'nonmaterial directive agency' was guiding the pro- 
duction of these variations (Provine, 1971, 24). 
This long -standing thread of opposition to orthodox 
Darwinian selectionism was given new force in 1894, with the 
publication of William Bateson's Materials for the Study of 
Variation. As the name indicates, the book is mainly a 
catalogue of a large number of instances of variation. The 
long introduction, however, conveyed the import of these 
examples. Bateson argued that the morphological approach 
to evolutionary theory (in which he had been trained), had 
proven to be barren: attention had to shift to the empirical 
study /... 
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study of variation. This empirical study revealed clearly 
that large, discontinuous variations did occur in nature. 
Further, he concluded that it was this type of variation 
(and not quantitative individual differences) which was 
of evolutionary significance. Species were discontinuous 
entities, differing qualitatively from each other: environ- 
ments, by comparison, shaded continuously one into each 
other. The source of specific discontinuity could not, 
therefore, be the environment (whether acting in a direct 
Lamarckian or indirect selectionist fashion): it had to 
lie in variation, in the 'raw material' for evolution. 
Although Bateson said, cautiously, that 'inquiry into the 
causes of variation is as yet, in my judgment, premature' 
(1894, 78), he did suggest that the source of discontinuity 
should be sought 'in the living thing itself', and that the 
key to its understanding lay in the phenomena of pattern: 
symmetry and merism (Coleman, 1970, 250). 
In the following decade, Hugo de Vries published 
his Die Mutationstheorie (1901 -3), which was in part 
stimulated by Bateson's work (Allen, 1969, 65). Like 
Bateson, de Vries thought that large discontinuities were 
the key to the evolutionary process: 
The object of the present book is to show that 
species arise by saltation and that the individual 
saltations are occurrences which can be observed 
like any other physiological process, 
(Quoted by Allen, 1969, 59 -60) 
While Bateson's work had had an impact amongst only those 
biologists with clear evolutionary concerns, that of 
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de Vries received wide and generally favourable attention 
(Allen, 1969, 65 -9). 
Thus, overlapping the controversy over the validity 
of Mendelism was this further dispute over the nature of 
evolutionary change. There was no necessary logical con- 
nection between the two issues. For example, Morgan's 
work from 1910 onwards on mutant Drosophila convinced him 
mutations could have small phenotypic effects (no greater 
than the usual limits of continuous variability): he 
simultaneously upheld Mendelism, a Mendelian mutation theory, 
and a view of evolution as a gradual process (Allen, 1968). 
Conversely, de Vries, although one of the three 'redis- 
coverers' of Mendelism, denied that progressive mutations 
obeyed Mendelian laws (Allen, 1969, 61), and became dis- 
enchanted with Mendelism (Provine, 1971, 68). But, for all 
this absence of a necessary connection, the two issues became 
closely bound together, especially in Britain. 
In one sense, Bateson came to Mendelism as a result 
of his belief in the role of discontinuities in evolution.(13) 
In the years following the publication of the Materials, he 
set himself the task of discovering how discontinuous variations 
might be passed on to successive generations (a key issue in 
the development of a 'saltationist' theory of evolution). 
The method he chose was experimental plant hybridisation, 
thé /... 
fat MP 
(13) For an interesting account of the reasons for Bateson's 
favourable assessment of Mendelism, see Darden (1977). 
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the crossing of closely related varieties and the examination 
of the characteristics of sets of offspring of such crosses 
(Coleman, 1970, 250 -1). Bateson was travelling by train 
from Cambridge to London, to deliver a lecture on the pre- 
liminary results of his investigations, when he first read 
Mendel's paper on peas; he immediately incorporated the 
results into his lecture (3. Bateson, ed., 1928, 73). He 
had been 'made ready' for reading Mendel by his own work on 
discontinuous variations and their heredity. He reacted 
enthusiastically, and interpreted Mendelism as supporting 
his own 'saltationist' evolutionary views. He wrote 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 223): 
The discovery of Mendelian elements admirably 
coincided with and at once gave a rationale of 
these facts. 
Pearson and Weldon also felt there to be a con- 
nection between Mendelism and a discontinuous view of 
evolution: but this, for them, was a reason to reject 
Mendelism, not to embrace it. Pearson wrote (1906, 306): 
To those who accept the biometric standpoint, 
that in the main evolution has not taken place 
by leaps, but by continuous selection of the 
favourable variation from the distribution of 
the offspring round the ancestrally fixed type, 
each selection modifying pro rata that type, 
there must be a manifest want in Mendelian 
theories of inheritance. Reproduction from 
this standpoint can only shake the kaleidoscope 
of existing alternatives; it can bring nothing 
new into the field. To complete a Mendelian 
theory we must apparently associate it for the 
purposes of evolution with some hypothesis of 
'mutations'. 
Thus, the biometricians' opposition to Mendelism can be seen, 
at least in part, as an opposition to the saltationism with 
which /... 
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which they associated it. 
So the problem of explaining the biometrician/ 
Mendelian controversy is one of explaining these divergent 
views of evolution, at least in so far as we wish to explain 
the prior dispute between the biometricians and Bateson, and 
its continuance into the later phase of the controversy 
over Mendelism proper. These divergent views on evolution 
cannot be seen as arising from experimental evidence, as 
they took the form of assumptions, rather than conclusions. 
Bateson (1901) separated variation by definition into the 
two classes of 'specific' variations (which were discon- 
tinuous and of evolutionary significance) and 'normal' or 
'continuous' variations (which a priori were not) , and 
criticised Pearson et al. (1901b) on the grounds that Pearson 
had not done so. And, as the quotation above indicated, 
Pearson took the continuous view of evolution as 'the bio- 
metric standpoint', i.e. as a presupposition. 
Factors internal to the social system of science, 
such as professional competences, may again be examined as 
a possible grounding for these different views of evolution. 
Allen (1969) shows how de Vries's mutation theory appeared 
initially to solve some of the problems which troubled the 
Darwinian theory (see also Darden, 1976). Biologists might 
then be expected to take up the new theory as a promising 
area for innovative work. In particular, the mutation 
theory gave new relevance to experimental work in the form 
of /... 
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of attempts to demonstrate mutations in plants and animals 
reared in experimental conditions. Mayr (1973, 149) 
states of the period immediately after 1900: 
I am not aware of a single experimental... 
biologist who championed natural selection. 
Old- fashioned field naturalists, by comparison, tended, 
according to Mayr, to remain faithful to orthodox Darwinism. 
It would therefore seem plausible to suggest that 
the assessment of evolutionary theories by experimental 
biologists was informed by judgments of the relative scope 
offered by these theories for experimental work, and that 
it was in part for this reason that they preferred the 
mutation theory to orthodox Darwinism. An instance of 
this would appear to be C.B. Davenport. Davenport had in- 
troduced Pearsonian biometry to America, but following the 
'rediscovery' of Mendelism and the publication of the 
Mutationstheorie he 'defected'.(14) Davenport had consider- 
able experience as an experimentalist, and had introduced 
the teaching of experimental morphology to Harvard. A 
'painfully ambitious' man, he was from 1902 to 1904 engaged 
in a campaign to persuade the Carnegie Institution to set 
up a station for the experimental study of evolution. He 
therefore approached the mutation theory with a strong in- 
terest in the experimental studies it made possible. In 
1902, he toured Europe, visiting the Marine Biological 
Stations /... 
OM NO 
(14) For biographical details of Davenport, see MacDowell 
(1946) and Rosenberg (1961). 
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Stations there'to better fit myself for the work of direct- 
ing the Station for Experiments on Evolution, whenever the 
Carnegie Institution establishes it' (quoted by MacDowell, 
1946, 19). On his return Davenport wrote (1903, 46): 
The most important events relating to the study 
of variation that have occurred during the past 
two years have been the establishment of the 
journal Biometrika, the foundation in America of 
a Society of Plant and Animal Breeding, the com- 
pletion of the first volume of de Vries's 'Mutations - 
theorie', and the rediscovery of Mendel's Law of 
Hybridity. Especially the latter two events have 
awakened a strong tendency toward the experimental 
study of evolution. 
During the last four months the recorder has visited 
many of the experimental evolutionists of Europe. 
While the total work on this subject in Europe is 
of the greatest importance, it is carried on under 
conditions that greatly hamper the work and make it 
impossible to start experiments that require to be 
carried on for a long period of years. Everywhere 
the hope was expressed that in America a permanent 
station for experimental evolution would be founded, 
and it was believed that the Carnegie Institution 
would be the proper organisation to initiate and 
maintain such a station. 
Thus, we can claim that for Davenport the mutation theory 
and Mendelism made it possible to do more (within his desired 
occupational role) than the Darwinism of the biometricians. 
In 1904 he did indeed achieve his aim of becoming Director 
of a Laboratory set up by the Carnegie Institution at Cold 
Spring Harbor, and the work done under his direction was 
Mendelian and mutationist in tendency. As he wrote, review- 
ing the work of de Vries (1905, 369): 
The great service of de Vries's work is that, 
being founded on experimentation, it challenges 
to experimentation as the only judge of its 
merits. It will attain its highest usefulness 
only if it creates a widespread stimulus to the 
experimental investigation of evolution. 
Such /.., 
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Such an attitude to mutation was incompatible with col- 
laboration with Pearson, and Pearson and Davenport split 
violently.(15) 
Professional competences thus seem to have played 
a part in the overall dispute over evolution. Once again, 
however, their role seems to be weaker when we approach the 
central figures in the controversy in Britain. Bateson, 
Pearson and Weldon were not primarily experimentalists. 
In some ways both Bateson and Weldon were closer to the old - 
style naturalist than to the new professional experimental 
biologist; Pearson, of course, was by training not even a 
biologist. Therefore, it would seem desirable to seek an 
alternative 'grounding' of the radically different views on 
evolution exemplified in the work of the major participants 
in the controversy. 
6.4 A Structural Hypothesis 
In order to go beyond consideration of professional 
competences and to develop a fuller explanation of the con- 
troversy in terms of the sociology of knowledge, it is 
necessary to step back for a moment from the details of the 
dispute. As has been argued in sections 1.4 and 4.2, 
causal explanations of the beliefs of particular individuals 
cannot /... 
(15) The split can be followed in their correspondence in 
the Davenport Papers. 
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cannot be provided by the sociology of knowledge: individuals 
such as Karl Pearson rather have to be taken as examples, 
perhaps of a particularly striking nature, of the relation- 
ship between knowledge, social interests and the social 
structure. So I shall start by suggesting a sociological 
hypothesis connecting the issues of evolution and inheritance 
debated by the biometricians and Mendelians to social in- 
terests. Then, in section 6.5, I shall examine material 
from the writings of the major participants in the controversy 
which can be taken as evidence for the hypothesis. 
One aspect of the hypothesis arises fairly directly 
out of the analyses of chapters three and four. Stated 
baldly, I suggest that the distinctive judgments and technical 
developments manifested in the biometric approach to evolution 
and inheritance can be related to the social interests of 
the rising professional middle class. The obverse of this 
claim was suggested by the work of William Coleman (1970) 
on Bateson, although, in using Coleman's analysis in this 
way, I am going beyond what he himself argues. 
(16) The 
account of evolution and inheritance produced by Bateson and 
his closest followers can, I would claim, be seen as sustained 
by the interests of those whose social position was threatened 
by/... 
am so 
(16) Coleman's work is best seen as a contribution to the 
history of ideas, not the sociology of knowledge. He 
presents what seems to me a persuasive analysis of 
Bateson's belief system, but does not seek to relate 
this to the social structure in any fully explicit 
way. 
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by economic growth and the social changes consequent upon 
the industrialisation and modernisation of British society. 
It is not suggested that this hypothesis provides 
a complete explanation of the controversy. As well as not 
claiming to explain individual behaviour, the hypothesis 
does not contradict the assertion that social interests 
related to professional competences can be seen as operat- 
ing in the controversy. To use, in loose analogy, the 
terminology of Althusser (1969, 87 -116), concrete conjunctures 
are in general overdetermined: social factors of more than 
one type have to be considered in explaining any particular 
episode. Nevertheless, the structural hypothesis put 
forward here may throw light on aspects of the controversy 
which otherwise remain puzzling. 
Consider biometry. Within biometry, scientific 
judgments reflected a cognitive interest in predicting and 
controlling the overall incidence of characteristics within 
populations. While in asserting this nothing is claimed 
about the motives of particular individual biometricians, 
it helps us understand certain key aspects of the biometric 
school considered as an institution and of their work con- 
sidered as a 'paradigm' or 'disciplinary matrix' (Kuhn, 
1970). Thus, in the work of the biometric school biological 
populations were taken as the unit of analysis in studies 
of evolution and heredity: individual instances were of 
importance only in the aggregate. 
techniques /... 
The definitions and 
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techniques used by the biometricians referred to populations 
and their characteristics. These definitions and tech- 
niques (spelt out most explicitly in Pearson, 1896) were 
predicated on a descriptive and predictive model of the 
evolutionary process, in which inheritance and selection 
operated in a measurable fashion to produce definite effects 
on succeeding generations. 
We, therefore, require a generalised investigation 
of the following kind: Given p + 1 normally cor- 
related organs, p out of these organs are selected 
in the following manner: each organ is selected 
normally round a given mean, and the p selected 
organs, pair and pair, are correlated in any 
arbitrary manner. What will be the nature of the 
distribution of the remaining (p + 1)th organ? 
... If the p organs are organs of ancestry - as many 
as we please r and the (p + 1)th organ that of a 
descendant, we have here the general problem of 
natural selection modified by inheritance. 
(Pearson, 1896, 298; emphasis deleted) 
This model made possible the prediction of the effects of 
intervention, whether of the animal breeder or the eugenist, 
in animal or human populations, and allowed, for example, 
calculations of the duration of selection needed to establish 
new breeds (Pearson, 1896, 314 -8). It was not that the bio- 
metricians studied evolution, tested their model, and then 
decided that evolution was a process that had certain charac- 
teristics, such as acting on populations as aggregates of 
individuals. These characteristics were rather pre- 
suppositions of the biometric view: they were simply what 
the biometricians meant by evolution.(17) 
Biometry /... 
- 
(17) This comes over most clearly in their criticisms of 
Bateson (see Weldon, 1894 and Pearson, 1902a). 
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Biometry was, as has been discussed in chapters 
four and five, closely tied to eugenics. No distinction 
was drawn by the biometricians between human populations on 
the one hand, and plant and animal populations on the other, 
as far as the techniques for the analysis of evolutionary 
change were concerned. Indeed, the central tenet of all 
social Darwinism was the parallelism between the two spheres. 
The application of biometric techniques to man thus in- 
volved a model of human society which had certain character- 
istic features. Human populations were atomistic and 
aggregative in their properties, and change was a process 
that took place on a population level. On this model, 
social change could indeed be seen as evolution. From 
generation to generation, the statistical characteristics 
of the individuals making up in aggregate a given population 
altered slowly in response to the effects of natural selection, 
assortative mating and differential fertility. 
Hence, a relationship existed between the cognitive 
interest underlying biometry - in the prediction and control 
of the overall incidence of characteristics within populations - 
and the interests of the rising professional middle class. 
As analysed above, this social group can be seen as having 
an interest in interventionist, scientistic measures of 
reform and social control, such as were exemplified in 
Fabianism and eugenics. These would both increase the 
occupational positions open to its members and increase its 
status as the possessor of the specialised knowledge necessary 
.for /... 
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for such schemes. The atomistic, aggregative, populational 
model of society was a model in which the potential for 
planned social intervention was at a maximum. If society 
was the sum of its individual parts, and classes and com- 
munities simply names for collections of individuals and 
not entities sui generis, then the effects of any given 
course of action were easily predictable. One had, as it 
were, simply to measure the effects on each individual, and 
add them up for the population. Take eugenic intervention 
as an example. The eugenists assumed that the 'unfit' 
could be identified as individuals, and incarcerated or 
sterilised, with predictable benefits in the next generation. 
This scheme would, of course, have run into great difficulties 
if it had encountered opposition on a class or community 
basis, if it had been taken as directed, not against in- 
dividuals, but against collective entities. Its success 
was thus, to a certain extent, predicated on the individual- 
istic, atomistic model of society: indeed, its decline in 
the inter -war period may in part be attributed to the declin- 
ing creditability of that model, as instanced by the dif- 
ficulty of treating unemployment on the mass scale of the 
1920's and 1930's as the result of individual inadequacy. 
In assuming this model of society, Pearson and 
the eugenists did not consciously choose between alter- 
natives: it is implicit, rather than explicit, in their 
thought. It was certainly not a hypothesis to be tested, 
but rather was the basis of their procedures and proposals. 
While /... 
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While it was arguably the dominant image of society in 
Victorian Britain, it was by no means the only one. Other 
models would have been available to them, had they needed 
them. Their interests, however, led them to select, albeit 
quite unconsciously, a model of society which allowed the 
greatest scope for the types of policy they wished to 
pursue. 
(18) 
What was the detailed connection between this 
model of society and the biometric view of evolution? It 
is not my argument that the biometricians as a group of in- 
dividuals came to hold a view of society and then selected 
a view of nature congruent with it. Such an argument could 
perhaps be made for Karl Pearson, but it misses the essential 
point. In Victorian and Edwardian Britain the connections 
between evolutionary biology and images of society were 
institutionalised /... 
(18) This is not in itself to be depracated: revolutionary 
socialists and conservatives can be seen as doing the 
same thing. It would, after all, be strange to see 
a group selecting a model of society in which the 
potential for its policies to work was small. 
Of course, it could be suggested that the opposite 
process takes place as well: that, on the basis of 
a model of society, groups select what seems the most 
appropriate policy. Undoubtedly this happens; but 
in answering the consequent question, of why a given 
model of society should be held, we are again led 
back to consideration of social interests. For 
reasons of simplicity, it seems best to hold, at a 
first approximation, to the above formulation, 
despite its obvious crudity. 
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(19) institutionalised. To say something about nature (in 
the sense of, say, a general pronouncement about evolution) 
was to say something about society. In an enterprise such 
as biometry /eugenics, society and nature were inextricably 
intertwined: the option of saying 'A holds for nature' but 
'not -A holds for society' was neither taken nor, apparently, 
considered.(20) Individuals may well have been unconcerned 
with the implications that biological theorising would be 
taken, through these institutionalised connections, as 
having: Pearson's colleague otieldon may have been an instance 
of this. These implications and connections were nonethe- 
less real. If Weldon had succeeded in his attempt to 
demonstrate the empirical validity of orthodox Darwinism 
(Weldon, 1895), social Darwinism and eugenics would thereby 
have been strengthened. 
Against the biometric view of evolution was ranged 
a different view. It emphasised the role of individual in- 
stances of variation rather than population processes; the 
discontinuous and relatively unpredictable nature of change 
as against its gradual and law- governed nature; and the 
holistic integrity of the organism rather than its 
plasticity /... 
(19) See, for example, Young (1969). 
(20) It is interesting to note in passing Helfand's recent 
re- evaluation of Huxley's Evolution and Ethics (1893), 
which has conventionally been seen as an instance of 
the taking of this option. Helfand (1977) argues 
that Huxley was attacking, not social Darwinism in 
general, but only those forms of it to which he was 
politically opposed: he was pursuing an argument 
within a broadly social- Darwinian framework. 
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(21) plasticity. Again, a parallel view of societ can be 
found. This highlighted the role of the individual genius 
rather than the characteristics of the mass; it foresaw 
not gradual progress but sudden catastrophe; it was 
pessimistic about the possibility of reform; and it 
deployed the image of society as an organism to attack the 
atomistic individualism of bourgeois society. 
Clearly Coleman (1970) has some justification in 
referring to this as a 'conservative style of thought'.(22) 
In Mannheim's original analysis (Mannheim, 1953), German 
conservatism was seen as sustained by the social interests 
of a landed aristocracy fundamentally opposed to bourgeois 
revolution, and to the 'natural law' style of thought that 
formed its typical ideological counterpart. The British 
aristocracy was, however, not generally in opposition to 
the bourgeoisie but in a situation of accommodation with it 
(Barrington Moore, 1967, 3 -39). No single major social 
locus /... 
(21) This view was that held by Bateson and, perhaps to a 
lesser extent,Punnett, but, as Coleman (1970) points 
out, certain connections with the earlier views of 
opponents of Darwinism such as Butler and 1Aivart can 
be seen. 
(22) Some of the chief characteristics of conservative 
thought are, according to Mannheim (1953), i t s 
opposition to rationalist individualism (of which 
utilitarianism would be the best British example), 
its elevation of 'being' over 'thinking', of the 
whole over the parts, of the particular over the 
general, and the traditional over the progressive. 
Conservatism took issue with the mechanism and atomism 
of bourgeois thought, opposing to it holism and the 
metaphor of the social organism, and emphasing the 
qualitative rather than the quantitative. Mannheim 
is clear that these are general characteristics, and 
not all to be found in the thought of any one con- 
servative thinker. 
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locus of conservatism, in Mannheim's sense, appears to have 
existed in Victorian Britain. Nonetheless, conservative 
hostility to bourgeois 'progress' could be expected: not 
all sections of old elites were able to come to an amicable 
peace with, or share in the profits of, industrial capitalism. 
Such conservative romanticism does indeed form a persistent, 
if diffuse, strain in British intellectual life in the 
Victorian and Edwardian periods.(23) 
6.5 Some evidence 
A full discussion of evidence for and against the 
hypothesis put forward in the previous section would go far 
beyond the scope of this thesis, involving as it would wide - 
ranging studies of the social uses of evolutionary beliefs, 
of the relations of these uses to the social structure and 
to social interests, and of the variations of these uses 
through time. The discussion here will be limited to the 
writings of the two major figures discussed in this chapter, 
Pearson and Bateson; Bateson's social background and its 
relations to his thought will also be examined. 
The material presented in this section (and in 
section 6.6, which extends this discussion to R.A. Fisher's 
'resolution' of the controversy) should be taken only as 
relevant evidence. The hypothesis put forward in section 
6.4/... 
(23) See, in particular, Williams (1968), but also Perkin 
(1972, 237 -52 and 262 -4) and Levitas (1976). 
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6.4 suggests simply the existence of connections between 
evolutionary beliefs and social interests. It does not 
suggest that all persons of a given social background would 
necessarily adopt one position rather than another. As 
the case of Bateson, discussed below, shows, individual 
biographies are complex, and in any case family background 
is only one amongst several social factors of relevance. 
Nor does the hypothesis assert that a given position can be 
adopted for only one reason. Thus, as discussed in sections 
5.2 and 5.3, individual motives for adherence to the bio- 
metric school were possibly very varied. The position, for 
example, of Pearson's major co- worker W.F.R. Weldon is un- 
clear in the matter of the socio- political connotations of 
biometry. He never actively supported eugenics and 
Pearsonian social Darwinism; nor did he ever make any 
apparent attempt to distance himself from them.(24) So, 
in suggesting the existence of connections between bio- 
logical beliefs and social interests, it is by no means 
implied that these connections were apparent as motives in 
all individual cases: particular scientists may well have 
chosen to ignore them, or have been uninterested in them. 
The evidence for the hypothesis presented here is simply 
that of the manifestation, in the writings of Pearson and 
Bateson, of these connections. 
no/... 
Clearly this evidence in 
(24) Weldon's letters to Pearson (Pearson Papers) do give 
some suggestions of social attitudes broadly congruent 
with Pearson's; for example, support for imperialism, 
hostility to upper -class superficiality, approval of 
the 'middle classes'. 
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no way proves the validity of the hypothesis: it may, 
however, go part of the way to indicating its plausibility. 
In the case of Pearson, part of the evidence con- 
cerns the parallelism of his early views on social change 
(section 4.4) and his later views on biological change, in 
particular the emphasis in both on the continuity of change 
and its consequent predictability. This is discussed in 
MacKenzie and Barnes (1975), although the emphasis on it in 
that paper may be misleading. Further evidence is provided 
by some of his detailed reasons for opposing Mendelism, 
especially as applied to the key nexus between biology and 
society, eugenics. Mendelism in general he may have dis- 
liked: its eugenic application he found dangerous. He 
and two collaborators wrote (Pearson, Nettleship and Usher, 
1913, 491; quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, part 2, 169 -70): 
The problem of whether philosophical Darwinism 
is to disappear before a theory which provides 
nothing but a shuffling of old unit characters 
varied by the appearance of an unexplained 'fit 
of mutation' is not the only point at issue in 
breeding experiments. There is a still graver 
matter that we face, when we adduce evidence that 
all characters do not follow Mendelian rules. 
Mendelism is being applied wholly prematurely to 
anthropological and social problems in order to 
deduce rules as to disease and pathological states 
which have serious social bearing. Thus we are 
told that mental defect, - a wide term which covers 
more grades even than human albinism, - is a 'unit 
character' and obeys Mendelian rules; and again on 
the basis of Mendelian theory it is asserted that 
both normal and abnormal members of insane stocks 
may without risk to future offspring marry members 
of healthy stocks. Surely, if science is to be a 
real help to man in assisting him in a conscious 
evolution, we must at least avoid spanning the 
crevasses in our knowledge by such snow -bridges of 
theory. A careful record of facts will last for 
ages, but theory is ever in the making or the un- 
making/... 
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making, a mere fashion which describes more or 
less effectually our experience. To extrapolate 
from theory beyond experience in nine cases out of 
ten leads to failure, even to disaster when it 
touches social problems. In all that relates 
to the evolution of man and to the problems of 
race betterment, it is wiser to admit our present 
limitations than to force our data into Mendelian 
theory and on the basis of such rules propound 
sweeping racial theories and inculcate definite 
rules for social conduct. 
Pearson's evolutionism was designed to provide a means for 
controlling social change. This did not simply constrain 
the content of evolutionary biology by ruling out, as the 
first sentence of the above quotation indicates, theories 
such as Mendelian mutationism which formulated evolution as 
a discontinuous and unpredictable process. It also con- 
strained its form. To be credible, social programmes such 
as eugenics had to be seen as based on sure knowledge, not 
knowledge that was subject to future retraction and contra- 
diction. For Pearson, this meant that a theory of evolution 
and heredity had to be developed from observational data, 
and from these alone. Knowledge of the 'facts' was stable 
and a safe basis for social action. Theory which went 
beyond the facts was, however, subject to 'fashion', to 
change. Thus, evolutionary biology should be phenomenalist, 
not theoretical, in its form. 
Pearson felt that his own approach met this 
criterion. As outlined above, his notion of heredity was 
a phenotypic, phenomenalist one. Biometry attempted to 
'display' evolution as measurable mass change in population 
distributions. 
Pearson /... 
The mathematical apparatus presented in 
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Pearson (1896) took observational data and analysed it 
according to multiple regression models. The law of 
ancestral heredity, according to Pearson, was derived from 
observational data, and enabled the apparently theory -free 
prediction of offspring characteristics from ancestral 
characteristics. The effects of eugenic intervention were 
predictable, without any biological theory of heredity, 
because Pearson's concept of heredity simply summarised 
what happened in the 'passage' of a characteristic from given 
individuals in one generation to those in the next. Theory - 
free control, as well as theory -free prediction, was thus 
apparently possible. 
Early Mendelism, by comparison, was obviously theo- 
retical. A simple exemplar was being imaginatively and some- 
times rashly deployed, and was being modified in what often 
seemed an ad hoc fashion. Pearson wrote (1906, 306): 
The simplicity of Mendel's Mendelism has been 
gradually replaced by a complexity as great as 
that of any description hitherto suggested of 
hereditary relationships ... The old categories 
are, as Weldon indicated, being found insufficient, 
narrower classifications are being taken, and 
irregular dominance, imperfect recessiveness, the 
correlation of attributes, the latency of ancestral 
characters, and more complex determinantal theories 
are becoming the order of the day. 
With hindsight, we can identify this as creative science, 
as simply the growth of genetic knowledge. But for Pearson, 
who sought in the study of heredity the basis of an applied 
social science of evolution, this process could have 
scandalous consequences. 
The /... 
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The most serious of these was when Davenport (1910) 
suggested that feeblemindedness was a simple Mendelian re- 
cessive, and went on (Davenport, 1911) to argue that a whole 
range of characteristics of eugenic importance were of a 
similar nature. Davenport drew from this what seemed to 
Pearson to be not merely a foolish, but an immoral conclusion: 
Weakness in any characteristic must be mated 
with strength in that characteristic; and 
strength may be mated with weakness. 
(1910, 25) 
A devasting criticism of Davenport's work eventually appeared 
from Pearson's department, showing how Davenport's methods 
were biased towards producing the simple Mendelian results 
he sought. It concluded (Heron, 1913, 62): 
The future of the race depends on the strong 
mating with the strong, and the weak refraining 
from every form of parenthood. Nothing short 
of this rule will satisfy the true Eugenist. 
In the course of time, Mendelians themselves came to reject 
Davenport's simplistic analyses. Bateson was always doubtful 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 341 fn.) , although in the 1920's 
Punnett still assumed that feeblemindedness was a simple 
recessive trait (Punnett, 1925, 705). Pearson's point, how- 
ever, was that unjustified theoretical extrapolations, even 
if subsequently retracted, could have disastrous anti -eugenic 
consequences. Eugenics could not be based on a fallible 
theory: it had to be based on 'hard fact', reliable pre- 
diction, and thus unerring control. 
Norton (1975a; 1975b) has drawn particular attention 
to Pearson's phenomenalism as a cause of his opposition to 
M en de l i sm / , . . 
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Mendelism, and points to the fact that this phenomenalism 
was advanced prior to the rediscovery of Mendelism in 
Pearson (1892a). Norton's view, it seems to me, has to be 
supplemented in two crucial aspects. Firstly, Pearson's 
positivist and phenomenalist philosophy of science reflects 
the general position of science in his thought, as the 
arbiter of morality and social change (see section 4.7). 
Speculative, imaginative theorising had to be eliminated 
from a science intended for this role. Thus, it is 
possible to see Pearson's general phenomenalism as reflect- 
ing his view of the social role of science: his particular 
evolutionary phenomenalism reflected the social role of 
evolutionary science. Secondly, it would be mistaken to 
see Pearson's science as determined in detail by his over- 
all philosophical views. Some of his science indeed looks 
very strange when judged in these terms (an example is 
discussed in the next chapter). His overall philosophical 
aims were thus at best only a partial determinant of his 
science. More particular factors, such as the connection 
between scientific theorising and eugenics, have also to 
be taken into account. In the case of Mendelism, this 
connection 'ran parallel' to his overall philosophy: in 
the episode discussed in the next chapter it partly cross- 
cut it, and proved in that instance stronger than it.(25) 
Bateson was, by comparison with Pearson, a much 
less 'public' thinker. In the case of Pearson, there is 
clear documentary evidence of social and political views 
preceding /... 
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(25) Norton suggests another possible cause of 
Pearson's opposition to Mendelism: his up- 
holding of a Weltbild in which it was denied 
that any two objects were totally alike (as 
Mendelian factors in a sense were). It seems 
to me that, to the extent that Pearson held to 
this, it can best be seen as a generalisation 
from his biological beliefs and experience, 
rather than as a determinant of them. That 
is how I would interpret the following, which 
is perhaps his most explicit statement on the 
matter (Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A, 84 fn.): 
I must confess to feeling it extremely 
difficult to accept the view that the 
population of germ cells belonging to 
an individual organism are like atoms, 
identical in character, and have a 
germinal capacity defined by absolutely 
the same formula. Such a population 
of germ cells is, if parasitical, still 
an organic population, and one continually 
in a state of reproduction and change. 
No other organic population that we know 
of is without variation among its 
members ... 
This interpretation is, I think, supported by 
Norton's account (Norton, 1975a) of the origins 
of Pearson's belief in biological variability, 
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preceding his views on biology. In the case of 3ateson, 
this is not so. Yet Bateson's writings provide sufficient 
evidence to allow it to be claimed that, in his case too, 
connections between social interests and biological thought 
are manifested. 
Dr Alan Cock, who is writing a biography of 
Bateson, believes several of the particular points made by 
Coleman (1970) regarding Bateson's 'conservative thought' 
and, in particular, its relationship to Bateson's hostility 
to the chromosome theory, to be wrong. A full judgment on 
this issue must obviously be withheld until the publication 
of Cock's work. On my reading of Bateson, it would seem 
that Coleman has achieved an insight into his thought, even 
if some of Coleman's detailed arguments are subsequently 
disproven. 
That William Bateson can justly be described in 
his social and political thought as, in Mannheim's sense, 
'conservative' seems clear. His general essays (reprinted 
in B. Bateson, ed., 1928) reveal a man deeply opposed to 
egalitarianism and to what he called 'malignant individualism', 
who placed his faith in exceptional genius, especially of 
an artistic kind, who hated the vulgar commercial imperialism 
which he felt to lie behind the Boer War and First World War, 
who hankered after the stable social order of feudalism to 
replace an industrial capitalism which he felt to be 
socially unnatural and ecologically doomed.(26) Bateson's 
conservatism /... 
(26) See, for example, B. Bateson (ed.) (1928, 15 -16, 128 -42, 
347, 354, 357, 456 -7). 
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conservatism was not of an activist kind. He was com- 
pletely disillusioned with party politics and almost 
totally pessimistic about reversing the trend of social 
change by reformist means. In one area only did he move 
from thought to action: the defence of his beloved Cambridge 
from the encroachments of industrial society.(27) 
What may be more contentious than this charac- 
terisation of Bateson's social and political thought is 
Coleman's central claim that Bateson, in his science, can 
be seen as a conservative thinker. Coleman's argument rests 
chiefly on the 'style' of Bateson's science, on what he 
claims to be its emphasis on experiential concreteness and 
on the aesthetic, on pattern and form and on visual metaphors. 
Rather than discuss this general characterisation, I will 
concentrate instead on more specific instances of overt con- 
nections of the social and the biological in Bateson's work. 
Before doing this, it is, however, necessary to discuss one 
immediate and obvious objection to any characterisation of 
Bateson's science as, in Mannheim's sense, conservative 
thought. 
On Mannheim's schema, atomism is a general charac- 
teristic of natural -law thought, and not of conservative 
thought, which counterposes holism to atomism. Yet Bateson 
was a Mendelian, and surely Mendelism is the archetype of 
reductionist /... 
(27) This is further discussed below. 
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reductionist atomism? The interesting point about Bateson, 
at least on Coleman's analysis, is, however, precisely 
Bateson's hostility to those chromosome theorists who most 
fully developed the atomic metaphor in Mendelism by, in 
effect, reducing the gene to a material particle. As 
against their literal atomism, Bateson developed an alter- 
native metaphor which, while still mechanical, emphasised 
holistic ordering rather than 'billiard ball' materialism. 
Animals and plants are not matter, wrote Bateson, they are 
'systems through which matter is continually passing'. On 
this view: 
The cell ,,, is a vortex of chemical and molecular 
change ... We must press for an answer to the 
question, How does our vortex spontaneously divide? 
The study of these vortices is biology, and the 
place at which we must look for our answer is cell 
division. 
(Quoted by Coleman, 1970, 274 -5) 
Coleman (1970, 264 -9) makes the interesting suggestion that 
the source of Bateson's alternative metaphor was the 
ethereal, non -material vortex atom of the Cambridge physicists. 
The latter have themselves been analysed by Wynne (1977) as 
exhibiting a conservative style of thought. 
Holism played an important part in Bateson's bio- 
logical thinking. His son Gregory writes of him (G. Bateson, 
1973, 349) : 
In the language of today, we might say that he 
was groping for those orderly characteristics 
of living things which illustrate the fact that 
organisms evolve and develop within cybernetic, 
organisational and other communicational 
limitations. 
Early letters to his sister Anna, taken together with the 
Materials/. 
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Materials, reveal William Bateson's early evolutionary 
thinking as centring round his dissatisfaction with what 
he saw as the impoverished view of the organism in orthodox 
Darwinism and his search for an alternative way of con- 
ceptualising the organism as an integrated, patterned 
whole.(28) Orthodox Darwinism he criticised as a 
'utilitarian view of the building up of Species' (1894, 11). 
The manifest lack of utility of many specific characteristics, 
such as plumage, and the fact that many useful characteristics 
could only be useful if perfect (and thus coula not have 
arisen gradually), were for him strong arguments against this 
'utilitarian' selectionism. 
It would be too speculative to place much weight 
simply on Bateson's choice of the term 'utilitarian' to 
describe what he opposed in accepted evolutionary theory.(29) 
It is interesting, however, that at precisely the time when 
Bateson was developing his opposition to orthodox Darwinism 
he was conducting his major campaign in Cambridge University 
politics. He was a leader of the opposition to the 
abolition of the compulsory entrance qualification in 
classical Greek. It may seem strange that a man who was 
a scientist and not a classical scholar should choose such 
an /... 
IMO 
(28) Bateson (1894), and B. Bateson (ed.) (1928, 39 -43). 
(29) Coleman does, however, suggest that for Bateson, 
'Darwinism hued all too closely to the blighted 
atomistic individualism of the utilitarians' 
(Coleman, 1970, 295). 
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an issue to devote his energies to, but for Bateson compulsory 
Greek was of enormous symbolic importance. At stake was 
the 'Classical System' as against mere 'Technical education'. 
Mathematics was, he felt, compulsory for the wrong reasons: 
it was useful 'in trade and professions for the making of 
money' (quoted by Crowther, 1952, 252). Greek, by com- 
parison, was a means of social control and enculturation: 
In the arid mind of many a common man there is 
an oasis of reverence which would not have been 
there if he had never read Greek. For Society 
it would be dangerous, and for the common man it 
would be hard, if he had never stood thus once in 
the presence of noble and beautiful things. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 48) 
Those who came to Cambridge from 'the Black Country of the 
commonplace' had to be exposed to the 'side of life which 
is not common' (B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 48). To remove the 
entrance qualification in Greek would lead to the selection 
for Cambridge of those who, in the words of his wife, had 
'educational aims ... so utilitarian as to be properly 
placed outside the University pale' (B. Bateson, ed., 
1928, 49). 
Bateson's broadsheet on compulsory Greek suggests 
a conscious connection between his attacks on utilitarianism 
in education and in biology. He admitted that the Classical 
System was 'useless'. However, 
... from grim analogies in Nature it must be 
feared that it is in just this 'uselessness' 
that the unique virtue of the [Classical] 
System lies. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 48) 
It seems possible that there was a link between Bateson's 
social /... 
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social defence 'of the things which are beautiful and have 
no "use "' (B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 48) and his attack on a 
biological utilitarianism that held that 
.., living beings are plasticconglomerates of 
miscellaneous attributes, and that order of 
form or Symmetry have been impressed upon this 
medley by Selection alone. 
(Vr. Bateson, 1894, 80) 
The link may have been a common concern for the necessary 
conditions of holistic order and stability, whether social 
or biological, as against exclusive concern for the 'useful'. 
The chief social lesson of biology, for Bateson, was of the 
need (and indeed inevitability) of a return to an essentially 
feudal social order (B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 354) to replace 
the competitive commercial individualism of Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain. 
One expression of Bateson's hostility to orthodox 
Darwinism was thus his development of a holistic view of the 
organism which emphasised those aspects of it, the phenomena 
of pattern and symmetry in particular, which could not be 
seen as 'useful'. The publicly more prominent aspect was, 
of course, his championing of discontinuity. Here again, 
the social and the biological intermingled in his writings. 
He opposed, both socially and biologically, the biometric 
view of evolution as an orderly, predictable process based 
on gradual changes in the aggregate. Real advance came, 
he felt, from rare and largely unpredictable discontinuities, 
whether the appearance of a 'sport' in biology or an ex- 
ceptional 'genius' in society. The 'genius' and the 
'sport' /... 
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'sport' were indeed identified: 
It is upon mutational novelties, definite 
favourable variations, that all progress in 
civilisation and in the control of natural 
forces must depend. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 353) 
... we have come to recognise that evolutionary 
change proceeds not by fluctuations in the 
characters of the mass, but by the predominance 
of sporadic and special strains possessing 
definite characteristics ... 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 354) 
Given the crucial role of eugenics in expressing 
the connection between society and biology in Pearson's 
thought, Bateson's attitudes to eugenics take on particular 
interest. Bateson was just as much of a hereditarian as 
any of the eugenists, and quite happy to interpret class 
differences in genetic terms. He showed no compassion for 
most of those on whom the practice of negative eugenics was 
proposed. He wrote of the 'feebleminded': 
The union of such social vermin we should no 
more permit than we would allow parasites to 
breed on our own bodies. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 306) 
Eugenics disquieted him, however. Its reforming nature 
was alien to his pessimistic conservatism: 
The kind of thing I say on such occasions 
talks on eugenics] is what no reformer 
wants to hear, and the Eugenic ravens are 
croaking for Reform ,.. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 388) 
He disliked what he saw as the narrowly middle class values 
of the eugenics movement. Why did the eugenists focus on 
convicted criminals, and not on the 'army contractors' and 
'newspaper patriots', he asked. 
Consistent and portentous selfishness, combined 
with /.,, 
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with dulness of imagination are probably 
just as transmissible as want of self -control, 
though destitute of the amiable qualities not 
rarely associated with the genetic composition 
of persons of unstable mind. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 374) 
He would 'shudder', he said, when he read Galton's con- 
demnations of 'Behemianism'. He suggested that Galton had 
too much respect for 'material success'. 
In the eugenic paradise I hope and believe 
that there will be room for the man who works 
by fits and starts, though Galton does say 
that he is a futile person who can no longer 
earn his living and ought to be abolished. 
The pressure of the world on the families of 
unbusinesslike Bohemians, artists, musicians, 
authors, discoverers and inventors, is serious 
enough in all conscience ... Broadcloth, bank 
balances and the other appurtenances of the 
bay -tree type of righteousness are not really 
essentials of the eugenic ideal ... I imagine 
that by the exercise of continuous eugenic 
caution the world might have lost Beethoven 
and Keats, perhaps even Francis Bacon, and that 
a system might find advocates under which the 
poet Hayley would be passed and his friends 
Blake and Cowper rejected. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 374 -5, 377) 
Bateson, then, was torn. He recognised eugenics as a move- 
ment of the 'intellectual and professional class' (B. Bateson, 
ed., 1928, 387) to which he belonged. Yet its success 
would have merely continued the process of the encroachment 
of utilitarian rationalisation and modernisation against 
which he had set himself. 
The case of Bateson illustrates in interesting 
fashion why a deterministic sociology of knowledge applied 
at the individual level is impossible. In his occupational 
position, Bateson belonged to the professional middle class, 
as/... 
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as indeed did his father, W.H. Bateson, Master of St. John's 
College, Cambridge. Both his grandfathers were Liverpool 
businessmen.(30) He himself developed a conservative 
ideology, and in doing so broke with his family background 
(his father was a leading university reformer and Liberal). 
Yet that does not mean that his conservatism was suspended 
in the air, unconnected to any social formation. The most 
obvious social formation to which one might seek to connect 
it was the aristocracy. But, while Bateson clearly held 
the old aristocracy in high regard, he had no illusions in 
them as a social force: 
The old aristocracy has largely gone under, not 
because it had not great qualities, but because 
those qualities were not of a kind that count 
for much in the modern world. 
(B. Bateson, ed., 1928, 417) 
In any case, he clearly saw himself as a member of the 'in- 
tellectual classes', and not of the aristocracy. What 
appears instead to have been crucial to Bateson's conservatism 
was Cambridge University. This social institution formed 
the background of his early life (his father had already 
been Vice -Chancellor of Cambridge University at the time of 
his birth): as suggested above, his political energies were 
largely!... 
(30) Apparently on this basis, Crowther (1952, especially 
256 and 289) suggests that Bateson should be placed 
among the class of rentiers. He puts forward an 
interesting but quite unsupported hypothesis that 
Bateson's early break with evolutionary embryology 
is connected with his rentier background and with 
the association of comparative embryology with the 
landed class through the person of F.M. Balfour and 
through the aristocratic nature of Balfour's College, 
Trinity. 
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largely channelled into defending its integrity and élite, 
anti -utilitarian ethos.(31) His defence of traditional 
Cambridge was in spite of (or perhaps because of) the fact 
that his personal career in the University was largely un- 
successful. He never reached the prominent position of 
his father, and for a long time relied on marginal posts 
(such as the Stewardship of St. John's College) in order 
not to have to seek employment outside the University. 
It is clear that several options were open to 
Bateson. He could, for example, have chosen to press for 
Cambridge University to 'move with the times', become 
'relevant', and so on, and in doing so could have hoped 
that this would have increased his personal opportunities 
for advancement. (If he had taken this option he would 
indeed have been continuing the family tradition.) In 
adopting an anti -utilitarian, anti -reforming conservatism, 
he can, from the point of view of the sociology of knowledge 
at any rate, be seen as making a genuine choice.(32) Never- 
theless, it was a choice between options that were themselves 
formed by the social structure. He was choosing to defend 
rather /... 
(31) On one issue Bateson was a 'progressive'. He was in 
favour of the admission of women to Cambridge degrees. 
Why he should have felt that this did not violate the 
Cambridge ethos, I do not know: it may be connected 
to the fact that his family contained several highly 
talented women. 
(32) Of course, had we more information about his early life, 
psychological makeup and so on, we might no longer see 
this choice as free. The point, however, is that it 
would be mistaken to see it as constrained simply by 
his social background. 
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rather than reform, a given social institution. He was 
choosing opposition to, rather than furtherance of, a given 
process of industrialisation and modernisation. So it 
makes sense to see his conservatism as socially conditioned, 
as one response to a given set of social circumstances, even 
if not, at the level of Bateson as a concrete individual, 
socially determined. Although the generality of the con- 
servative response is not crucial to this argument, it is 
interesting to note that Wynne (1977, 38 -89) finds it to be 
prominent amongst Cambridge dons of Bateson's generation.(33) 
In general, then, the writings of Pearson and 
Bateson can be seen, I would suggest, as offering support 
to the sociological hypothesis put forward in the previous 
section. Their work can be taken as evidencing connections 
between ideas in evolutionary biology and social interests. 
The validity of the sociological hypothesis is not dependent 
on the correctness of the particular analyses of the writings 
of Pearson and Bateson put forward here: because the hypothesis 
involves no necessary claim about individuals, it could still 
hold even if these particular analyses should prove to be 
wrong. Nevertheless, the plausibility of the hypothesis 
is enhanced if it can help provide satisfactory accounts 
which deepen our understanding of individuals' work. As a 
further /... 
(33) See also Rothblatt (1968). It is interesting to con- 
trast this conservative response with Pearson's call 
for Cambridge University to become more relevant and 
technologically -oriented (K. Pearson, 1886). 
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further test of its ability to do this, the evolutionary 
biology of R.A. Fisher will now be considered. 
6.6 The Controversy Resolved? 
and Evolution 
R.A. Fisher on Genetics 
Above, it was pointed out that the connection 
between the two issues of the validity of Ivíendelism and the 
nature of evolution was contingent, not necessary. The 
contribution of R.A. Fisher was to demonstrate this decisively, 
by showing the possibility and advantages of adopting a 
Mendelian view of heredity together with an orthodox 
Darwinian view of evolution. The general outline of how 
he did this is well-known (see, for example, Provine, 1971, 
140 -54), although the details are complex (Moran and Smith, 
1966). In this section, I shall discuss one issue only: 
the relationship of Fisher's work to the ideological aspects 
of the controversy discussed above.(34) 
The later controversy between Karl Pearson and 
R,A. Fisher /... 
(34) For an account of Fisher complémentary to that given 
here, see Norton (1977). Similar analyses of the work 
of J.B.S. Haldane and Sewall Wright would be interesting. 
It may be (see below) that parallels between the 
approaches of Haldane and Fisher may be found; I 
should, however, be very much surprised if that were 
the case for Wright. The disagreements between the 
three founders of modern population genetics (for 
example, Fisher's violent dislike of Wright's notion 
of 'genetic drift') might possibly be illuminated by 
such an analysis. 
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R.A. Fisher has diverted the attention of historians from 
the strong similarities in overall perspective of the two 
men. Their family backgrounds were, broadly, similar. 
Fisher's father was a well -known auctioneer, from a family 
of businessmen. His maternal grandfather was a successful 
London solicitor. One of his uncles had been highly placed 
in the Cambridge Mathematics `ripos and had entered the 
church. He thus came from a family straddling the pro- 
fessional and commercial middle class, but one which does 
not seem to have been particularly wealthy. Family fin- 
ancial difficulties indeed forced Fisher to rely on scholar- 
ships for his university education (Mahalanobis, 1938). Like 
Pearson, Fisher was a convinced eugenist. In conventional 
political terms he was certainly to the right of Pearson's 
Fabian socialism. Nevertheless, Fisher too can be inter- 
preted as employing eugenics as an ideology of the pro- 
fessional middle class, if anything more explicitly. Thus, 
Fisher argued that the Eugenics Education Society should 
'put itself in direct and sympathetic touch with the special 
aspirations of professional bodies' (1917, 212). A pro- 
fession, he wrote (19/7, 207): 
... must have power to select its own members, 
rigorously to exclude all inferior types, who 
would lower both the standard of living and the 
level of professional status. In this process 
the eugenist sees a desirable type, selected for 
its valuable qualities, and protected by the ex- 
clusive power of its profession in a situation of 
comparative affluence. 
It was important that an 'exclusive profession' could 'offer 
advantageous prospects to the sons of its members', by, for 
example /... 
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example, 'requiring the nominations of each candidate by a 
number of members of the profession'. This would 'give a 
considerable advantage to the children of the professional 
men', and lessen the entry of 'new blood' which was 'on the 
whole, inferior to the professional families of long stand- 
ing° and which rendered difficult 'the maintenance of a high 
tradition of professional etiquette' (1917, 210 -11). 
Fisher's eugenics was, like Pearson's, integrated 
into a wider social Darwinism. 
From the moment that we grasp, firmly and com- 
pletely, Darwin's theory of evolution, we begin 
to realise that we have obtained not merely a 
description of the past, or an explanation of the 
present, but a veritable key of the future. 
(1914, 309) 
His interpretation of international competition, and of its 
relation to eugenics, was similar to Pearson's. 
The modern nation is a genetic, territorial, 
and an economic organism ... European nations 
are grouping themselves along ethnic lines ... 
The widespread, fruitful, and successful races 
of the future belong to the dominant nations of 
today ... the overmastering condition of ultimate 
predominance is nothing else than successful 
eugenics; the nations whose institutions, laws, 
traditions and ideals, tend most to the production 
of better and fitter men and women, will quite 
naturally and inevitably supplant, first those 
whose organisation tends to breed decadence, and 
later those who, though naturally healthy, still 
fail to see the importance of specifically eugenic 
ideas. 
(1914, 310-11) 
Fisher identified the major eugenic threat as the high 
relative fertility of the 'socially lower classes', and 
warned that the low fertility of ruling classes had been 
the cause of the collapse of almost all past civilisations. 
Fisher /... 
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Fisher was thus a convinced eugenist and a con- 
vinced social Darwinist. There is no doubt that, in over- 
all terms, he was more sympathetic to the biometric than to 
the Mendelian side of the biometrician /Mendelian debate; 
there is strong evidence from his early writings that this 
position of his is to be explained in terms of his eugenic 
and social Darwinist commitments. His first discussion of 
the matter (Fisher, 1911) explicitly treats biometry as a 
eugenic strategy: 
Biometrics then can effect a slow but sure 
improvement in the mental and physical status 
of the population; it can ensure a constant supply 
to meet the growing demand for men of high ability. 
'Mendelian synthesis', by comparison, promised quick and 'almost 
miraculous' results, but Fisher appears to have doubted the 
practicality of its application to man, dependent as it was 
on 'experimental breeding'. In a later paper, written 
jointly with his fellow Cambridge eugenist C,S. Stock, 
Fisher noted the existence of a 'confused controversy' 
between Darwinians and 'extreme Mendelians'. Fisher and 
Stock argued: 
It is essential for Eugenists to consider on 
which side they ought to range themselves ... 
(1915, 60) 
Closely echoing Pearson, they argued that 'it is in the 
highest degree unlikely that Mendelism will ever cover even 
the field of heredity' (1915, 60) and that Mendelism was 
being rashly applied: 
... regrettable things have been done, and more 
regrettable things have been said in America in 
the name of Mendel. Direct legislative proposals 
have been made, and in some casespassed, based upon 
quite /... 
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quite inadequate knowledge. Persons suffering 
from supposedly Mendelian defects have been 
advised to mingle with sound stocks, though the 
result of doing so is clearly to lay up hereditary 
trouble for the future. 
(1915, 59) 
Eugenists were thus topen to all kinds of attack on the side 
of Mendeliam'. By comparison, 'on Darwin's ground they are 
impregnable'. 
Were all information, except that used by Darwin 
inaccessible, such information would not only allow 
but compel us to formulate eugenic concepts and 
proposals. Changes in the constitution of a mixed 
population depend primarily upon selection; the 
existing and possible agencies of selection do at 
present and must always provide the most fruitful 
field of eugenic research. These agencies acting 
at large amidst a multitude of random causes, each 
of which may have predominant influence if we fix 
our attention upon a particular individual, never - 
theless determine the progress or decadence of the 
population as a whole. We may borrow an illustration 
from the kinetic theory of gases. The several mole- 
cules are conceived to move freely in all directions 
with greatly varying velocities, but the statistical 
result is a perfectly definite measurable pressure. 
Controversy may rage round the nature and properties 
of the atom, yet our knowledge of general principles 
enables us to calculate gas pressures with accuracy. 
We are independent of particular knowledge about 
separate atoms, as in eugenics we are independent of 
particular knowledge about individuals. It is by no 
means suggested that such knowledge is not of the 
highest importance, interest and use. It is, however, 
unnecessary alike for a general theory of gases and 
for a general theory of eugenics. 
(Fisher and Stock, 1915, 60 -1) 
It would seem, then, that Fisher's scientific 
judgments, like those of the biometricians, were informed 
by a cognitive interest in controlling and predicting the 
overall incidence of characteristics in populations. Further, 
it appears that in his case, too, this cognitive interest 
can be linked to a desire to construct a social evolutionism 
that /... 
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that would form a solid basis for prediction and control of 
the evolution of societies, and, more particularly, for 
eugenics. The development of a theory of natural selection 
expressing this cognitive interest was precisely what 
Fisher achieved in the Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. 
Take, for example, Fisher's 'fundamental theorem of natural 
selection' (1930, 35; emphasis deleted): 
The rate of increase in fitness of any organism 
at any time is equal to its genetic variance in 
fitness at that time. 
This theorem, Fisher argued, enabled one to dismiss the 
objection that 'natural selection depends on a succession 
of favourable chances'. Natural selection did operate 
according to the laws of chance, but according to their 'con- 
tinuous and cumulative action' (1930, 37); when evolution 
was conceived of as a mass process, laws of evolution could 
indeed be formulated. In the Genetical Theory one can still 
see the traces of the connection of this cognitive interest 
to eugenics and social Darwinism. Five of the book's 
twelve chapters deal with social evolution and eugenics, 
and Fisher comments in the introduction (1930, x): 
The deductions respecting Man are strictly 
inseperable from the more general chapters ... 
Indeed, Fisher argued that detachment from the outcome in 
the real world' of theoretical researches such as his was 
improper: 
Such detachment sterilises theory as much as 
it blinds practice. 
(1930, 264) 
- 304 - 
In the light of this cognitive interest, it is 
not surprising that Fisher's assessment of the evolutionary 
theories of Bateson was negative. Bateson's influence 
upon evolutionary theory was 'chiefly retrogressive', his 
early writings were 'rash polemics' (1930, ix -x). Even in 
his Cambridge days, Fisher was 'consciously out of sympathy' 
with the tendency in evolutionary theory represented by 
Bateson (Mahalanobis, 1938, 239). Fisher's attitude to 
Bateson's genetics, however, was quite different. In 
Fisher (1911), he told the Cambridge University Eugenics 
Society of 'the view of inheritance which I have taken up': 
On this theory the inherited nature of any 
living creature consists of a large number of 
Mendelian characters .e. 
Despite his qualms about the consequences for eugenics of 
'extreme Mendelism', he adhered from then on to a Mendelian 
theory: arguing that it was not incompatible with the 
observed biometric distributions and correlations (1911); 
using a multifactorial Mendelian model to produce the first 
heritability estimate (1918a); claiming that ' Mendelism 
supplied the missing parts of the structure first erected 
by Darwin' (1930, ix). 
From the very start of his work Fisher realised 
that the issues of the biometrician /Mendelian debate were 
separable. As he and Stock put it in 1914: 
Darwinism is concerned with evolution, Mendelism 
with the mechanism of heredity. 
(59) 
Fisher took up the path that Pearson had opened with his 
papers /... 
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papers on Mendelism, but had never taken: that of accepting 
Mendelism and adapting it as a resource for the development 
of eugenics and a theory of evolution reflecting the cog- 
nitive interests of the biometricians. Fisher did not 
obtain support from Karl Pearson in doing so: neither 
(despite the generally accepted historical view of the 
refereeing of Fisher, í918a) did he face active opposition 
(35) or hostilit y from Pearson. He did, however, clash 
several times with Bateson's collaborator, R.C. Punnett 
(1875 -1967). 
There are interesting similarities between Punnett 
and Bateson. Although Punnett, who became first Professor 
of Genetics at Cambridge, was born to a less elevated position 
in the middle class than Bateson, he married into the landed 
gentry (Crew, 1967, 317). Like Bateson, he was a leader 
of the campaign to defend compulsory Greek (Crew, 1967, 315). 
His biological and social views, and the intermingling of 
the two, were to a degree similar to those of Bateson, as 
when he wrote (Punnett, 1925, 707): 
The general character of a population is a very 
stable thing, highly resistent to external in- 
fluences, and marked changes in its inherent 
nature are to be measured only in terms of 
centuries or tens of centuries. But it may be 
objected that progress is rapid, and its effects 
are striking in periods far shorter than the span 
of a man's life. To which the biologist would 
reply that such progress is not dependent upon 
any change in the constitution of the population 
itself, but to the appearance in it of a few 
individuals /... 
(35) See Norton and Pearson (1976,especially 153 -4). 
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individuals endowed with exceptional qualities. 
Those who want more progress must see to it that 
more of these exceptional minds are produced and 
given their opportunities. 
Punnett, like Fisher, felt the danger of 'the intellectual 
and professional classes' being crushed 'between the upper 
and nether millstones of the commercial class and the pro- 
letariat' (1926, 84 -6). This did not, however, lead him 
to the self- confident interventionism of Fisher's eugenics. 
Punnett played an important role, instead, in pointing to 
the limitations of eugenic intervention, by showing that 
deleterious recessives could not be 'bred out' of the 
population as quickly as the eugenists hoped (Punnett, 1917). 
The disagreements between Fisher and Punnett re- 
capitulated many of the issues of those between Pearson and 
Bateson. Most prominently, disagreed over the question 
of the nature of evolution. Thus, Fisher (1927; 1930, 146- 
69) disputed the interpretation of mimicry in butterflies 
put forward by Punnett (1915). Punnett had given a 
Mendelian account of mimicry and argued that it was 'an 
evolutionary phenomenon which must occur by distinct leaps° 
(Provine, 1971, 137). Fisher argued that the validity of 
a Mendelian account of mimicry did not imply its origin by 
saltation, because the phenotypic effects of a gene 'may be 
influenced, apparently to any extent, by means of the 
selection of modifying factors' (1930, 166): instead, Fisher 
defended the thesis of the 'gradual evolution of such mimetic 
resemblances'. Punnett, in his turn, took issue with 
Fisher' Genetical Theory of Natural Selection on account 
of/000 
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of its evolutionary gradualism and selectionism, claiming a 
much more important evolutionary role for mutations than 
that allowed by Fisher (Punnett, 1930). Other disagreements 
concerned the efficacy of eugenic intervention - Fisher (1924) 
taking issue with Punnett for having 'inadvertently supplied 
material for anti -eugenic propaganda' - and the general 
importance and relevance to biology of mathematical work 
such as Fisher's, (36) 
I t is thus only if one takes a narrow view of the 
biometrician /Mendelian controversy that Fisher can be seen 
as providing a resolution of it. Fisher is, I would argue, 
better seen as continuing the controversy, albeit with some- 
what different weapons. The cognitive interests manifested 
in his work, and their connection with social interests, are 
essentially the same as in the work of Pearson. i3ecause 
of this, and because of the particularly explicit connection 
between Fisher's eugenics, his social Darwinism, and his 
perception of the social interests of the professional 
middle /... 
1.0 
(36) In his referees report on Fisher (1918a), Punnett 
commented: 
... I do not feel that this kind of work affects 
us biologists much at present. It is too much 
of the order of problem that deals with weightless 
elephants upon frictionless surfaces... 
(Norton and Pearson, 1976, 155) 
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middle class, the case of Fisher provides further evidence 
for the hypothesis suggested in section 6.4.(37) 
(37) The work of Haldane on evolutionary theory (see, 
for example, Haldane, 1932) is not considered here. 
One point that may, however, be worth making, is 
that Haldane was not as different in political 
terms from Pearson (or Fisher) as might be supposed. 
At approximately the same time as Fisher was active 
in the Cambridge University Eugenics Society, Haldane 
joined the committee of the newly formed Oxford 
Society and advocated the eugenic case in an Oxford 
Union debate (Searle, 1976, 13). Although he left 
the Eugenics Society after 1920 (Werskey, 1971, 179) , 
he retained a basic sympathy for much of the eugenic 
case: 
... Pearson and his colleagues were completely 
right in one respect. Even if, in spite of 
his predictions, the nation has improved in 
some measurable directions, it would have 
improved more if, say, a million children who 
were born to unskilled labourers had been born 
to skilled workers, teachers, and the like. 
(Haldane, 1957, 435) 
in 
Like Pearson, Haldane believe4a1"scientific society" 
ruled by an enlightened élite' (Werskey, 1971, 178). 
His comments on Pearson (Haldane, 1957, especially 437) 
show clearly the extent to which he saw both his science 
and his politics as in continuity, not conflict, with 
Pearson' s. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Controversy over the Measurement of Association 
The controversy between Karl Pearson and his followers, 
on the one hand, and George Udny Yule, and a small group of 
supporters, on the other, about how best to measure association 
is much less well- known, but in some ways no less bitter, 
than that between the biometricians and the Mendelians.(1) 
I shall argue that it too can be analysed in roughly the 
same fashion. Despite the detailed and estoric nature of 
the issue at stake, social interests may be important in 
this case also. 
I begin by describing the two publications in 1900 
in which Pearson's and Yule's divergent views on association 
were first presented. In sections 7.2 and 7.3, I discuss 
the further development of their views and their evaluations 
of each other's position. I then argue that the theorising 
and scientific judgments of Pearson and Yule have to be under- 
stood as embodying different cognitive interests. In 
section 7.5, these cognitive interests are related to the 
different 'goal orientations' of Pearson and Yule: that is 
to /... 
(1) There has been no full historical analysis of the con- 
troversy over the measurement of association. Walker 
(1929, 130 -41) gives a useful annotated bibliography 
and the important theoretical work by Goodman and 
Kruskal (1954-9) contains a thorough review of work 
on association. 
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to the different objectives which can be seen as condition- 
ing their work in statistical theory. The analysis is 
then extended in section 7.6 to include the other members 
of the British statistical community who supported one or 
other of the two leading participants, and possible alter- 
native explanations of the controversy are discussed. The 
chapter ends by referring back to the analyses presented in 
chapters three, four and six, in order to suggest, tent- 
atively, a way in which social interests can be seen as 
bearing on this controversy. 
7.1 The Issue 
By 1900 British statisticians had reached apparent 
consensus on how to measure the correlation of those 
variables, such as height and weight, for which a measure- 
ment scale with a valid unit of measurement existed. In 
his concepts of regression and correlation Francis Galton 
had provided the basic technology for dealing with these 
'interval' variables.(2) F.Y. Edgeworth, S.I. Burbury and 
Karl Pearson had extended the theory from two to any number 
of variables, and Pearson had provided the now standard 
product -moment formula for the coefficient of correlation. 
Aside from some private disagreement(3) as to the extent to 
which /... 
(2) The use of terms such as 'interval'and 'nominal' here 
is anachronistic, but their use clarifies the issue 
at stake. For these terms see S.S. Stevens (1946). 
(3) This disagreement is discussed below in section 7.4. 
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which Galton's theory, developed for normally- distributed 
variables, could be applied to non -normal variables, the 
problem seemed solved for interval -level variables. From 
1900 onwards attention shifted to nominal variables - those 
in which no unit of measurement was available, and classi- 
fication into different categories was all that was possible. 
The two main attempts to develop a theory of the association 
of nominal variables were by Karl Pearson and George Udny Yule 
(1871- 1951). 
Let us consider Yule's work (Yule, 1900) first. 
His approach was extremely direct. Consider a set of N 
objects, classified according to two nominal variables A and 
B. Each object is classed as either Al or A2, and either 
B1 or 
B2.(4) 
Thus Al might be 'survived an epidemic', A2 
'died in the epidemic'; B1 'vaccinated', B2'non- vaccinated'. 
The data can be presented conveniently as follows: 
B1 (vaccinated) iB2(unvaccinated) Total 
A1 (survived) a b a + b 
A2 (died) c d c + d 
Total a+ c b+ d N 
Thus /..e 
(4) In the following I have been forced, for the sake of 
clarity, to use a standard form of notation. This 
is to be regretted, as Yule's and Pearson's notations 
did to some extent reflect their differing approaches. 
Yule used a notation drawn from symbolic logic. For 
Al and Al he wrote A and oc, where C,4 signified not -A, 
and for B, and Bz he wrote B and/3, with /3signifying 
not -B. His notation for the frequency I label 'a' 
was (AB), for 'b', (AA), etc. 
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Thus 'a' is the number of those vaccinated who survived the 
epidemic, 'b' of those unvaccinated who survived the epidemic, 
and so on. 
Yule argued that a coefficient of association for 
such a table must have three properties. Firstly, it should 
be zero if and only if A and B are non -associated or in- 
dependent. In the above example, survival and vaccination 
(A and B) would be said to be independent if the proportion 
of survivors was the same amongst the vaccinated and the un- 
vaccinated. This can be expressed symbolically as: 
a 
a + c 
b 
b + d 
or ab + ad = ab + bc 
or ad - bc = 0. 
Working backwards through this chain of thought, it can be 
shown that ad - be = 0 implies that A and B are non -associated. 
Thus the first desideratum will be satisfied by a coefficient 
which has the value zero if and only if ad - be = 0. 
The second property is that the coefficient should 
be +1 when, and only when, A and B are completely associated. 
There are two possible senses of complete association here. 
The first is the strong sense in which A and B are said to 
be completely associated only when all Al's are B1's and all 
A2's are B2's (i.e. b = c = 0). In the above example, this 
would mean that all those who were vaccinated survived and 
all those who were not vaccinated died. 
weak er /... 
There is also a 
- 313 - 
weaker sense of complete association, according to which A 
and B are completely associated if either all Al's are B1's 
or all A2's are B2's. Either of the following two tables 
thus displays complete association in this sense: 
B1 (vaccinated) B2 (unvaccinated) 
A1 (survived) a 0 
A2 (died) c d 







In the first table none of the unvaccinated survive (even though 
some of the vaccinated die). In the second none of the 
vaccinated die (even although some of the unvaccinated live). 
Yule chose to use this weaker definition of complete assoc- 
iation; thus, his second criterion was that the coefficient 
should be +1 if and only if either b = 0 or c = O. 
The third property is that the coefficient should 
be -1 when A and B are completely associated in a negative 
sense. Again, there is a strong and a weak meaning of 
complete negative association, and Yule chose the weak mean- 
ing. A and B are completely associated in the negative 
sense when either all A1's are B2's or all A2's are B1's. 
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B1 B2 
A1 0 b 





1 a b 
A2 c 0 
Thus the coefficient should be -1 if and only if either a = 0 
or b = 0. 
Yule then examined the coefficient Q - 
ad - bc 
ad + bc' 
Clearly, if ad - bc = 0, then Q = 0. Conversely Q = 0 implies 
ad - bc = 00 So Q satisfies the first condition. If either 
b = 0 or c = 0, then bc = 0, and Q = ad /ad = +1. Also if 
Q = +1, then ad - bc = ad + bc, hence bc = 0, and so either 
b = 0 or c = 0. So Q satisfies the second condition. 
Finally, if either a = 0 or d = 0, then ad = 0, and Q = -bc/ 
bc = -1; conversely Q = -1 implies ad - bc = -ad - bc, hence 
ad = 0, and so either a = 0 or d = 0. Q thus satisfies all 
three conditions, and Yule put it forward as a measure of 
association in two -by -two tables. However, as Yule was 
aware, Q has no special justification. There are an un- 
limited number of functions which satisfy Yule's three con- 
ditions -- for example Q3, Q5, and so on. Further, as Pearson 
was later to show, two different tables could be ranked in 
one order as regards strength of association by one of these 
functions, and in a different order by another, 
Pearson's approach (Pearson, 1900b) was to produce, 
by a much tighter but more precarious theoretical argument, 
a /... 
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a coefficient of association which he called the 'tetrachoric 
coefficient of correlation'. I shall denote it by rT 
(Pearson's denoted it simply by r). The crucial assumption 
at the base of the derivation of rT is that the observed 
four -fold table can be regarded as having arisen in the 
following fashion. The observed categories A1, A2 and B1, 
B2 are taken to correspond to ranges of more basic interval 
variables y and x: Al corresponding, for example, to y ` k', 
A2 to yj k; B1 to x; h', B2 to x)h'. It is further 
assumed that y and x jointly follow a bivariate normal dis- 
tribution, with x having zero mean and standard deviation 
al, and y zero mean and standard deviation o-2. Geometrically 
this can be shown as in figure two. In figure two we see 
the bivariate normal frequency surface (which is shaped like 
a bell with elliptical cross -sections) rising above the plane 
of x and y. This plane is divided into four quadrants by 
lines through the point (h', k') - the four quadrants corres- 
ponding to the cells of the four -fold table. The volume 
above the top left of these quadrants corresponds to the 
frequency with which xs< h' and y k' , and thus corresponds 
to the frequency a in the original table. 
Pearson had thus provided a model of a statistical 
distribution assumed to underly the given two -by -two table. 
The model has three parameters, h' /71, k' /o-2, and r, the 
correlation of x and y. There are three independent para- 
meters in the given table (not four, as the total, N, is 
regarded as fixed and a + b + c + d = N). 
fitted /.., 
The model can be 
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re 2 
Pearson's Model of Underlying Variables 
z 
A 
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fitted to any four -fold table, as the equations relating 
the model and the observations are always soluble, although 
the solution requires the use of numerical methods (see 
appendix D). A value for r, the correlation of the under- 
lying variables, can thus be found. 
This correlation of the underlying variables was 
what Pearson called the 'tetrachoric coefficient of cor- 
relation'. While Pearson was clearly aware that the mathe- 
matical derivation of this coefficient involved the assumption 
of an underlying bivariate normal distribution, and was also 
aware that this assumption could not usually be tested, he 
referred to it as the correlation in the title of his 
memoir and in other places. He did consider other, empirical, 
coefficients of association, including Yule's Q, but treated 
them only as approximations to rT, with the advantage of much 
greater ease of calculation, but the disadvantage of deviat- 
ing by a greater or lesser extent from rT. 
One last point has to be made before the further 
developments of the different approaches are considered. 
Yule's and Pearson's coefficients have been presented as if 
the data to which they were applied were always entire 
populations. In this I am remaining faithful to the work 
of Yule and Pearson, who did not systematically distinguish 
between sample statistics and population parameters. Yule 
and Pearson were of course aware that the data to which 
they applied Q and rT were often drawn from samples, but, 
apart /... 
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apart from calculating the 'probable errors' of their co- 
efficients, they did not address themselves generally to 
the problems posed by this. 
7.2 Further Developments In Pearson's and Yule's 
Approaches 
The invention of the tetrachoric coefficient by 
no means concluded Pearson's theoretical work on the measure- 
ment of association. Indeed, this area was a major focus 
of his work in mathematical statistics from 1900 to 1922. 
Pearson was fully aware of the shortcomings of rI, - in 
particular, its restriction to two -by -two tables. While 
continuing to champion the use of rT, he attempted to find 
an approach to the problem of the measurement of association 
that would allow the direct analysis of larger tables (those 
in which objects are classed as Al, A2, ..., Ap and B1, B2, 
, Bq) and would, if possible, avoid the assumptions in- 
volved in the derivation of r,I,. 
The most important of these attempts was his develop- 
ment of the theory of contingency. This derived from the 
application of his own X test to two -way tables (Pearson, 
1900c). For any such table it is possible to work out the 
expected frequencies in each cell on the assumption that the 
two variables are independent, and then to measure the 
divergence between observed and expected frequencies by 
means of X. Reference to the distribution of .X. then gives 
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a measure of the probability of such a divergence from the 
expected frequencies, on the assumption of independence. 
z 
The value of X itself was of little direct interest to 
Pearson. He wanted not simply to reject the hypothesis 
of no association, but to measure the strength of association. 
s 
The value of X cannot serve as such a measure, because 
multiplying the frequencies in each cell of a table by a 
constant (which presumably does not alter the strength of 
i 
association) multiplies the value of X by that constant. 
This problem is, however, easily avoided. If the value of 
X is divided by N, the total number of cases in the table, 
then the resultant coefficient clearly remains unaltered by 
multiplication of each cell in the table by a constant. 
This coefficient 561=.XN Pearson (1904b, 6) referred to 
as the mean square contingency. 
A measure based on X has clear attraction. It 
is free from any need to assume underlying variables, and 
it can be applied to any size of table. It is even in- 
dependent of the ordering of the categories of each variable. 
2 
The problem is, which particular measure based on .t. should 
be used? Once again, Pearson solved this problem by ref- 
erence back to the correlation of normally distributed in- 
terval variables. He supposed any given table to have 
arisen by splitting these continuous variables into categories. 
He then found a relationship between the mean square con- 
tingency for such a table and the coefficient of correlation 
of the underlying variables, r. In the limiting case that 
the /... 
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the number of cells in the table tends to infinity, he 




He then proposed the coefficient: 
C - 
which he called the 'first coefficient of contingency' 
(Pearson, 1904b, 9).(4) If the two -way table had arisen 
by categorisation of an underlying bivariate normal dis- 
tribution, and if the number of cells in the table was 
large, then C1 approximated to the coefficient of correlation 
of the underlying variables. Because C1 is a monotonic 
function of the value ofXfor the table from which it is 
calculated, it has also a certain justification quite apart 
from the validity of these assumptions. 
C1 did not displace rT in Pearson's affection. 
Pearson felt that C1 was best used only in larger tables (of 
about 25 cells), because for small tables the limit relation- 
ship between C1 and r did not hold, and thus C1 was a bad 
estimate of the correlation of underlying variables. 
Hence the new conception of contingency, while 
illuminating the whole subject ... does not do 
away with the older method of fourfold division. 
(Pearson, 1904b, 9) 
(4) Pearson also proposed a second coefficient of contingency, 
based on a different function of the divergence between 
observed and expected frequencies. This was easier to 
calculate but did not have any similar clear relation- 
ship to r, and was less used. 
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Pearson's fundamental criterion was still the relationship 
between a coefficient of association and the correlation of 
underlying variables: he still sought a coefficient of 
association directly comparable with the correlation co- 
efficient of interval variables. 
Other developments of the theory of association 
by Pearson and his co- workers follow broadly on the same 
lines. 
(5) 
The desire for comparability with the interval- 
level coefficient of correlation can be seen in such com- 
ments as 'in order that our results shall agree fairly 
closely with the results for Gaussian distributions we 
select ..e our scale ...' (Pearson, 1912a, 24). One major 
aim of this work was to 'improve' C1 by various corrections, 
the most important being the class -index correction, described 
in Pearson (1913a). Again, the basis of the correction is 
the assumption of underlying continuous variables, and the 
purpose of the correction is to improve the estimate of the 
correlation of these variables by taking account of the fact 
that C1 is calculated from a finite number of cells rather 
than the infinite number presupposed by the limit relation- 
ship between C1 and r. Uncorrected, C1 has a tendency to 
underestimate the 'true' correlation. The typical effect 
of a class index correction on a five -by -five table is to 
boost C1 by about 0.05. 
The final attempt Pearson made to find a 'perfect' 
solution /... 
(5) See, for example, Pearson (1910a; 1912a; 1913). 
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solution to the problem of the measurement of association 
was to derive an iterative method for fitting a bivariate 
normal distribution to a two -way table (in effect, to find 
a counterpart to rT for tables larger than two -by -two). A 
solution to this problem was published in a joint paper 
with his son Egon Pearson (K. and E.S. Pearson, 1922). But 
the resultant 'polychoric coefficient', while representing 
in a sense the logical conclusion of Karl Pearson's 
approach to the problem, was in that pre -computer age 
defeated by the sheer laboriousness of its mode of calculation. 
Yule developed two further coefficients, the 
'product -sum coefficient', rpS, and the 'coefficient of col- 
ligation', w. These two coefficients did not represent any 
fundamental break with the approach lying behind his earlier 
work. Both satisfy his three criteria for a coefficient 
of association, with the only difference being that, while 
Q and w take the value 1 for perfect association in the weak 
sense (either b or c zero), rpS takes this value only for 
positive association in the strong sense (both b and c zero). 
The product -sum coefficient is the ordinary interval -variable 
coefficient of correlation applied to a two -by -two table, 
not on Pearson's sophisticated model, but 'naïvely', by 
making the assumption that the two categories correspond to 
the values 0 and 1 of a discrete variable. It can be shown 
that this yields the value: 
PS 
Yule /... 
ad - bc 
V (a 4-c)( ba-d)(u+ 6)(c+d) 
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Yule referred to 
rPS 
as 'the correlation- coefficient for a 
[two -by -two table' although he did not suggest it dis- 
placed Q.(6) The coefficient of colligation (Yule, 1912) 
links Q and rps. 
w 
The formula for it is 
ad Uç 
and Q and w are related by a simple equation: 
Q = 2w 
1 + w2 
When the given two -by-two table is reduced to a standardised 
symmetrical form by multiplication and division of the rows 
and columns by constants until each marginal total equals 
2N, w for the original table equals rps for the standardised 
table. So w and rps are also related. But the inter- 
relatedness of Q, w and 
rpS 
is much weaker than the inter- 
relatedness of Pearson's coefficients, all of which bear some 
reference to the single theoretical standard of the interval- 
variable coefficient of correlation. Q, w, and rPS give 
different values when applied to the same table, and Yule 
gave no general rules as to which to use in a given case. 
7.3 The Controversy 
The /... 
an 00 SS 
(6) The product -sum coefficient was first introduced by 
Yule (1911, 212 -3). This coefficient had previously 
and independently been suggested by the geneticist 
W. Johannsen (1909, 272 -9) and by the anthropologist 
F. Boas (1909). It had even been used by Pearson 
(1904a) quite without comment, but in a very different 
situation, that of theoretical Mendelian inheritance 
(for which see below). 
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The fundamental issues at stake in the controversy 
were implicit in the two original papers that Pearson and 
Yule published in 1900. Neither openly attacked the other, 
however, and personal relations between the two men seem to 
have remained good. Open conflict began only in late 1905. 
On 7 December, Yule read to the Royal Society of London two 
papers (Yule, 1906a; Yule, 1906b) critical of some aspects 
of Pearson's work, in particular throwing doubt on the 
validity of the assumptions underlying Pearson's use of the 
tetrachoric coefficient. Pearson replied to these criticisms 
in an article in Biometrika (Pearson, 1907). At this stage, 
the controversy was still not generalised to all aspects of 
the competing approaches to the measurement of association. 
This happened only when Yule published his textbook An 
Introduction the Theory of Statistics (1911), in which 
he gave an account of his measures Q and rPS. Pearson's 
collaborator David Heron wrote a sharply- worded warning to 
the readers of Biometrika on the 'danger' of Yule's 
formulae (Heron, 1911). Yule in his turn read to the 
Royal Statistical Society a long paper defending his position 
and attacking Pearson's (Yule, 1912). Pearson and Heron 
replied in a paper covering 157 of the large pages of 
Biometrika (Pearson and Heron, 1913; see also Pearson 1913b). 
This paper effectively marked the end of the overt phase of 
the controversy (though see also Greenwood and Yule, 1915). 
It was, however, unresolved. Pearson and Yule no doubt 
felt they had fully stated their positions, but neither had 
succeeded /... 
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succeeded even partially in convincing the other. Yule's 
obituary notice of Pearson refers to the controversy and 
comments, 'Time will settle the question in due course' 
(Yule, 1936, 84). 
The main focus of Yule's attack on the tetrachoric 
coefficient was on the assumptions involved in its derivation 
and use. He wrote (Yule, 1912, 140): 
The introduction of needless and unverifiable 
hypotheses does not appear to me a desirable 
proceeding in scientific work. 
When dealing, for example, with vaccination statistics (an 
area where biometricians had applied the tetrachoric method), 
Yule argued that 'vaccinated', 'unvaccinated¢, 'survived° 
and 'died' constitute naturally discrete classes: 
... all those who have died of small-pox are 
all equally dead: no one of them is more dead 
or less dead than another, and the dead are 
quite distinct from the survivors. 
(Yule, 1912, 139 -40) 
To apply here a coefficient that had as its basis an assumption 
of underlying continuous variables was absurd: 
At the best the normal coefficient can only 
be said to give us in cases like these a 
hypothetical correlation between supposititious 
variables. 
(Yule, 1912, 140) 
There were cases, Yule conceded, where the assumption of 
underlying continuity was 'less unreasonable'. In these 
cases, however, the hypothesis that the underlying dis- 
tribution is bivariate normal was frequently doubtful. 
Pearson had often used the tetrachoric coefficient in two- 
by-two tables which had been obtained from larger tables by 
the /... 
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the amalgamation of adjacent classes. Indeed until his 
invention of the coefficient of contingency he was forced 
to do this, as he had no method of analysing larger tables. 
In these larger tables, unlike two -by -two tables, it was 
possible to test the validity of the hypothesis of an 
underlying bivariate normal distribution. 
This could be done in two ways. First, if the 
hypothesis is true, then it should not matter, from the 
point of view of the calculation of rT, which precise way one 
chose to amalgamate classes. The value of rT should be at 
least approximately independent of the boundary line chosen 
between the two final classes. Yule was thus able to test 
Pearson's hypothesis by calculating rT in several different 
ways for the same large table. He showed (Yule, 1912, 144) 
that, at least in certain cases given by Pearson, the values 
obtained varied considerably, ranging for example from 0.27 
to 0.58 in a table on the resemblance between fathers and 
sons in eye -colour. Secondly, if a large table has in 
fact arisen according to Pearson's hypothesis, then it 
should display the property Yule termed 'isotropy'. Con- 
sider any 4 adjacent frequencies, nl, n2, n3 and n4 extracted 
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The table is called 'isotropic' if the sign of nln4 - n2n3 
is the same for all similar 'sub -squares' of the table. In 
his first published criticism of Pearson's work, Yule tested 
for 'isotropy' tables on which Pearson had, after amal- 
gamation of classes, used rT. He found (Yule, 1906a) that 
many were not 'isotropic'. 
Pearson (1907) defended himself by arguing that 
Yule's isotropy criterion was invalid because he had failed 
to evaluate the probable error of n1n4 - n2n3. Because a 
given table is only a sample from a larger population, a 
failure of isotropy may occur through random fluctuation 
alone. Pearson accepted that the variation in values of 
rT obtained in different ways from the same table showed 
that in certain cases the assumption of underlying normality 
did not appear to be tenable. But he had been aware of 
this, he said, and the method of contingency had been 
developed to deal precisely with those cases. When co- 
efficients of contingency were worked out for the tables in 
question, they were found to agree 'sensibly' with the 
tetrachoric coefficients, and Pearson claimed that his con- 
clusions thus held, despite the flaws in the method by which 
they had been obtained. 
The basis of the attack on Yule's approach mounted 
by Pearson and Heron was that, for the same table, Yule's 
various coefficients did not agree in value, and further 
that for tables formed from genuine bivariate normal data 
none /... 
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none agreed with the ordinary correlation coefficient. For 
one table given by Yule, Heron found that Q = 0.91 while 
= 0.02. For bivariate normal data, Q did not differ 
very much from the correlation coefficient so long as divisions 
were taken near the medians, but for more extreme divisions 
the divergence could be large (e.g. r = 0.5, Q = 0.97). For 
such data, Q varied in value according to exactly where the 
divisions were taken; the same is true of (and indeed 
of w) . 
Pearson and Heron felt that Yule was reifying his 
categories. Only in rare cases - such as that of Mendelian 
theory, where the categories of a two -by -two table correspond 
to the presence or absence of a Mendelian unit and thus the 
two variables genuinely are discrete (factor present = 1; 
factor absent = 0) - was the use of such methods justified. 
In these cases was the correct way to extend the ordinary 
theory of correlation, as it assumed just such discrete 
variables. In general, however, treating categories in 
this way was mere empty formalism. 
And here we will at once emphasise the 
fundamental difference between Mr. Yule 
and ourselves. Mr. Yule, as we will 
indicate later, does not stop to discuss 
whether his attributes are really continuous 
or are discrete, or hide under discrete 
terminology true continuous variates. We 
see under such class- indices as 'death' or 
'recovery', 'employment' or 'non -employment' 
of mother, only measures of continuous 
variates - which of course are not a priori 
and necessarily Gaussian ... 
The controversy between us is much more important 
than an idle reader will at once comprehend. It 
is the old controversy of nominalism against 
realism /... 
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realism. Mr. Yule is juggling with class - 
names as if they represented real entities, 
and his statistics are only a form of symbolic 
logic. No knowledge of a practical kind ever 
came out of these logical theories. As ex- 
ercises for students of logic they may be of 
educational value, but great harm will arise to 
modern statistical practice, if Mr. Yule's 
methods of treating all individuals under a 
class -index as identities become widespread, 
and there is grave danger of such a result, 
for his path is easy to follow and most men 
shirk the arduous. 
(Pearson and Heron, 1913, 161, 302) 
Pearson and Heron justified the biometric position by arguing 
that it was necessary to make some hypothesis about the 
nature of the continuous frequency distribution of which 
the observed classes were groupings. The only distribution 
which had been adequately studied mathematically was the 
normal. In practice, they argued, methods based on the 
normal distribution almost always gave adequate results. 
The unique advantage of these methods seemed to them to out- 
weigh the difficulties involved; 
The coefficient of correlation has such valuable 
and definite physical meanings that if it can be 
obtained for any material, even approximately, 
it is worth immensely more than any arbitrary 
coefficients of 'association' and 'colligation'. 
(Pearson and Heron, 1913, 300) 
7.4 Cognitive Interests 
In a very general sense the work of Pearson and 
Yule can be seen as manifesting the same cognitive interests. 
In providing measures of association, both Pearson and Yule 
were attempting to extend the scope of scientific prediction 
into a field where no reliable techniques of inference were 
available /... 
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available, To frame matters like this is, however, in- 
sufficiently specific. There was no single 'natural' way 
to extend the scope of statistical analysis into this new 
area; the different ways in which Pearson and Yule did it 
can perhaps be accounted for by the differing concrete forms 
in which general interests in prediction and control were 
manifested. 
Pearson's work was dominated by its reference to 
an existing achievement of statistical theory, the interval - 
level theory of correlation and regression. For Pearson, 
this theory was an exemplary instance of the way statistics 
enhanced the scope of prediction. Thus, regression was the 
theory of how best to predict the value of one variable from 
that of another, in situations where there was no one -to -one 
correspondence. The correlation of two variables was, for 
Pearson, that constant, or set of constants, that was suf- 
ficient to describe how the expected value of one variable 
depended on the value of another (Pearson, 1896, 256 -7). 
In one case only had the correlation in this sense been 
fully specified: that of two variables that followed a bi- 
variate normal distribution. Given the correlation co- 
efficient for two such variables, it was possible to state 
immediately the expected value of one variable associated 
with any value of the other. 
Pearson's approach to the association of nominal 
variables was evidently structured by an interest in maximis- 
ing/... 
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ing the analogy between the association of such variables 
and the correlation of interval -level variables with a 
joint normal distribution. This correlation had a clear 
meaning in terms of prediction, and this meaning made it 
uniquely suitable as the criterion for judging the strength 
of association. Use of this basic reference point was 
the foundation of Pearson's attempt to construct a unitary 
theory of association and correlation, and of his negative 
evaluation of the work of Yule. 
The derivation of rT shows that Pearson initially 
defined association as the correlation of the hypothetical 
underlying bivariate normal distribution. In the later 
work on contingency this literal superposition of the two 
cases was partially discarded: Pearson accepted that the 
assumption of an underlying bivariate normal distribution 
might not be factually correct. But the analogy still 
operated, as can be seen in the way that the bivariate 
normal model was used to choose the particular functions of 
z X that were selected to be the coefficients of contingency. 
Measures of association were thus seen by Pearson as ways 
of estimating the correlation of an actual or notional 
underlying distribution. This was, in effect, simply what 
Pearson meant by 'measuring association', and the way in 
which he described rT as 'the coefficient of correlation' 
indicates the taken -for- granted nature of the metaphor. 
For Pearson, the basic criterion of the validity of co- 
efficients of association was their usefulness in the 
estimation /... 
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estimation of this underlying correlation. 
This criterion of validity was typically oper- 
ationalised in the following way. Interval data that 
followed a bivariate normal distribution would be taken, 
and from this data a two -by -two or larger table would be 
constructed. Thus, if the data referred to the height 
and weight of individuals, a two -by -two table could be con- 
structed by classifying those individuals over six feet as 
'tall', those under as 'short', those over 150 lb. as 
'heavy', those under as 'light'. A coefficient of 
association would then be applied to this table. If the 
value of the coefficient approximated well to the interval - 
level correlation of height and weight, this was a point 
in its favour. If the values of a coefficient did not 
tally with the coefficient of correlation, then this was 
an argument for its rejection. 
The tetrachoric coefficient passed this test; 
its ability to do so was of course guaranteed by its method 
of construction. So did the coefficient of contingency, 
at least for sufficiently large tables. Yule's co- 
efficients, on the other hand, all failed abysmally. Not 
only were they on the whole poor approximations to the co- 
efficient of correlation, but the values they took depended 
on where the arbitrary division between 'tall' and 'short' 
and 'heavy' and 'light' were taken.(7) 
(7) For examples of this process of evaluation see Pearson 
(1900b, 15 -18) and Pearson and Heron (1913, 193 -202). 
Pearson's use of it can be found from the very beginning 
of his work on association. Thus, on 6 May 1899, before 
the appearance of the first published papers on the topic, 
he wrote to Yule pointing out to him that Q failed this 
test (Pearson Papers, Cl D6). 
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Given the basic interest in maximising the nominal/ 
interval analogy, Pearson's use of the bivariate normal 
model makes sense. It was not that he was obsessed by the 
normal distribution. Quite the opposite: he was one of 
the first statisticians to point to the non -normal nature 
of many empirical distributions (Pearson, 1895), and had 
sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to develop a theory of col... 
relation for non -normal variables which would fully take 
into account their non- normality.(8) Pearson's position 
was pragmatic. If correlation is taken, as Pearson took 
it, to depend upon the specification of the function which 
best predicts the value of one variable from that of another, 
then something about the joint distribution of the two variables 
must be assumed. Only one joint distribution was, Pearson 
felt, sufficiently well known for this kind of analysis to 
be possible: the bivariate normal. Experience with the 
normal distribution had, he argued, shown that even if the 
assumption of normality was not strictly correct, inferences 
based on that assumption were unlikely to be seriously mis- 
taken (Pearson and Heron, 1913). Thus, if one had to use 
a model, Pearson felt that the bivariate normal was best. 
Further /... 
r 
(8) Pearson felt that an approach to the correlation of non - 
normal variables must be built on knowledge of the 
particular form of their joint distribution, for only 
if this was known would it be possible to know how best 
to predict values of one variable from that of the 
other (Pearson, 1896, 274; Pearson, 1920b). Yule, by 
comparison, claimed that the ordinary product- moment 
coefficient could be used for these non -normal variables 
as it had an interpretation as the slope of the best -fitting 
line (in the least- squares sense) through their joint 
distribution, irrespective of the particular form of this 
distribution (Yule, 1897a). This difference of opinion 
can be seen in the letters of 1896 between Pearson and 
Yule in the Pearson Papers (C1 D6) . 
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Further, some model was necessary if the nominal /interval 
analogy was to have any validity. For consider Yule's Q 
as an example of a coefficient not based on an explicit 
model, Values of Q are not comparable with those of the 
coefficient of correlation. Nor can comparability of the 
nominal and interval cases be achieved by reducing the in- 
terval data to two -by -two tables and applying Q, for the 
value of Q depends on the process by which this is done. 
Indeed, comparison of the values of Q from one two -by -two 
nominal table to another becomes, on this perspective, a 
process which is very difficult to justify. Without some 
model of the situation to give a meaning to coefficients of 
association, their comparative use appeared to Pearson 
dangerously arbitrary. 
Pearson's approach to the theory of association 
was thus fairly tightly structured by the analogy between 
the association of nominal variables and correlation employed 
as a tool for interval -level prediction. Yule's approach 
was much looser. A coefficient of association in the nominal 
case (or, indeed, a coefficient of correlation in the interval 
case) was for him a measure of statistical dependence that 
need satisfy only general formal criteria (be zero for in- 
dependence, one for complete dependence, and so on). Just 
to know that two variables are associated (that vaccination 
and survival, for example, are not independent) is obviously 
of some use in solving problems of prediction and control. 
Yule was not primarily concerned to be able to draw tighter 
inferences /... 
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inferences than this. Specific problems of prediction 
and control in specific contexts of use did enter into 
Yule's choice of particular coefficients (for example, 
between Q, w and rp5 in any particular instance) but did 
not structure Yule's overall formulation of the problem of 
association.(9) Yule can thus be seen as putting forward 
a general, formal theory of association which left a great 
deal of room for elaboration in specific instances. He 
did not seek a single best measure of association. Just 
as there are different measures of central tendency (mean, 
median, mode, and so on), there were, Yule felt, different 
ways of measuring association, which would yield different 
values for the same table. The superiority of one to the 
other could not be guaranteed in advance of the consideration 
of /... 
(9) Indeed Yule was to come to doubt whether a coefficient 
of association was always what was needed. He wrote 
to Major Greenwood on 2 March 1915 (Yule- Greenwood 
Letters): 
Here are the cholera arithmetic and diagrams. 
I have also enclosed a couple of sheets of 
lucubration on the measure of the advantage, 
and efficiency or effectiveness, of immunisation 
or similar processes. I cannot see my way to 
a measure of association, for I cannot get 
clear in my mind to begin with what we want 
to measure by the association coefficient: 
I seem to get more muddle headed whenever 
I try to think it out. In fact I don't 
seem really to want a measure of association 
at all. The 'advantage' or 'effectiveness' 
give what I want and neither is of the nature 
of an association coefficient, but the first 
is a regression and the second GOD knows what. 
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of particular applications. Attempts to do so on the basis 
of contentious assumptions (such as that of underlying dis- 
tributions) were, Yule felt, simply dangerous and mislead- 
ing. Yule felt that when working with nominal data one had 
to accept the limitation implied by the level of measurement: 
one was dealing with cases classed into categories, and 
nothing more. The statistician had to accept the data as 
given. Yule's methods were thus structured by a cognitive 
interest in prediction using nominal data as phenomena in 
their own right; the nominal /interval analogy had for him 
no direct force. 
The differing cognitive interests of Pearson and 
Yule led to their two positions being incommensurable.(10) 
Logic and mathematical demonstration alone were insufficient 
to decide between the two positions. Their concepts of 
'measuring association' were different: for Pearson, it 
meant seeking to estimate an underlying correlation; for 
Yule, seeking in a looser sense to measure the dependence 
of the given nominal data. The same mathematical result 
would be interpreted differently by the two sides, in the 
light of their different cognitive interests. 
Thus, both sides knew that for any given table 
Yule's /... 
(10) For the concept of incommensurability, see Feyerabend 
(1962) and Kuhn (1970, especially 148 -50). The 
relationship of incommensurability to cognitive in- 
terests is discussed in Barnes and MacKenzie (1978). 
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Yule's three coefficients, Q, rpS and w, would normally not 
agree, and sometimes would differ wildly in their values. 
For Pearson, this was sufficient to damn Yule's system 
utterly, for how could there be three different values for 
the association of one table? For Yule, on the other hand, 
this was fully to be expected, for Q, rpS and w were simply 
different ways of summing up the observed data. Similarly, 
both sides accepted that the value of the coefficient of 
contingency was affected by the size of the table to which 
it was applied. For Yule, this was a severe weakness of 
the coefficient of contingency. Under certain circumstances 
its value reflected the number of cells in the table as much 
as the association of the data. For Pearson, on the other 
hand, this property was only to be expected. The coefficient 
of contingency was equal to the coefficient of correlation 
only in the limit case where the number of cells in the 
table became infinite. Therefore it was not surprising 
that the value of the coefficient of contingency should be 
affected by table size: on the assumption of an underlying 
normal distribution this could be corrected for. To take 
another instance, it was not disputed by either side that 
when applied to genuinely continuous binormal data, the 
value of Yule's Q differed considerably according to where 
the division (for example, between tall and short) was 
taken, For Pearson this invalidated Q. For Yule any 
property that Q had when artificially applied to interval 
data did not affect its use for nominal data, because he 
rejected /... 
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rejected Pearson's basic model of an underlying distribution 
7.5 Cognitive Interests and Goal Orientations 
The differing cognitive interests manifested in 
the work of Pearson and of Yule were not accidental. They 
can be related to differing objectives in the development 
of statistical theory, and perhaps ultimately to differing 
social interests. 
As has been shown in chapter four, Pearson's com- 
mitment to eugenics played a vital role in motivating his 
work in statistical theory. Pearson's eugenically- oriented 
research programme was one in which the theories of regression, 
correlation and association played an important part. The 
connection between these theories and eugenics had been first 
forged by their founder, Francis Galton, as was shown in 
chapter two. Pearson's work in statistical theory con- 
tinued this link between the mathematics of regression and 
correlation and the eugenic problem of the hereditary rel- 
ationship of successive generations. 
In his first fully general discussion of the 
statistical approach to the theory of evolution, Pearson 
defined 'heredity' as follows(1896, 259): 
Given /... 
(11) See Yule (1912, especially 145-6 and 159 -63); 
Pearson and Heron (1913, especially 171 -83 and 193 -202); 
Pearson (1904b, 8 ..9); Pearson (1913a). 
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Given any organ in a parent and the same or any 
other organ in its offspring, the mathematical 
measure of heredity is the correlation of these 
organs for pairs of parents and offspring ... 
The word organ here must be taken to include 
any characteristic which can be quantitatively 
measured. 
Two pages earlier Pearson (1896, 256 -7) had explained that 
the correlation of two variables (he used the term 'organs') 
was what defined the function allowing the prediction of 
the value of one from that of the other. Put together, 
these notions of heredity and of correlation indicate what 
Pearson was doing. He was constructing a mathematical 
theory of descent, in order to be able to predict from the 
knowledge of an individual's ancestry the characteristics 
of that individual. Galton had solved the problem for the 
individual's parentage; Pearson wished to go further back 
and consider grandparents, great- grandparents, and so on. 
Pearson's paper reveals two aspects of his 
attitude to correlation and its measurement. His notion 
of correlation, as a function allowing direct prediction 
from one variable to another, is shown to have its roots in 
the task that correlation was supposed to perform in evolution- 
ary and eugenic prediction. It was not adequate simply to 
know that offspring characteristics were dependent on 
ancestral characteristics: this dependence had to be 
measured in such a way as to allow the prediction of the 
effects of natural selection, or of conscious intervention 
in reproduction. To move in the direction indicated here, 
from prediction to potential control over evolutionary 
processes /... 
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processes, required powerful and accurate predictive tools: 
mere statements of dependence would be inadequate. 
Secondly, the prominence of correlation in his statistical 
thought can be seen to be related to the role of correlation 
as measuring the 'strength of heredity'. To define heredity 
as the correlation of parents and offspring indicates the 
a priori nature of Pearson's hereditarianism; that the 
correlation could be due to the similarity of parental and 
offspring environments was not even considered in this 
paper. 
(12) 
It also indicates the possibility that the 
direct linking of correlation and heredity could well be 
the motor behind Pearson's work on the theory of correlation. 
If the study of heredity was to be increased in its scope, 
the theory of correlation had to undergo parallel develop- 
ment. In this paper of 1896, the move from consideration 
of parentage to entire ancestry was clearly associated with 
the development of the theory of correlation from Gal ton' s 
two variable case to an indefinite number of variables. 
The major restriction on Pearson's studies of 
heredity in the late 1890`s was their limitation to measurable 
characteristics. Many characteristics, such as the 
colouration /..p 
(12) Later Pearson attempted to demonstrate the small role 
of environment by comparing 'coefficients of heredity' 
with correlations between the characteristics of 
children and particular aspects of their home environment; 
however, this was for him a subsidiary problem, as he 
believed that home environment was in any case largely 
a reflection of the innate characteristics of a child's 
parents. See, for example, Pearson (1910b). 
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colouration of animals and plants and the eugenically crucial 
mental characteristics of man, were not immediately sus- 
ceptible to quantification (this period of course predates 
the invention of the Binet -Simon scale of 'intelligence'). 
All that was possible for these characteristics was classi- 
fication of individuals into categories, and as the resulti -ng 
data could not be analysed by an interval -level theory of 
correlation, there was no direct way of estimating the 
'strength of heredity' for these characteristics. To ex- 
tend research in heredity from interval to nominal charac- 
teristics required, given Pearson's operational definition 
of heredity, the extension of the theory of correlation 
from interval to nominal variables. 
That this is the correct interpretation of the 
origins of Pearson's work on the theory of association is 
suggested by Pearson's own description of his problem 
situation: 
Many characters are such that it is very difficult 
if not impossible to form either a discrete or a 
continuous numerical scale of their intensity. 
Such, for example, are skin, coat, or eye -colour 
in animals, or colour in flowers ... Now these 
characters are some of those which are commonest, 
and of which it is generally possible for the eye 
at once to form an appreciation. A horse -breeder 
will classify a horse as brown, bay or chestnut; 
a mother classify her child's eyes as blue, grey 
or brown without hesitation and within certain 
broad limits correctly. It is clear that if 
the theory of correlation can be extended so as 
to readily apply to such cases, we shall have 
much widened the field within which we can make 
numerical investigations into the intensity of 
heredity, as well as much lessened the labour 
of collecting data and forming records. 
(Pearson and Lee, 1900, 324 -5) 
Pearson's/... 
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Pearson's research on heredity did not simply 
provide the motivation for the development of his theory 
of association. It also conditioned the nature of that 
theory. In his problem situation can be seen the con- 
nection between his social Darwinian and eugenic goals and 
the cognitive interests manifest in his work on association. 
Pearson already had what he felt to be a satisfactory means 
for the investigation of the inheritance of interval charac- 
teristics, by the use of which he had accumulated a con- 
siderable body of 'coefficients of heredity'. In order 
to maximise the value of information on the inheritance of 
nominal characteristics, it was necessary to devise a 'co- 
efficient of heredity' for them that paralleled that for 
interval characteristics. Therefore, the direction of 
development of the theory of association was, in the case 
of Pearson, determined by the need to maximise the analogy 
between the association of nominal variables and the cor- 
relation of interval variables. Pearson wanted to be able 
to say 'the coefficient of heredity for human mental ability 
is r', and to compare that with the already calculated 'co- 
efficients of heredity' for height, and other similar 
characteristics. A coefficient of association such as 
Yule's Q would not have enabled him to do this. As ex- 
plained above, values of Q cannot be compared with that of 
the coefficient of correlation; nor can both height and 
mental ability data both be analysed by the use of Q, 
because of Q's dependence on the arbitrary boundary between 
'tall' /... 
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'tall' and 'short'. For interval /nominal comparison to 
be plausible, Pearson needed a coefficient which, when 
applied to dichotomised height data, would yield a value 
as close as possible to that of the coefficient of cor- 
relation: hence Pearson's construction of rT, and hence 
also his fundamental criterion of evaluation of coefficients 
of association. 
Pearson had in fact begun collecting a set of 
primarily nominal data of great relevance to eugenics even 
before he had devised, in rT, the necessary means of analys- 
ing it. Parent -child correlations were difficult to 
collect; Pearson however reasoned that the correlation of 
siblings (a term he introduced for pairs of brothers or 
sisters irrespective of sex(13)) were of equal theoretical 
value as measures of the strength of heredity.(14) By 
circulating teachers, he obtained information on nearly 4000 
pairs of siblings, including interval physical characteristics 
such as the cephalic index, nominal physical characteristics 
such as eye -colour, and a range of nominal mental characteristics 
such as 'ability' and 'conscientiousness'. The study was 
begun in 1898; by 1903 Pearson felt able to give a com- 
prehensive survey of the results obtained in his Huxley 
Lecture /... 
(13) See K. Pearson (1914 -30, 3A, 3321. 
(14) Sibling correlations and parent -child correlations 
were of course connected by the Galton /Pearson 'Law 
of Ancestral Heredity'; see K. Pearson (1898, 404 -7). 
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Lecture to the Anthropological Institute (Pearson, 1903c; 
some early results were presented in Pearson, 1901c). This 
was Pearson's major contribution to the hereditarian theory 
of mental characteristics, and the forerunner of many later 
more sophisticated attempts to prove the dominance of nature 
over nurture. 
(15) 
It is also his most central attempt to 
use rT, and the one which most strongly drew Yule's criticism. 
Pearson's analysis of mental ability can be taken 
as an example of his procedure. He had asked teachers to 
classify each of a pair of siblings into one of the follow- 
ing classes: quick intelligent, intelligent, slow intelligent, 
slow, slow dull, very dull and inaccurate -erratic. 'Very 
dull', for example, was defined as 'capable of holding in 
their minds only the simplest facts, and incapable of 
perceiving or reasoning about the relationship between facts' 
(K. Pearson, 1903c, 209). To permit the use of rT, these 
seven categories were reduced to two, 'quick intelligent' 
and 'intelligent' forming one category, and the rest the 
other. Two -by -two tables were then drawn up, such as the 
following /... 
- 
(15) Three crucial differences between Pearson's work and 
later studies are the introduction of a numerical 
scale of 'intelligence', the use of twins as well as 
siblings in general, and the application of multi - 
factorial Mendelian models (in addition to simple 
measures of resemblance) to gain estimates of 
'heritability'. Important though these differences 
are, this later work can be seen as elaborating 
Pearson's basic approach, rather than diverging 
radically from it. 
For an interesting point of view on Pearson's Huxley 
Lecture, see Welch (1970); see also the comments by 
E.S. Pearson (1972). 
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following for pairs of brothers, which is reconstructed from 














Totals 850 1018 1868 
From these tables, values of rT were then calculated (in this 
case rT = 0,46). 
Pearson found from these data measures of the 
'strength of inheritance' for nine mental and nine physical 
characteristics, and was also able to bring into the com- 
parison other previously produced estimates of the cor- 
relation of physical characteristics in pairs of siblings. 
Central to his argument were two assumptions, only partly 
explicit: the comparability of the coefficients of cor- 
relation for interval data and the value or rT for nominal 
data; and the interpretation of these coefficients as 
measures of the 'strength of heredity'. On the basis of 
these assumptions, he was able to claim a remarkable finding: 
the strength of inheritance for a wide range of human mental 
and physical characteristics was virtually identical at 
around /... 
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around 0.5. Further, he claimed that environment played 
no significant part, and thus presumably assumed that 
residual effects (the fact that the correlation was only 
0.5 and not 1.0) were simply the result of chance variations. 
Environment could, Pearson felt, be discounted because his 
series of characteristics included eye -colour. It was 
accepted that environment played no part in determining eye - 
colour, and yet the strength of inheritance for eye -colour 
was very close to the common 0.5. If environment played 
no part in the case of eye -colour, Pearson deduced that it 
therefore played no part in the other cases. Pearson's 
conclusion (1903c, 204) was a strong affirmation of rigorous 
hereditarianism: 
We are forced, I think literally forced, to the 
general conclusion that the physical and psychical 
characters in man are inherited within broad lines 
in the same manner, and with the same intensity ... 
We inherit our parents' tempers, our parents' con- 
scientiousness, shyness and ability, even as we 
inherit their stature, forearm and span. 
Pearson thus had, by use of the tetrachoric co- 
efficient, been able to forge a connection between physical 
and mental human characteristics along which inductive in- 
ferences could pass. It was, he felt, widely admitted that 
human physical characteristics were largely determined by 
heredity. By use of this channel of inference an identical 
conclusion could be drawn for mental characteristics. The 
polemical possibilities that this opened up for eugenists 
were obviously important. Pearson was able to further 
extend them by bringing coefficients of heredity for various 
characteristics /... 
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characteristics in animals into the argument. In other 
species the resemblance of parent and offspring is again 
roughly .5' (Pearson, 1903c, 204). Thus, the generally 
accepted conclusion that in animal species 'good stock 
breeds good stock' (Pearson, 1903c, 206) could be extended 
to man. 
At the end of the Huxley Lecture Pearson drew out 
the political conclusions which followed from his analysis. 
He talked of Britain's failure in imperialist competition 
with Germany and the United States, and the lack of in- 
telligence and leadership that was the cause of it. His 
work, he argued, showed that the only solution was 'to alter 
the relative fertility of the good and the bad stocks in the 
community'. 
That remedy lies first in getting the intellectual 
section of our nation to realise that intelligence 
can be aided and be trained, but no training or 
education can create it. You must breed it, that 
is the broad result for statecraft which flows from 
the equality in inheritance of the psychical and 
the physical characters in man. 
(K. Pearson, 1903c, 207) 
Given the contemporary concern for 'national efficiency', 
these were words in season, and were not without impact out- 
side the scientific community. Pearson's lecture was 
quoted at some length by the Inter -Departmental Committee 
on Physical Deterioration (1904, 38 -9), which had been set 
up by the Conservative Government as a result of the scare 
following early defeats of the British by the Boers in the 
South African War. 
have /... 
Few of Pearson's contemporaries would 
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have fully understood the mathematics of the tetrachoric 
coefficient, and few seem to have subjected his argument 
to close scrutiny, but the conclusion he was able to draw 
struck home. 
Yule, on the other hand, had no commitment to 
eugenics. There is no record of his ever having made a 
public statement of his attitude to eugenics, nor do his 
letters to Karl Pearson, for example, reveal his opinions. 
Nevertheless, in his correspondence with the man who was 
perhaps his closest friend, Major Greenwood, it is possible 
to discover evidence of Yule's private views. These appear 
to have been a mixture of indifference and hostility, as the 
following quotations(16) indicate: 
.,. votes for women is to me nearly as loath - 
worthy [sic3 as eugenics. 
The Eugenics Congress is rather a joke ... 
I've just got the letter from the Eugenics 
Equcatioan soc &ety] asking me to lecture. 
I do not altogether like it ... 
I am not a eugenist, and I am not in the least 
keenly interested in eugenics. 
When Yule's academic work touched on subjects of eugenic 
importance, a certain distance from the standard eugenic 
positions is apparent. On the issue of heredity versus 
environment he was cautious: 
To/... 
(16) From the letters of Yule to Greenwood of 3 April 1912, 
8 August 1912, 8 November 1912 and 17 August 1920 
(Yule- Greenwood Letters). 
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To take an example from the inheritance of 
disease, the chances of an individual dying 
of phthisis depends not only on the phthisical 
character of his ancestry, but also very 
largely on his habits, nurture and occupation. 
(Yule, 1902, 228) 
A major topic of Yule's early statistical work was pauperism, 
which the eugenists claimed to be a symptom of hereditary 
degeneracy. Yule, however, eschewed such arguments, and 
concentrated on the way administrative reforms, notably the 
abolition of out -relief, reduced the observed rate of 
pauperism (see Yule 1895 -6; 1896; 1899)!17) 
Even while he was a student of Pearson, Yule gave 
signs that he was to develop in an independent direction 
from his teacher.(18) In 1893, aged 22, he became Pearson's 
demonstrator, assisting in the teaching of mathematics to 
engineering students and forming, along with Alice Lee, the 
audience for Pearson's first advanced course in mathematical 
statistics. In 1895 he was elected to, and became an active 
member of, the Royal Statistical Society. The concerns of 
this august but rather conservative body, rather than 
Pearson's social Darwinism, form the context of application 
for much of Yule's statistical work. While Yule's work was 
technically /... 
(17) It is not clear to me whether or not Yule was at any 
point motivated by a desire to oppose eugenics (for 
example in his attacks on Pearson's Huxley Lecture). 
All that is crucial to the argument on cognitive in- 
terests in relation to goal orientation is that Yule 
obviously lacked any positive commitment to eugenics. 
(18) Biographical details for Yule are to be found in 
F. Yates (1952) and M.G. Kendall (1952). 
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technically far in advance of what the Royal Statistical 
Society was accustomed to, in subject, style and, indeed, 
in political assumptions, it would have been familiar. 
Thus, the Fellows were accustomed to an ameliorative 
orientation towards pauperism, and to Yule's focus on 
administration rather than the economy or social structure, 
even if the technical apparatus Yule employed was new. 
It is possible that Yule may have come to realise 
the need for a measure of association while studying another 
favourite topic of the Royal Statistical Society, vaccination 
statistics,, In 1897, during a discussion at the Society 
of an anti -vaccinationist paper, he made a long and highly 
critical comment on the author's use of statistical technique 
(Yule, 1897b). Consideration of the frequently dubious use 
of statistics in the vaccination debates then raging(19) might 
well have prompted him to seek a standardised measure of the 
association between vaccination and survival during an 
epidemic. Cognitive interests associated with an amelior- 
ative orientation to vaccination statistics may have played 
some role in structuring Yule's work on association.(20) 
WIO 
(19) For these debates see MacLeod (1967b). 
(20) In measuring the association of vaccination and survival 
it is obviously desirable for comparative purposes to 
have a measure which is independent of both the virulence 
of the epidemic (of the overall proportion of cases 
falling into the 'survived' and 'died' columns) and of 
the degree of activity of the medical authorities 
(proportions vaccinated and unvaccinated). Yule thus 
sought to construct coefficients which were unaltered 
by multiplication of any row or column by a constant. 
See Yule (1912, 113 -23). 
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They did not, however, generate a search for a single 
measure of association as a unique property of the data. 
At most, the requirements of the vaccination question 
placed but loose constraints upon the evaluation of measures 
of association. For example, a shared convention was needed 
that would distinguish between intervention being totally 
without effect (no association) and intervention being 
totally effective (complete association). But no more 
general inductive inferences needed to be drawn. Yule's 
use of formal rather than substantive criteria in the con- 
struction of coefficients of association, his development 
of an empirical rather than a unitary theoretical approach, 
and his preference for dealing with nominal data as it was 
given, would all make sense in the light of this situation. 
It was not, however, that Yule was developing a 
general theory of association while Pearson was developing 
one with only a limited sphere of application. Pearson 
strongly felt that his was a general theory, and applied it 
even to Yule's favourite cases such as vaccination statistics; 
Yule most strongly criticised the application of Pearson's 
theory to inheritance data.(21) Both sides felt the theory 
of the other was wrong, and not merely misapplied. I t was, 
rather, that Pearson's specific goal orientation led to a 
sophisticated and elaborate theory embodying specific cog- 
nitive interests, while Yule's more diffuse goal orientation 
led /.., 
OS 
(21) See K. Pearson (1900b, 43 -5), Yule (1912) and Yule 
(1906a). 
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led to a looser and more empirical approach which embodied 
cognitive interests of a more general nature. 
7.6 Further Aspects of the Controversy 
Up to this point I have treated the controversy 
as if it were simply a dispute between two individuals, 
Pearson and Yule. While these two were overwhelmingly the 
most active participants, it is important to look at the 
involvement of others in the British statistical community. 
The group of scientists contributing to the development of 
statistical theory in Britain in the period 1900 to 1914 was 
small. A list produced using Kendall and Doig's Biblio- 
graphy of Statistical Literature (1968) consists of 26 in- 
dividuals who can be seen as having in some sense an active 
ongoing interest in the development of statistical theory.(22) 
Of these, twelve can be regarded as members of Pearson's bio- 
metric school, since they had close institutional or personal 
ties to the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories at University 
College, London, and their preferred medium for publication 
seems /... 
(22) The list omits those who wrote only one paper in the 
field and who did not, therefore, seem to have had an 
ongoing active interest in it. The most obvious 
problem of inclusion /exclusion is the decision as to 
whether a piece of work contains a development of 
statistical theory and method or simply an application 
of existing methods. Thus, for example, Charles Spearman 
is included but Cyril Burt excluded, and while this does 
indicate real differences in the type of work they did, 
it shows that there is no absolute division between 
those included and those excluded. 
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seems to have been Biometrika. The other 14 had a wide 
variety of affiliations, and included civil servants, 
administrators and one industrial scientist, as well as 
university staff.(23) 
Ten of the twelve biometric school members either 
took part in attacks on Yule on this topic (Pearson, Heron), 
contributed to the theoretical discussion or development of 
the Pearsonian approach (J. Blakeman, W.P. Elderton, 
Everitt, Heron, Pearson, Snow, Soper) or used the tetrachoric 
coefficient in empirical work (E.M. Elderton, A. Lee, K.H.J. 
Schuster and all above except Blakeman and Soper). In the 
remaining two cases (Galton and Isserlis), I have not been 
able to find evidence of attitudes. Galton died in 1911, 
before the controversy came to a head; the work of Isserlis 
on the theory of statistics was just beginning at the end 
of this period. 
This overall pattern is as one would expect. 
The tetrachoric method and the related later developments 
were part of the distinctive approach of the biometric 
school, were widely applied to empirical data, primarily in 
the eugenic field, and were the focus of theoretical 
attention /... 
IMP 
(23) I would class the following as members of the biometric 
school: J. Blakeman, E.M. Elderton, W.P. Elderton, 
P.F. Everitt, F. Galton, D. Heron, L. Isserlis, A. Lee, 
K. Pearson, E.H.J. Schuster, E.C. Snow, H.E. Soper. 
The 'others' are A.L. Bowley, J. Brownlee, F.Y. Edgeworth, 
R.A. Fisher, W.S. Gosset, M. Greenwood, R.H. Hooker, 
T.M. Keynes, G.J. Lidstone, A.G. McKendrick, W.F. Sheppard, 
C. Spearman, G.H. Thomson, G.U. Yule. 
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attention. As was described in chapter five, the bio- 
metric school was a tightly -knit, coherent group, a large 
part of whose funding came from its activities in eugenic 
research.(24) This research was a team activity in which 
data collection, the development of the necessary mathe- 
matical theory, computation, and so on, wereclosely integrated 
under /... 
(24) The following skit, written by Major Greenwood (Green- 
wood to Yule, 8 November 1913; Yule Papers, box 1), in- 
dicates the extent to which the opponents of Pearson's 
methods felt themselves up against a coherent group 
with a clear orthodoxy: 
Extracts from The Times, 1 April 1925 
G. Udny Yule, who had been convicted of high treason 
on the 7th ult. was executed this morning on a 
scaffold outside Gower St. Station. A short but 
painful scene occurred on the scaffold. As the rope 
was being adjusted, the criminal made some observation, 
imperfectly heard in the press enclosure, the only 
audible words being 'the normal coefficient is - '. 
Yule was immediately seized by the Imperial guard and 
gagged. The coroner's jury subsequently received 
evidence that death had been instantaneous. Snow 
was the executioner and among others present were 
the Sheriff, Viscount Heron of Borkham and the Hon. 
W. Palin Elderton. 
Up to the time of going to press the warrant for the 
apprehension of Greenwood had not been executed, but 
the police have what they regard to be an important 
clue. During the usual morning service at St. Paul's 
Cathedral, which was well attended, the carlovingian 
creed was, in accordance with an imperial rescript 
chanted by the choir. When the solemn words, 'I 
believe in one holy and absolute coefficient of four- 
fold correlation' were uttered a shabbily dressed man 
near the North door shouted 'balls'. Amid a scene 
of indescribable excitement, the vergers armed with 
several volumes of Biometrika made their way to the 
spot, but one of them was savagely bitten in the 
calf by a small mongrel and in the confusion the 
criminal escaped. 
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under the personal supervision of Karl Pearson. So a 
relationship between the needs of eugenic research and the 
cognitive interests manifested in the development of the 
theory of association by the biometric school can reason- 
ably be held to exist, irrespective of the particular 
motives of individual members of the school. I have not 
been able to discover whether P.F. Everitt, say, who drew 
up the tables of tetrachoric functions to permit easier 
calculation of rT, shared Pearsonts beliefs. The point 
is, however, that he was working to overcome a difficulty 
which had arisen within the context of an integrated research 
programme in which the demands of eugenic research generated, 
and conditioned the solution of, particular technical 
problems. 
One important British statistician can be seen as 
leaving the biometric school in this period: Major Greenwood 
(1880 -1949). In his case, as was described in chapter five, 
two parallel processes can be observed in the period 1910 
to 1914. He left the immediate group of researchers round 
Karl Pearson at University College to take up a post of 
statistician at the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine. 
At the same time, perhaps as a result of his move into a 
new academic field which traditionally stressed environ- 
mental causes of disease, he became critical of eugenic 
doctrines. His attitude to the measurement of association 
also underwent a change in this period. In 1909, in a paper 
arguing the importance of the hereditary factor in tuberculosis, 
Greenwood!... 
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Greenwood used the tetrachoric coefficient, describing it 
as the 'exact' and 'true' method of measuring association 
(1909, 259). Soon, however, he became first a private 
and then a public critic of the tetrachoric method.(25) 
While the available evidence does not permit identification 
of a causal sequence linking these different changes, the 
case of Greenwood adds weight to the association between 
membership of the biometric school, scientific work in the 
eugenic field, and use of the tetrachoric and other Pearsonian 
methods. 
What of those statisticians who were not members 
of the biometric school? Of these only one, John Brownlee, 
seems to have been an enthusiast for the tetrachoric method. 
He was a member of the Glasgow Branch of the Eugenics 
Education Society.(26) Yule, Greenwood and Brownlee apart, 
only two 'non- biometric' statisticians seem to have publicly 
committed themselves on the measurement of association: 
F.Y. Edgeworth and R.H. Hooker. Neither, as far as I am 
able to tell, was a eugenist.(27) Both were members of 
the /... 
(25) See his letters to Yule in this period in the Yule Papers 
(box 1) and Greenwood and Yule (1915). 
(26) See Eugenics Education Society (1911; 1912). Brownlee 
even used r.r in the case of theoretical Mendelism, where 
the biometricians denied its applicability: see Brownlee 
(1910) and Snow (1912). 
(27) Edgeworth's one flirtation with hereditarianism is 
described in chapter five. I have not been able to find 
any writings by Hooker dealing with eugenics. 
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the Royal Statistical Society, and it was at a meeting of 
it that they gave at least qualified support to Yule 
(Edgeworth, 1912; Hooker, 1912); the Society seems, in 
fact, to have been the closest Yule came to having an 'in- 
stitutional base'. Clearly it was in no way comparable 
to Pearson's Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories, with their 
own publications and journal, but at least the Society pro- 
vided Yule with a sympathetic hearing and a place to publish 
his major attack on Pearson as well as other more minor 
writings on association. 
Thus, consideration of British statisticians 
other than Pearson and Yule seems to confirm in broad terms 
the association of Pearson's approach with the needs of 
eugenic research and that of Yule with the broader and less 
specific needs of general applied statistics. However, 
before moving to the final stage of the argument, it is 
necessary to consider other possible explanations of the 
controversy, and to examine briefly the history of the 
measurement of association after 1914. 
It might be argued that Pearson's philosophical 
views account for his attitude to the measurement of 
association. However, it would seem that his approach, 
with its use of hypothetical underlying variables, violates 
rather than exemplifies the positivist and phenomenalist 
programme of The Grammar of Science (K. Pearson, 1892a). 
The practical demands of his research proved stronger than 
his /... 
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his formal philosophy of science. His characterisation 
(Pearson and Heron, 1913, 302) of the dispute as between 
his 'nominalism' and Yule's 'realism' can indeed be turned 
on its head. In their concepts of correlation Pearson was 
the 'realist' and Yule the 'nominalist'. Pearson's Huxley 
Lecture argument, for example, rests on the interpretation 
of a correlation as the measure of a real entity, as a 
strength of heredity, and largely collapses if a correlation 
is seen as merely the name for an observed pattern of data. 
Pearson's general cosmological bent towards continuity and 
variation rather than homogeneity and discrete entities (dis- 
cussed in section 6.5) may in part account for his rejection 
of methods such as rpS (which involved treating individuals 
in a given category as in a certain sense identical), but 
cannot, it seems to me, account for the specific features 
of Pearson's methods of measuring association. 
Psychological explanations (such as a clash of 
personalities) also seem inadequate. Personal relations 
between Pearson and Yule seem to have been soured as a 
result of disagreement, rather than disagreement being caused 
by personal antagonism,(28) The divergence of views was 
already /... 
(27) This was the account given by Yule to Greenwood in his 
letters of 18 May and 26 May 1936 (Yule Papers, box 2). 
The Yule - Pearson correspondence (Pearson Papers, Cl D3 
and Cl D6) bears this out, as it continues on an 
amicable basis up to Yule's first criticism of Pearson 
in 1905 and is then abruptly terminated (apart from 
three letters of 1910, dealing with a personal matter). 
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already present in the perfectly amicable papers of 1900. 
Even if Pearson and Yule had remained the best of friends 
they would still have measured association differently, and 
this difference would still have to be explained. 
A third possible alternative explanation might be 
that non -eugenic biometrical concerns were of equal or 
greater importance in leading to Pearson's development of 
the tetrachoric method. It is certainly true that Pearson 
used rT to measure the 'strength of inheritance' in organisms 
other than man. But to separate a 'neutral' biometry from 
an 'ideological' eugenics would be ahistorical and would 
fail to capture the integral nature of Pearson's thought. 
The results of the biometric studies of heredity in animals 
were used in Pearson's eugenic argument: the channel of 
inference from the animal world to human physical characteristics 
to human mental characteristics was crucial to Pearson's 
position. 
How did the controversy end? Debate virtually 
ceased at the time of the First World War. Two factors may 
have been involved in this. After 1918 the huge amount of 
data on inheritance of human and animal characteristics 
flowing into the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories was 
much reduced. 'The post -war years were not favourable to 
the spread of Galton's eugenic creed' and in Pearson's work 
'eugenics was for the moment set aside' (E.S. Pearson, 1936 -8, 
part 2, 205, 206). 
problem /... 
Thus, the immediate importance of the 
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problem for Pearson was reduced, and much less theoretical 
and practical work on the measurement of association was 
done at the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories. Secondly, 
a new approach to eugenics and statistics was developing, 
most notably in the work of R.A. Fisher, which focused 
attention on different problems. Fisher used Mendelism 
in order to measure the 'strength of heredity' in a way 
that was different from that of Pearson. He employed an 
analysis of variance scheme based on a theoretical Mendelian 
model, rather than the direct comparison of correlation co- 
efficients (Fisher, 1918a; see section 6.6 and Norton, 1977). 
While Fisher did not reject Pearson's work on the inheritance 
of mental characteristics, his own research programme led 
him beyond it in a way that did not require the use of co- 
efficients of association. 
The controversy was not, however, resolved. Con- 
temporary statistical opinion takes a pluralistic view of 
the measurement of association, denying that any one co- 
efficient has unique validity. The influential work of 
Goodman and Kruskal (1954 -9, part 1, 763) argued that 
measures 'should be carefully constructed in a manner 
appropriate to the problem in hand' in such a way as to have 
operational interpretations. The general approach of 
modern statisticians is thus closer to that of Yule than 
that of Pearson. Yule's Q remains a popular coefficient, 
especially amongst sociologists (see, for example, Davis, 
1971). Pearson's tetrachoric coefficient, on the other 
hand /... 
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hand, has almost disappeared from use except in psychometric 
work (for example, Castellon, 1966). It is interesting to 
speculate whether this situation can be explained in terms 
of, on the one hand, the sharing by most modern statisticians 
of Yule's lack of an overall, specific goal- orientation and, 
on the other, the continuing influence of hereditarianism 
in psychometrics. This point could, however, be established 
only by an analysis of the contemporary literature, which 
is outside the scope of this study. 
7.7 The Controversy and Social Interests 
The preceding analysis has shown that Pearson's 
and Yule's theories of association were structured by dif- 
ferent cognitive interests, and that these different in- 
terests can be accounted for in terms of the relationship 
between Pearson's statistical theory and his eugenics 
research, and the lack of any similar relationship in the 
case of Yule. Pearson drew his support almost exclusively 
from the tightly -knit group of researchers, under his leader- 
ship, which was pursuing a unified research programme in 
statistics, biometry and eugenics. Yule gathered what 
support he could from individuals who were not enthusiastic 
about eugenics, and whose chief organisational link appears 
to have been the Royal Statistical Society. 
The final stage of the analysis is necessarily 
very tentative, and involves (as did the corresponding 
hypothesis in chapter six) a structural argument which cannot 
be /... 
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be proven from the material presented here. The 
structural argument is quite simple. It is that eugenics 
was sustained by the social interests of certain sectors of 
British society, and not by those of other sectors. 
One part of this structural hypothesis has already 
been presented in chapter three: that eugenics reflected 
the social interests of a rising professional middle class. 
The other part of it was suggested in section 6.5 in the 
discussion of William Bateson's attitude to eugenics: that 
declining élites which had turned to conservatism in reaction 
against bourgeois progress would not find the British eugenics 
of this period a suitable expression of their social in- 
terests. These groups certainly would have no reason to 
defend the urban 'residuum', nor to call into question the 
hierarchical division between mental and manual labour, and 
certainly were unlikely to be attracted to assertions of 
the inherent equality of all. However, the scientistic, 
interventionist, middle class nature of eugenics was not 
likely to attract them. While they might share many of 
the basic premises of hereditarian thought, British eugenics 
as a concrete cultural form would be alien to them. 
Such general evidence as is available on the 
social distribution of attitudes to eugenics seems to sup- 
port this hypothesis. That support for eugenics came 
almost exclusively from within the ranks of the professional 
middle class is documented in chapter three. 
to/... 
Opposition 
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to eugenics came from such diverse groups as right -wing 
conservatives, the Catholic Church and defenders of 
traditional civil liberties,(28) as well as from more pre- 
dictable quarters such as revolutionary socialists and 
those professionals (such as public health workers) with 
commitments to particular environmental reforms. The 
types of argument used in support of or against eugenics 
are also compatible with the hypothesis. Eugenic writings 
were quite often explicit propaganda for the professional 
middle class and for the social value of their skills. 
Conversely, one of the main strands of opposition to 
eugenics was the defence of reproduction as an area of 
traditional religious authority (or of personal free choice) 
against the encroachments of science and expertise. 
What of our two main participants? Pearson's 
work has been analysed in chapter four as an especially 
clear and important contribution to the development of 
eugenics as an ideology of the professional middle class. 
Yule is more problematic. Unlike Pearson, Yule was reticent 
about his social, political and philosophical attitudes, so 
there is a poverty of definite information on which to draw. 
What does, I think, emerge from his letters, from comments 
on him by those who knew him well, and from occasional 
passages in his writings, is a personally genial but at the 
same /... 
(28) See section 3.8 and Searle (1976, 110 -11). 
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same time fundamentally detached, sceptical and conservative 
man. Major Greenwood wrote of Yule that 'politically, even 
in university politics, he is a stern, unbending Tory' (Green- 
wood to Pearl, 19 August 1926; Pearl Papers). In later 
life Yule turned to religion (Yule to Greenwood, 2 February 
1936; Yule- Greenwood Letters). On several politically - 
relevant scientific issues, his position was radically dif- 
ferent from that of Pearson. As against Pearson's orthodox 
Darwinism, Yule advocated the anti -Darwinian and mutationist 
views of J.C. Willis (Yule, 1924; see Willis, 1922). As 
against Pearson's 'entrepreneurial' and 'socially -relevant' 
science, Yule's ideal of the scientific researcher was of 
a 'loafer of the world', free from ties, grants and commit- 
ments (Yule, 1920). As against Pearson's positivism, Yule 
was suspicious of the cult of measurement (Yule, 1921, 106 -7). 
In his social position, Yule can, at least in his early life, 
be seen as downwardly mobile. He came from an old- established 
élite family of army officers, Indian civil servants and 
orientalists. Both his father and his uncle had been 
knighted. The family's wealth does not, however, seem to 
have been transmitted to Yule. In the absence of a suf- 
ficiently well paying statistical job, he was forced, during 
most of the period discussed here, to take an administrative 
position in a board examining apprentice craftsmen and 
technicians and to lecture in the evenings to clerks. While 
Yule's social situation cannot be seen as predetermining his 
attitudes (there was nothing to stop him deciding, say, to 
throw in his hand with the eugenists or Fabians rather than 
to /... 
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to remain aloof), his career and beliefs, taken as a whole, 
can perhaps be seen as instancing possible connections between 
a declining élite, general conservatism and distaste for 
eugenics. 
In the light of the institutionalised nature of 
the connection between statistics and eugenics in the bio.. 
metric school, there would be little point in examining the 
social situation of individual biometricians other than 
Pearson. Although it would appear that in fact those of 
Pearson's students for whom information is available can 
in general be seen as 'rising professionals' rather than 
'members of a declining élite' (for example, David Heron, 
who came from a Scottish village school up through the 
education system to be a leading figure in government and 
academic circles (E.S Pearson, 1970a)),this sort of infor- 
mation is not of central importance. Yule's supporters 
are of somewhat greater interest, in that Yule was not the 
head of a research institution nor in any position of power, 
and therefore we can be rather more certain that those who 
supported him did so out of conviction. Both Hooker and 
Edgeworth were similar to Yule in background. R.H. Hooker 
was the son of Sir Joseph Dalton Hooker and grandson of 
Sir William Hooker, both Directors of the Royal Gardens at 
Kew; he himself had a humbler career as a civil servant in 
the Board of Agriculture (Yule, 1944). Francis Ysidro 
Edgeworth came from an old and distinguished family of Anglo- 
Irish gentry (Edgeworthstown, County Longford was their 
family /... 
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family seat), but one that was in particularly sharp decline. 
Although Edgeworth was the fifth son of a sixth son, he was 
the last in the male line of the Edgeworth's, and by the 
time he had inherited it the family estate had sunk into 
neglect (Keynes, 1926; Bowley, 1934). On the other hand, 
Greenwood, although listed in Burke's Landed Gentry, can, 
as the son and grandson of doctors, be better placed in the 
body of the professional middle class. His case (in which 
it has been hypothesised that his later occupational position 
in public health led him away from his early eugenic com- 
mitment) indicates the complexities of the relationship 
between class position and eugenic belief. 
Although too much weight should not be placed on 
this kind of evidence, it can be noted that the biographies 
of the individuals discussed here are broadly compatible with 
the pattern expected on the basis of the structural hypothesis. 29) 
On this hypothesis, it is claimed that eugenics was sustained 
by particular social interests. To the extent that this 
was so, and to the extent that the preceding sections have 
shown the importance in the controversy of the goals set by 
eugenic research, it can be concluded that social interests 
entered through the 'mediation' of eugenics into this episode 
in the development of statistical theory in Britain. 
MO OM 
(29) In the light of the biographical information on Yule, 
Edgeworth, Hooker and Bateson, it is interesting that 
Levitas (1976, 547) suggests that Christian Socialism - 
a paternalist, anti -bourgeois movement - was largely 
composed of individuals downwardly mobile from the 
pre -industrial élite. 
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Chapter Eight 
New Directions 
In this chapter I shall examine two social and 
intellectual processes that, although only beginning in 
the period discussed here, became of increasing importance 
from the 1930's onwards, Firstly, a new occupational role 
developed: that of the statistician employed in industrial 
and agricultural research. Secondly, with the establish- 
ment of statistical theory as an ongoing activity with a 
network of communication, there developed concern for what 
might be called 'metastatistics': systematic reflection on 
the theory and practice of statistics. To give an adequate 
account of these developments, even in their earliest stages, 
would be far beyond what is possible here, and to describe 
fully the work in statistical theory of the main figure 
discussed here - R.A. Fisher - would in itself require a 
separate thesis. Instead, I shall focus on one issue only: 
the development of the theory of statistical inference. 
I shall attempt to sketch some initial effects on the theory 
of statistical inference of the above processes. This is 
intended simply as an epilogue to the account of British 
statistics given in the preceding chapters, and as a 
pointer to future developments, and does not claim to be a 
comprehensive or detailed study of this fascinating topic. 
First /... 
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First, it will be necessary to examine briefly the 
'traditional' - Bayesian - mode of statistical inference. 
The common habit of referring to the frequentist - non - 
Bayesian - mode of inference as 'classical' is, as this 
section will show, quite at variance with the actual develop- 
ment of the theory of inference: Bayesian inference was 
the historical predecessor of frequentist inference. In 
section 8.2 the approach to inference of Karl Pearson and 
the biometric school will be discussed. Pearson's continuing 
employment of Bayesian inference will be described, as will 
his reliance on large sample assumptions. In section 8.3 
the work of W.S. Gosset ('Student') will be discussed. In 
his statistical theory Gosset broke decisively with the 
assumption of large sample size, and the reason why he did 
so will be presented. The following section deals with 
the early work of R.A. Fisher, who first developed a com- 
prehensive non -Bayesian theory of statistical inference. 
The final section then discusses Fisher's period of work in 
the 1920's at the agricultural research station at Rothamsted, 
and points to the significance of Fisher's book, Statistical 
Methods for Research Workers (1925), in providing an exemplar 
of a new occupational role for the statistician- 
8.1 The Traditional Approach to Inference 
Much of statistical theory - especially twentieth 
century statistical theory - is concerned with the problem 
of inference. 
advantage /... 
Put crudely (and here crudeness is an 
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advantage in that precision is explicitly theory - laden) 
the problem is one of the nature of the statements that 
statisticians can make on the basis of their analyses. 
Typically, they will have data on only a subset of the 
cases they are interested in, and will wish to say something 
about the whole set. They may want to make a prediction, 
on the basis of past experience, as to what will happen in 
the future. They may wish to change their estimates of 
the plausibility of a hypothesis in the light of an ex- 
periment. They may wish to say something about a popu- 
lation on the basis of having examined a sample of it 
chosen at random. They may wish to phrase what they have 
to say not in the form of a statement, but in that of a 
decision or recommendation for action. Generally, they 
want to infer from the known and examined to the unknown 
and unexamined. In doing this, statisticians are no dif- 
ferent from other scientists, or indeed from ordinary members 
of society. However, part of the expectations surrounding 
the role of statistician is that they should do this as 
reliably as possible, and should use the specialised know- 
ledge of their discipline in order to do so. 
In the contemporary world, problems of statistical 
inference tend to be closely linked with technical prediction 
and control: for example, in the techniques of quality con- 
trol. However, the historical roots of statistical in- 
ference lie elsewhere. Much of the framework of inference 
was developed in the context of problems of belief in a 
general /... 
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general sense, and in particular of theological belief. 
The problem of inference was this: given our limited 
knowledge, ought we to believe in God? Or, given our 
lack of knowledge of God, what is the rational decision 
to take with regard to Christianity? The concept of 
probability was used to interpret and give meaning to 
decisions about religion. By metaphoric extension a 
concept from games of luck (that of chance, hasard) was 
linked to the old, non- quantitative concept of probability, 
used, for example, by the schoolmen of the Middle Ages to 
discuss particular doctrines of Christianity that were 
disputed (Hacking, 1975). 
As Hacking (1972; 1975, 63 -72) points out, this 
tradition stems initially from Pascal's famous 'wager' on 
the existence of God. Given wide circulation in the 
Jansenist Logic (Arnauld and Nicole, 1965; first published 
in 1662), the theological use of probability stimulated, 
inter alia, Jacques Bernoulli's famous discussion of the 
'art of conjecturing' (Hacking, 1971a; Hacking, 1975, 143- 
53). In Britain, Newtonian natural theology provided 
much of the framework for the eighteenth century development 
of probability theory (K. Pearson, 1924, 404; P. Buck, 1977, 
83 -4). In the introduction to the most important early 
work of probability theory to be published in English, The 
Doctrine of Chances, de Moivre (1738, v) explained the 
theological relevance of the theory of probability: 
... we may learn, in many Cases, how to 
distinguish the Events which are the effects 
of/000 
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of Chance, from those which are produc'd by 
Design: The very Doctrine that finds Chance 
where it really is, being able to prove by a 
gradual Increase of Probability, till it 
arrive at Demonstration, that where Uniformity, 
Order and Constancy reside, there also reside 
Choice and Design. 
John Arbuthnot (1710) provided the best -known example of 
the kind of analysis de Moivre had in mind. He demon- 
strated that the persistent slight excess of male over 
female births observed in London was extremely unlikely to 
be the result of chance deviation from a true 1 :1 ratio. 
God, he concluded, was intervening to ensure an extra supply 
of male babies to counterbalance the higher male infant 
mortality rate, thus making the holy sacrament of marriage 
available to the whole population. 
The Reverend Thomas Bayes agreed that probability 
theory should be no trivial pastime. He wrote: 
So far as Mathematics do not tend to make men 
more sober and rational thinkers, wiser and 
better men, they are only to be considered as 
an amusement, which ought not to take us off 
from serious business. 
(Quoted by Barnard, 1958, 132) 
The problem to which Bayes addressed himself was, in the 
words of his friend Richard Price, to 'give a clear account 
of the strength of analogical or inductive reasoning' (Bayes, 
1764, 135; Price's emphasis). De Moivre and others had 
not, according to Price, fully achieved the main purpose 
of the doctrine of chances, namely: 
... to shew what reason we have for believing 
that there are in the constitution of things 
fixt laws according to which events happen, 
and that, therefore, the frame of the world 
must be the effect of the wisdom and power of 
an /... 
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an intelligent cause; and thus to confirm the 
argument taken from final causes for the 
existence of the Deity. 
(Bayes, 1764, 135) 
The precise problem Bayes dealt with was this: 
Given the number of times in which an unknown 
event has happened and failed: Required the 
chance that the probability of its happening 
in a single trial lies somewhere between any 
two degrees of probability that can be named. 
(1764, 136; Bayes's emphasis) 
Bayes assumed that the probability of the event happening 
was constant but unknown: call this unknown probability G. 
He supposed that we start from a state of complete ignorance, 
so that all values of 6 between 0 and 1 are equally likely. 
On this basis, he showed that if an event has been observed 
to happen p times, and to fail q times, the probability, a 
posteriori, of e lying between a and b ( U d .5.1 ) was: 
SI' eP(1-e) d 
S` OP (I-o) a 8 0 
(This expression is that given by Todhunter (1865, 2951. 
Bayes tended to talk of areas under curves rather than 
integrals.) 
The underlying idea in Bayes's approach was 
generalised by P.S. de Laplace (1814, especially 177 -88 and 
363 -401), and became the foundation of nineteenth century 
theories of inference. British writers typically referred 
to it as the 'method of inverse probability'.(1) At the 
cost /... 
(1) In 'direct' probability we work from a model or 
description of a situation to deduce consequences: 
this urn contains five white balls and five black 
balls, therefore the probability of drawing a white 
ball is 0.5. 'Inverse' probability arguments occur 
when, for example, we work backwards from observation 
of the outcome of drawing balls to reach probabilistic 
conclusions about the proportion of white and black 
balls in an urn. 
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cost of some anachronism, it can be presented in brief as 
follows. Let X be a random variable with a frequency 
distribution, f(xI &), dependent on an unknown parameter e. 
On the basis of previous knowledge and experience, we 
ascribe a prior probability distribution,-n-(0), to e. 
We then perform an experiment, or make certain observations, 
and obtain a sample of n independent values of X. Call 
these n values x1, x2, ..., xn, or collectively, x. Let 
g(x;e) be the probability of these values occurring for a 
given value of e. Then, 
g(x;O) = f(x116) f(x2(0) .... f(xnle) 
The posterior distribution of @, -rr(e)x), is proportional 
to the prior distribution of 8 multiplied by the probability 
of the observed sample for any given value of 8: 
7.1-'-(01x) Dc g (x;O) Tr (9) 
Now let us make what the nineteenth century writers called 
the assumption of the 'equal distribution of ignorance': 
let us assume that the prior distribution of e is uniform, 
or, in other words, that T(0) is a constant, and does not 
depend on (9. (2) 
Then /... 
(2) For what happens if the range of possible values of e 
is infinite, see D.V. Lindley (1965, 2, 18 -19). Full 
consideration of this issue, which involves some dif- 
ficult and contentious points, would lead us too far 
away from the historical material to be discussed. 
Then 
or 
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-r,--( 
e1x) (,)(x;e 
TT ( )=C (x,0) 
where C is a constant, not involving e, that can be evaluated 
by use of the condition that the integral of ir- (O ¡.x) over 
the range of e must be equal to unity. 
The last equation for the posterior distribution 
of e implies that - if the assumptions of this analysis are 
granted, and the constant C is ignored - we can treat g(x;O) 
(the 'likelihood function', to use an anachronism) as the 
posterior distribution of 8. This appears to have been 
the meaning to nineteenth century British mathematicians of 
the 'method of inverse probability' (for example, Todhunter, 
1865, 584 and 592). The assumptions of the method - such 
as that of the 'equal distribution of ignorance' were by no 
means always explicit. Indeed, it seems not entirely un- 
likely that many mathematicians might have remembered the 
conclusion of the analysis - that a 'likelihood function' 
could be treated as a posterior distribution - without in 
all cases being fully conscious of the method by which it 
had been reached. 
(In passing, it should be noted that the 'method 
of inverse probability' is indeed a generalisation of Bayes's 
original result. The latter can be derived from the former 
as follows. If the probability of an event happening is 8, 
then the probability of the observed sample - of the event 
happening p times and failing q times - is 
(P+ it) ' e (,._ e) t 
This/... 
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This, then, is g(x;(3). On the 'method of inverse probability'it 
(multiplied by the constant c) can be treated as the posterior 
distribution of O. In other words, 
Trr' ( el x) = C(1)1+1j! OP (1 - 0)1. 
P - 
)¡ 




QP ( 1-0)a 0 
p! et. O 
0P (I-g)1 
Ç P(1- 0)dB 
--'(01x) 
and so the posterior probability of 0 lying between a and b 
) i s 
L 6 P 0(1 0)'E10 
P (1 - 
Q)Q 
LI 
This, of course, is Bayes's result.) 
Many modern statisticians would find the 'method 
of inverse probability' unconvincing, in part because of 
doubts about the nature of the concept of probability under- 
lying the method. It is interesting, however, that, for 
at least the early part of the nineteenth century, this was 
not a contentious issue. From the time of Pascal to the 
middle years of the nineteenth century, two approaches to 
probability that were later to be distinguished were not 
differentiated. These Hacking (1971b; 1975) calls the 
'epistemological' and the 'physical' interpretations. In 
the epistemological interpretation, 'Prob(alb) expresses a 
relation between an hypothesis a and some evidence b' (1971b, 
340). This relation can be interpreted as a question of 
degree /... 
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degree of logical support, or, subjectively, as a question 
of personal belief. In the physical interpretation, on 
the other hand: 
... Prob (alb) expresses a physical feature of 
a chance set -up on which one might make repeated 
trials. It denotes the relative frequency with 
which outcomes of kind a would occur among out- 
comes of kind b. 
(Hacking, 1971b, 340) 
Physical probability in this sense can be talked of either 
in terms of a limiting ratio in an infinite sequence of 
trials, or in terms of a 'dispositional property'. 
The key to much of the early vitality of probability 
theory was the metaphoric link formed between the epistemo- 
logical interpretation (drawn from theology) and physical 
interpretation (drawn from games of chance). As Hacking 
points out, early writers tended to give a definition of 
probability in terms of equally possible cases. Thus 
P.S. de Laplace defined probability as 'le rapport du nombre 
des cases favorables á celui de tous les cas possibles' 
(1814, vii). Despite the manifest inadequacy and apparent 
circularity of this definition (can we define equally pos- 
sible cases except in terms of probability ?), it survived 
and flourished, because by using it writers 'could usefully 
equivocate' between epistemological and physical inter- 
pretations of probability (Hacking, 1971b, 341). 
'Probability' then served as a 'gloss' in the 
ethnomethodological sense (Garfinkel and Sachs, 1970). 
Most probability theorists, if called upon to define 
'probability' /... 
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'probability', would have given the 'equally possible 
cases' definition. But in doing so, they were merely 
retreating from one gloss to another. Mathematicians 
concentrated on 'doing' probability theory, and in this 
process the meaning of the central gloss developed. 
P.S. de Laplace's great Théorie Analytique des Probabilités 
showed the richness of the structure that could be developed 
on this basis. Nevertheless, during the nineteenth century 
British writers began to criticise the foundations of 
probability theory, largely from an empiricist point of 
view, and sought to narrow and clarify the concept of 
probability.(3) 
The most important of these works on the foundations 
of probability theory was John Venn's The Logic of Chance, 
first published in 1866.(4) Venn's position was that in 
considering probability 'experience is our sole guide' 
(1866, 26). The proper objects for analysis by the theory 
of probability are, Venn argued, series of observed events, 
not gradations of belief. He defined the probability of 
an event in terms of the limiting value of its relative 
frequency in an infinite series of trials (1866, 107 -8). 
The /... 
(3) In passing, it is interesting to note that efforts to 
reach a satisfactory and universally -applicable 
definition of probability have proved futile, and that 
mathematicians have responded to this by considering 
'probability' as an undefined term that satisfies a 
particular set of axioms, that is, is used in a 
certain way within mathematical 'talk'. 
(4) For a general account of nineteenth century developments 
in this area, see Laudan (1973). 
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The Bayes /Laplace principle of the 'equal distribution of 
ignorance° was attacked by Venn as lacking justification 
in experience, and leading in certain cases to absurd 
results. 
Venn's empiricist argument did not overturn the 
'method of inverse probability'. Edgeworth, who had con- 
siderable interest in problems of inference, defended the 
traditional approach on philosophical grounds (Edgeworth, 
1884), and continued to use Bayesian methods in practice 
(Edgeworth, 1908- 9).(5) When Karl Pearson first turned to 
problems of inference - in pursuit of his studies in the 
philosophy of science - he too remained within a basically 
Bayesian framework. Given his desire to base all knowledge 
on experience, subjective interpretations of probability 
were unattractive to him: he worked with at least a 
loosely frequentist view of probability. But 'inverse 
probability' arguments he found useful because of the way 
they could be employed to justify induction. In the 
Grammar of Science he adopted a compromise position: he 
sought to justify the 'principle of the equal distribution 
of ignorance' on empirical grounds (Pearson, 1892a, 174 -5). 
Neither wholehearted °degree of belief' Bayesianism nor a 
complete rejection of inverse probability methods were 
attractive /... 
MO 
(5) In this - his most important work on inference - 
Edgeworth did, however, attempt a 'direct probability' 
justification of his procedure. See Edgeworth 
(1908 -9, addendum) and Pratt (1976). 
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attractive to him. As the next section will show, his 
practical statistical experience did not force him to 
abandon this compromise. 
8.2 The Biometric School's Approach to Inference 
In his views on inference Karl Pearson was, 
ultimately, a Bayesian. Certainly, there is evidence that 
he was not a particularly happy or confident Bayesian, and 
his doubts may have grown with the passage of time, but his 
work remained, broadly speaking, within the framework of the 
traditional approach to inference. 
Pearson's Bayesianism is most strongly evidenced 
by the major early contribution of the biometric school to 
the theory of inference: Pearson and Filon (1898),, Ad- 
mittedly, the Bayesianism of this rather difficult paper is 
not explicit. E.S. Pearson comments guardedly (1967, 345): 
The basis of the approach used here is a little 
obscure and there seems to be implicit in it the 
classical concept of inverse probability. 
To provide a full exposition of Pearson and Filon (1898), 
showing the Bayesian nature of their argument, would be a 
lengthy, but relatively straightforward task (some useful 
clues are provided by Welch, 1958, 780). Instead, I shall 
present a special case of the general theorem constructed 
by Pearson and Filon, in order to show simply and briefly 
the nature of their approach. The problem I shall con- 
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(The general theorem gave a means of cal- 
culating the probable errors, and correlation of errors, 
of 'frequency constants° - parameters of frequency dis- 
tributions - in general.) 
Consider a simple random sample of size n drawn 
from a normally- distributed population with mean zero and 
unknown standard deviation © : denote this sample x1, x2, 
.,. , xn, or, collectively, x. The probability of the 
occurrence of this sample, for a given value of e, is 
given by 
9 (x e) - - e-x? 
Pearson argued that the best value to give 9 is that which 
maximises g(x; Q).(7) He showed that this value was 8 0, 




(6) Karl Pearson dealt with this problem in his lectures 
on statistical theory in the Autumn of 1894. His 
treatment of it is described in Yule's Notes (1, 89- 
92). From Yule's Notes alone it is not entirely 
clear what Pearson was doing; but when the relevant 
passage is interpreted in the light of the nineteenth 
century understanding of the 'method of inverse 
probability' the basis of the analysis becomes clear. 
The continuity between this example and the general 
theorem of Pearson and Filon (1898) is apparent: for 
example, a one -dimensional version of the general 
theorem is given in Yule's Notes (5, 41 -2), in a 
passage dating from January 1896. 
(7) The justification for this was apparently not dis- 
cussed by Pearson at any length: it may have rested 
in part on the interpretation of g(x;ß) as the posterior 
distribution of e. One problem with the general theorem 
of Pearson and Filon (1898) is that it was in practice 
applied to estimates that were not maxima of the 
posterior distribution, in particular to estimates of 
the parameters of skew curves obtained by the method 
of moments; this was pointed out by R.A. Fisher 
(1922a, 329 fn). 
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probable error of the standard deviation as estimated by 
this method. 
Pearson's procedure makes sense only if it is in- 
terpreted as an application of the traditional 'method of 
inverse probability'. It rested on the (implicit) treat- 
ment of g(x;©) as the posterior distribution of e: his 
manipulation of g(x;8) is meaningless if g(x;e) is inter- 
preted as a direct, rather than an inverse, probability. 
Because e is the value of 8 that maximises g(x;e), it is 
the mode of the posterior distribution of() . Write e as 
(90+z. Then 
/ 
( x e - ^ n e X P - ` x112 ( eo +z)-23. i2 eG+Z) 
Now 
9 (3;00)-7 /Z exp - (x`2/2 O23 (2-rtYn -2 
// ( 
/ z n 
So 9(x;6) ,lx; ®o) = l %eo) er`P1 2( I+ eo) + 2 
.J ( .1 
since 2xZZ n Bo . This is the posterior distribution of 
e about its mode. It is clearly not normal. However, if 
we assume that the errors under consideration are small 
(i.e. that z is small by comparison with (90), the distribution 
can be shown to be approximately normal. For ( )c I, we have 
+ Z/eo ) = e X P 1, - rt. I o 
J 
q ( i -i- Z/Bo) 
i/3 `=xP 
( z/eo- % /p+ 6p -._ ) 3. 
and exp "/2.( I+/ß» +/2)jä exP{-n.1-Z/eG+3/ZZZ- Z/s-.._ 0 0 
3 
3 
Neglecting terms in (z /p,,) and higher powers, we have, 
therefore, 
9 
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So the posterior distribution of e is given by 
T (x Jo) = C 9 (z 8) Constant X ex © P C J 
since g(x ioo) is independent of 0 and z = e - e 0 
This is a normal curve with mean O and standard deviation 
0,/72n. . The probable error of 0r, is thus 0,674 5d 2n : 
that is to say, the posterior probability that the true value 
of B lies in the interval G 2 0.6745-9-9 is 0.5. 
0 
n%2'n. 
The approach to finding the probable errors of 
frequency constants presented in Pearson and Filon (1898) 
was a generalisation of that employed in this example. 
They treated what we would now call the 'likelihood function' 
as the joint posterior distribution of the frequency constants 
in question; they were, therefore, following the 'method 
of inverse probability' and making the implicit assumption 
of a uniform joint prior distribution of the frequency con- 
stants. From this they showed that - on the assumption of 
'small' errors - the joint posterior distribution was multi- 
variate normal, and they gave an expression for what would 
now be called its covariance matrix, which enabled the 
probable errors and correlation of errors of frequency 
constants to be calculated. 
Despite the impressive nature of this result, 
Pearson cannot have been entirely happy with the process by 
which it had been reached, for as soon as an alternative 
means of deriving probable errors became available, he 
adopted it. The alternative method was developed by 
W.F. Sheppard /... 
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W.F. Sheppard. Sheppard seems to have taken Venn's 
criticisms of the basis of the 'method of inverse probability' 
more to heart than did either Edgeworth or Pearson. Writing 
to Galton on 29 February 1896 about the paper that was to 
become his major contribution in this area (Sheppard, 1898b), 
Sheppard said: 
In dealing with questions of probability I 
have proceeded on what appear to me to be 
the correct lines laid down by Venn in The 
Logic of Chance. 
(Galton Papers, 315) 
The key to Sheppard's approach was his non -Bayesian concept 
of 'probable error'. This he defined, not as an interval 
of a posterior probability distribution, but in terms of 
the distribution of an estimate in repeated sampling. 
Pearson later summed up Sheppard's concept: 
The simple idea involved in the probable error 
of a statistical constant is of the following 
kind: If the whole of a population were taken 
we should have certain values for its statistical 
constants, but in actual practice we are only 
able to take a sample, which should if possible 
be a 'random sample'. If a number of random 
samples be taken any statistical constant will 
vary from sample to sample, and its variation 
is distributed according to some law round the 
actual value of the constant for the total 
population. This variation would be very 
properly measured by the standard deviation 
of the constant for an indefinitely great 
series of random samples. 
(K. Pearson, 1903b, 273) 
By defining 'probable error' in these terms, 
Sheppard reformulated the problem in such a way as to avoid 
the use of any but 'direct' probabilities. He started with 
an analysis of a simple kind of repeated sampling: 
Let the individuals comprised in an indefinitely 
great community be divided into any number of 
classes /... 
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classes A, B, C, .,,, and let the numbers in 
these classes be proportional toa,AY, ..., 
so that +/3 +y+ .,. = 1. Suppose a random 
selection of n individuals to be made, and let 
the numbers drawn from the different classes be 
respectively no', n/3', nX',..., so that o0 +/3' 
+ó' + ... = 1. Then - 0003-/3', ó'_ ?j', ... 
are the errors in c<, /3,Y, 
(Sheppard, 1898b, 117; Sheppard's emphasis) 
By using the multinomial distribution, Sheppard quickly 
derived the following results: 
(i ) that the mean value of 00 is x; 
(ii) that the mean square of X' - X is x (1 -00/n; 
(iii) that the mean value of c'j3' is c/3 - 04)3 /n, and 
the mean value of the product of oc' - and ,/3' 
is - .V3 /n. 
He showed that the general linear function a(' -a) + b(/3'- )3 ) 
+ e( ?l' -2Y) + ... has mean value zero and mean square 
°((a2a + b2/3 + c2 >J+ .,,) - (aoc + b/3+ cY+ ...)23' /n. 
He gave expressions for its mean product with another similar 
linear function, and for its mean kth power, and showed that 
for large n its distribution tended to normality. 
Sheppard then used these results to attack the 
main problem of the probable error of frequency constants: 
Let X be any magnitude which is determined by 
observation of the ratios Y' ,/3' ,ó' , . .. Then 
X can be written in the form f(oc',ß',V, ...). 
Now suppose n to be very great. Then the values 
of -«' /3 -/31, ó- ?l', ... are distributed 
normally with mean values zero and mean squares 
oc(1 -0)/n,/3(1 -/3) /n,áí(1 -Y) /n,...; and 
therefore it may be supposed that in any particular 
case the values of &' - x , ß' -ß , )' -?(, .. will 
be very small. Thus X is of the form f (x,j3,?f, ... ) 
+ f (mac' -04) + f 
it 
( /3' -p) + f( ?)/' -y ) + ...; (8) 
and /... 
ONO 
(8) [Sheppard, who was trying to avoid the explicit use of the 
differential calculus in this paper, did not define 
f,, fß, f,_, etc. They are, of course, the coefficients 
of the first order in the Taylor expansion of f.] 
- 385 - 
and therefore [ by the above] its mean value is 
f(x ,Jo?, Y, ...), and the different possible 
values are distributed normally about this mean 
value with mean square 
(cf« +ß fp + - f + . ) +ß f/3 + 1fß+ in 
(Sheppard, 1898b, 122 -3) 
If the expression in the curled brackets be called .-, and 
if Q be the factor 0.6745, then Q,./17). is the probable error 
of X, the probable discrepancy between its observed value 
) and its true value f(x,ß,ß, ...). As 
we will not in practice know the true values oç ß, 4--, ..., 
in evaluating Cj /0/ we can only use the observed values 
731 y' 'But, n being great, the mistake so introduced 
in Qr /,/ is small in comparison with Q r/T itself'. (Sheppard, 
1898b, 124). 
Pearson soon adopted Sheppard's method. In his 
paper on the tetrachoric coefficient (1900b), the probable 
error of the coefficient is calculated by Sheppard's method, 
(It is, indeed, far from clear how one could apply the method 
of Pearson and Filon (1898) to this case.) That this was 
not an isolated departure from the 1898 method was shown by 
an editorial 'On the Probable Errors of Frequency Constants' 
in Biometrika (Pearson,1903b). There, the two 'fundamental 
memoirs' cited are Pearson and Filon (1898) and Sheppard 
(1898b), but the method used is that of Sheppard, and not 
that of Pearson and Filon. 
In many cases, the probable errors obtained by the 
old (Pearson and Filon) method and by the new (Sheppard) 
method are identical. 
(notably /... 
Nevertheless, in certain cases 
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(notably those of method -of- moments estimates of the 
parameters of skew frequency curves) the methods do not 
agree. In practice, Pearson used Sheppard's method in 
these problematic cases (Pearson, ed., 1914; see Fisher, 
1922a, 329 fn.); but he never publicly discussed the reasons 
for his change of procedure. Nor did he generalise his 
use of Sheppard's method for this type of problem to a 
rejection of the Bayesian approach in general.(9) It 
would appear that, uneasy as he may have been about Bayesianism, 
and ready as he was to adopt non -Bayesian methods such as 
Sheppard's when these were available, he could see no 
general replacement for Bayesianism. He justified his 
continued adherence to the traditional view of inference on 
explicitly pragmatic grounds: 
If science cannot measure the degree of 
probability involved [in prediction from past 
to future experience] - so much the worse for 
science. The practical man will stick to his 
appreciative methods until it does, or will 
accept the results of inverse probability of 
the Bayes /Laplace brand till better are forthcoming. 
(K. Pearson, 1920a, 3) 
Aside from Pearson's Bayesianism, another - better 
known - aspect of his view of inference needs to be dis- 
cussed: the persistent assumption in his statistical theory 
of large sample sizes. 
who /... 
This has been examined by E.S. Pearson, 
oo ON 110 
(9) Pearson might reasonably have argued - although I have 
no evidence that he did - that the general theorem of 
Pearson and Filon (1898) was correct, even if it had 
been incorrectly applied to estimates that were not 
maxima of the posterior probability distribution. 
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who notes that Karl Pearson considered that small -sample 
statistical work 'was dangerous and should be avoided' 
(E.S. Pearson, 1939, 378). What was at stake, however, 
was more than the cultivation of one area of statistical 
theory as against another. Large -sample assumptions 
formed the justification for a characteristic move in 
Pearson's statistical theory. In evaluating the probable 
error of a frequency constant, one typically obtains an ex- 
pression involving the value of that constant and /or other 
frequency constants. Pearson (in common with Sheppard and 
other statistical theorists of the time) would then sub- 
stitute the sample estimate of the frequency constant for 
its unknown population value: if the sample size was large 
enough, the error this would lead to would be sufficiently 
small to be unimportant. Such was Pearson's confidence in 
this process that he never systematically distinguished, in 
his notation, between population parameters and sample 
estimates of these. His faith in the generality of this 
process can be seen as at the root of his disagreement with 
R.A. Fisher as to what to do when, in performing a chi square 
test, the constants of the expected distribution are 
estimated from observed data. Fisher (1922b) had argued 
that the number of degrees of freedom of chi square should 
be reduced by one for each constant estimated from the 
observed distribution. Pearson replied that such a sub- 
stitution of a sample for a population value was quite 
unproblematic: 
... in a considerable number of cases [the.] 
sampled /.., 
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sampled population is unknown to us; we have 
no direct means of finding ",2444. etc. L the moments of the population] . fVhat accordingly 
do we do? Why we replace the constants of 
the sampled population by those calculated from 
the sample itself, as the best information we 
have. And the justification of this proceeding 
is not far to seek. /ws as found for the sample 
will only differ from the,p of the sampled popu- 
lation by terms of the order 1/./W; for example 
if we are not dealing with small samples, and o' 
be the standard deviation of the sample, o ".differs 
from a- by terms of the ordercrATIand accordingly 
the standard deviation of the mean is written 
when it is reallyo /,r. This method of treating 
probable errors is universal in the case of fair 
sized samples to -day and scarcely needs justification... 
... What we actually do is to replace the accurate 
value of 31C-, which is unknown to us, and cannot be 
found, by an approximate value, and we do this with 
precisely the same justification as the astronomer 
claims, when he calculates the probable error on 
his observations, and not on the mean square error 
of an infinite population of errors which is unknown 
to him ... 
(K. Pearson, 1922, 186 -7; Pearson's emphasis) 
The next generation of British statisticians could 
not, unlike Karl Pearson, accept this substitution of sample 
for population values as unproblematic. In the next section, 
the work of the first person who seriously questioned it, 
W.S. Gosset, will be discussed. It would appear that 
Karl Pearson never fully understood the basis for the concern 
of Gosset (and those who followed him). Perhaps this was 
because Karl Pearson, as a biometric statistician and 
eugenist, moved in a world of large samples (E.S. Pearson, 
1967, 349 -50). For him, statistical inference was, in 
practice, inference based on large samples: he had no need 
to seek a more general theory of inference. 
8.3/... 
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8.3 W.S. Gosset ('Student') 
W.S. Gosset (1876 -1937) spent the entirety of his 
working life in the employment of Arthur Guinness and Son, 
the famous brewers.(10) Guinness was an early example of 
an 'agribusiness' firm, operating on a scale that came near 
to dominating the economy of Ireland. In 1880 Guinness 
bought over half the Irish barley crop (Lynch and Vaizey, 
1960, 221). The scope and scale of its activities made 
possible what was, for Ireland or Britain, a relatively 
early employment of science to understand and systematise 
the traditional art of the brewer, and to improve the pro- 
cesses of production of the agricultural raw materials on 
which brewing depended. Gosset (who started work for 
Guinness in 1899) was one of a number of science graduates 
taken on for this task. 
His career, quite apart from its specific interest 
from the point of view of the history of statistics, forms 
an interesting case study for the sociology of science. 
As against the theory of Kornhauser (1962), it illustrates 
the claim by Barnes (1971) that individuals do not necessarily 
experience conflict between the demands of an industrial 
organisation and the 'norms of pure science'. There is no 
evidence /... 
AIM 
(10) The following draws chiefly on E.S. Pearson (1939) 
and on the fascinating unpublished material quoted 
therein. Biographical information on Gosset is 
contained also in McMullen (1939) and Fisher (1939). 
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evidence that Gosset chafed at having (presumably because 
of a company regulation) to publish under a pseudonym. 
Although offered at least one academic job (McMullen, 1939, 
357) he preferred to remain with Guinness, rising to become 
in 1935 manager of the newly established Guinness brewery 
in London. He seems to have accepted quite unselfcon- 
sciously the practical demands (and profit -oriented con- 
siderations) of his working environment (see, for example, 
E.S. Pearson, 1939, 366 and 373). Following Barnes (1971), 
we can say that Gosset's scientific training left him with 
competences that he employed in response to the demands of 
his occupational role, but not with a set of internalised 
scientific norms that conflicted with those demands. 
Further, the case of Gosset illustrates the thesis of 
Ben -David (1960, especially 557 -8) that innovations in 
science are frequently the work of individuals marginal to 
the established scientific community, 'role- hybrids' with 
academic training but practical concerns (see also Mulkay, 
1974 and Edge and Mulkay, 1975). 
Gosset, the son of a colonel in the Royal Engineers, 
was educated in mathematics and the natural sciences at 
Oxford. He was apparently the most mathematical of the 
scientists employed by the company (McMullen, 1939, 355), 
and quickly became involved in the problems of analysis 
posed by the numerical results of experimental trials. His 
training had provided him with some resources applicable in 
this area, those of the theory of errors. 
(1939/... 
E.S. Pearson 
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(1939, 363) suggests that he used three texts of error 
theory: Airy (1861), Merriman (1901) and Lupton (1898). 
Gosset soon found, however, that error theory was not 
fully adequate for the kind of work that had to be done in 
the brewery. 
One problem was the assumption made by the error 
theorists of the independence of observations (see section 
2.4). As Gosset was later to put it, in the brewery situ- 
ation, where many variables could not be controlled, 'secular 
change' could lead to 'successive experiments being positively 
correlated' (1908a, 12). He concluded (presumably as a 
result of direct experience) that the standard methods of 
combining independent errors were inapplicable (E.S. Pearson, 
1939, 364 -5). He was at this stage unaware of the work of 
Galton and Pearson on correlation, and could not entirely to 
his satisfaction solve the problem of how 'to establish a 
relationship between sets of observations' (E.S.Pearson, 1939, 
366).(11) A second difficulty was, in essence, a problem 
of/... 
(11) E.S. Pearson suggests that 'given a little more time... 
Gosset would have found for himself Galton's correlation 
coefficient' (1939, 366). This seems to me unlikely. 
In one sense, Galton and Gosset shared a common problem: 
the inapplicability of the standard error theory tech- 
niques when dealing with dependent variables. But 
Galton's thought was informed by his work on heredity, 
and it was from this that he drew the key notion of 
reversion. Gosset does not seem to have had available 
to him a comparable intellectual resource, and so he 
approached the problem differently: unlike Galton, he 
worked directly from the 'anomaly' that arose in the 
application of error theory to brewery data. He deduced 
from this a criterion to help him judge whether or not 
two variables were independent, but apparently did not 
go on to seek a measure of the degree of their dependence. 
See the passage 'What is the right way to establish a 
relationship between sets of observations ?', quoted by 
E.S. Pearson (1939, 366). 
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decision theory. In a report to his board of directors in 
1904, he pointed out that because of the large scale pro- 
cesses used in brewing, and the difficulties of exact con- 
trol of them, accurate experimentation was not possible, 
and any conclusions drawn were necessarily probabilistic 
rather than certain (E.S. Pearson, 1939, 363 -4). The 
question was, then, that of the 'degree of probability to 
be accepted as proving various propositions' (E.S Pearson, 
1939, 365). Gosset soon realised that there was no single 
answer to this question: 
... in such work as ours the degree of certainty 
to be aimed at must depend on the pecuniary 
advantage to be gained by following the result 
of the experiment, compared with the increased 
cost of the new method, if any, and the cost of 
each experiment. 
(E.S. Pearson, 1939, 365 -6) 
The error theorists, working in astronomy and such fields, 
had not faced difficulties of this nature. This problem 
was the first posed by Gosset to Karl Pearson when he con- 
sulted him in July 1905, contact having been made through 
Vernon Harcourt, an Oxford chemist (E.S. Pearson, 1939, 365). 
What advice, if any, Pearson was able to give 
Gosset on this question is unknown. Pearson was, however, 
able to solve Gosset's problem with non -independent obser- 
vations by introducing him to the correlation coefficient. 
On his return to Dublin, Gosset enthusiastically applied 
the new method. As Egon Pearson puts it (1939, 367): 
It became possible to assess with precision 
the relative importance of the many factors 
influencing quality at the different stages 
in the complicated process of brewing, and 
before /... 
- 393 - 
before long the methods of partial and multiple 
correlation were mastered and applied [by Gosset]. 
But a further problem had already arisen by the time Gosset 
met Pearson, and this was one for which there was no solution 
in either error theory or biometric statistical theory. 
I find out the P.E. Cprobable error] of a certain 
laboratory analysis from n analyses of the same 
sample. This gives me a value of the P.E. which 
itself has a P.E. of P.E. /1/2n . I now have 
another sample analysed and wish to assign limits 
within which it is a given probability that the 
truth must lie. E.g. if n were infinite, I could 
say 'it is 10 : 1 that the truth lies within 2.6 
of the result of the analysis'. As however n is 
finite and in some cases not very large, it is 
clear that I must enlarge my limits, but I do not 
know by how much. 
(E.S. Pearson, 1939, 366) 
Error theorists such as Merriman (on whose work Gosset seems 
to have been drawing in this instance) were certainly aware 
that formulae such as that for the probable error of a 
probable error were strictly valid only for large numbers 
of observations. Nevertheless, they continued to use them: 
Merriman (1901) gives probable errors based on five, seven 
and eight measurements. In practice, of course, the error 
theorists were concerned chiefly with giving a fairly rough 
indication of the reliability of a result. It may not have 
worried them that exact probability statements based on the 
law of error were not valid for probable errors obtained from 
small numbers of observations. But it did worry Gosset, 
perhaps because of his 'decision theory' orientation. 
Furthermore, Gosset soon realised that precisely the same 
problem arose with the correlation methods he had so recently 
learnt: 
Correlation /... 
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Correlation coefficients are usually calculated from 
large numbers of cases, in fact I have only found 
one paper in Biometrika of which the cases are as 
few in number as those at which I have been working 
lately. 
(E.S. Pearson, 1939, 367) 
Gosset was afraid that the biometric school's formula for 
the probable error of a correlation coefficient would not 
be valid for the small samples (e.g. n = 10) with which he 
had to deal. 
Guinness must have been an unusually enlightened 
employer, for it was its 'general practice' to allow its 
scientific staff leave for specialised study (E.S. Pearson, 
1939, 369). As a result of this arrangement, Gosset was 
able to spend the year 1906 -7 in England, working with 
Karl Pearson. He spent the time learning mathematical 
statistics, and trying to find a solution to what he had 
come to see as the chief problem in using statistical 
methods in the brewery: the large -sample assumptions upon 
which the error theory and biometric techniques were based. 
Gosset wrote to a colleague in Ireland from his house in 
Tunbridge Wells: 
I go up to K.P.'s lectures from here and on 
other days work at small numbers: a greater 
toil than I had expected, but I think absolutely 
necessary if the Brewery is to get all the 
possible benefit from statistical processes. 
(E.S Pearson, 1939, 373) 
The result of his studies he published in two papers on 'The 
Probable Error of a Mean' and the 'Probable Error of a 
Correlation /... 
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Correlation Coefficient' (1908a; 1908b).(12) 
Gosset began 'The Probable Error of a Mean' by 
pointing out that one can consider a series of experiments 
as a sample drawn from a hypothetical infinite population 
of experiments carried out under similar conditions. The 
statistician's aim was to 'form a judgment' about this 
population: typically this question 'turns on the value of 
a mean, either directly, or as the mean difference between 
... two quantities' (1908a, 11). With only a small series 
of experiments to go on, there were two sources of un- 
certainty. One was uncertainty about the form of the 
population distribution; Gosset claimed that the assumption 
of normality was justified by experience, convenience and 
the fact that 'it appears probable that the deviation from 
normality must be very extreme to lead to serious error' 
(1908a, 11). This left him free to concentrate on the 
second source of uncertainty: the effect of 'errors of 
random sampling' on the reliability of estimates of the 
population mean. 
Gosset pointed out that the standard method of 
treating this problem was based on the assumption of large 
sample size. This assumption was used to justify sub- 
stituting the sample standard deviation for that of the 
population /... 
(12) In fact a third remarkable paper came out of his year's 
work, again a solution to a practical problem of the 
brewery. Gosset independently reinvented the Poisson 
distribution in studying the error involved in counting 
yeast cells with a haemacytometer (1907). 
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population in the formula for the probable error of a mean. 
But large samples could not always be obtained: 
.., it is sometimes necessary to judge of 
the certainty of the results from a very 
small sample, which itself affords the only 
indication of the variability. Some chemical, 
many biological, and most agricultural and large - 
scale experiments belong to this class, which has 
hitherto been almost outside the range of statistical 
inquiry. 
(1908a, 12) 
His approach to the problem was in three stages. In the 
first, which proved the most difficult, he tried to find 
the sampling distribution of the square of the sample 
standard deviation (s2) for a given value (2) of the square 
of the population standard deviation. He was unable to pro- 
vide a full analytic solution to the problem, but, by the 
use of Pearson's method of moments, he in fact reached the 
now accepted result(where n is the sample size and C a con- 
stant): 
C( n2.3 X - r77 Sz y ( S2). ( 13) ) c P 
In the second stage, he showed (denoting by x the difference 
between the sample mean and population mean) that x and s, 
and x2 and s2, were both uncorrelated. In the third stage, 
he went on to make the implicit assumption that x and s were 
independent (not in fact strictly proven by the result of 
the /... 
Z 
(13) In other words, ns i2 is distributed as - wi th n -1 
degrees of freedom. The distribution of s2 had been 
discussed earlier by writers in the error theory 
tradition (see K. Pearson, 1931; Sheynin, 1966; 
Sheynin, 1971a; Kendall, 1971), but this work, on a 
problem that was marginal to the main concerns of 
error theory, was unknown to the British statisticians 
of the time. 
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the second stage), and to find the distribution of z = x /s, 




+ LI Z 
where the constant depends on the value of 
n.(14) 
Gosset concluded: 
Since this equation is independent ofo-it will 
give the distribution of the distance of the 
mean of a sample from the mean of the population 
expressed in terms of the standard deviation of 
the sample for any normal population. 
(1908a, 18) 
Gosset tested his equations for the distributions of s2 and 
z by showing that they fitted well the observed distributions 
of artificially generated samples from a known population, 
and gave a table of z for n from four to ten. The paper 
concluded with examples of the use of the z distribution, 
taken from the testing of the efficacy of soporific drugs, 
and from agricultural research. 
The Probable Error of a Correlation Coefficient' 
addressed itself to the following problem: 
A random sample has been obtained from an in- 
definitely large population and r [the sample 
correlation coefficient] calculated between 
two variable characters of the individuals com- 
posing the sample. We require the probability 
that R [the correlation coefficient] for the 
population from which the sample is drawn shall 
lie between any given limits. 
(Gosset, 1908b, 35) 
To/... 
(14) The modern approach used not z but t = z (n - 1)2; 
making this substitution in the above equation 
immediately yields the t distribution with n -1 
degrees of freedom. 
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To solve this problem two things had to be known, said 
Gosset: the distribution of r for a given value of R, and 
the prior distribution of R. The latter 'can hardly ever 
be known', he said, 'so that some arbitrary assumption must 
in general be made' (1908b, 35). His paper focused on the 
first issue. The distribution of r had been discussed by 
the biometricians, but 
.., their method involves approximations which 
are not legitimate when the sample is small. 
(1908b, 36) 
Gosset approached the problem empirically, taking 
a known population with R = 0, and examining the distribution 
of r in artificially generated samples of sizes two, four 
and eight. He found that the distribution 
n -4 
yo ( 1 - r2) 
where y 
0 
is a constant, described adequately his empirical 
sampling distributions and, for large n, gave the results 
obtained by the biometricians. He concluded that it 
... probably represents the theoretical dis- 
tribution of r when samples of n are drawn from 
a normally- distributed population with no cor- 
relation. 
(1908b, 41) 
Gosset was, however, unable to suggest an extension of this 
result for populations with non -zero correlations. 
These two papers represented far more than simply 
new results extending the scope of existing biometric theory. 
They can be seen as indicative of a different theoretical 
approach /... 
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approach. Unlike, for example, Pearson and Filon (1898), 
Gosset systematically distinguished between what would now 
be called sample statistics and population parameters, and 
used different notations for each (r and R, s and o-). He 
could not accept Pearson's view that the substitution of a 
sample estimate for a population parameter was unproblematic. 
Further, Gosset's focus on small-sample problems forced him 
to seek the exact distributions of sample statistics, rather 
than to rely on the asymptotic normality of sampling dis- 
tributions. But if Gosset's work was in this sense a 
radical innovation, in a second sense it remained within 
the traditional approach to inference. Basically, Gosset's 
approach was Bayesian. This is explicit in Gosset (1908b), 
but can be seen also in the way in which Gosset refers 
(1908a, 30) to 'the chance that the mean of the population 
of which these experiments are a sample is positive'. 
The important impetus given to the development of 
the theory of inference by Gosset can, as the above account 
has hopefully shown, be accounted for by Gosset's practical 
concerns. This was certainly Gosset's own view. He wrote 
to R.A. Fisher in 1915: 
I don't know if it would interest you to hear 
how these things came to be of interest to me 
but it happened that I was mixed up with a lot 
of large scale experiments partly agricultural 
but chiefly in an Experimental Brewery. The 
agricultural (and indeed almost any) Experiments 
naturally required a solution of the mean /S.D. 
problem and the Experimental Brewery which concerns 
such things as the connection between analysis of 
malt and hops, and the behaviour of the beer, and 
which takes a day to each unit of the experiment, 
thus limiting the numbers, demanded an answer to 
such questions as 'If with a small number of cases 
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I get a value r, what is the probability that 
there is really a positive correlation of 
greater than (say) .25 ?' 
(Quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1968, 407) 
It would of course be mistaken to see Gosset's practical 
concerns generating his results ab nihilo: he drew fully 
on the established corpus of biometric theory, Both 
Gosset (1908a) and (1908b) rely heavily on, for example, 
Pearson's system of frequency curves (Pearson, 1895). In 
the case of Gosset, we have an instance of how a new focus 
for cognitive interests in prediction and control - the 
sphere of agricultural and industrial production - could 
transform an existing corpus of knowledge. 
As E.S. Pearson has shown, the practitioners of 
the existing corpus of knowledge were, while not hostile, 
unimpressed. Thus, Karl Pearson, writing to Gosset on 
17 September 1912 on the issue of whether to estimate the 
standard deviation by dividing the sum of squared deviations 
by n or by n - 1, remarked that the issue was of little 
practical importance 
... because only naughty brewers take n so 
small that the difference is not of the order 
of the probable error! 
(Quoted by E.S. Pearson, 1939, 368) 
Lacking Gosset's practical concerns, Karl Pearson could see 
the problem of small samples as,at best, only a marginal 
one. The integration into statistical theory of Gosset's 
pioneering insights was to be achieved not by Pearson, but 
by R.A. Fisher. 
8.4/,.. 
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8.4 R.A. Fisher as 'Metastatistician' 
When Fisher became interested in statistical theory 
in the years immediately preceding 1914, he faced a very 
different situation from that faced by Pearson 20 years 
earlier. In the early 1890's there was no coherent 
tradition of statistical theory in Britain. Statistical 
inference as a field of study hardly existed. Although 
the method of inverse probability had been challenged on 
philosophical grounds, no practical alternative existed. 
The use of the normal distribution, especially by the error 
theorists, dominated statistical practice. Although a 
little work had been done on non -normal distributions, the 
normal distribution continued to hold theoretical sway. 
By around 1911, however, a network of statisticians had 
come into existence, with personal links established even 
between those (such as Pearson and Gosset) whose practical 
concerns were different. Sheppard had shown that non - 
Bayesian inference was a practical possibility. Pearson 
had extensively discussed frequency curves other than the 
normal, and several non -normal distributions (notably chi 
square, but also Gosset's 'z' and the as yet not fully 
understood sampling distribution of the correlation co- 
efficient) had received theoretical attention. A much 
richer intellectual field thus lay before Fisher, and the 
network of personal contacts between statisticians was 
such that (unlike in the case of Arthur Black in the 1880's) 
intellectual isolation was not a major problem. 
NO/000 
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No immediate practical concern appears to have 
generated Fisher's work on statistical inference. It is 
not that Fisher was, by nature, a 'pure theorist'. As 
discussed above, his concern for eugenics was vitally 
important to his work on evolution and genetics. It is 
rather that the social and intellectual development of 
British statistics had, by 1914, opened up the opportunity 
for the successful pursuit of 'metastatistics',(15) 
Fisher's 'metastatistics' was a 'second -level' activity: 
solving problems thrown up by the work of others, criticis- 
ing others' procedures, attempting to integrate existing 
techniques into a systematic theory. If a single charac- 
terisation of Fisher's'metasgatistics' of this period was 
required, it would be this: the devèlopment of a non - 
Bayesian theory of inference and the consequent reformulation 
of the 'mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics', 
to quote the title of the crucial paper (1922a) which formed 
the culmination of Fisher's early work on inference. 
The origins of Fisher's anti -Bayesian outlook 
are, at present, unknown; until the Fisher papers are 
opened /... 
(15) In a sense Edgeworth had, much earlier, been a 
'metastatistician', but the intellectual resources 
for metastatistics in the 1880's and 1890's were 
relatively sparse. The real advances were made 
by men such as Galton and Pearson, whose practical 
concerns led them to extend statistical theory in 
new directions, and thus to add to it, rather than 
reflect on it. 
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opened any statement on this must be (16) P Y premature. There 
can, however, be little doubt that by around 1911 Bayesianism 
in Britain was on the defensive. As shown in section 8.2, 
even Pearson, who continued to be an advocate of Bayesianism, 
clearly felt uneasy about the basis of Bayesian techniques. 
In an intellectual climate where empiricism and positivism 
were commonplace, Bayesianism, with its apparently weak 
empirical base, came under suspicion. Fisher's key role 
was to turn this suspicion into a viable alternative to 
Bayesianism. 
(17) 
In this section I shall trace in outline the 
development of Fisher's work on inference from his first 
paper in the'theory of statistics (1912c) to his crucial 
(1922a). Aside from showing how Fisher attempted to con- 
struct his non -Bayesian theory of inference, this section 
will examine the role of the intellectual resources provided 
by /... 
(16) John Venn was President of Gonville and Caius College 
when Fisher was an undergraduate there. Despite Venn's 
age (he was 75 in 1909), personal contact between him 
and Fisher cannot be ruled out, and Fisher would almost 
certainly have read Venn's Logic of Chance. It may 
have been through Venn, therefore, that Fisher first 
came into contact with explicitly anti -Bayesian ideas. 
But the mere fact of contact would not explain Fisher's 
adoption of these ideas. 
(17) Of course, a Bayesian (e.g. Jeffreys, 1974) would argue 
that Fisher's approach was not a real alternative to 
Bayesianism, but simply one in which particular 
assumptions were hidden from view. Given the incom- 
mensurability of the Bayesian and frequentist frame- 
works, this is an impossible issue to adjudicate. The 
historically important point is, however, that Fisher 
felt he was developing a radically non -Bayesian theory 
of inference. For an interesting evaluation of Fisher 
by a leading modern Bayesian, see Savage (1976). 
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by the previous generation of 3ritish statisticians in 
Fisher's 'metastatistics'. The section will end with a 
brief examination of the dispute between Fisher and 
Karl Pearson. 
Fisher (1912c) took up a problem prominent in the 
early statistical work of Karl Pearson: the fitting of 
frequency curves to observed data. Pearson (1895) had 
provided a practical solution to the problem, the 'method 
of moments', in which the moments of the observed data 
would be calculated, and used to choose which of Pearson's 
family of frequency curves best fitted the data and what 
values the parameters of the chosen curve should be given. 
Fisher, however, felt that Pearson's method lacked any clear 
theoretical justification, and sought instead an 'absolute 
criterion'. At first sight, Fisher's method looked like 
the old 'method of inverse probability'. Suppose we are 
trying to fit a curve of the form f(x,$,,...,8r,) to 'a set 
of data (x.1, ..., xn), where Al ,..., 4, are parameters 
whose best values we are seeking. Fisher suggested that 
the best values of A, ..., Q were those which maximised P, 
where 
log e = 10, -P (cL) ©,, Or). 
On the 'method of inverse probability' P is simply the 
posterior probability of G,...'0r (on the assumption of a 
uniform joint prior distribution of these parameters) . 
Indeed, Fisher wrote 'the probability of any particular 
set of A's is proportional to P' (1912c, 157). On the last 
page /... 
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page of his paper, however, there was to be found a 
striking passage which showed clearly his divergence from 
the 'method of inverse probability': 
We have now obtained an absolute criterion 
for finding the relative probabilities of 
different sets of values for the elements 
of a probability system of known form. It 
would now seem natural to obtain an expression 
for the probability that the true values of the 
elements should lie within any given range. Un- 
fortunately we cannot do so. The quantity P 
must be considered as the relative probability 
of the set of values Q, Az ... ,A ; but it would 
be illegitimate to multiply this quantity by the 
variations dQ, dAL , ... ,dAr and integrate through 
a region, and to compare the integral over this 
region with the integral over all possible values of 
the A's. P is a relative probability only, suitable 
to compare point with point, but incapable of being 
interpreted as a probability distribution over a 
region, or of giving any estimate of absolute 
probability. 
This may be easily seen, since the same frequency 
curve might equally be specified by any r independent 
functions of the A's, say fé fá'17 ..., ,0'r, and the 
relative values of P would be unchanged by such a 
transformation; but the probability that the true 
values lie within a region must be the same whether 
it is expressed in terms of A or fá, so that we should 




)25 Y a) .''Yr/ 
a condition whic is manifestly not satisfied by 
the general transformation. 
(1912c, 160) 
What Fisher was pointing out in the above passage was that, 
used in different ways, the standard method of inverse pro- 
bability (which he described in the first paragraph above) 
gave different results. LetJ1,be a section of the parameter 
space of the A's, andlLthe corresponding section of the 
parameter space of the ft's, and let 
(e ,t:r) 
5 - . I , s25i, S13f -1 
be the Jacobian of the transformation from the 0's to the 
,51's /... 
0's. 
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Then, by a standard formula of the integral calculus, 
P a e 
- a o; = 5 P 0, ci 
and thus the probability that the value of the ,'s lies in 
JÌ' i s given by 
(J S,P-Td . , . C rr - 
However, applying the method of inverse probability directly 
to the 0's, that probability is given simply by 
P d drr. 
The two results are thus compatible only if J = 1, which, 
as Fisher pointed out, would not in general be the case. 
The paradox arises because the two different ap- 
plications of the method of inverse probability involve two 
contradictory assumptions: in the first case of a uniform 
joint prior distribution of the Q's, in the second of a 
uniform joint prior distribution of the fá' s. Phrased in 
this way, Fisher's result is hardly surprising, but we must 
remember that assumptions of uniform prior distributions were 
at the time often made as a matter of course, and non- 
uniform priors were seldom considered. Fisher was pointing 
out that the method of inverse probability as it was in fact 
used (with a more or less automatic assumption of uniform 
priors), could not provide consistent results. One way of 
resolving this problem would have been to advocate much more 
careful consideration of prior distributions (including the 
use of non -uniform priors) . Fisher, however, was to choose 
a different way: that of attempting to avoid completely the 
assumption of prior distributions. 
Gosset/... 
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Gosset was the only practising statistician who 
seems to have read Fisher's paper when it was published. 
He thought Fisher's approach 'unpractical and unserviceable' 
and wrote to Fisher making some particular criticisms. It 
appears to have been in pondering these that Fisher came up 
with one of his most important ideas: that of representing 
a sample of size n by a point in n- dimensional space. By 
the end of the Summer of 1912 he had written to Gosset 
giving, by use of his method, a proof of Gosset's z -dis- 
tribution.(18) Two years later he had solved by this 
method an even more difficult problem, that of the sampling 
distribution of the correlation coefficient. The bio- 
metricians had tried unsuccessfully to solve this problem 
(Soper, 1913): it was of greater import to them than that 
of the distribution of z, because the latter distribution 
rapidly approached the normal, while that of r appeared to 
do so only much more slowly and for very high values of the 
correlation coefficient the deviation from normality might 
be important even for the large sample sizes with which the 
biometricians worked. Fisher's work on these two problems 
was published in Biometrika (Fisher, 1915): this paper 
sufficed to establish him in the eyes of Pearson and Gosset 
as a mathematical statistician of note. 
From 1915 there is a break of five years in Fisher's 
publications /,,. 
ell fat MP 
(18) Gosset described his early contacts with Fisher in a 
letter to Karl Pearson, 12 September 1912, quoted by 
E.S. Pearson (1968, 406). 
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publications in statistical theory proper. It can be 
presumed, however, that he continued to be active in working 
in the field, for his next three papers on inference (1920; 
1921; and, especially, 1922a) were major contributions to 
statistical theory. The themes of the earlier papers 
(1912c; 1915) were taken up, generalised and formalised in 
a way that diverged in two crucial ways from 'traditional' 
and biometric approaches to inference. 
Firstly, these papers generalised the anti - 
Bayesianism of Fisher (1912c). In part in response to 
misunderstanding of his approach by the biometricians, Fisher 
clarified the divergence between it and the 'method of in- 
verse probability'. 
The attempt made by Bayes, upon which the deter- 
mination of 'inverse probabilities' rests, ad- 
mittedly depended upon an arbitrary assumption, 
so that the whole method has been widely dis- 
credited ... two radically distinct concepts 
have been confused under the name of 'probability' 
and only by sharply distinguishing these can we 
state accurately what information a sample does 
give us respecting the population from which it 
is drawn. 
(1921a, 4 -5) 
Ordinary direct probability - which Fisher defined in terms 
of relative frequency (1922a, 312) - was, for example, what 
one used in describing the probability distribution of a 
sample correlation coefficient r for a definite value of 
the correlation,ç , of the population from which it was 
drawn. When, however, one discussed the unknown value of 
e on the basis of knowledge of a particular 
sample with a 
correlation of r, it was impossible to find a probability 
distribution /... 
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distribution of(: 
Such a problem is indeterminate without knowing 
the statistical mechanism under which different 
values ofp come into existence; it cannot be 
solved from the data supplied by a sample, or 
any number of samples, of the population. 
(1921a, 24) 
The best one could do was to find what Fisher had in 1912 
called the 'relative probability' of different values of r , 
and now called their 'likelihood': 
What we can find from a sample is the likelihood 
of any particular value of p , if we define the 
.likelihood as a quantity proportional to the 
probability that, from a population having that 
particular value of p , a sample having the 
observed value r, should be obtained. 
(1921a, 24) 
The concepts of probability and likelihood were, Fisher said, 
radically different in their nature. 
We may discuss the probability of occurrence 
of quantities which can be observed or deduced 
from observations, in relation to any hypotheses 
which may be suggested to explain these obser- 
vations. We can know nothing of the probability 
of hypotheses or hypothetical quantities. On the 
other hand we may ascertain the likelihood of 
hypotheses and hypothetical quantities by calculation 
from observations: while to speak of the likelihood 
(as here defined) of an observable quantity has no 
meaning. 
(1921a, 25) 
Later Fisher was to qualify (with his concept of 'fiducial 
probability') the radicalism of his denial of the meaning- 
fulness of probability statements about hypotheses. None- 
theless, this paper is of vital importance, constituting as 
it did the first clear public rejection by a practising 
British statistician of Bayesian methods. 
The second divergence from tradition was the 
emphasis /... 
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emphasis placed by Fisher on the construction of exact dis- 
tributions. In the work of Gosset this emphasis had, as 
we have seen, arisen from practical concerns. In Fisher's 
approach it was given a new theoretical centrality. In 
his opinion, the job of the statistician could be resolved 
into three parts. The statistician should treat any set 
of data as a sample from a - possibly hypothetical - popu- 
lation. The first problem faced by the statistician was 
that of deciding what mathematical form the distribution of 
the population should be assumed to take. This should 
initially be done on a pragmatic and empirical basis, and 
the assumptions made tested later. The second problem was 
that of the estimation, from the sample data, of the para- 
meters of this population distribution (for example, of its 
mean and standard deviation if it were a normal distribution). 
The third part of the statistician's job Fisher summed up 
as 'problems of distribution', that is problems of the 
discovery of the sampling distributions of the 'statistics' 
used to estimate the population parameters. This was of 
crucial importance, because only through the knowledge of 
these sampling distributions could estimation be changed 
from a matter of common -sense to one of science: 
... the study of the random distribution of 
different suggested statistics, derived from 
samples of a given size, must guide us in the 
choice of which statistic it is most profitable 
to calculate. 
(Fisher, 1922a, 314) 
Fisher suggested three 'criteria of estimation' (1922a, 316). 
The first was 'consistency': 
That /... 
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That when applied to the whole population the 
derived statistic should be equal to the parameter. 
The second was 'efficiency': 
That in large samples, when the distribution of 
the statistics tend to normality, that statistic 
is to be chosen which has the least probable error. 
The third was that of 'sufficiency': 
That the statistic chosen should summarise the 
whole of the relevant information supplied by 
the sample. 
This latter criterion had emerged in Fisher's discussion 
(Fisher, 1920) of different means of estimating the standard 
deviation of a normal population. Fisher had shown that 
the formula, 
J- 
- It X- 
-2. 
n 
was more 'efficient' (in the above sense) than its competitor, 
Bessel's formula, 
/-r ß(1X- I) 
W 
This result had been known to at least some error theorists. 
What was new was that Fisher showed that for a given value 
of g-2. , the distribution of oTwas independent of the value 
of the population standard deviation o-, and thus 'the actual 
value of o¡ can give us no further information as to the 
value of o- '(Fisher, 1920, 768). 
Fisher (1922a) was chiefly important in its 
systematic presentation of Fisher's new formulation of the 
tasks of statistical theory. But Fisher by no means re- 
stricted himself to the presentation of definitions. In a 
section entitled 'Formal Solution of Problems of Estimation' 
he returned to the method of Fisher (1912c), now described 
as /... 
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as the 'method of maximum likelihood'. He carefully dis- 
tinguished likelihood from inverse probability, and solved 
a problem which had not been raised in his previous work: 
that of providing a general expression for the 'standard 
errort(19) of statistics obtained by the method of maximum 
likelihood. Suppose the population distribution of a 
variable x depends on a single parameter A: call this dis- 
tribution f(x,A). Let 9 be the maximum likelihood estimator 
of A. Then 7-6 , the standard error of A, is given, Fisher 
(1922a, 327 -9) showed, by the formula 
tt 1 frnecLn v n c, r I"- F(X,e) u2 oT 
C-A7- a Ó 81 
This result was reached by a process analytically very similar 
to that of Pearson and Filon (1898), but interpreted in terms 
of relative frequency, not inverse probability.(20) Fisher 
went on to argue (incorrectly, as he was later to acknowledge) 
that maximum likelihood estimators generally satisfy the 
criterion of sufficiency.(21) The paper ended with an ex- 
tensive discussion of various practical applications of the 
new approach: for example, Fisher showed that Pearson's 
'method /... 
(19) In this period 'standard error' (standard deviation of 
the sampling distribution) was gradually supplanting 
the older 'probable error'. The first use of the 
former term was apparently by Yule (1897a, 483; see 
Walker, 1929, 188). In part the change reflected the 
general prominence the biometricians gave to the standard 
deviation; in part, the increasing tendency to think 
of the 'error' as an interval of a sampling distribution, 
not of a posterior probability distribution. 
(20) Fisher held (1922a, 329 fn.) that the Pearson /Filon 
approach was correct so long as it was interpreted as 
giving the standard errors of maximum likelihood 
estimators. 
(21) In fact, Fisher proved the converse, that sufficient 
statistics, when they exist, are maximum likelihood 
estimators (1922a, 330 -1). 
- 413 - 
'Method of moments' was not in general 'efficient'. 
Fisher's reformulation of statistical theory did 
not depend logically on the work of the previous generation 
of British statisticians. However, it seems unlikely that 
without this previous generation Fisher would ever have been 
able to do this work, for without them there would have been 
precious little, in terms of ongoing activity, to reformulate. 
Moreover, although it is impossible without more evidence 
to be certain of the detailed genesis of Fisher's concepts, 
it seems likely that they arose in part in consideration of 
particular problems. Consideration of Pearson's method of 
moments seems to have played an important role in the 
evolution of the method of maximum likelihood. It is un- 
likely that Fisher would have focused in the way he did on 
exact distributions, had he not had two partially worked out 
exemplars (Gosset's studies of the distributions of 'z' and 
'r') before him. The concept of sufficiency arose from 
consideration of a long -established problem of error theory. 
Thus, in a certain sense, the preconditions for Fisher's 
'metastatistics', in terms of a relatively rich body of 
statistical practice and partially theorised techniques, 
had been laid down by the work of men like Pearson and 
Gosset: their work was a vital resource for his. 
'Metastatistics' of this kind had, inevitably, a 
critical edge. Inadequacies in the statistical practice 
and crudity in the statistical theory of the previous 
generation were highlighted by Fisher. 
had/... 
They, by and large, 
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had been men concerned with the development of adequate tools 
for tasks defined largely by their extra -statistical con- 
cerns: Fisher, by comparison, studied the tools in them- 
selves and their relations to each other. Part of the 
dispute that arose between Fisher and Pearson was simply 
misunderstanding, as when Pearson interpreted Fisher's 
application of his 'absolute criterion' to sample estimates 
of the correlation coefficient as a Bayesian argument in- 
volving a uniform prior distribution.(22) More serious in 
their effects were Fisher's direct criticisms of some of 
Pearson's methods, notably the method of moments (see above) 
and the choice of degrees of freedom for the chi square test 
when /... 
(22) Fisher (1915, 520 -1); Soper et al. (1917); Fisher 
(1921a). It is interesting that the connection 
between biometric statistics and eugenics may have led 
the biometricians to feel that the assumption of a 
uniform prior in the case of the coefficient of cor- 
relation was unjustified. They gave a practical 
example of how Bayesian inference might be used in the 
case of a researcher confronted with a parent -child 
correlation of 0.6 based on a sample of 25. They 
argued that, from their considerable experience of 
such correlations, a suitable prior distribution 
would be one which had a mean of 0.46 and a standard 
deviation of 0.02. The 'most likely value' of the 
correlation coefficient of the population from which 
the sample was drawn they found using Bayes's theorem 
to be 0.46225. 'We see that our new experience 
scarcely modifies the old and this is what we should 
naturally conjecture would be the case' (Soper et al., 
1917, 359). In view of the analysis in chapter seven, 
this conclusion is interesting as representing formal 
evidence of the biometricians' degree of belief in 
the clustering of the values of parent -child correlations. 
Gosset had also found that the use of non -uniform prior 
distributions for the correlation coefficient 'made a 
fool of the actual sample'. For him, however, this 
was an argument against their use, and in favour of 
Fisher's approach. See Gosset's letter to Fisher 
3 April 1922, in McMullen (ed.)(n.d.). 
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when applied to a two -way table. Pearson had argued 
(1900c, 164 -7) that in cases (of which the two -way table 
was one) where the parameters of the theoretical frequency 
distribution were estimated from the data, the chi square 
test could be used without alteration. Fisher (1922b) 
argued that the degrees of freedom of chi square were 
reduced by one for each parameter estimated from the data. 
For a two -by -two table, Fisher concluded, the correct number 
of degrees of freedom was not three, as Pearson had as sumed, 
but one. 
The dispute between Pearson and Fisher cannot be 
seen (as that between Pearson and Bateson, say, can be) as 
resulting from incompatible cognitive interests. One is 
tempted to say, in the case of the degrees of freedom for 
chi square, that Pearson was simply mistaken.(23) More 
generally, it can indeed be said that Pearson and Fisher 
differed in their approaches to inference (E.S. Pearson, 
1936 -8, part 1, 222 -3 and part 2, 211 -3). Yet it still 
makes sense to see both approaches as embodying the same 
cognitive interest in inference as a means of prediction 
and control. Both Pearson's and Fisher's approaches can 
be seen as attempts to generalise from the known to the 
unknown, ultimately with a view to maximising man's potential 
control over social and natural processes. The difference 
between /... 
wo .01 - 
(23) E.S. Pearson (1936 -8, part 1, 222) has pointed to the 
precise lacuna in Pearson's analysis. Yule had already 
seen it in 1916: see his letter to Greenwood of 
12 March 1916 (Yule- Greenwood Letters). 
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between the two approaches lies perhaps in this: that 
Pearson was concerned primarily with prediction and control 
in a limited area, and was content with what seemed to him 
to be a theory of inference adequate to this task, while 
Fisher in his 'metastatistics' turned to problems of pre- 
diction and control more generally. 
Two consequences flow from this. The first is 
that to some extent a model of cumulative growth, rather than 
of incommensurability in the full sense, must be seen as 
applying to development of statistics from the biometric to 
the 'risherian' paradigm.(24) Acceptance of Fisher's 
approach did not necessarily entail discarding the theoretical 
work of the biometricians; the practical inferences made 
with biometric statistics could (perhaps with minor modifi- 
cations) still be made using Fisher's approach, Thus, Fisher 
did not say that the method of moments was wrong: merely 
that it was not always the most efficient. He did not re- 
place the chi square test, but simply suggested how it could 
more accurately be used.(25) The second consequence was 
that the Pearson /Fisher controversy largely lacked the 
'group' structure characteristic of the debates discussed 
(24) Except in as far as the biometric approach was i3ayesian, 
in which case one can talk of incommensurability; but 
the biometricians were only half -heartedly Bayesian. 
(25) Compare the divergence between Pearson and Yule, where 
acceptance of the approach of one side entailed dis- 
carding the techniques of the other side virtually in 
their entirety, and often rejecting the concrete in- 
ferences of the other side. 
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in chapters six and seven. Pearson was, in effect, isolated. 
The older generation of statisticians accepted, albeit with 
reluctance, 
(26) 
that Fisher, in relation to Karl Pearson, 
was 'right'. Fisher's approach was more general and more 
powerful.(27) Individual explanation, rather than social- 
structural explanation, seems apt in this case. Thus, one 
might hypothesise that Pearson's personal psychological 
'investment' in the particularities of the techniques that 
he developed was too great to allow him easily to admit that 
Fisher was correct,(28) 
8.5 Statistics and Agricultural Research: 
Fisher at Rothamsted 
It would of course be grossly misleading to leave 
an impression of Fisher's work in statistical theory as 
being solely 'metastatistical' in its nature. In 1919 
Fisher was appointed to the newly created post of statistician 
at /... 
1444 O. 4f 
(26) Thus, Yule wrote to M.G. Kendall following the death 
of Karl Pearson: 
I feel as though the Karlovingian era has come to 
an end, and the Piscatorial era which succeeds it 
is one in which I can play no part. 
(Quoted by M.G. Kendall, 1952, 2) 
(27) For example, it incorporated not only Pearson's tech- 
niques but also Gosset's. Of course, Fisher's approach 
was soon to be challenged by others (the E.S. Pearson/ 
J. Neyman theory of inference, and a revitalised 
Bayesianism) of equal generality and power. 
(28) In a letter to Major Greenwood, 26 May 1936, Yule 
suggested that in the last years of his life Pearson 
was gradually working his way to a partial acceptance 
of Fisher's criticisms (Yule Papers, box two). 
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at the Rothamsted Experimental Station, and some of his 
most important work was done in the context of the practical 
demands of agricultural research. 
Fisher was not, in fact, the first British 
statistician to become involved in agricultural research. 
As pointed out above, the interests of Guinness Brewers in- 
cluded agriculture, as well as brewing. In the period prior 
to 1914, Gosset was already interested in agricultural 
research and in contact with workers in England, who, presum- 
ably as a result of the resurgence of agricultural research 
in this period, had already started to apply elementary 
statistical techniques to the results of agricultural ex- 
periments.( 
29) 
Interestingly enough, it was through these 
contacts that Gosset first came to know of the work of Fisher, 
and it may well have been partly through Gosset that Fisher 
was appointed to Rothamsted.(30) 
Fisher /... 
(29) Wood and Stratton (1910); Mercer and Hall (1911). The 
revival of agricultural research was presumably due to 
the recovery from the late- nineteenth century agricultural 
depression and the start of large -scale state funding, 
perhaps occasioned in part by the threat of war. In 
1902, its new director Daniel Hall found the long - 
established Rothamsted Experimental Station 'more like 
a museum than a laboratory' (E.J. Russell, 1966, 233), 
but under the energetic direction of Hall and his 
successor, E.J. Russell, it began to revive. The 
Liberal government set up a £2.5 million development 
fund for agriculture, and by the outbreak of war in 1914 
there were twelve institutes and two minor centres of 
agricultural research in Britain. 
(Russell, 1966, 272). 
(30) Gosset to Karl Pearson, 12 September 1912, in E.S. Pearson 
(1968, 406); Gosset to Fisher, 30 December 1918, in 
McMullen (ed.) (n.d.). 
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Fisher worked at Rothamsted from 1919 to 1933, and, 
even after he left to take up the Galton Chair of Eugenics 
vacated by Karl Pearson, he continued to live in Harpenden 
and to play an active role in the life of the research 
station (Yates and Mather, 1963, 94). His publications 
almost immediately reflected the new environment. Fisher 
(1921b) shows Fisher getting to grips with the problem that 
was the immediate cause of his appointment: the existence 
at Rothamsted of a huge bulk of only partially analysed ex- 
perimental records (Russell, 1966, 325). In this paper 
Fisher analysed the wheat yields in 13 plots that had been 
under continuous observation from 1852 to 1918, developing 
in the course of the analysis a novel method of curve fitting 
using orthogonal polynomials. The long series of papers 
published by Fisher at Rothamsted (reprinted in Bennett, ed., 
1971 -4, 1 and 2) gives ample evidence of the highly pro- 
ductive nature of Fisher's response to the practical demands 
of the research station. This response utilised Fisher's 
previous practical and theoretical statistical experience: 
an interesting example being the use of the technique of the 
analysis of variance, originally developed in eugenic 
research (Fisher, 1918a), as the basis for the design and 
analysis of agricultural experiments (Fisher and MacKenzie, 
1923). 
The most important published product of Fisher's 
early years at Rothamsted was his Statistical Methods for 
Research Workers (1925). 
follows /... 
Fisher introduced the book as 
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follows: 
For several years the author has been working in 
somewhat intimate co- operation with a number of 
biological research departments; the present 
book is in every sense the product of this cir- 
cumstance. Daily contact with the statistical 
problems which present themselves to the laboratory 
worker has stimulated the purely mathematical 
researches upon which are based the methods here 
presented. Little experience is sufficient to 
show that the traditional machinery of statistical 
processes is wholly unsuited to the needs of 
practical research. Not only does it take a 
cannon to shoot a sparrow, but it misses the 
sparrow; The elaborate mechanism built on the 
theory of infinitely large samples is not accurate 
enough for simple laboratory data. Only by 
systematically tackling small sample problems on 
their merits does it seem possible to apply 
accurate tests to practical data. 
(1925, vii) 
In part, the book was a presentation of Fisher's approach 
to' the foundations of statistical inference together with 
his extensive work on exact distributions. But it was also 
more than that. Fisher drew on his experience to show the 
usefulness of his methods of inference to practical problems. 
Thus, he showed the applicability of the method of maximum 
likelihood to the estimation of genetic linkage in self - 
fertilised animals and plants (1925, 24 -5). The Poisson 
distribution was illustrated with Gosset's work on counting 
yeast cells (1925, 58 -9), and problems of bacterial counting 
were discussed (1925, 61 -4). Chi square was discussed in 
the context of breeding experiments (1925, 77 -90). Gosset's 
practically_ motivated work on small -sample theory was 
systematically presented and integrated into Fisher's general 
approach (1925, 101 -13). Regression was illustrated by 
analysis of the effect of nitrogenous fertilisers on grain 
yield /.,. 
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yield and by the comparison of the relative growth rates 
of two cultures of an alga (1925, 119 -25). The discussion 
of the correlation coefficient showed how Fisher's work on 
its exact distribution could be used to test the significance 
of particular values (1925, 138 -75). The analysis of 
variance was presented and illustrated from both genetics 
and experimental field trials (1925, 188 -209). The topic 
of the analysis of field trials was further developed, and 
it was shown how the analysis of variance, combined with a 
restricted but randomised experimental design (the famous 
'Latin square') provided a powerful technique for agricultural 
experimentation (1925, 224 -32). 
While this approach does not sound exceptional to 
the modern reader, Statistical Methods for Research Workers 
was a remarkable innovation. It incorporated Fisher's con- 
viction that a theory of statistical inference could be 
developed that did not rely on inverse probability and was 
not restricted to large samples. But, almost more importantly, 
the book incorporated a new idea for the statistician's role 
(and therefore a new function for statistical theory). The 
statistician should get involved in the practical business 
of experimentation, was the message. This clearly pre- 
supposed the diffusion of the type of occupational role that 
Fisher (and Cosset) occupied. It was not even enough that 
the scientist should hand his results to the statistician 
for analysis: experiments (especially large -scale applied 
experiments that were difficult to 'control') had to be 
designed /... 
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designed by those with statistical expertise. 
The sales of Fisher's book over the following 25 
years indicate something of the diffusion of the model of 
the role of the statistician and of statistical theory con- 
tained in it. 7 editions appeared within 13 years, and by 
1950 nearly 20,000 copies in all had been sold (Yates, 1951, 
31). Within British statistics, Fisher's work exerted 
tremendous influence, even amongst those closest to Karl 
Pearson (E.S. Pearson, 1974). Rothamsted emerged as a 
centre of statistical research (and even, in an informal 
sense, teaching, as many came, especially from outside 
Britain, to learn in an 'apprentice' role) to rival University 
College. Thus, in 1926, two of Karl Pearson's new staff 
(Oscar Irwin and John Wishart) left University College 'to 
gain new experience with R.A. Fisher at Rothamsted' 
(E.S. Pearson, 1970b, 456). 
By the mid- 1920's there were, therefore, clear 
signs of the beginning of a new era in the development of 
statistical theory in Britain. The new role for the 
statistician in agricultural and industrial production, and 
in scientific research in general, may have been in some ways 
more modest than the position of political influence hoped 
for by Karl Pearson. The new role was, however, one of 
considerable importance. Its evolution, and whether the 
practical demands associated with it can be seen as trans- 
lating themselves into cognitive interests underlying 
statistical theory, are interesting problems. They fall, 
however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
901 Eugenics and the Development of Statistical Theory 
in Britain 
Statistical theory could potentially have developed 
in response to a wide variety of impulses. Statistical 
techniques were used in many fields in the period 1865 to 
1925. These ranged from administration (official statistics) 
to astronomy (error theory). From the 1870's to 1914, one 
particular impulse can, however, be seen as dominant in the 
institutional and intellectual development of statistical 
theory in Britain: eugenics. While other factors were of 
course present, and a unicausal theory of a phenomenon such 
as the development of statistical theory would be absurd, 
eugenics seems to have been the most important single factor. 
Only towards the end of the period covered here, with the 
work of W.S. Gosset and R.A. Fisher, do other impulses - 
the needs of industrial and agricultural research and the 
growth of communal concern for 'metastatistical' problems of 
consistency and generality - begin to rival eugenics, and 
only after 1925 do they clearly overtake it. 
Francis Galton, Karl Pearson and R.A. Fisher are 
probably the three most important individuals in the develop- 
ment of statistical theory in Britain in this period. Others 
such /..0 
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such as Francis Ysidro Edgeworth and George Udny Yule were 
by no means their intellectual inferiors, but left nothing 
like the same historical mark. Galton provided the basic 
tools of correlation and regression that were the chief 
intellectual stock -in -trade of British statistical theory 
up to 1914. By personal contact and the exemplars pro- 
vided by his work, he was also responsible for the recruit- 
ment of many of those who started work in the field before 
1900. It is clear that the major impulse behind Galton's 
statistical work was his enthusiasm for eugenics. Not all 
those that he recruited were similarly motivated; but it 
would seem from the material reviewed in chapter five that 
his contacts with those who were not attracted by his over- 
all programme tended to be shortlived and relatively un- 
fruitful. Only two mathematicians seem to have been fired 
with enthusiasm for the notion of quantifying the theory of 
heredity and evolution. One, Arthur Black, died before the 
promise shown by his early work could develop. The other, 
Karl Pearson, was the man who succeeded in taking over where 
Galton had left off. He took Galton's brilliant but mathe- 
matically crude insights, and refined and systematised them. 
With Galton's moral and financial assistance, he created in 
the Biometric and Eugenic Laboratories, and later in the 
Department of Applied Statistics at University College, the 
teaching and research core of the new discipline of 
statistical theory. In Biometrika, he (along with Galton 
and Pearson's zoologist colleague Y.F.R. Weldon) gave the 
new discipline its major organ of communication and dis- 
semination/... 
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semination of knowledge. 
In the case of Pearson, eugenics was the in- 
creasingly pivotal aspect of an interrelated network of 
intellectual concerns: meritocratic socialism, a social 
Darwinism orientated to the struggle between nations, a 
reformist feminism, a naturalistic ethical theory and a 
positivist epistemology. Evolution was crucial to Pearson. 
By quantifying the theory of evolution and making it scien- 
tific according to his positivist standards, he felt he 
could produce a science not just of biology, but of society. 
It was a science that could be (and was) used to refute anti - 
socialist arguments, to investigate the claims of feminism, 
and, above all, to show how nations could be made fit for 
the struggle for existence. Pearson's quantitative social 
Darwinism was in some ways a broader enterprise than Galton's 
eugenics, but eugenics was still at its core. Human evolution 
was studied so as to make intervention in the process, and 
ultimately conscious control over it, possible. Pearson's 
statistical theory developed as the intellectual foundation 
of this positivist evolutionism, as a series of 'Mathematical 
Contributions to the Theory of Evolution'. 
Pearson's intellectual work and his research in- 
stitute attracted many students, an important minority of 
whom went on to become important figures in twentieth century 
British statistical theory. At least some of those who 
studied at University College came because they found 
Pearson' s/ . . 
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Pearson's overall intellectual programme attractive. Even 
those who came simply to obtain a unique training in 
statistical theory came, after all, to a research institute 
and department which were made possible largely by money 
for eugenics. The close ties between eugenics and 
statistics can be seen in the fact that Pearson, as Head 
of the Department of Applied Statistics, bore the title 
Galton Professor of Eugenics. 
R.A. Fisher, the third of the three crucial 
figures of this period, never in fact studied at University 
College. Eugenics, however, seems to have played an 
important role in his beginning work on statistical theory. 
Fisher was a co- founder of the Cambridge University Eugenics 
Society, and eugenics was a major inspiration of his early 
work, especially in statistical biology. Further, even if 
Fisher eventually pushed statistical theory in a different 
direction from that followed by Pearson and Galton, he did 
not do so ab nihilo, but by building on earlier, in part 
eugenically -inspired, developments. 
Comparison with other countries is useful to set 
the British experience in context.(1) This intimate con- 
nection/... 
IND 
(1) The available material is very patchy. Koren (ed.) 
(1970) has an international perspective, but deals 
primarily with official statistics, not statistical 
theory: for the former, Westergaard (1932) remains the 
best source for the period up to 1900. There are a 
number of useful works referring to specific countries. 
For France, see T.N. Clark (1967; 1973, especially 122 -46). 
For Italy, see Gini (1926). For Germany, see Lexis (1893) 
and Oberschall (1965). For Russia, see Zarkovich (1956; 
1962), Maistrov (1974, 161 -224) and Adams (1974, 69 -98). 
For Scandinavia, see Särndal (1971). For the United 
States, see Owen (1976) and Ben -David (1971, 149 -50). 
- 427 - 
nection between statistics and eugenics appears to have been 
a phenomenon unique to Britain. In other countries, 
statistical theory remained tied to older concerns such as 
administrative and social statistics (especially in France 
and Italy) and error theory (especially in Scandinavia). 
The use of statistics in agricultural research did become 
of importance in the Soviet Union and the United States, 
but only towards the end of the period considered here. 
It would be very difficult to reach a measured 
judgment on the relative importance to statistical theory 
of the different national contributions of this period. 
To someone trained in the British tradition of statistical 
theory, the British contribution naturally seems paramount, 
because so much of what one is now taught as statistical 
theory (regression, correlation, the chi square test, t test, 
analysis of variance, method of maximum likelihood, and so 
on) can be traced in large part to the British work of this 
period. But this could well be a point of view informed by 
an overly ethnocentric notion of what is salient in modern 
statistical theory. The histories of the non -British 
schools of statistics (especially the Russian) are, in any 
case, as yet largely unwritten. 
I t does, however, seem likely that, whatever judg- 
ment may ultimately be arrived at as to the relative importance 
of different national contributions, the content of these 
contributions will be seen as significantly different. It 
may well be that these differences can be accounted for by 
the /... 
- 428 - 
the differing contexts in which statistical theory developed. 
Thus, in Italy a school of statistical theory emerged, 
approximately contemporaneous with the British school, but 
institutionalised in a very different context and producing 
a different kind of statistical theory. According to 
Corrado Gini (1884 -1965), the leading twentieth century 
Italian statistician, the Italian school was based on a 
conscious opposition to a single- minded focus on mathematical 
approaches to statistics (Gini, 1926, 707). Instead of 
building a powerful mathematical apparatus based on somewhat 
narrow assumptions (for example, the assumption of normally - 
distributed populations), the Italian school developed a wide 
variety of descriptive measures for use in a similarly wide 
range of applications (the Gini coefficient of income in- 
equality is the best known to British statisticians). This 
tendency can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that 
statistics developed as an academic discipline in Italy within 
law faculties, and most job opportunities lay in the state 
statistical service (Gini, 1926, 704 -6). Usefulness in 
diverse social, economic and administrative studies was 
therefore at a premium; mathematical sophistication at a 
discount. A movement calling itself eugenist did develop 
in Italy, in which Gini and some other statisticians played 
a major role, but, perhaps in accordance with the specific 
ideology of Italian fascism, its concerns were with broad 
demographic changes. Studies of heredity and social class 
were not prominent, and may even have been discouraged by a 
corporatist /... 
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corporatist ideology that played down class differences. 
The Italian eugenics movement does not, therefore, seem 
to have shifted the attention of Italian statisticians from 
their traditional area of study to the type of concerns which 
exercised British statisticians.(2) 
The dominant tradition in British statistics was 
connected only weakly with international developments. 
Egon Pearson (1967, 340 -1) comments on the lack of acquain- 
tance of British statisticians of this period with much of 
the continental literature. Only Edgeworth, whose work 
followed a quite different direction from that of Galton 
and Pearson, appears to have made much use of the statistical 
theorising of contemporaries such as Lexis. This is, of 
course, hardly surprising. Statistical theory was only 
beginning to emerge into its modern form of a developed in- 
ternational discipline. Men such as Galton, Pearson and 
Arthur Black saw themselves not as contributing to an exist- 
ing well- developed field, but as pioneering a new one: the 
statistical study of heredity and evolution. Historically, 
it is in this context that their work must be seen. 
Thus, it would appear that in studying British 
statistical theory in this period we are dealing with a dif- 
ferentiated/... 
(2) An unpublished paper on the Italian eugenics movement 
by George S. MacPherson of the Department of the History 
and Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania, 
is, to my knowledge, the only specific secondary source 
on Italian eugenics (MacPherson, 1973). For C. Gini, 
see his papers (1927; 1930), also T. Salvemini (1968). 
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ferentiated tradition, relatively separate from other 
national schools, and developing statistical theory in its 
own distinctive way. A comparative perspective suggests, 
therefore, that it is plausible that much of what was 
specific to Britain in the development of statistical theory 
can be accounted for by the specifically British connection 
between statistics and eugenics.(3) 
9.2 Knowledge and Interests 
This study confirms the claim by Ben -David (1971) 
that social factors external to science can affect the rate 
of scientific advance. If we take statistical theory as 
'internal' to science and the eugenics movement as 'external' 
to it, then it is clear that the latter 'external' factor 
did indeed affect the pace with which the former scientific 
field developed.(4) On the other hand, this study dis- 
confirms /... 
(3) To attempt to answer the further question as to why 
this connection was specifically British would be, in 
the existing state of comparative knowledge, a purely 
speculative exercise. Part of the answer may, however, 
lie in the fact that Britain, as well as being the home 
of eugenics, was also the home of Darwinism, with its 
implicitly statistical concept of the species. Then 
Galton and Pearson turned to eugenics they did so with 
Darwinian, and thus statistical, eyes. 
(4) It must, however, be noted that this study also shows 
the problematic nature of the 'internal' /'external' 
boundary. Most of the major figures discussed here 
would have argued that eugenics was part of science, 
or that eugenics was an application of scientific 
knowledge and not something 'external' to science. 
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confirms Ben -David's view that social factors are largely 
irrelevant to the conceptual growth of science. The 
political and ideological goals of the eugenics movement, 
which were, as has been argued in chapter three, themselves 
an expression of the social interests of the professional 
middle class, affected the content of innovations in 
statistical theory. From Galton's work in the 1870's on 
reversion to that of Pearson in the early 1900's on assoc- 
iation, the conceptual development of statistics was 
markedly affected by eugenics. Similarly an 'external' 
factor - the needs of production in the brewing industry - 
formed the impulse that led Gosset to his crucial theoretical 
break with the dominant tradition of statistical theory. 
Social goals 'external' to statistical theory - and indeed 
'external' to science as we now understand it - played a 
constitutive role in statistical innovation. 
The possibility exists, however, that social in- 
fluence on innovation might have been of only marginal 
importance. A priori, it is not implausible that needs 
connected with particular applications generated theoretical 
innovations but that these innovations were then judged 
according to perfectly general criteria in no way related 
to these needs. If assessment were context -independent, 
then social factors conditioning innovation would be at 
least partially cancelled out in their effects, for only 
those innovations of genuine worth would be judged valid. 
This /... 
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This radical separation of the generation of in- 
novation and its assessment does not seem justifiable in the 
light of the material discussed in the preceding chapters. 
In such cases as Galton's assessment of error theory, 
Bateson's or Fisher's assessment of evolutionary theory, 
Pearson's assessment of the work of Yule, or Gosset's 
assessment of biometric statistical theory, there seems to 
be no great difference between the factors conditioning 
assessment and those conditioning the individual's own in- 
novative work. Assessment, like innovation, was context - 
bound and structured by goals and interests of specific 
kinds. Nor was there a disinterested community of 
statisticians to whose context -free judgments we can turn. 
The dominant tradition in statistical theory, the biometric 
school, manifested an evaluative orientation which was, as 
has been shown in chapters six and seven, closely bound to 
specific interests. 
It would of course be possible to conclude that 
such context -bound and interest -related assessments should 
be discounted as inadequate, unscientific and biased. This 
material would then be taken as an instance of 'external 
factors' producing bad science, and the episodes discussed 
here would be seen as temporary set -backs on the road to 
properly scientific statistical theory. Such an inter- 
pretation cannot be straightforwardly refuted, but it does 
have to face certain problems. It would have to be con- 
cluded that throughout a prolonged period of activity that 
no -one/... 
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no -one would deny was crucial to the development of statistical 
theory, judgment has been revealed to be typically less than 
'properly scientific'. Further, it would appear to be 
extraordinarily difficult to specify on what basis 'properly 
scientific' judgments could actually have been made. It 
is easy on the basis of present -day knowledge to classify 
judgments as 'right' or 'wrong': Galton was right about 
regression; Pearson was wrong about association; Fisher 
was right about evolution; Bateson was wrong about evolution; 
Gosset was right about small samples; and so on. But such 
classification cannot easily be related to the actual his- 
torical basis of judgments. Very limited specific interests 
sometimes produced 'right' judgments, as in the case of 
Gosset. The most sophisticated and methodologically aware 
thinker considered here, Karl Pearson, was perhaps most often 
'wrong'. The same interests led both to 'right' judgments 
(Galton on regression) and to 'wrong' judgments (Pearson on 
association). 
Thus, at best, the 'properly scientific judgment' 
becomes a most mysterious entity: rare in practice, his- 
torically unimportant in the construction of our present 
knowledge, and, apparently, no more likely to lead to correct 
conclusions than narrowly interested judgments. Few of the 
scientists discussed here would have admitted that their 
judgments were less than 'properly scientific': it is 
paradoxical that Cosset, who was perhaps the only one who 
would happily have agreed that his judgments were structured 
by /... 
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by narrow interests, would now be seen as 'right'. I t be- 
comes increasingly difficult, in the light of considerations 
such as these, to believe that the notion of an abstract 
'properly scientific judgment' can be of historical use. 
To dismiss the context -bound and interest -laden judgments 
of these scientists as ipso facto inadequate seems facile 
and gratuitous. Surely it is better to seek an alternative, 
less dismissive, approach. 
Fundamentally, this approach must consist of see- 
ing context -bound and interest -laden judgments as neither 
necessarily wrong nor necessarily inadequate, but simply as 
judgments. Let us admit that no actual scientific judgment 
can be envisaged that compares a knowledge -claim with the 
whole universe or tests a technique in all its possible ap- 
plications, and conclude that all judgments must in some way 
be 'limited'. Our efforts can then be devoted to develop- 
ing a framework to help us understand scientific judgments 
in their contexts and in their relations to interests. 
In the introduction to this thesis it was sug- 
gested that a useful pointer to such a framework might lie 
in the work of Habermas (1972) . The notion of knowledge- 
constitutive cognitive interests has been, I would argue, 
helpful in understanding the concrete materials presented 
here. The notion does not artificially separate 'discovery' 
and 'justification', nor does it carry any pejorative con- 
notations. Can we then see Habermas's overall approach as 
valid /... 
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valid here? Habermas suggests that constitutive of judg- 
ment in the 'empirical -analytical sciences' is a frame of 
reference that defines both the object of these sciences 
('objectified processes') and their goal (an increase in 
the ability to predict and control natural processes, as 
exemplified by successful experimentation or useful tech- 
nology). A cognitive interest in prediction and control 
is thus constitutive of those disciplines which fall under 
the rubric of the natural sciences. 
There is much to suggest the plausibility of 
analysing the statistical theory studied here as embodying 
an interest in prediction and control of objectified pro- 
cesses. Objectification is arguably intrinsic to the basic 
statistical procedures of measuring and classification (see, 
for example, Cicourel, 1964, 7 -38). Statistical inference 
was (and is) an attempt to predict from a known sample the 
characteristics of an unknown population. A regression 
analysis yields a rule for predicting the expected value of 
one variable from that of another variable or set of variables. 
Successful statistical procedures enhance the potential for 
control; this is most obviously the case when statistical 
theory is used in production ('quality control', yield 
trials, and so on), but it holds also in other areas (for 
example, in the relationship between biometric statistical 
theory and eugenic intervention). 
Despite these useful insights to be gained from 
Habermas' s / .. . 
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Habermas's approach, it cannot be accepted without quali- 
fication. My first reservation concerns the separation 
of instrumental action and meaningful communication to be 
found, for example, in Habermas's distinction between the 
interests constitutive of the 'empirical- analytic' and 
'hermeneutic' sciences. This separation appears to be too 
rigid. To forget that scientific prediction and control 
takes place within a shared framework of meanings and 
assumptions, which is sustained by consensus and authority, 
would be to neglect completely the insights of the Kuhnian 
and post-Kuhnian history and philosophy of science (see 
Barnes, 1977, 17 -18). To see Pearson's eugenic statistics 
as simply a form of objectified prediction and control, and 
not also as a contribution to ideological communication about 
social values, would be to ignore its historical and bio- 
graphical context. It seems desirable to withdraw from 
the separation of instrumental action and communication to 
a concept that includes both: perhaps the Marxist notion 
of 'practice'. To relate Pearson's statistics to eugenics 
as a possible 'practice' means to relate it to an activity 
that had, if it was to be successful, to involve persuading 
(or bullying) people into compliance, as well as predicting 
and controlling the characteristics of human populations. 
The eugenists had to communicate as well as to control. 
My first reservation is thus that the interests 
informing science must be seen as wider than those of extend- 
ing the scope of instrumental action. My second reservation 
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is that these interests are differentiated to a greater 
degree than Habermas might suggest. If scientific know- 
ledge were indeed informed by a single, unitary interest in 
prediction and control, we would return, by a circuitous 
route, to a context -independent criterion for scientific 
judgments. Admittedly, this criterion would be interest - 
laden, but the interest concerned could justifiably be 
claimed to be a general human interest. There is, however, 
little in this study to lend plausibility to an 'abstracted 
instrumentalism' of this kind. Thus, in the controversies 
discussed here, both sides might quite reasonably have 
claimed to be extending the scope of prediction and control. 
Yet the ways in which they were doing so were radically dif- 
ferent, and it is extremely difficult to imagine a wholly 
neutral way of testing which side was making the greater 
contributions to the furtherance of prediction and control. 
Instead, it must apparently be concluded that the cognitive 
interests informing the work of the scientists considered 
here were never fully general interests in prediction and 
control, but always interests that were'situated', that were 
made concrete with reference to specific exemplars and to 
particular forms of prediction and control of particular 
processes. 
Having admitted this, we can then ask the question: 
what caused the actual observed particularisations of in- 
terests, or selection of criteria for judgment, manifested 
in the work of given participants? The answer to this 
question /... 
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question seems typically to involve matters of cultural 
context (such as availability of exemplars of successful 
prediction) or of social interest. The social interests 
involved appear to have been sometimes narrow, esoteric 
and 'internal' to science (such as those of professional 
biologists in preserving the value of their competences), 
and sometimes general, political and 'external' to science 
(such as those of the professional middle class as mediated 
through the eugenics movement). 
The view suggested here is thus one in which 
scientific knowledge is constitutively linked to practice 
through situated cognitive interests. It is to be hoped 
that the concrete materials presented here indicate at 
least the plausibility of this view in this particular in- 
stance. To discuss fully the general implications of this 
view is outside the scope of this work. One crucial point, 
however, must be raised: the relationship of this historical 
analysis to questions of the status of present -day knowledge 
in statistical theory. 
To say, following Habermas, that interests are 
constitutive of knowledge is to invite a possible misunder- 
standing. The German language differentiates between two 
aspects of the notion of 'knowledge': Erkenntis ('the act, 
process, form or faculty of knowing') and Wissen ('the 
passive content of what is known'). Habermas's analysis 
refers to the first, rather than the second (Habermas, 1972, 
319). So must any similar analysis, if it is 
to avoid the 
'genetic /... 
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'genetic fallacy' of concluding that the origins of know- 
ledge forever determine its status. Knowledge must be 
analysed as a resource for practice, and knowing must be 
seen as a process. Only in this way can the 'genetic 
fallacy' be avoided.(5) 
The analogy between knowledge as a resource for 
practice and tools in the everyday sense may make this point 
clearer. A tool's construction will reflect the tasks for 
which it was designed, and it will initially be evaluated 
according to its adequacy in the performance of these tasks. 
This does not mean, however, that its use is always limited 
to these tasks; it may well be found helpful for purposes 
quite different from those for which it was developed. 
Similarly, the construction and evaluation of knowledge can 
be structured by cognitive interests without these deter- 
mining for all time the fate of this knowledge. Of course, 
it is true that the initial uses of a tool may well give us 
a clue as to other possible uses, may suggest the amendments 
that will be required to achieve different purposes v°:ith it, 
and /... 
199 
(5) In other words, the notion of knowledge- constitutive 
cognitive interests makes sense only if knowledge is 
treated as a resource for practice and not, as in 
mathematical realism, as a collection of objects. In 
the light of evidence showing the context -bound and 
interest -laden nature of scientific evaluation, the 
realist must presumably argue for the irrelevance of 
the adequacy of the procedures of evaluation to the 
question of the truth of what is being evaluated. 
This, however, leaves the issue of how we know the 
content of the 'real' highly problematic. 
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and may indicate in which situations we may have to discard 
it. All of this, however, is contingent, not necessary. 
That Galton's and Pearson's eugenic concerns 
structured their statistical theory does not imply, there- 
fore, that the modern statistician who does not share these 
concerns need necessarily eschew the use of the concepts 
developed by them. It is not that the acceptance of a 
technique by modern statisticians guarantees its context - 
independent and interest -free validity. Rather, the con- 
struction and evaluation of statistical theory by modern 
statisticians needs to be studied in its own right before 
any conclusions can be drawn as to the cognitive interests 
constitutive of present -day statistics. 
'Our statistics is different', the modern statis- 
tician may well claim. To say this is false in one sense, 
true in another. It is false, in that to claim that 'we' 
have achieved eternally valid knowledge, or evaluations not 
structured by context or interest, would be unjustifiable. 
It is true, to the extent that 'our' statistical theory has 
emerged in a historical process from 'theirs'. This his- 
torical process has largely been one of the generalisation 
of the scope of statistical theory, as statisticians have 
come to grips with new situations. 'Their' concepts have 
been modified, stretched or discarded. So 'our' statistics 
is in this sense more general than 'theirs', and hence it 
is relatively easy for us to see the context bound nature 
of 'their' thought. It is not that 'our' statistics 
explains /... 
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explains 'theirs' as a special case; rather, 'theirs' 
helps to explain 'ours', in that 'their' knowledge was 
used in the construction of 'ours'. It is not, as a 
realist might have it, that Galton and Pearson discovered 
some of the current stock of truths; rather, it is that 
they, in solving their problems, produced resources that 
have been used by later statisticians to solve other 
problems. Like 'theirs', 'our' statistics is a social 
and historical product and can be studied by sociological 
and historical methods; but it is different from 'theirs' 
in that it has evolved from it. 
9.3 Patterns of Explanation 
The analysis of patterns of cognitive interest 
can be carried out largely with the published and manuscript 
sources that are used in any intellectual history. An 
account is produced of the development of an area of know- 
ledge that can be compared with other accounts, and thus 
checked. However, in moving from the analysis of cognitive 
interests to relating those cognitive interests to social 
interests, new problems are necessarily encountered. If 
these latter interests are not 'disciplinary', but wider 
social interests, we immediately enter the domain of general 
history and sociology. 
The sociology of knowledge hypotheses presented 
in this study can rest only in small part on the documentary 
evidence used here. Even the material on the social com- 
position/... 
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position and programme of the eugenics movement presented 
in chapter three is far from sufficient. To support these 
hypotheses properly would require a general theory of social 
structure and social interests applied to the situation of 
intellectuals in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. 
The necessary historical and sociological work has hardly 
begun. Thus, the hypotheses put forward here remain un- 
confirmed conjectures. The most I can hope to have done 
is to have indicated their plausibility and potential fruit- 
fulness for further research, and perhaps to have thrown 
some light on the methodological problems involved in apply- 
ing the sociology of knowledge to a scientific specialty 
such as statistical theory. 
One difficulty is that the direction of the socio- 
logical explanation used here is opposite to the direction 
of the hitorical investigation. The historical investigation 
began with the documentary evidence and worked outwards into 
the surrounding society. The sociological explanation, 
however, begins with the structure of that society and the 
interests of various classes in it, and goes on to hypo- 
thesise how these interests might have led to the trans- 
formation of existing scientific culture and to the pro- 
duction of new knowledge. These two processes of study 
are of course only formally separate: I have tried as far 
as I am able to follow Lucien Goldmann's injunction to in- 
tegrate them dialectically, to move from the text to the 
society and back to the text, and so on ( Goldmann, 1964). 
But /... 
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But there remains a persistent problem of presentation. 
The object of this study is a given body of knowledge pro- 
duced by a historically unique group of individuals. The 
evidence used is a set of particular writings and individual 
biographies. The explanation used is, however, a structural 
one, which does not give a deterministic account of in- 
dividual behaviour. It does not, for example, claim that 
if Karl Pearson's brother had become a statistician he 
would have developed statistical theory in the way Karl 
Pearson did. Thus, the sociological account put forward 
here, even if it were to be verified by further studies, in 
no sense yields a necessary and sufficient explanation of 
the specific object of this study. 
In essence, this is a simple point. As Marx put 
it, people 
... make their own history, but they do not make 
it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir- 
cumstances directly encountered, given and trans- 
mitted from the past. 
(1968, 97) 
For the freedom of people to make their own history, we can 
here read their freedom to produce their own knowledge. A 
strict individual, or even a statistical, determinism is there- 
fore not to be expected. On the other hand, individual 
creativity must operate in a given historical situation. 
The resources for innovative thought to be found in a given 
cultural tradition and social setting are limited. In a 
divided society, knowledge (especially knowledge of such 
topics /... 
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topics as human heredity and social evolution) is used in 
the construction of legitimations and ideologies. Thus, 
Karl Pearson, say, did not start from nothing: his thought 
developed within in a given cultural context, where ideas 
of heredity and evolution already had their social uses. 
Further, he had no choice as to the family into which he 
was born; he had a choice of how to lead his life, but not 
an unrestricted one, as he had at least in part to choose 
between given options. These factors are by no means suf- 
ficient to determine the course of his life and thought. 
They do, however, point to the fact that as an individual he 
had to act in a given historical situation. In the limited 
sphere of culture in which he operated, he was able to trans- 
form that situation: but even that he could do only with 
given materials. 
So an individual such as Karl Pearson can be 
regarded as a 'trace element'. Pearson's work constitutes 
an important and clear contribution to the construction of 
eugenic ideology as an appropriate expression of the social 
interests of the professional middle class. By examining 
it, we can perceive some aspects of the general character 
of the connections between ideas and interests at the time. 
Further, social interests do not affect ideas in a dis- 
embodied way, but through the concrete practice, thinking 
and writing of individuals and groups of individuals. The 
study of Pearson and his followers thus reveals to us one 




It is perhaps worth ending by restating, in the 
light of the above provisos, the overall structural argument 
put forward in the preceding chapters. It is suggested 
that during the latter part of the nineteenth century the 
social stratum composed of scientifically -based professional 
occupations gradually developed at least a limited degree 
of self- awareness. Previously, this stratum had tended to 
provide intellectual spokesmen for other, more fundamental 
social classes: the aristocracy, bourgeoisie and, to a much 
lesser extent, the working class.(6) This situation gradually 
changed, presumably as a result of the growing numerical and 
social weight of this stratum. The first signs of the change 
were in its interlinked élite, the 'intellectual aristocracy'; 
towards the end of the century indications of the change appear 
in the 'nouvelle couche sociale' of professional employees 
(Hobsbawm, 1968). Ideologies were elaborated which cele- 
brated the professional stratum itself. It was claimed that 
the knowledge, skills and 'mental ability' of the professional 
expert were of paramount importance in a modernising society, 
and that these deserved respect and rewards equal to or 
greater than those owing to title, wealth or manual work. 
Eugenics is taken here as instance of one of these ideologies 
(chapter three). Galton, Pearson and Fisher are taken as 
individuals making important contributions to this emerging 
professional /..o 
wrir 
(6) For documentation of this see Perkin (1972, 218 -70). 
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professional ideology. Galton is taken as a member of the 
'intellectual aristocracy'; Pearson and Fisher as members 
of the 'nouvelle couche sociale'. The forms in which they 
developed this ideology differed: for example, Pearson con- 
structed a left -wing variant while Galton and Fisher con- 
structed relatively right -wing variants. Nonetheless, in 
all three cases, the same basic social interests were mani- 
fested in the system of belief constructed. 
The work of those, such as Bateson and Yule, who 
stood aside from or opposed these developments can be seen, 
I would tentatively suggest, as expressing different social 
interests. The process of 'modernisation' inevitably 
caused a deterioration in the relative position of some old 
élite groups. Fragments of these may have reacted, not by 
seeking an accommodation with the new order, but by opposing 
it, or by seeking to insulate themselves from it. Pearson's 
positivist and collectivist version of eugenics might well 
be expected to be particularly distasteful to those in this 
position. 
I would thus conjecture that it is useful to see 
at least two distinct constellations of interests as mani- 
fested in the thought of the British intelligentsia of the 
Victorian and Edwardian period. One was grounded in the 
situation of those professional occupations which were grow- 
ing in importance with modernisation; it found expression 
in technocratic ideologies such as Fabianism and eugenics. 
The /... 
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The other was grounded in the situation of those disparate 
members of the old élite (such as downwardly -mobile off- 
spring) to whom modernisation posed a threat; this con- 
stellation of interests found expression in various forms 
of conservatism, but not in scientistic ideologies such as 
eugenics. This remains only a conjecture. Given such 
factors as the contingency of individual biographies and 
the crosscutting effects of some particular occupational 
affiliations, I would not expect clear and straightforward 
patterns to emerge from future studies. Nonetheless, I 
would advocate its use as a hypothesis that, though perhaps 
in a modified form, may eventually throw light on some 
aspects of the history of science, and of intellectual life 
in general, in this period. 
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Appendix A 
Archival Sources 
The following archival sources were consulted in 
the course of the preparation of this thesis, and I should 
like to express my thanks to the relevant individuals and 
institutions for permission to see theme I was unable to 
find or obtain access to two sets of papers. The first 
of these consists of the technical reports, etc., prepared 
by W.S. Gosset while employed by the Guinness Brewery in 
Dublin. These were used by E.S. Pearson in writing his 
biography of Gosset (E.S. Pearson, 1939), and thus this 
omission is perhaps not too serious.(1) Access to the 
papers of R.A. Fisher, in the care of the Department of 
Genetics, University of Adelaide, was refused. Much of 
what is written in this thesis concerning Fisher must there- 
fore be liable to correction or addition once the Fisher 
Papers are opened. In addition, I was unable to obtain 
access to the papers of Karl Pearson until after the first 
draft of this thesis was virtually complete, and thus I 
have not been able to make as full use of them as I would 
have liked. 
Bateson /... 
(1) I should like to thank Mr A.V. Vincent, Head of 
Management Services, Arthur Guinness Son & Co. 
(Dublin) Ltd., who attempted to locate these for me. 
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Bateson Papers. 
Dr Alan Cock kindly allowed me to see parts of his copy of 
a microfilm of the papers of William Bateson prepared by 
William Coleman. Sections 10a-c, 13, 14b, 15 and 18 con- 
tain material relevant to Bateson's controversy with the 
biometricians. (In addition, Professor C.D. Darlington 
showed me some further correspondence of Bateson's not on 
the microfilm, as did the Librarian of St. John's College, 
Cambridge.) 
Black's Notebooks. 
A set of 23 manuscript notebooks by Arthur Black. These 
were found for me by Messrs David and Richard Garnett, 
Mr David Garnett has kindly allowed them to be placed in 
the Library of University College, London. 
Cambride Universit Euenics Societ Papers. 
These were found in the library of the Eugenics Society, 
Eccleston Square, London SW1, under reference C.1.393. 
They consist of a set of manuscripts, typescripts and press - 
cuttings referring to the activities of the Cambridge Uni- 
versity Eugenics Society, and contain previously unknown 
papers by R.A. Fisher (1911; 1912a; 1912b). 
Darwin, Leonard Papers. 
Dr Roy MacLeod kindly allowed me to examine a set of the 
papers of Major Leonard Darwin being catalogued at the 
University of Sussex and now in Cambridge University Library. 
Unfortunately, they provided no information on the chief 
point of interest, the relations between Major Darwin and 
R.A. Fisher /... 
- 450 - 
R.A. Fisher. The few items of correspondence of Major 
Darwin's in the care of the Royal College of Surgeons at 
Down House include no letters to or from Fisher. 
Davenport Papers. 
These are in the care of the American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia. They include letters from Francis Galton, 
Karl Pearson, R.A. Fisher. Although they are of consider- 
able general interest, the Davenport papers do not in general 
throw much light on the development of statistical theory. 
Galton Papers. 
These are in the Library of University College, London. 
Along with the Pearson Papers (and possibly the Fisher Papers 
when they are opened), they form the major archival source 
on the history of statistical in Britain. A hand - 
list compiled by M. Merrington and J. Golden was issued in 
1976. 
Pearl Papers. 
These are in the care of the American Philosophical Society, 
Philadelphia. From the point of view of British statistics, 
the most interesting part of these papers is the extensive 
correspondence from Major Greenwood and George Udny Yule, 
which contains a lot of informal information on the 
British statistical community. 
Pearson Papers, 
These are now in the Library of University College, London. 
Although a handlist compiled by M. Merrington was issued in 
1974/... 
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1974, they were not opened to scholars in general until 
1977. Material of particular interest includes Pearson's 
first written reflections on Galton's work (Pearson, 1889) 
and his correspondence with colleagues such as Yule. 
Royal Statistical Society Minutes. 
The minutes of the Council and Executive Committee of the 
Society for the period of the thesis were examined. In 
the light of their formal nature (and of the relatively small 
role of the Society in the development of statistical theory 
in this period), these proved to be of little interest. The 
records of the Society for the period after 1930 (such as 
material on the 'Study Group', on the Industrial and Agri- 
cultural Research Section and on the activities of the 
Society in the Second World War) are of greater interest, 
but fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
Yule- Greenwood Letters. 
These consist of a set of letters from George Udny Yule to 
Major Greenwood, arranged in chronological order and dating 
from the period 1910 to 1949, in the possession of Mr George 
B. Greenwood, 2, Burhill Road, Hersham, Walton -on- Thames, 
Surrey. This series of letters, which appears reasonably 
complete, is probably the best single manuscript source for 
the study of Yule. 
Yule's Notes. 
These are five manuscript notebooks by George Udny Yule, and 
are his notes of Karl Pearson's lectures on statistical 
theory /... 
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theory in the academic years 1894 -5 and 1895 -6. They were 
given by Yule to the Department of Statistics, University 
College, London. These proved particularly useful in 
elucidating some otherwise opaque published work (in par- 
ticular, Pearson and Filon, 1898). They are now in the 
Pearson Papers (84). 
Yule Papers. 
These are the papers of George Udny Yule in the care of the 
Royal Statistical Society. Of particular interest are 
letters between Yule and Major Greenwood prior to 1914, in- 
cluding letters from Greenwood to Yule not duplicated in the 
Yule- Greenwood Letters, and material gathered by Yule in 
writing his obituary of Karl Pearson. 
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Appendix B 
The Social Composition of the Eugenics 
Education Society 
Farra l l' s data refer mainly to two groups: the members of 
the Council from 1908 -20, and a random sample of 60 members 
and associate members of the Society from 1912 -13. With 
his kind permission, I reproduce his data: 
Occupations of the Members of the EES Council 
Occupation Total Well- documented 
number 
Medical 26a 10 
Academic 18 16 
Politicians 4 3 
Clergy 3 3 
Social Work 3 3 
Scientists 2 2b 
Writers 2 2c 
Military Officers 2 1 
Lawyers 1 1 
Housewives 2 2 
Not Known 48d 0 
Totals 111 43 
a. Includes five who had the title 'Dr' but about whom no 
further information was available. 
b. Includes Col. H.E. Hills, FRS, who was a military officer 
specializing in military engineering. 
c. Includes Havelock Ellis whose writings were largely 
scientific. 
d. Includes eight people who had university degrees 
and 
ten with the title, 'Sir' or 'Lady'. 
The 'well- documented number' refers to those for 
whom definite 
biographical information was available. 
Source: Farrall (1970, 221) 
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Occupations of the Members of the Random Sample 
Number Occupation Number Occupation 
Academic 6 ',ri f ea 5 
Medical 3 Lawyer 1 
Social Work 2 Director of Art Museum 1 
Writer 2 Local Government 1 
Clergy 1 Part -time author 2 
Military Officer 1 No Information 35 
Total 60 
a. All were wives of prominent people. 
b. These two members are known only because of the one or 
two books they each wrote 
Source: Farrall (1970, 227) 
The group of 41 Council members for 1914 is a subset of 
Farrall's group of 111 Council members for 1908 -20, and can 
be._seen as a check on the 'not known' or not 'well- documented' 
cases in Farrall's list. We see that there is in fact no 
reason to doubt his conclusions. Individuals already identified 
by Farrall are asterisked. 
*President: Major Leonard Darwin, Son of Charles 
*Hon. Secretary: 
Hon. Treasurer: 
Mr Crofton Black: 
Darwin. Retired army engineer. 
( Who was Who, 1929-40.) 
Mrs Sybil Gotto, Hon. Secretary 
1907-20. Widow of Naval Officer. 
Effectively worked full -time for 
eugenics. (Eugenics Review, 47 
L1955 -6J, 149.) 
Paul von Fleischl. Treasurer of 
E.E.S., 1907 -22. Occupation un- 
known. 
Barrister and official of Land 
Sir Edward Brabrook: 
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Union. (E.E.S., Sixth Annual Report, 
25, and Eugenics Review, 12 [1920-20, 
91.) 
Barrister, Chief Registrar of Friendly 
Societies, 1891 -1904. Director of 
Society of Antiquaries and former 
President of the Anthropological 
Institute. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Mrs Theodore Chambers: Wife of Theodore Chambers, civil 
servant and businessman. (Who was 
Who, 1951 -60.) 
Hon. Sir John Cockburn: Former Minister of Education, South 
Australia. Doctor. Represented 
Australia at international conferences 
on health, eugenics, etc. (Who was Who, 
1914.) 
Mr R. Newton Crane: 
Mr A.E. Crawley: 
Sir H. Cunningham: 
Dr Langdon Down: 
International lawyer. (Who's Who, 
1914.) 
Author. Wrote on anthropology, sport, 
etc. (Who's Wh o , 1914.) 
Former lawyer and judge in India. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
Physician to National Association 
for Welfare of Feeble -Minded. 
(Medical Directory, 1914.) 
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*Mr Havelock Ellis: Scientist and author. (Who's Who, 
1914.) 
Prof. J. Findlay: Professor of Education, University 
of Manchester. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Mr E.G. Wheler Galton: Nephew of Francis Galton, Farmer 
at Claverdon. Interested in scientific 
aspects of agriculture. (K. Pearson, 
1914 -30.) 
*Dr M. Greenwood: Medical statistician. See chapter 
f ive. 
Dr W. Hadley 
Mrs W.H. Henderson: 
*Major E.H. Hills, 
F.R.S.: 
Very Rev.W.R. Inge: 
Miss Kirby: 
Lecturer in Medicine, London Hospital. 
Physician, Chest Hospital, Victoria 
Park. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Wife of Admiral Henderson, who since 
retirement had served on Metropolitan 
Asylums Board. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Director of Durham University, 
Observatory, President of Royal Astro 
nomical Society. Former military 
engineer. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Dean of St. Paul's. Former Professor 
of Divinity at Cambridge. (Who's 
Who, 1914.) 
Secretary of National Association 
for Welfare of Feeble-Minded. 
(Eugenics Review, 1 [1909-10] , 85.) 
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Dr Ernest Lane: Senior surgeon, St. Mary's Hospital. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
*Prof.E.W. Macbride: Professor of Zoology, Imperial College. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
Lady Owen MacKenzie: Widow of Sir George Sutherland 
MacKenzie (1844 -1910), merchant and 
geographer. (D.N.B.) 
*Mr Robert Mond: Industrial Chemist, Director of 
Brunner, Mond & Co. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
*Dr F.W. Mott, FRS: Neuropathologist. Physician to 
Charing Cross Hospital (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Mr G.P. Mudge: Surgeon, university teacher, and 
author of biology textbooks. 
(University of London Calendar and 
British Museum Catalogue.) 
*Mrs G. Pooley: 
*Mr W. Rae, M.P.: 
*Dr., Archdall Reid: 
Mr John Russell: 
Wife of opthalmic surgeon, G.H. Pooley. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
Liberal M.P. for Scarborough. (Who's 
Who, 1914.) 
Physician and author of books on 
heredity, alcoholism, etc. (Medical 
Directory, 1914.) 
Headmaster of King Alfred's School, 
Hampstead. (Alumni Cantabrigienses, 
Part II.) 
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*Mr F.C.S. Schiller: Philosopher, Oxford University. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
*Prof. A. Schuster, Secretary of Royal Society. For- 
F.R.S.: merly Professor of Physics, University 
of Manchester. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
*Mr Edgar Schuster: Former Galton research fellow in 
eugenics. In 1914 at Oxford University. 
(Paton and Phillips, 1973.) 
*Dr C.G. Seligmann: Professor of Ethnology, University 
of London. Formerly Hunterian Pro- 
fessor at Royal College of Surgeons. 
(Who's Who, 1914.) 
*Prof. C. Spearman: Grote Professor of Mind and Logic, 
University of London. (Who's Who, 
1914.) 
*Prof. J.A. Thomson: 
Dr. A.F. Tredgold: 
Mrs Alec Tweedie: 
*Mr W.C.D. Whetham, 
F.R.S.: 
Dr Douglas White: 
Dr Florence Willey: 
Professor of Natural History, University 
of Aberdeen. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Physician specialising in mental 
diseases. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
Writer and columnist. (Who's Who, 
1914.) 
Senior tutor, Trinity College, 
Cambridge. Physicist. (Who's Who,1914.) 
Physician. (Medical Directory, 1914.) 
Lecturer in midwifery, London School of 
Medicine for Women. (Who's Who, 1914.) 
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Appendix C 
Galton and the Mathematicians: Watson, MacAlister, 
Hamilton Dickson, Venn, Burbury and Sheppard 
Rev. H.W. Watson, 1827 -1903. 
Watson studied mathematics at Trinity College, 
Cambridge, and in 1850 was Second Wrangler.(1) After a 
brief period as a mathematics teacher, he entered the church, 
where he continued to pursue his interests in mathematics, 
which were chiefly in the area of mathematical physics (Watson, 
1876; Watson and Burbury, 1879; Watson and Burbury, 1885 -9) . 
Galton contacted Watson to help him solve a problem of pro- 
bability theory that had arisen in his eugenics, that of the 
probability of the extinction of family names. Watsonts 
partial solution of it (Watson and Galton, 1874) is now 
regarded as the beginning of the theory of branching pro- 
cesses. D.G. Kendall (1966) discusses it, and describes 
the subsequent history of the theory. At the time, the 
'Galton- Watson process' was taken no further. Watson returned 
to his own concerns, and did no further work in statistics, 
apart from one paper (Watson, 1891) in which he discussed 
a 
problem, again submitted to him by Galton, to do 
with the 
combination of probable errors (for example, in deducing 
intra- fraternity variability from population 
variability 
and /... 
(1) Biographical details are taken from 
Who was Who 
1897 -1915 and Bryan (1903). 
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and the variability of fraternity means). 
Galton's collaboration with Watson fell short of 
what Galton wanted. Writing to Sheppard, Galton commented: 
'Watson is over busy and I think too fastidious and timid' 
(quoted by K. Pearson, 1914 -30, 3B, 486 -7). It is interest- 
ing to speculate how much of Watson's failure to do more 
work on Galton's problems could be attributed to the cautious 
attitude to hereditarianism shown by his comment on Hereditary 
Genius (Watson to Galton, 7 January 1870; Galton Papers, 
120/4): 
... you do not allow perhaps sufficient importance 
to the influence of association and surrounding 
circumstance on the determination of a man's career 
up to his time of University degree. 
Sir Donald MacAlister, 1854 -1934. 
MacAlister was another Cambridge- trained mathe- 
matician, and Senior Wrangler in 1877.(2) Like Watson, 
MacAlister spent a short period as a mathematics teacher 
before turning to one of the more established professions, 
in his case medicine. From 1881 he practised and taught 
medicine in Cambridge. In 1907 he was appointed Principal 
of the University of Glasgow. 
Galton approached MacAlister, whom he first met 





For biographical details see the Dictionary 
of 
National Biography and E.F.B. MacAlister 
(1935). 
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error' for those cases (such as those covered by Fechner's 
Law) in which the geometric mean was the best measure of 
central tendency: Galton wanted something corresponding to 
the normal curve in its relation to the mean. In response, 
MacAlister produced what has become known as the log- normal 
distribution (Galton, 1879; MacAlister, 1879). That was, 
however, his only contribution to statistical theory. 
Galton retained a high opinion of him: 
He is very favourably disposed towards Eugenics 
and is, as you know, a vigorous mathematician. 
(Galton to K. Pearson 18 August 1910. Quoted in 
Pearson, 1914 -30, 3A,,430.) 
MacAlister did help Weldon with his first biometric paper, 
'explaining ... many points connected with the law of error' 
(Weldon, 1890, 445) . In general, though, MacAli ster' s 
medical career seems to have prevented him from doing as 
much in the field as he might have wanted. Writing to 
Galton (2 March 1889; Galton Papers, 279/3) he commented: 
Heredity in your hands is becoming fast an exact 
study. I only wish that my pressing avocations 
had allowed me to help you more. 
J.D. Hamilton Dickson, 1849 -1931. 
Hamilton Dickson was educated at Glasgow and 
Cambridge Universities, and was placed Fifth Wrangler in the 
1874 Mathematical Tripos.(3) In 1877 he was appointed a 
tutor of Peterhouse College, and he spent most of the 
remainder /... 
(3) Biographical information is taken from 
M. M cC . F [a i rg r i ev e] (1931). 
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remainder of his life in mathematical teaching and research 
at Cambridge. 
Hamilton Dickson's famous collaboration with 
Galton is described in chapter two. As was shown there, 
Galton had in fact virtually solved the problem before 
handing it over to Hamilton Dickson. In his autobiography 
Galton mentioned one mathematical collaborator with whom he 
had particular difficulties of communication because of the 
divergence (discussed in section 2.2) between the cognitive 
interests underlying his approach and that of error theory. 
There is some reason to believe that that mathematician was 
in fact Hamilton Dickson. A letter to Galton, dated 
Christmas day 1890 (Galton Papers, 236/4), shows Hamilton 
Dickson struggling unsuccessfully with the problem of the 
combination of probable errors solved for Galton by Watson 
(1891). Hamilton Dickson appears to have been attempting 
to apply a simple error theory model to a situation in whibh, 
as Watson showed, it was inapplicable.(4) Despite the 
importance of its first product, Galton's collaboration with 
Hamilton Dickson thus did not bear further fruit. 
John /... 
OM ma 
(4) Galton (1908, 305) thanks Watson for his help in Galton's 
'struggles' with applications of the Gaussian Law, and 
goes on in the same paragraph to talk of his dif- 
ficulties with mathematicians failing to comprehend 
his approach: 
I could give a striking case of this, but 
abstain 
because it would seem depreciatory of a 
man whose 
mathematical powers and ability were far 
in excess 
of my own. 
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John Venn, 1834 -1923. 
Venn, a member of one of the leading families of 
the 'intellectual aristocracy', was educated at Cambridge, 
being placed Sixth Wrangler in the 1857 Mathematical 
Tripos.(5) He then entered the Church, but returned to 
Cambridge in 1862 to become lecturer in moral science at 
Gonville and Caius College. He remained in Cambridge for 
the rest of his life, becoming President of his College in 
1903. 
Venn was, of course, primarily a philosopher, not 
a mathematician, and his best known work was on symbolic 
logic and the foundations of the theory of probability. In 
the 1880's he developed an interest in anthropometry. Little 
is known of the origins of this interest, but the immediate 
stimulus to Venn appears to have been a lecture Galton gave 
in Cambridge in 1884.6) Following Galton's lecture a small 
committee was established to obtain measurements of Cambridge 
undergraduates similar to those already obtained by Galton 
in his Anthropometric Laboratory in London. Venn analysed 
the data gathered on the undergraduates, comparing the physical 
characteristics of three groups classified according to the 
class /... 
(5) Biographical information for Venn is taken from the 
Dictionary of National Biography. For the Venn family 
see Annan (1955, 276). 
(6) See K. Pearson (1914 -30, 2, 268) and J. Venn (1888, 
140 -1). 
The latter source gives the date of the lecture 
as June 
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class of degree they obtained. Venn adapted well -known 
error theory techniques in a way that was then somewhat 
unusual to test the significance, as we would now put it, 
of the differences found. 
Venn did do some further statistical work: Venn 
(1891) discusses non -Gaussian error curves. He did not, 
however, go beyond these beginnings to make any major con- 
tributions to statistical theory. 
S. H. Burbury, 1831-1911. 
Burbury was trained at Cambridge in both classics 
and mathematics.(7) For 20 years after leaving Cambridge 
he did no scientific work, pursuing instead a legal career. 
H.W. Watson, who was a close friend of his, reawakened his 
scientific interests, and together they worked on electro- 
magnetic theory and the kinetic theory of gases (i'atson and 
Burbury, 1879; Watson and Burbury, 1885 -9) . 
At the end of the 1880's, Burbury became interested 
in problems of the foundations of the kinetic theory. He 
came to doubt whether the molecules of a gas could be treated 
as independent from each other in their relative motion. 
Burbury felt that Galton's theory of correlation provided a 
possible route to a generalisation of the assumptions under- 
lying the derivation of the theorems of the kinetic theory. (18 
The /... 
(7) Biographical details are taken from Bryan (1911; 1913). 
(8) This seems to have been his primary motive for work on 
correlation, although his letters to Galton (Galton 
Papers, 212) and membership of the Royal Society's 
Evolution Committee (K. Pearson, 1906, 289) indicate a 
certain interest in biometry. 
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The Maxwell -Boltzmann distribution, derived on the assumption 
of the mutual independence of velocities, was analogous to 
the distribution of independent normal variables. 3urbury 
(1894; 1895) modified this distribution by the introduction 
of product terms, making it analogous to the distribution 
of correlated normal variables. In doing this he derived, 
apparently independently of Edgeworth and Pearson, a multi- 
variate generalisation of Galton's bivariate normal surface. 
Burbury's approach was sophisticated. In modern 
terminology we would describe him as having used characteristic 
functions to obtain a multivariate version of the central 
limit theorem. The statistician of today would undoubtedly 
prefer his approach to the problem to that of either 
Edgeworth or Pearson. Burbury's work was, however, relatively 
sterile. He attempted to apply his refined model to the 
problem of the liquefaction of a gas (Burbury, 1899), but 
was unable to obtain specific quantitative predictions. He 
did no further work of relevance to statistical theory. 
W.F. Sheppard, 1863 -1936. 
William Fleetwood Sheppard was born in Australia, 
but sent to England to complete his education.(9) He won 
a scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge and in 1884 was 
placed Senior Wrangler, ahead of William Bragg. He became 
a Fellow of Trinity, and published a paper dealing with 
Bessel /.., 
(9) For Sheppard's life and work see N.F. Sheppard 
(1938), 
Aitken (1938) and Fisher (1938) . 
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Bessel functions (Sheppard, 1889). He soon left Cambridge, 
however, and took up a legal career; in 1896 he joined the 
Education Department (later Department of Education and 
Science), where he worked until his retirement in 1921. 
In his Cambridge days he became interested in 
Galton's work, and visited Galton's Anthropometric Laboratory 
several times (W.F. Sheppard, 1938, 3). In the early 1890's 
he entered into correspondence with Galton (Galton Papers, 
245/22 and 315). Galton strongly encouraged him to take 
up statistical work. Sheppard does not appear to have 
done so immediately, but in the summer of 1895 he began work 
on the paper that was to become Sheppard (1898b); by October 
1895 he had already reached the main results of that paper 
(Sheppard to Galton, 8 October 1895; Galton Papers, 315). 
Galton gave Sheppard considerable help and encouragement, 
paying for his paper to be typed and negotiating its acceptance 
by the Royal Society (see the letters between Sheppard and 
Galton in 1896; Galton Papers, 245/22, 315). By the 
Autumn of 1896 Sheppard seems to have developed the basic 
ideas of 'Sheppard' s corrections'. 
(10) 
Towards the end of 
the 1890's, the full range of Sheppard's mathematical concerns 
became clear, with the appearance of a series of papers ranging 
from /... 
(10) A summary of these appeared as Sheppard (1897b), 
and 
they were fully presented in Sheppard (1898c). The 
first reference to this work is in a letter to Galton 
of 26 September 1896 (Galton Papers, 315). 
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from pure mathematics (Sheppard, 1898a) to statistical 
theory (1899a; 1900) and numerical analysis (1899b; 1899c). 
It is not entirely clear why Sheppard took up 
statistical work. He had fairly wideranging interests in 
politics (N.F. Sheppard(1938, 3) quotes a description of 
him as 'a genuine Liberal .,. a social reformer of the 
Toynbee Hall type'), and in culture (Sheppard (1897a) in- 
dicates his passion for Wagner). It is possible that the 
eugenic aspects of Galton's work interested him: 
It happens that I have always been interested in 
'probabilities', particularly from the logical 
point of view, and that is the reason why your 
books have especially interested me as showing 
their bearing on one branch of the still unsolved 
mystery of human evolution. 
(Sheppard to Galton, 30 October 1892; Galton Papers, 
315) 
Sheppard's statistical work does not, however, reveal any 
close connections to eugenic applications. 
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Appendix D 
The Tetrachoric Expansion of the Bivariate 
Normal Distribution 
In this account I have stayed as close as possible 
to Pearson's original presentation, while removing some of 
the more detailed steps of the argument. The modern 
statistician would of course want to improve this account 
by systematically distinguishing between sample statistics 
and population parameters. The derivation of the tetra - 
choric expansion can also be made neater by the use of 
characteristic functions and Hermite polynomials. 
(1) 
Consider a bivariate normal frequency surface 
Z ex 
Q-1 -2- 
where N is the total number of observations,o; andolare 
the standard deviations of variables x and y (both of which 
are measured in terms of deviations from their respective 
means), and r is the correlation of x and y. Let this 
surface be divided into four parts by planes at right 
angles to the axes of x and y, at distances h' and k' from 
the origin: 
(1) See M.G. Kendall (1943, 1, 354 -6). Note 
that Kendall's 
'Tchebycheff- Hermite Polynomials' (1943, 
1, 145 -7) are 
somewhat differently defined from the Hermite 
poly- 
nomials commonly used in applied mathematics 
(e.g. 
Arfken, 1968, 477 -81). 
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(This figure corresponds to the horizontal plane of figure 2.) 
Let h = -/é and k = VA; z . Then 
evaluated in terms of the frequencies 
formed by the two planes. Let these 
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and h can be evaluated in terms of b + d by use of tables 
of the normal distribution. 
N Q° 
Similarly e + d = exP d y {-+ 
and k can be evaluated in terms of c + d. 
ii,,,, Now t7Ì 
= ,z d x c y 
k 
00 
f.c7 2r N r1 rTz ' 
N `ap 
¡ op 
J( (i-rj 2,r i 1 _ r i 
This equation relates r to d, N, h and k (the last two of 
1 yz 2rxyl i 2xP ' 2 `1-rZ) (z-2-.4. Z°.Z , c "ri. / dxGiy 
which we have already evaluated in terms of a, b, c, d), and 
can be solved for r. If the right -hand side is expanded 
in a series in r, after some manipulation the following result 
is obtained: 
b r3 -I) (kZ 1) 
N 1, ( r+ r i, k , Z - . r 1, (,1 -3) k (V -3) 
+ r 11+4- 6t, +3 6 
V +3) 
4.- 10í11+15)k (k- Iokz+.15 
r 6- 15114` +45f,- I5Ì ík6- 15 k4 
+ 4.5kZ- 1s) 
r. ( 16 -210 4- 51, -los) k(k6- 21k4 +1o5k -1O5) 
+ 
H 
! `/ exP , 
1 I - I 
Z !Q C1 h A l ` yTT where  e x¡ °- i J 
With/... 
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With jr) < 1, the series converges rapidly, and terms of 
order higher than r 
8 
can normally be neglected, leaving a 
polynomial equation for r that can be solved numerically. 
Thus, given observed frequencies a,'b, c, d it is always 
possible to fit the model of an underlying bivariate 
normal distribution to the observations, and to deduce a 
value for its correlation. 
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